CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 22, 2019 | 305 Ga. 23
...l. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, and we granted Father's petition for certiorari posing the following question: "Did the trial court properly dismiss the custody modification action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) ?" We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the action on this ground, and we therefore reverse.
1....
...Navy relocated Father to Norfolk, Virginia. The court issued a temporary order on Father's complaint for modification on July 8, 2016. However, on August 19, 2016, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the modification action for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) required dismissal of the action because the relocation of all parties from the state of Georgia divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court held a hearing on Mother's motion to dismiss. Following that hearing, the court, in dismissing the action, determined that it had "lost subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2)": "[Father] lives in Virginia, [Mother] lives in Florida with the child, and since neither the child nor the parents now reside in Georgia, this Court has lost its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody determination."2
Father appealed the order, and the Court of Appeals affirmed....
...her the parents nor the child remained in the state.
2. As explained by the Court of Appeals, in 2001, Georgia adopted the UCCJEA to replace its predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA").3 The provision at issue here is OCGA §
19-9-62, which is materially identical to UCCJEA § 202. OCGA §
19-9-62 provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Code Section
19-9-64, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with Code Section
19-9-61 or
19-9-63 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until ......
...t commencement of proceeding to conclude that family court retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction after parties moved away from state because modification proceeding was still pending). And the official comment to UCCJEA § 202, from which OCGA §
19-9-62 was drawn, provides with regard to the language of subparagraph (a) (2):
*261Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding....
...its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman,
294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1),
751 S.E.2d 337 (2013). We are mindful that in interpreting the meaning of OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2), "we do not look at the text in isolation....
...ional, statutory, and common law alike - that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question." (Citations omitted.) Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement System of Georgia,
297 Ga. 557, 558 (1),
775 S.E.2d 527 (2015).
In substance, OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) provides that a court which has made a child custody determination has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over that determination - that is, that court (and only that court) has jurisdiction to modify the child custody determinatio...
...314, 315 (1),
110 S.E.2d 370 (1959) ("Jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a suit for permanent alimony depends on existence of the marital relation at the time the action is instituted." (citing Durden v. Durden,
191 Ga. 404, 406 (2),
12 S.E.2d 305 (1940) (same) ) ). We find nothing in OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) that is inconsistent with this general background rule....
...ases that jurisdiction is determined as of the time an action is filed, along with decisions addressing the issue in other jurisdictions in accord with the official comment to § 202 of the UCCJEA, answer the question not expressly addressed by OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) - the point in the modification proceeding at which the circumstance described in the subsection must exist to divest the court of jurisdiction over that modification proceeding.
3....
...All the Justices concur, except Peterson, Warren and Bethel, JJ., who concur in Divisions 1, 2 (a), 3, and in the judgment, and concur specially in Division 2 (b).
Peterson, Justice, concurring specially.
I concur in the construction the majority affords OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2)....
...ssembly's stated interest in uniformity. Statutes mean today what they meant when they were enacted. That fundamental principle applies regardless of whatever interpretational directions the General Assembly purports to give. Either the text of OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) meant at the time of its 2001 enactment what the majority says it means, or it does not have that meaning today....
...But the majority points to no such pre-2001 decisions.
Ultimately, I concur because, as the majority explains in Division (2) (a), pre-2001 Georgia caselaw made clear that jurisdiction in domestic relations cases is determined based on residence at the time an action is filed.2 Nothing in OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) changed that background rule, so it still applies.
I am authorized to state that Justice Warren and Justice Bethel join in this concurrence.
The court found that Mother: failed to abide by the parenting plan and engaged in a patt...
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2006 | 280 Ga. 367, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 953
...The trial court authorized service on appellant pursuant to OCGA §
9-10-91, the Georgia Long Arm Statute. In response, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction challenging the constitutionality of OCGA §
19-9-62(a) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), OCGA §
19-9-40 et seq....
...s concerned but held as to the modification action that it had subject matter jurisdiction as the court that made the initial child custody determination; that personal jurisdiction over appellant was not necessary, OCGA §
19-9-61(c); and that OCGA §
19-9-62 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI. [2] This Court granted appellant's interlocutory application in order to address the trial court's ruling on the venue issue. 1. We affirm the trial court's ruling upholding OCGA §
19-9-62(a)....
