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2018 Georgia Code 23-1-8 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 23 EQUITY

Section 1. General Provisions, 23-1-1 through 23-1-25.

23-1-8. Nature of equity - Considers done what ought to be done.

Equity considers that done which ought to be done and directs its relief accordingly.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3019; Code 1868, § 3031; Code 1873, § 3086; Code 1882, § 3086; Civil Code 1895, § 3926; Civil Code 1910, § 4523; Code 1933, § 37-106.)

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of local government law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Equity treats as done that which in fairness ought to have been done. United States v. Ferguson, 409 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 529 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976).

Since equity considers that done which ought to be done, it is therefore recognized that in order to prevent forfeitures, which are not favored, equity will lay hold upon any expressed intention of an insured to designate an eligible beneficiary, or any inchoate effort to designate a substituted beneficiary in lieu of a deceased one, where death or illness of the insured prevents the filling of such vacancy. Hewell v. Atlanta Police Relief Ass'n, 184 Ga. 702, 192 S.E. 828 (1937).

Since equity considers that done which ought to have been done, equity will decree that a child is entitled to the fruits of a legal adoption where the act of formal adoption had not been consummated. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

This section sets out the general principle on which a court of equity may, in a proper case, allow inheritance under the so-called doctrine of virtual adoption. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

Where the plaintiffs are alleged to constitute the sole survivors of the class which could be designated as beneficiaries of the defendant relief association, and for whose benefit the certificate was taken out and maintained, equity in the exercise of its jurisdiction will account that done which ought to have been done if opportunity had been given, and in order to avoid a forfeiture will treat such children, the plaintiffs, as being in good conscience as much as the actual beneficiaries under the certificate as if the insured father had been afforded opportunity to name and had actually named them as such. Hewell v. Atlanta Police Relief Ass'n, 184 Ga. 702, 192 S.E. 828 (1937).

Despite the death of the party against whom relief is sought, equity will grant relief and decree that to be done which ought to have been done. Holsomback v. Caldwell, 218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962).

Where to a proceeding to foreclose a deed to secure debt as an equitable mortgage, which prays for judgment for principal, interest, and attorney's fees, a debtor files a plea in which it is alleged that the petitioner held as collateral fire insurance policies with a loss-payable clause in favor of the petitioner aggregating more than the amount of the debt, which had become due and payable as the result of a fire some months before there was a default on the debt, and that the insurance could have been collected at any time, but was not collected due solely to the negligence of the petitioner who had made no demand for payment, and that the attorney's fees sought in the foreclosure proceeding would have been unnecessary had such collection been made, such plea alleged facts sufficient to show a breach of duty, both in law and in equity, upon the part of the creditor, which would prevent it from collecting attorney's fees and deny the creditor any relief in equity. Irwin v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 204 Ga. 582, 50 S.E.2d 354 (1948).

Even though an appointment may have been made to an office where the term of the incumbent has not expired, and in pursuance of the order of appointment the incumbent has been forcibly removed from the room or quarters of his office and thereby deprived of the opportunity of exercising the duties of the office, such incumbent will in equity continue to be treated as the incumbent for the purpose of protecting him in his right to function as such official, pending a judicial determination of the validity of such appointment. Partain v. Maddox, 227 Ga. 623, 182 S.E.2d 450 (1971).

The court considers as actually having been performed acts which have been directed or which have agreed or intended to be done. Thus, an agreement to give security may, in a proper case, be deemed to have been executed by the giving of security. United States v. Ferguson, 409 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 529 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976).

What should have been done must be determined.

- Equitable maxim, codified at O.C.G.A. § 23-1-8, that equity considers that done which ought to be done and directs its relief accordingly, cannot be fulfilled when that which should have been done still remains to be determined. Wallace v. Wallace, 301 Ga. 195, 800 S.E.2d 303 (2017).

