Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, §§ 1551(14) and 1551(90), and former Ga. L. 1937, p. 864, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

"Local controversy" construed.

- Dispute as to whether an audit of a school board's financial affairs by the State Department of Audits complied with a local act requiring the audit to be performed by a private accounting firm was not a "local controversy" involving school law because the dispute involved neither the administration of the schools nor the rights of the individuals within the schools. Rather, it involved a purported legal duty placed upon the board by law. Glynn County Bd. of Educ. v. Lane, 261 Ga. 544, 407 S.E.2d 754 (1991).

Liability of state for segregation activities of local schools.

- State is not strictly liable for any alleged unlawful segregation activities by local schools. However, the state has continuing authority and an obligation to insure that local education agencies have completely eliminated all vestiges of the dual system and have not adopted practices that will cause racial separation. Georgia State Conference v. Georgia, 570 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Ga. 1983).

Applicability of Superior Court Rules.

- Rule 25 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules, regarding recusal, does not apply to school board proceedings under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160 because that rule addresses pre-hearing matters. Johnson v. Pulaski County Bd. of Educ., 231 Ga. App. 576, 499 S.E.2d 345 (1998).

Recusal required for due process.

- President of the school board, who recommended the principal's removal from that capacity, should have been recused from participation in the school board's hearing on the matter and the board's failure to recuse the president denied the principal due process. Johnson v. Pulaski County Bd. of Educ., 231 Ga. App. 576, 499 S.E.2d 345 (1998).

Consideration of affirmative defense required.

- Judgment upholding the decision of a local board of education (local board) expelling a student for fighting was reversed because the record fully supported that the student properly raised the issue of self-defense before the local board and that the board failed to apply the proper law and make the board's own findings of fact on the issue. Henry County Bd. of Educ. v. S. G., 301 Ga. 794, 804 S.E.2d 427 (2017).

Cited in Keever v. Board of Educ., 188 Ga. 299, 3 S.E.2d 886 (1939); Davis v. Haddock, 191 Ga. 639, 13 S.E.2d 657 (1941); Guy v. Nelson, 202 Ga. 728, 44 S.E.2d 775 (1947); Walker v. McKenzie, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 870 (1953); Irwin v. Crawford, 210 Ga. 222, 78 S.E.2d 609 (1953); Morman v. Pritchard, 108 Ga. App. 247, 132 S.E.2d 561 (1963); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964); Moore v. Crouse, 393 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1968); Grimes v. Clark, 226 Ga. 195, 173 S.E.2d 686 (1970); Ken Stanton Music, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 227 Ga. 393, 181 S.E.2d 67 (1971); Fuller v. Williams, 150 Ga. App. 730, 258 S.E.2d 538 (1979); Hilton Constr. Co. v. Rockdale County Bd. of Educ., 245 Ga. 533, 266 S.E.2d 157 (1980); Wells v. Banks, 153 Ga. App. 581, 266 S.E.2d 270 (1980); Hogan v. Taylor County Bd. of Educ., 157 Ga. App. 680, 278 S.E.2d 106 (1981); Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1981); Benton v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Educ., 168 Ga. App. 533, 309 S.E.2d 680 (1983).

Constitutionality of section.

- See Lott v. Board of Educ., 164 Ga. 863, 139 S.E. 722 (1927) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1551 (90)); Morman v. Pritchard, 108 Ga. App. 247, 132 S.E.2d 561 (1963);.

Fair Dismissal Act constitutional.

- Fair Dismissal Act of Georgia, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940 et seq., both on the Act's face and as applied, not only met, but exceeded, the minimum due process standard in a situation when a teacher who was to be terminated for cause opposed termination. Holley v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).

Creation of school courts and tribunals.

- Under the Constitution of 1877, the legislature was authorized to create school courts or tribunals and confer jurisdiction on the courts or tribunals to hear and determine school controversies. Boatright v. Yates, 211 Ga. 125, 84 S.E.2d 195 (1954).

Jurisdiction of local boards of education.

