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2018 Georgia Code 21-2-525 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 21-2-525 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 21-2-525

TITLE 21 ELECTIONS

Section 2. Elections and Primaries Generally, 21-2-1 through 21-2-604.

ARTICLE 13 CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND PRIMARIES

21-2-525. Hearing; powers of court generally.

  1. Within 20 days after the return day fixed in the notice as provided in subsection (a) of Code Section 21-2-524 to the defendant, the presiding judge shall fix a place and time for the hearing of the contest proceeding. Such judge may fix additional hearings at such other times and places as are necessary to decide the contest promptly.
  2. The court having jurisdiction of the action shall have plenary power, throughout the area in which the contested primary or election was conducted, to make, issue, and enforce all necessary orders, rules, processes, and decrees for a full and proper understanding and final determination and enforcement of the decision of every such case, according to the course of practice in other civil cases under the laws of this state, or which may be necessary and proper to carry out this chapter. The court shall have authority to subpoena and to compel the attendance of any officer of the primary or election complained of and of any person capable of testifying concerning the same; to compel the production of evidence which may be required at such hearing, in like manner and to the same extent as in other civil cases litigated before such court; to take testimony; and to proceed without delay to the hearing and determination of such contest, postponing for the purpose, if necessary, all other business.
  3. The court may, in its discretion, limit the time to be consumed in taking testimony, dividing such time equitably among all litigants concerned, with a view therein to the circumstances of the matter and to the proximity of the next succeeding primary or election.

(Ga. L. 1893, p. 124, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 107; Civil Code 1910, § 121; Code 1933, § 34-2801; Code 1933, § 34-1706, enacted by Ga. L. 1964, Ex. Sess., p. 26, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 295, § 1.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former § 21-3-425 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Time for hearing

- The requirement that the judge must set a hearing date "within 20 days after the return day" provides a deadline by which a date must be set. Head v. Williams, 269 Ga. 894, 506 S.E.2d 863 (1998) (decided under former § 21-3-425).

The trial court did not violate the statute by setting a hearing date on the same day as the return day fixed in the notice to the defendants where from the time the petitioner filed the petitioner's petition, the petitioner knew that the petitioner had the burden of presenting evidence to support the petitioner's allegations of illegal voting and tampering with absentee ballots and where the petitioner had six days' notice that a hearing date was being set and three days' notice of the actual date of the hearing. Head v. Williams, 269 Ga. 894, 506 S.E.2d 863 (1998) (decided under former § 21-3-425).

When court required to inspect vote recorder ballots.

- In the absence of any statutory authority authorizing a hand count and determination by election officials of voter intent with regard to nondefective ballots voted by means of vote recorders, and in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud, misconduct by election officials, improper functioning of vote recorders or tabulating machines, a court, in an election contest, is not bound under this section to require the inspection or hand count of nondefective ballots voted by means of vote recorders. Rary v. Guess, 129 Ga. App. 102, 198 S.E.2d 879 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-525).

Judge's function under this section (see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-525) is not judicial. Carter v. James, 96 Ga. 280, 23 S.E. 201 (1895) (see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-525).

Where evidence of defendant's liability conflicting, court may hold hearing on costs.

- Where the presiding judicial officer hearing a contested election case under this section issued a fi. fa. for costs and the evidence of the defendant's liability was conflicting, the judge of the superior court did not abuse judicial discretion in issuing, upon petition, a restraining order against execution of the fi. fa. until a hearing could be held on the issues raised by the pleadings. McLeod v. Reid, 120 Ga. 785, 48 S.E. 315 (1904) (see O.C.G.A. § 21-2-525).

Decision of the ordinary (now probate judge) in a contested "fence or no fence" election is final. Skrine v. Jackson, 73 Ga. 377 (1884).

Burden of showing election returns inaccurate is upon the intervenor. Brown v. City of Atlanta, 152 Ga. 283, 109 S.E. 666 (1921).

Decision of superior court judge final.

- Where the election of a county officer was contested, and the evidence which was taken before a justice of the peace of the county, together with all the papers filed in the contest, was duly transmitted to the judge of the superior court of the circuit in which the contest arose, the decision by the latter therein is final, and the writ of certiorari will not lie to review the contest. Robertson v. Easley, 20 Ga. App. 258, 92 S.E. 1027, cert. denied, 20 Ga. App. 832 (1917) .

Ordinary's decision in municipal election contest is final.

- Where an ordinary renders a decision in a contest over a municipal election, the ordinary does not act in a judicial capacity, thus a writ of certiorari to the superior court to review the contest does not lie. Harris v. Glenn, 141 Ga. 687, 81 S.E. 1103 (1914).