There may be valid contract to adopt without the express use of term "adopt" in contract. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

Language clearly showing intent to effect an adoption according to the law, considered under the attendant and surrounding circumstances though not containing precise legal phraseology, is sufficient to create a virtual adoption. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

An oral agreement to adopt may be shown by the acts, conduct, and admissions of the parties, and in order to establish such a contract, the exact word "adopt" need not be used. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

In a case of virtual adoption the alleged agreement must be proved so clearly, strongly, and satisfactorily as to leave no reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

An authenticated copy of an application of the parent for a homestead which contained the following question and answer, "If married, of whom does your family consist?" "My wife and adopted daughter and myself," was relevant in an action to prove a virtual adoption as illustrating whether there had been a contract to adopt the child, since it indicates that the child was living with the parents at that time. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

A parol obligation of a person to adopt the child of another as his own, accompanied by a virtual though not a statutory adoption, and acted upon by all parties concerned for many years and during the obligor's life, may be enforced in equity upon the death of the obligor by decreeing the child entitled as a child to the property of the obligor, undisposed of by will. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

An agreement by a married couple that if the natural parent would relinquish all claims of all nature to his child the couple would adopt the child as their own, would love her and provide for her fully all things essential to her welfare, and make her their heir to inherit at their death as if she had been their natural child, is sufficient to create a contract of adoption. Toler v. Goodin, 200 Ga. 527, 37 S.E.2d 609 (1946).

Equitable relief available under an indemnity contract.

- Where the Chapter 11 debtor's officer settled a lawsuit against the debtor and the officer without informing the debtor's successor of the settlement, as equitable relief under O.C.G.A. § 23-1-8, the officer was reimbursed under an indemnification clause only for an amount the debtor had previously authorized for settlement. In re First Am. Health Care of Ga., Inc., 288 Bankr. 598 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002).

Specific performance properly applied.

- Specific performance was the proper remedy since there was no adequate remedy at law given the nature of the stock in the small, family-owned business, and the explicit acknowledgment in the shareholders' buy-sell agreement that specific performance was the appropriate remedy in the event of a breach. Moreover, given the failure of all parties to strictly follow the terms of either the agreement or Bylaws, an equitable remedy considered that done which ought to be done. Wallace v. Wallace, 345 Ga. App. 764, 813 S.E.2d 428 (2018).

Determining beneficiary under pension plan.

- Because a city employee asked for and completed forms given to the employee by the city's human resources department to change the beneficiary of the employee's retirement plan to the employee's brother, but was not given the correct form for that change by the human resources department, a trial court properly used its equity power to hold that the brother was entitled to the benefit. Westmoreland v. Westmoreland, 280 Ga. 33, 622 S.E.2d 328 (2005).

In pari delicto.

- Georgia law follows the well-settled maxim that equity seeks to do equity, O.C.G.A. § 23-1-8, and the equitable doctrine of in pari delicto is based on the principle that to give the plaintiff relief would contravene public morals and impair the good of society; hence, it should not be applied in a case in which to withhold relief would, to a greater extent, offend public morals. Hays v. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2006).

Consistent with O.C.G.A. § 23-1-8, the in pari delicto defense was inapplicable because liquidators were pursuing claims of fraudulent transfer, conspiracy, and procuring breach of fiduciary duty for the benefit of innocent creditors. Am. Pegasus SPC v. Clear Skies Holding Co., LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2015).

Cited in Gilford v. Green, 33 Ga. App. 1, 125 S.E. 80 (1924); Richards v. Plaza Hotel, Inc., 171 Ga. 827, 156 S.E. 809 (1931); Rowe v. Cole, 176 Ga. 592, 168 S.E. 882 (1933); Biddle v. Papa, 180 Ga. 468, 179 S.E. 357 (1935); Rose v. Crane Heating Co., 198 Ga. 295, 31 S.E.2d 717 (1944); Shaw v. Miller, 215 Ga. 413, 110 S.E.2d 759 (1959); Bair v. Willis, 218 Ga. 563, 129 S.E.2d 774 (1963); Stith v. Willis, 219 Ga. 62, 131 S.E.2d 620 (1963); Jordan Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 309 F. Supp. 148 (S.D. Ga. 1970); McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986); Brown v. Brown, 265 Ga. 725, 462 S.E.2d 609 (1995).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 126.

C.J.S.