- County board of education is the tribunal for hearing and determining all matters of local controversy in reference to the construction or administration of school law, but an appeal from the decisions of the board may be had to the State Board of Education. Pass v. Pickens, 204 Ga. 629, 51 S.E.2d 405 (1949).

This section grants to local boards of education the power to act as tribunals for hearing and determining any matter of local controversy concerning the construction or administration of school law and grants to any party aggrieved by a local decision the right to appeal to the State Board of Education and to the superior court. Sumter County Bd. of Educ. v. Mosley, 147 Ga. App. 478, 249 S.E.2d 284 (1978).

Construction of "local controversy."

- "Local controversy," within the meaning of this section, refers only to disputes within one school system and not to those involving a contract between county boards of education. Wilson v. Strange, 235 Ga. 156, 219 S.E.2d 88 (1975).

Term "local controversy" in subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160 refers to matters of controversy pertaining to or existing within one local school board as discrete from other school boards. Bacon v. Brewer, 196 Ga. App. 130, 395 S.E.2d 383 (1990).

Suspension of teacher is a matter of "local controversy" in reference to the construction or administration of school law, within the meaning of this section, and, if not appealed, is binding on the parties. Pierce v. Beck, 61 Ga. 413 (1878) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1551 (90)).

Nonrenewal of single one-year contract.

- In most instances, the simple nonrenewal of a single, one-year contract, standing alone, as opposed to the nonrenewal of the contract of a "tenured" teacher or a breach of contract, will not constitute a "matter of local controversy in reference to the construction or administration of the school law." Dalton City Bd. of Educ. v. Smith, 256 Ga. 394, 349 S.E.2d 458 (1986).

Nonrenewal of assistant principal's contract.

- When the school board has not admitted that the board let an assistant principal go for unlawful reasons and the petitioners have not presented any evidence to substantiate the petitioners' claim that the assistant principal was not rehired as a result of an exercise of constitutionally protected activities, the petitioners have not shown any facts which would remove the decision to not renew the contract from the realm of policy into the realm of law. Dalton City Bd. of Educ. v. Smith, 256 Ga. 394, 349 S.E.2d 458 (1986).

Action for breach of contract against a local board of education, alleging that the plaintiff had been improperly dismissed from a coaching position, raised issues that were clearly matters of local controversy and clearly referred to the construction or administration of school law and, accordingly, no error was rendered by the trial court's dismissal on the ground that administrative remedies (i.e., hearing before the local board with appeal to the State Board of Education) were not exhausted. Arp v. Bremen Bd. of Educ., 171 Ga. App. 560, 320 S.E.2d 397 (1984).

Local boards have freedom to adopt or ignore recommendations of Professional Practices Commission. Rabon v. Bryan County Bd. of Educ., 173 Ga. App. 507, 326 S.E.2d 577, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 855, 106 S. Ct. 160, 88 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1985).

County board may fix area to be served by school and locate schoolhouse therein.

- County board of education is empowered by law to fix the area to be served by each public school and to locate the site of the schoolhouse therein as near the center of the area served as practicable, and such an action by the county board is final unless objections are filed. Boney v. County Bd. of Educ., 203 Ga. 152, 45 S.E.2d 442 (1947).

County board cannot determine contested election of school trustee.

- Under this section, a county board of education has no power or authority to hear and determine election contests growing out of the election of a school trustee (now appointed) within a local school district within a certain county in this state; the ordinary of the county (now judge of the probate court) wherein the contest may arise has jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest. Ramsey v. Mingledorff, 181 Ga. 803, 184 S.E. 322 (1936).

When teacher becomes "permanently elected," teacher can only be removed for cause.

- When a teacher, having been employed for more than five years as the principal of a school, became "permanently elected" under the terms imposed by the Teacher Tenure Act of 1937, Ga. L. 1937, p. 1409, the teacher could not be suspended or removed except for cause and had the right to defend in a hearing before the local board. County Bd. of Educ. v. Young, 187 Ga. 644, 1 S.E.2d 739 (1939).

Transfer to another school without cause or hearing allowed, provided no salary reduction.

