Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, former Code 1933, §§ 74-501 through 74-525, subsequently codified as §§ 19-9-40 through19-9-64, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

"Home state" for all purposes which former Chapter 9 was designed to govern, did not mean the residence or domicile of the parent having legal custody. Rather, "home state", for purposes of former § 19-9-43, meant the place where the child lived or had recently lived and where the child would presumably still be living had the child not been surreptitiously removed therefrom. Harper v. Landers, 180 Ga. App. 154, 348 S.E.2d 698 (1986) (decided under former §§ 19-9-42 and19-9-43).

The facts of the instant case fit squarely within former § 19-9-43(a)(1) and (2), since it was undisputed that the children lived in Paulding County, Georgia, with their mother and their grandmother who, both during her daughter's times of disability and after her death, "acted as a parent" to the minor children, giving them emotional and financial support and it is also undisputed that the grandmother's petition was filed July 30, 1985, and that the father was personally served in Melbourne, Florida, on September 21, 1985, both dates being less than six months after May 24, 1985, when the children were removed from Georgia. Thus, at the initiation of the action, Georgia was the children's "home state," as defined in former paragraph (5) of § 19-9-42. Harper v. Landers, 180 Ga. App. 154, 348 S.E.2d 698 (1986) (decided under former §§ 19-9-42 and19-9-43).

First parent took the parties' child from Georgia to South Carolina and filed a custody action there. As the child had lived with the second parent in Georgia for at least six consecutive months immediately before the second parent commenced a child custody proceeding there, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-41, Georgia was the child's "home state" and the Georgia trial court thus had jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61(a)(1) to grant the second parent temporary custody. Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303, 680 S.E.2d 150 (2009).

Trial court erred in dismissing a husband's divorce complaint on the ground that jurisdiction was properly with the Italian court because the trial court had jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), specifically O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61(a) and (b), and no other court did since Georgia was the only state, including Italy, that could qualify as the "home state" of the parties' child pursuant to the UCCJEA, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-41(7), at the time either the Italian custody proceeding or the Georgia proceeding was commenced and at the time the trial court entered the court's initial child custody order; under the UCCJEA, the jurisdictional inquiry entered into by the Italian court was insufficient because the Italian court undertook no analysis of the home state of the child or of any other factors that could be considered a substitute for such but simply found that the prerequisites for jurisdiction over a divorce action were met. Bellew v. Larese, 288 Ga. 495, 706 S.E.2d 78 (2011).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying a wife's motion to stay the Georgia divorce proceeding commenced by the husband in lieu of the State of New York proceeding the wife filed because the record showed that the wife and children had lived in Georgia with the husband since 2000 and continued to live in Georgia until sometime after the couple filed their respective petitions for divorce; thus, Georgia was the home state of the children for the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq., and New York was not. Black v. Black, 292 Ga. 691, 740 S.E.2d 613 (2013).

When a mother moved to Florida with an out-of-wedlock child but permitted the child to stay with the child's father in Georgia for lengthy periods, and all the child's health care occurred in Georgia, the child's "home state" was Georgia for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61(a) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq. Slay v. Calhoun, 332 Ga. App. 335, 772 S.E.2d 425 (2015).

Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq., the mother's motion to vacate a temporary custody order was improperly denied because the trial court never had subject-matter jurisdiction to make a custody determination as Georgia was not the child's home state because the record did not establish that the mother's time in Texas was a temporary sojourn as the mother maintained employment in Texas, and the child had been born in and previously lived in Texas, had extended family in Texas, and attended church, had a regular doctor, and received public benefits in Texas; and, although the mother told the father that the mother intended to return to Georgia, the mother did so out of fear for the mother and the child's safety. Kogel v. Kogel, 337 Ga. App. 137, 786 S.E.2d 518 (2016).

In a child custody dispute in which a mother and child had lived in Georgia for 22 days before traveling to Turkey, and a Turkish court had awarded the mother custody, a Georgia court erred in asserting jurisdiction because Georgia was not the child's home state, and the Turkey action was commenced first and in compliance with UCCJEA requirements. Gorelik v. Gorelik, Ga. App. , 815 S.E.2d 330 (2018).

"Home state" means physical presence without regard to legal residence; thus, when the mother lived in Illinois and the child lived with her there continuously from at least May 1979, until December 1980, except for a two-week absence to go to Georgia in July 1980, where she married her present husband, Illinois was the child's "home state," and since the father commenced custody proceeding in May 1981, less than six months after the mother removed the child to Georgia in December 1980, Illinois trial court had jurisdiction to determine the custody of the child. Brenner v. Cavin, 163 Ga. App. 694, 295 S.E.2d 135 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 74-503 and 74-504).

"Home state" not a bar to finding personal jurisdiction.

- Father petitioning for modification of custody and visitation rights cannot contest personal jurisdiction in a counterclaim by mother to modify child support despite "home state" requirement. Yount v. Mulle, 266 Ga. 729, 470 S.E.2d 647 (1996) (decided under former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act).

"State" defined.

- For purposes of the former Georgia Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, specifically former O.C.G.A. § 19-9-42(10), the Commonwealth of the Bahamas constitutes a state. Edwards v. Edwards, 254 Ga. App. 849, 563 S.E.2d 888 (2002).

"Custody proceeding."

- Former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act applied to adoption proceedings even before the 1988 amendment of former paragraph (3) of § 19-9-42 which added such proceedings to the list of matters included within the term "custody proceeding." Gainey v. Olivo, 258 Ga. 640, 373 S.E.2d 4 (1988) (decided under former § 19-9-42).

Because the Georgia superior court had exclusive and continuing subject matter jurisdiction over the grandparents' modification of custody action, as there was no evidence to suggest that the initial 2001 custody determination was not made consistent with O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61, even without personal jurisdiction over the child's parent, the custody determination entered by the superior court was upheld on appeal; moreover, visitation was considered a custody issue under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-41(3). Daniels v. Barnes, 289 Ga. App. 897, 658 S.E.2d 472 (2008).

Res judicata did not bar custody petition.

- Since a previous visitation order related to the grandparent's right to visitation, not custody, and the legal issues to be decided varied, the trial court properly determined that res judicata did not bar the grandparents' petition for custody under the Uniform Child Jurisdiction and Custody Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 et seq.; the Act does not provide that the judgment is conclusive as to all issues which could have been put in issue. Scott v. Scott, 311 Ga. App. 726, 716 S.E.2d 809 (2011).

Cited in Upchurch v. Smith, 281 Ga. 28, 635 S.E.2d 710 (2006); Jones v. Van Horn, 283 Ga. App. 144, 640 S.E.2d 712 (2006); Zinkhan v. Bruce, 305 Ga. App. 510, 699 S.E.2d 833 (2010); Oglesby v. Deal, 311 Ga. App. 622, 716 S.E.2d 749 (2011); Bowman v. Bowman, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Mar. 6, 2018).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Habeas Corpus, §§ 95 et seq., 107. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 26 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, § 241 et seq. 43 C.J.S., Infants, § 10 et seq. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 94 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.L.A.) § 2.

ALR.

- What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 78 A.L.R.4th 1028.

Home state jurisdiction of court under § 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1.