...e the defendant resides." By its plain language, this provision has no application to out-of-state defendants for the obvious reason that they do not reside in any county in this State. Accordingly, we find no merit in appellant's argument that OCGA §
19-9-62(a) improperly varies our constitutional venue provisions or that the Legislature violated Art....
...See Ga. L.2001, p. 128, § 1 et seq. Unlike the Connecticut case on which she relies, the UCCJEA in Georgia requires only that the initial child custody determination be entered "consistent with" OCGA §
19-9-61 or §
19-9-63. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA §
19-9-62(a)....
...s and requests made before the UCCJEA was enacted. See Ruth v. Ruth, 32 Kan.App.2d 416, 83 P.3d 1248(I)(B)(1) (2004). 3. The trial court correctly concluded that it has subject matter jurisdiction over appellee's modification action pursuant to OCGA §
19-9-62 and that personal jurisdiction over appellant was not necessary in order for it to address the requested modification of its child custody determination....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 2006 | 281 Ga. 28, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 3004
...Upchurch contends it was error to transfer the child custody modification action to Cobb County because under OCGA §
19-9-61 of the UCCJEA the initial child custody determination in this case was made by a Fulton County court. However, the applicable provision of the UCCJEA is OCGA §
19-9-62(a), which recognizes that exclusive continuing jurisdiction lies in the court of this State "which has made a child custody determination consistent with [OCGA §
19-9-61]" until: (1) a court of this State determines that no pertinent party has a significant relationship with the State and substantial evidence concerning the child's welfare is no longer available in the State or (2) there is a judicial determination that no pertinent party presently resides in this State. OCGA §
19-9-62(a). The question thus is whether the Cobb County court's February 2004 order qualified as a child custody determination under OCGA §
19-9-62(a)....
...[1] It is undisputed that Smith and the children had resided in Cobb County for more than six months prior to Upchurch filing his 2002 modification action; that under OCGA §
19-9-23 Cobb County was the proper venue for that action; and that neither of the events enumerated in OCGA §
19-9-62(a), which would extinguish Cobb County's continuing jurisdiction, has occurred....
...See OCGA §
19-9-41(3) ("child custody determination" defined to include orders modifying legal or physical custody with respect to a child). Under the UCCJEA, therefore, Cobb County had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over its child custody determination, see OCGA §
19-9-62(a), and the proper venue for modification of that determination was Cobb County....
...Contrary to Upchurch's argument, Devito does not demand a different result. In Devito, the initial child custody determination was the only child custody determination made and venue was properly placed in the court with continuing jurisdiction under OCGA §
19-9-62(a)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2006 | 628 S.E.2d 108
...The trial court authorized service on appellant pursuant to OCGA §
9-10-91, the Georgia Long Arm Statute. In response, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction challenging the constitutionality of OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), OCGA §
19-9-40 et seq....
...concerned but held as to the modification action that it had subject matter jurisdiction as the court that made the initial child custody determination; that personal jurisdiction over appellant was not necessary, OCGA §
19-9-61 (c); and that OCGA §
19-9-62 does not violate Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI.2 This Court granted appellant’s interlocutory application in order to address the trial court’s ruling on the venue issue.
1. We affirm the trial court’s ruling upholding OCGA §
19-9-62 (a)....
...e defendant resides.” By its plain language, this provision has no application to out-of-state defendants for the obvious reason that they do not reside in any county in this State. Accordingly, we find no merit in appellant’s argument that OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) improperly varies our constitutional venue provisions or that the Legislature violated Art....
...See Ga. L. 2001, p. 128, § 1 et seq. Unlike the Connecticut case on which she relies, the UCCJEA in Georgia requires only that the initial child custody determination be entered “consistent with” OCGA§
19-9-61 or §
19-9-63. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA§
19-9-62 (a)....
...2004).
*369Decided March 27, 2006.
David & McPhail, Robert S. McPhail, for appellant.
Stacy C. Bondurant, for appellee.