- Board of education had the right merely to transfer a teacher from the position of principal to that of a teacher in another school without assigning a cause or a hearing, provided the board did not act merely arbitrarily and exercised the board's judgment as to what was best for the school system, and provided the board did not accompany the demotion with a reduction in salary. County Bd. of Educ. v. Young, 187 Ga. 644, 1 S.E.2d 739 (1939).

Georgia Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings before local boards of education. Hood v. Rice, 120 Ga. App. 691, 172 S.E.2d 170 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1070, 90 S. Ct. 1514, 25 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1970).

Board's decision final unless appeal taken.

- When sitting as a court to hear and determine an issue over which the board has jurisdiction, a decision of the school board is final unless an appeal therefrom is taken. Patterson v. Boyd, 211 Ga. 679, 87 S.E.2d 861 (1955).

County board without power to sue and be sued.

- Artificial persons have only such powers as are conferred upon them by their creator, and county boards of education, creatures of the law, have not been clothed as such with the power to sue and be sued. Parker v. Board of Educ., 209 Ga. 5, 70 S.E.2d 369 (1952).

Janitorial services contract not requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.

- When the matter in dispute was a janitorial services contract, indistinguishable from similar contracts in the general realm of commercial activity, except that one of the parties to the contract was a school system, an action for breach of the contract by the school system was not "a local controversy in reference to the construction or administration of the school law," requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160, although the school system claimed the contract was void under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-504. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp. v. Cherokee County Sch. Sys., 257 Ga. 60, 354 S.E.2d 424 (1987).

School board determines own agenda.

- Citizen was not entitled to a writ of mandamus directing a school board to place the citizen on the board's agenda because setting the agenda was a discretionary act that was not subject to mandamus and none of the statutes cited by the citizen, O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-1160(a),45-10-1, or50-6-6(b), imposed a duty on the board to place the citizen on the board's agenda. James v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 283 Ga. 517, 661 S.E.2d 535 (2008).

Self-defense may be raised as an affirmative defense in a student disciplinary proceeding. Henry County Bd. of Educ. v. S. G., 301 Ga. 794, 804 S.E.2d 427 (2017).

Appeal right exists only when county board decides matter of local controversy.

- Right of appeal given in this section exists only when the county board of education has heard and decided some matter of local controversy in reference to the construction or administration of the school law and is confined to the parties to the controversy, but is not applicable to a direct proceeding brought against the board to compel the discharge of some official duty. Bryant v. Board of Educ., 156 Ga. 688, 119 S.E. 601 (1923) (decided under former Code 1910, § 1551 (14)).

Both county and state boards tribunals with limited jurisdiction.

- Both the county board, for the purpose of the original trial, and the state board, for a trial on appeal, are by law made tribunals with limited jurisdiction. Boney v. County Bd. of Educ., 203 Ga. 152, 45 S.E.2d 442 (1947).

County board bound by state board decision on education of handicapped.

- County board of education violates federal law by refusing to act on the findings of a state hearing officer that a handicapped child cannot receive an appropriate education in public school. Christopher N. v. McDaniel, 569 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

State board given jurisdiction of decision of county board sitting as court.

- In order for the State Board of Education to have jurisdiction of an appeal, the appeal must be from a decision of the county board sitting as a court, not from a mere action of the board. Mallard v. Warren, 222 Ga. 731, 152 S.E.2d 380 (1966).

Only the decisions of the county board made on disputed issues are appealable; if there has been no issue heard and decided by the county board, there can be no parties and no testimony which the law authorizing an appeal contemplates. Boney v. County Bd. of Educ., 203 Ga. 152, 45 S.E.2d 442 (1947).

Provisions of the law which specify the essentials of an appeal show that only the decisions of the county board made on disputed issues are appealable. If there has been no issue heard and decided by the county board, there can be no parties and no testimony which the law authorizing an appeal contemplates. Owen v. Long County Bd. of Educ., 245 Ga. 647, 266 S.E.2d 461 (1980).

State board restricted to testimony considered by county board.