Cited in Hollifield v. Vickers, 118 Ga. App. 229, 162 S.E.2d 905 (1968); Henderson v. County Bd. of Registration & Elections, 126 Ga. App. 280, 190 S.E.2d 633 (1972).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Elections, §§ 415 et seq., 428 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 29 C.J.S., Elections, § 509 et seq.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 21-2-525

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Payne v. Chatman, 485 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 28, 1997 | 267 Ga. 873, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 1433

...l disposition in the appellate courts. This legislation provides an important procedural framework for the prompt resolution of election contests, including initiation *725 and notice of an election contest (OCGA § 21-2-524), a timely hearing (OCGA § 21-2-525) and an appeal from the final decision of the trial court (OCGA § 21-2-528). The Election Code gives a trial court ample power and discretion to control the election contest process to insure that the proceedings are resolved in a timely manner. OCGA § 21-2-525(c)....
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Rhonda J. Martin v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Reg. & Elections, 307 Ga. 193 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2019

...But an election contest is, by statutory design, an expedited proceeding — and one that vests in trial courts broad authority to manage the proceeding, including to “proceed without delay to the hearing and determination of” the election contest. See OCGA § 21-2-525 (b)....
...the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. . . .”). Arguing that the trial court abused its discretion and committed legal error when it 5 The Election Code refers to “hearings” in relation to election contests. See OCGA § 21-2-525....
... of the Georgia Code pertaining to contested elections. OCGA § 21- 2-525 (b). Although the relevant provisions of the Election Code do not mention the term “discovery,” let alone set out election-contest- specific party discovery procedures, see generally OCGA § 21-2-525, the Code does give trial courts the “authority . . . to compel the production of evidence which may be required at such hearing, in like manner and to the same extent as in other civil cases litigated before such court. . . .” OCGA § 21-2-525 (b). And most importantly for this case, the Election Code by its plain terms both authorizes and compels trial courts to conduct election contests expeditiously. As just one conspicuous example, OCGA § 21-2-525 (b) contains the unusual provision that trial courts “shall have authority . . . to proceed without delay to the hearing and determination of such contest, postponing for the purpose, if necessary, all other business.”17 OCGA § 21-2-525 (b) (emphasis supplied)....
...nd expeditiously. In sum, “[t]he Election Code gives a trial court ample power and discretion to control the election contest process to [e]nsure that the proceedings are resolved in a timely manner.” Payne, 267 Ga. at 875 (citing OCGA § 21-2-525 (c)); cf....
...Those directives include that a trial judge presiding over an election contest “shall promptly begin presiding over such proceedings,” OCGA § 21-2-523 (e) (emphasis supplied); may schedule hearings “as . . . necessary to decide the contest promptly,” § 21-2-525 (a); may, “in its discretion, limit the time to be consumed in taking testimony,” § 21-2-525 (c); and “shall have authority ....
...not more than ten days nor less than five days after the service of such notice,” § 21-2-524 (f); and the “presiding judge shall fix a place and time for the hearing of the contest proceeding” “[w]ithin 20 days after the return day fixed in the notice” required by OCGA § 21-2-524 (a). OCGA § 21-2-525 (a). Indeed, we have interpreted the 20-day requirement in OCGA § 21- 2-525 (a) as “provid[ing] a deadline by which the judge must set a date for a hearing.” Head, 269 Ga....
...w from the Election Code,’ the ‘Municipal Election Code,’ or ‘Chapter 3 of Title 21’ shall be deemed to refer to this chapter.” OCGA § 21-2-1 (b). As explained above in Division 2 (a), we held in Head that the precursor to OCGA § 21-2-525 (a) “provides a deadline by which the judge must set a date for a hearing.” Head, 269 Ga. at 895. Given that OCGA § 21-2-525 (a) also permits trial courts to “fix additional hearings at such other times and places as are necessary to decide the contest promptly,” it is not entirely clear whether the hearing required to be set under the 20-day deadline must...
...be the actual trial on the election contest, but Head demonstrates that it can be. See Head, 269 Ga. at 894. We note that no party complains that the trial court in this case failed to meet the statutory requirements for setting hearings under OCGA § 21-2-525 (a). outset that “he had the burden of presenting evidence to support his allegations” and had “six days’ notice that a hearing date was being set and three days’ notice of the actual date of the hearing.” Id....
...which the people have chosen their representative is a drastic remedy,” it “should not be undertaken lightly, but instead should be reserved for cases in which a person challenging an election has clearly established a 26 Citing OCGA § 21-2-525 (b), Petitioners also contend that the trial court committed reversible error by “[f]ail[ing] to [g]ain [u]nderstanding of the [c]ase.” Although it is, of course, important for trial courts to understand the cases before them, Petitioners’ argument misapprehends OCGA § 21-2-525 (b), which establishes the plenary power trial courts are given to gain a “full and proper understanding” of election contest cases; the statute does not create a legal responsibility, the failure of which results in reversible error....
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Schmitz v. Barron, Dir., 863 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 21, 2021 | 312 Ga. 523

...that vests in trial courts broad authority to manage the proceeding, including 2 to ‘proceed without delay to the hearing and determination of’ the election contest.” Martin, 307 Ga. at 194 (quoting OCGA § 21-2-525 (b))....
...at 194 (“[A]n election contest is, by statutory design, an expedited proceeding — and one that vests in trial courts broad authority to manage the proceeding, including to ‘proceed without delay to the hearing and determination of’ the election contest.” (quoting OCGA § 21-2-525 (b)). We further recognize that the process of serving parties and candidates under OCGA § 21-2-524 (f) differs markedly from the normal process of serving parties to a civil case....
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Broughton v. Douglas Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 690 S.E.2d 141 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 25, 2010 | 286 Ga. 528, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 161

...per ex parte communications where Appellants were notified and appeared at the hearing. See Cagle v. Davis, 236 Ga.App. 657, 662(4)(a), 513 S.E.2d 16 (1999). 5. Quarterman also contends that the trial court erred by violating the requirement in OCGA § 21-2-525(a) that a time and place for the hearing of the contest proceeding be set within 20 days after the return day fixed in the notice sent to the defendants pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-524(a)....