3. The trial court correctly concluded that it has subject matter jurisdiction over appellee’s modification action pursuant to OCGA §
19-9-62 and that personal jurisdiction over appellant was not necessary in order for it to address the requested modification of its child custody determination....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 22, 2019 | 628 S.E.2d 108
...The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and we granted Father’s petition for certiorari
posing the following question: “Did the trial court properly dismiss the custody
modification action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2)?”
We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the action on this ground, and
we therefore reverse.
1....
...Navy relocated Father to Norfolk, Virginia. The court issued a
temporary order on Father’s complaint for modification on July 8, 2016.
However, on August 19, 2016, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the modification
action for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) required
1
The court found that Mother: failed to abide by the parenting plan and
engaged in a pattern of alienation; failed to provide Father with visitation; failed
to place Father’s name on school paperwork or...
...Georgia divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court held a hearing on Mother’s motion to dismiss. Following
that hearing, the court, in dismissing the action, determined that it had “lost
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2)”: “[Father] lives
in Virginia, [Mother] lives in Florida with the child, and since neither the child
nor the parents now reside in Georgia, this Court has lost its exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over the child custody de...
...3
2. As explained by the Court of Appeals, in 2001, Georgia adopted the
UCCJEA to replace its predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(“UCCJA”).3 The provision at issue here is OCGA §
19-9-62, which is
materially identical to UCCJEA § 202. OCGA §
19-9-62 provides in relevant
part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Code Section
19-9-64, a court
of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent
with Code Section
19-9-61 or
19-9-63 has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over the determination until ....
...ommencement of proceeding to
conclude that family court retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction after parties
moved away from state because modification proceeding was still pending). And
the official comment to UCCJEA § 202, from which OCGA §
19-9-62 was
drawn, provides with regard to the language of subparagraph (a) (2):
Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding....
...jurisdiction
ceases.” (Emphasis supplied.)
6
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman,
294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1)
(751 SE2d 337) (2013). We are mindful that in interpreting the meaning of OCGA
§
19-9-62 (a) (2), “we do not look at the text in isolation....
...tory, and
common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision
in question.” (Citations omitted.) Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement System of
Georgia,
297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) (775 SE2d 527) (2015).
In substance, OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) provides that a court which has
made a child custody determination has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over
that determination – that is, that court (and only that court) has jurisdiction to
modify the child custody determi...
... (“Jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a suit for permanent alimony depends on
existence of the marital relation at the time the action is instituted.” (citing Durden
v. Durden,
191 Ga. 404, 406 (2) (12 SE2d 305) (1940) (same))). We find nothing
in OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) that is inconsistent with this general background rule.
And we must presume that the General Assembly, in adopting the Uniform Act,
was aware of the background rule and, had it desired to arrive at a different
conclusion regarding the jurisdictional guideline therein, it could have so
provided....
...s that
jurisdiction is determined as of the time an action is filed, along with decisions
addressing the issue in other jurisdictions in accord with the official comment to
§ 202 of the UCCJEA, answer the question not expressly addressed by OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) – the point in the modification proceeding at which the
circumstance described in the subsection must exist to divest the court of
jurisdiction over that modification proceeding.
3....
...d concur
specially in Division 2 (b).
12
S18G0146. PLUMMER v. PLUMMER.
PETERSON, Justice, concurring specially.
I concur in the construction the majority affords OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2).
But I cannot join Division (2) (b) of the majority’s opinion, which relies on a
comment by the Uniform Law Commission....
...Assembly’s stated interest in uniformity. Statutes mean today what they meant
when they were enacted. That fundamental principle applies regardless of
whatever interpretational directions the General Assembly purports to give.
Either the text of OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) meant at the time of its 2001 enactment
what the majority says it means, or it does not have that meaning today....
...But the majority points
to no such pre-2001 decisions.
Ultimately, I concur because, as the majority explains in Division (2) (a),
pre-2001 Georgia caselaw made clear that jurisdiction in domestic relations
cases is determined based on residence at the time an action is filed.2 Nothing in
OCGA §
19-9-62 (a) (2) changed that background rule, so it still applies.
I am authorized to state that Justice Warren and Justice Bethel join in this
concurrence.
2
Division (2) (b) suggests such a background rule applies more broadly in American
law....