- In requiring that the appeal contain the testimony heard by the county board, this section shows an intent that the state board is restricted at the hearing on appeal to the testimony previously considered by the county board; this would prohibit a de novo trial by the state board. Boney v. County Bd. of Educ., 203 Ga. 152, 45 S.E.2d 442 (1947).

State Board had jurisdiction although local board failed to give proper notice.

- Although a superior court erred in ruling that the State Board of Education lacked jurisdiction over two tenured teachers' appeals from their nonrenewal under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-942 because the appeals were more than 30 days from the date the local board voted, the superior court properly affirmed the State Board's decision to reverse the local board's nonrenewal decisions because the local board failed to comply with the decision and notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(a). Clayton County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilmer, 325 Ga. App. 637, 753 S.E.2d 459 (2014).

State board's decisions binding unless void.

- State Board of Education's decisions are binding upon parties who submit their causes to that tribunal through the orderly mode of procedure provided by law, unless the decisions are subject to be set aside because the decisions are void. Maxey v. DeKalb County Bd. of Educ., 220 Ga. 158, 137 S.E.2d 657 (1964).

State board not empowered to reconsider decisions.

- This section contains no express provision for reconsideration by the board of the board's decisions, and under a strict construction of the statutes relating to the State Board of Education this power may not be implied. Murdock v. Perkins, 219 Ga. 756, 135 S.E.2d 869 (1964).

Appeal not moot when misconduct is contested issue before local board.

- After a student was expelled for violations of the local board of education's code of student conduct, because the determination of the student's misconduct was a contested issue before the local board, the student was allowed to appeal the decision, and the superior court did not err in ruling that the student's appeal to the State Board of Education was not moot; however, despite its initial ruling that the appeal was moot, the state board reviewed the local board's decision on the merits and found that the student had not been suspended from school before the disciplinary hearing and, therefore, was provided a timely hearing. Fulton County Bd. of Educ. v. D. R. H., 325 Ga. App. 53, 752 S.E.2d 103 (2013).

Appeal not required.

- Tenured teacher was not required to appeal to the State Board of Education; the Atlanta Public Schools' failure to grant the teacher a hearing on the nonrenewal of the teacher's teaching contract after a hearing was requested made such an appeal futile since such appeals were confined to the record and presupposed a hearing was held by the local board. Atlanta Pub. Schs v. Diamond, 261 Ga. App. 641, 583 S.E.2d 500 (2003).

When state board exercises judicial powers, certiorari available remedy.

- When the state board exercises the board's judicial powers in rendering a decision, a writ of certiorari is a remedy available. Murdock v. Perkins, 219 Ga. 756, 135 S.E.2d 869 (1964).

Certiorari available directly to superior court from county board.

- Remedy of certiorari from a judicial decision of a county board of education is available directly to the superior court without first exhausting the authorized appeal to the State Board of Education. Rockdale County Sch. Dist. v. Weil, 245 Ga. 730, 266 S.E.2d 919 (1980).

Alternate route for access to the superior court is certiorari from decision of local board of education. Deriso v. Cooper, 246 Ga. 540, 272 S.E.2d 274 (1980).

Plaintiff-high school principal had an adequate remedy at law as plaintiff contended that the transfer was a demotion and not a reassignment as contended by the school superintendent. Such was a matter of local controversy in reference to the administration of school law; and, thus, the local board was the proper tribunal. Emerson v. Bible, 247 Ga. 633, 278 S.E.2d 382 (1981).

Prerequisites to equitable relief.

- Barring extraordinary circumstances, exhaustion of statutory remedy of appeal is prerequisite to relief in equity. Boatright v. Brown, 222 Ga. 497, 150 S.E.2d 680 (1966).

When the controversy is a "local controversy," within the meaning of that term as used in this section, the plaintiffs are not entitled to resort to the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus or to have equitable relief in the absence of a showing that the plaintiffs have exhausted the plaintiffs' administrative remedies or that the remedy provided by this section will not afford the plaintiffs adequate relief. Surrency v. Dubberly, 225 Ga. 735, 171 S.E.2d 306 (1969).

In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the exhaustion of the remedy provided by this section for the resolution of local controversies in reference to the construction or administration of school laws is a prerequisite to relief in equity. Deriso v. Cooper, 246 Ga. 540, 272 S.E.2d 274 (1980).

Before seeking equitable relief it is necessary that plaintiff-high school principal first exhaust administrative remedies and show the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Emerson v. Bible, 247 Ga. 633, 278 S.E.2d 382 (1981).

Student must exhaust administrative remedies.

- When a student instituted suit against the superintendent of county schools and several high school officials, claiming that the student's civil rights had been violated when declared ineligible to play varsity basketball during the student's senior year in high school, since the student's claims were matters of local controversy and clearly related to the construction or administration of school law, the student was required to exhaust administrative remedies before instituting action in the courts. The student's failure to exhaust these remedies authorized the trial court to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss. Grayer v. Hagler, 181 Ga. App. 662, 353 S.E.2d 545 (1987).

If no "local controversy," exhaustion of administrative remedies not required.

- When the controversy is not a matter of "local controversy" in reference to the construction or administration of school law, an action for injunctive relief and damages against the board does not first require exhaustion of administrative remedies. Eastwind Developers, Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 238 Ga. 587, 234 S.E.2d 504 (1977).

When section's remedies not exhausted, resort to equity premature.

- When a plaintiff fails to exhaust the hearing and appeals remedy created by this section, or to indicate why this remedy at law is inadequate, a resort to equity for injunctive relief against a school board is premature. Carter v. Board of Educ., 221 Ga. 775, 147 S.E.2d 315 (1966).

Courts will not preempt the administrative remedy provided by O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160 in the first instance except as a matter of equity when it is necessary to prevent irreparable injury, or when equity alone can grant adequate relief; the courts of equity will not interfere until and unless the administrative remedy has been exhausted and has failed to eliminate the violation of law or the gross abuse of discretion which is its equivalent, and this by way of appeal only. Bacon v. Brewer, 196 Ga. App. 130, 395 S.E.2d 383 (1990).

Equity will not intervene.

- If no effort is made to exhaust one's administrative remedies, or an adequate remedy at law is available, equity will not intervene. Otwell v. West, 220 Ga. 95, 137 S.E.2d 291 (1964).

Equity will not interfere with schools' management unless board has acted without authority of law. Patterson v. Boyd, 211 Ga. 679, 87 S.E.2d 861 (1955).

Discretion in local boards controls absent violations or gross abuse.

- Discretion has by law been vested in the county boards of education, and unless it is made clearly to appear that the board is acting in violation of the law or grossly abusing the boards' discretion, the boards' administration of the schools of the counties will not be enjoined by the courts. Pass v. Pickens, 204 Ga. 629, 51 S.E.2d 405 (1949).

Control and management of the public schools is in the county boards of education and will not be interfered with by the courts except in cases when that control and management is contrary to law. Colston v. Hutchinson, 208 Ga. 559, 67 S.E.2d 763 (1951).

Courts of equity will not interfere with the administration of the public school laws under which local controversies arise unless it is made clear to appear that the local school board is acting in violation of the law or is grossly abusing the board's discretion. Walker v. McKenzie, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 870 (1953).

Since the control and management of a county's public schools is vested by law in the county board of education, courts of equity will not interfere with the control and management thereof, except when action taken by the board is contrary to law. Warren v. Davidson, 218 Ga. 25, 126 S.E.2d 221 (1962).

This section provides an adequate remedy for an aggrieved party and equity will not interfere with the action of the board of education of a county unless it appears that the board has acted without legal authority. Davis v. Jarriel, 223 Ga. 624, 157 S.E.2d 282 (1967).

If the remedy provided by this section has not been exhausted, relief in equity is not available unless an act of the board violates some law or is such a gross abuse of discretion as amounts to a violation of the law. Deriso v. Cooper, 246 Ga. 540, 272 S.E.2d 274 (1980).

When statutory appeal remedy fails, or not adequate, equity grants relief.

- When the remedy by appeal from a decision of the local board has failed to eliminate the law violation, or the gross abuse of discretion which is its equivalent, equity will grant relief or, as is permissible in all cases to prevent irreparable injury, when equity alone can grant adequate relief, exhaustion of the statutory remedy of appeal is not a prerequisite to relief in equity. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 864).

Mandamus unavailable prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies.

- Mandamus will not lie when it appears that the complainant has not availed himself or herself of the administrative remedies available under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160, which provides for an appeal to the State Board of Education from decisions concerning the termination of teachers pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940 et seq. Lansford v. Cook, 252 Ga. 414, 314 S.E.2d 103 (1984).

Mandamus against school board for restoration of teacher's former status not precluded.

- Even though it is true that this section has application to county school systems created by local law, such as that for Richmond County, and even though it is true that a proceeding by a teacher for restoration of former status as principal and former salary would be a controversy falling within the terms of this section, not even such a construction would preclude a direct proceeding by mandamus against the board of education to compel a proper discharge of official duty. County Bd. of Educ. v. Young, 187 Ga. 644, 1 S.E.2d 739 (1939).

Courts empowered to inquire into right to hold public office.

- Membership on a board of education is a public office. Nothing in this section is intended to take, or has the effect of taking from the courts of this state the power to inquire into the right to hold public office and to confer this important power upon the school boards. Conley v. Brophy, 207 Ga. 30, 60 S.E.2d 122 (1950).

Interlocutory injunction.

- Since for a breach of duty under former Code 1933, § 32-938, adequate remedies at law were available, it was error to grant an interlocutory injunction to prevent that breach upon a petition seeking an injunction, which was brought by residents and taxpayers of that portion of the county embraced within the school district. Colston v. Hutchinson, 208 Ga. 559, 67 S.E.2d 763 (1951).

Judgment sustaining motion to dismiss petition seeking injunction proper.

- Judgment sustaining a demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to a petition seeking to have a county board of education enjoined from going forward with the board's program to establish a high school and erect a new high school building in and for a certain area of the county was proper since the petitioners had an adequate and complete remedy at law which the petitioners had not pursued, and since the petitioners had failed to appeal the board's decision alleging no sufficient reason for the failure to do so. Boatright v. Yates, 211 Ga. 125, 84 S.E.2d 195 (1954).

Court may dismiss complaint if section's procedure not followed.

- If a county board of education seeks equitable and injunctive relief against a child and the parents for allegedly transporting the child to another school district in disregard of the rules and regulations of the board, and it is nowhere shown in the record that the parties utilized the procedure provided in this section for determining matters of local controversy in regard to the administration of school law, either by holding a hearing at the county level or by appealing to the State Board of Education, the trial court may properly dismiss the complaint. Wayne County Bd. of Educ. v. Anderson, 231 Ga. 761, 204 S.E.2d 173 (1974).

Neither state board nor court is authorized to consider matter de novo from local board because both sit as appellate bodies. Ransum v. Chattooga County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 783, 242 S.E.2d 374 (1978).

As an appellate body, the superior court (like the State Board of Education) is not authorized to consider matters which were not raised before the local board. Sharpley v. Hall County Bd. of Educ., 251 Ga. 54, 303 S.E.2d 9 (1983).

When a school principal argued that the language of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a) is too vague, indefinite, and uncertain to meet due process requirements, but did not challenge the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160 in the proceedings before the Professional Practices Commission, the county board of education, or the State Board of Education, and this issue was not raised until the case was heard by the superior court, which sat as an appellate court, this constitutional issue was not timely raised by the principal and would not be considered on appeal to the Supreme Court. Sharpley v. Hall County Bd. of Educ., 251 Ga. 54, 303 S.E.2d 9 (1983).

Under subsection (e), on review, the state board and superior court shall be confined to the record. Therefore, the superior court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the parties, are bound by this rule. Sumter County Bd. of Educ. v. Mosley, 147 Ga. App. 478, 249 S.E.2d 284 (1978).

Superior court's review is on the record of the proceedings, and the any evidence rule applies. Additionally, school appeals are governed by the procedures set out in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160 and do not fall within the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50. Johnson v. Pulaski County Bd. of Educ., 231 Ga. App. 576, 499 S.E.2d 345 (1998).

After a student was expelled for violations of the local board of education's code of student conduct, the superior court erred by not confining the board's review to the record or the issues raised before the local board by citing to newspapers and online college admissions applications purportedly indicating that many colleges required high schools to submit disciplinary records for prospective students and also asked prospective students to self-report infractions. Fulton County Bd. of Educ. v. D. R. H., 325 Ga. App. 53, 752 S.E.2d 103 (2013).

Court without authority when issue not raised below.

- Trial court erred in reversing the State Board of Education's decision affirming the local board of education's termination of a teacher's employment on the basis that the hearing tribunal failed to timely provide the tribunal's findings of fact and recommendations to the local board because the teacher failed to raise the issue prior to the appeal to the trial court; thus, the court was prohibited from considering the issue and also prohibited from reviewing the decision of the State Board de novo. Clayton County Bd. of Educ. v. Vollmer, 328 Ga. App. 894, 763 S.E.2d 277 (2014).

Court bound to affirm decision supported by sufficient evidence.

- Sitting as an appellate body, the superior court is placed in a position similar to an appellate review of a jury verdict. Finding that there exists evidence sufficient to support the decision of a local board, the superior court is bound to affirm the decision. Ransum v. Chattooga County Bd. of Educ., 144 Ga. App. 783, 242 S.E.2d 374 (1978).

Superior court erred in reversing a local school board's decision to terminate a teacher for insubordination and willful neglect of duty pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a) because the decision was supported by evidence that the teacher made inappropriate comments about special education students, among other evidence. The "any evidence" standard of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(e) applied. Chattooga County Bd. of Educ. v. Searels, 302 Ga. App. 731, 691 S.E.2d 629 (2010).

County board empowered to select, locate, and acquire school sites.

- County board of education has the authority and power to select, locate, and acquire sites for school buildings in the county, according to the boards judgment and discretion, subject only to the approval or disapproval by the State Board of Education upon appeal. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 117.

County board empowered to make changes and relocations in school sites.

- When a county board of education has previously selected sites for schools and school building projects, the board has the power to subsequently make changes and relocations of the sites, and when approved by the State Board of Education such action becomes final. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 117.

County board may provide that no school bus shall transport pupils to unassigned attendance area.

- Under the general regulatory powers granted county boards of education, a county board, when the board deems it to be in the best interest and for the most efficient operation of the schools of the county, may by regulations duly adopted provide that no school bus under the jurisdiction of the board shall transport pupils to any attendance area other than areas to which the bus has been assigned by the board. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 272.

Controversies related to "handicapped" children procedurally controlled by section.

- Controversies arising out of the construction and administration of laws pertaining to the education of "handicapped" children, just as controversies arising out of the construction and administration of school laws generally, are procedurally controlled with respect to hearings and appeals by this section. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-1 (decided under former Code 1933, § 32-910, prior to amendment by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1508, § 1, which added subsection (f)).

Federal handicap provisions accept as proper those procedures contained in this section to assure "due process."

- 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-1 (decided under former Code 1933, § 32-910, prior to amendment by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1508, § 1, which added subsection (f)).

Procedure of using "regional hearing officer" and eliminating administrative appeal unauthorized.

- Procedure of using a "regional hearing officer" to conduct a hearing under this section and to eliminate any appeal to the State Board of Education is not only unauthorized by law but is in conflict with the "due process" guarantees of this section. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-1 (decided under former Code 1933, § 32-910, prior to amendment by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1508, § 1, which added subsection (f)).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Schools, §§ 78 et seq., 246, 250.

C.J.S.

- 78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, §§ 196, 211 et seq., 406 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity of statute or other regulations as to the use, or teaching, of foreign languages in schools, 7 A.L.R. 1695; 29 A.L.R. 1452.

Validity of regulation by public school authorities as to clothes or personal appearance of pupils, 14 A.L.R.3d 1201.

School's violation of parents' substantive due process rights due to their child's suspension or expulsion, 91 A.L.R.6th 365.