- 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 106.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute conferring on chancery courts power to abate public nuisance, 22 A.L.R. 542, 75 A.L.R. 1298.

Power of equity in absence of statute to render deficiency judgment in foreclosure action, 34 A.L.R. 1015.

Validity and enforceability of restrictive covenants in contracts of employment, 52 A.L.R. 1362, 67 A.L.R. 1002, 98 A.L.R. 963.

Doctrine of equitable conversion in relation to taxation, 112 A.L.R. 23.

Right to reformation of contract or instrument as affected by intervening rights of third persons, 79 A.L.R.2d 1180.

Rule denying recovery of property to one who conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable where claim which motivated the conveyance was never established, 6 A.L.R.4th 862.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 23-1-8

Total Results: 9  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Prince v. Black, 344 S.E.2d 411 (Ga. 1986).

Cited 25 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 1986 | 256 Ga. 79

...the father and that the father intended for the child to share in his intestate estate, in the same manner that the child would have shared if he had been formally legitimated, that equity will consider that done which ought to have been done. OCGA § 23-1-8....
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Simpson v. King, 383 S.E.2d 120 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 11, 1989 | 259 Ga. 420

...the father and that the father intended for the child to share in his intestate estate, in the same manner that the child would have shared if he had been formally legitimated, that equity will consider that done which ought to have been done. OCGA § 23-1-8....
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O'NEAL v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 1994 | 263 Ga. 850, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 489

...Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 658 (78 SE 30) (1913), the doctrine of equitable or virtual adoption was recognized for the first time in Georgia. Relying on the equitable principle that "equity considers that done which ought to have been done," id. at 659; see OCGA § 23-1-8, we held that an agreement to adopt a child, so as to constitute the child an heir at law on the death of the person adopting, performed on the part of the child, is enforceable upon the death of the person adopting the child as to property which is undisposed of by will....
...is harming the very person that the requirement would protect. For all the foregoing reasons, equity ought to intervene on the child's behalf in these types of cases, and require the performance of the contract if it is sufficiently proven. See OCGA § 23-1-8....
...opting parents have led the child to believe that he or she is a legally adopted member of their family. Rein at 785-787; Clark at 678, 682. 3. Because the majority fails to honor the maxim that "[e]quity considers that done which ought to be done," § 23-1-8, and follows a rule that fails to protect a person with superior equities, I dissent....
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Brown v. Brown, 462 S.E.2d 609 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 1995 | 265 Ga. 725

...Both parties' recognition of the incompleteness of the divorce judgment and their independent requests that the trial court make the earlier judgment whole by supplying the missing "Exhibit A" authorized the trial court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction and supply the missing document. OCGA §§ 23-1-3, 23-1-7, 23-1-8....
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Wallace v. Wallace, 301 Ga. 195 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 15, 2017 | 800 S.E.2d 303

...Absent a determination of which document applied, if any, and what the terms of that document demanded of the parties, this Court cannot provide meaningful appellate review. We do note that in its written order the trial court relied on the equitable maxim, codified at OCGA § 23-1-8, that equity considers that done which ought to be done and directs its relief accordingly That maxim cannot be fulfilled where that which should have been done still remains to be determined....
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Weiner v. Goldberg, 306 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 12, 1983 | 251 Ga. 470

...Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Hill, C. J., Smith and Weltner, JJ., who dissent. WELTNER, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. "Equity considers that done which ought to be done and directs its relief accordingly." OCGA § 23-1-8 (Code Ann....
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Westmoreland v. Westmoreland, 622 S.E.2d 328 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2005 | 280 Ga. 33, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 3506

...249, 251-252, 547 S.E.2d 782 (2001); Maxwell, supra at 230(2), 319 S.E.2d 88 (1984); Belote v. Belote, 167 Ga.App. 8(1), 306 S.E.2d 24 (1983); Mitchell, supra at 665, 191 S.E.2d 587. That is because "[e]quity considers that done which ought to be done and directs its relief accordingly." OCGA § 23-1-8....
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Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 16, 2015 | 770 S.E.2d 570

...act where one takes and agrees to legally adopt the child of another, but fails to do so.” 1 Mary F. Radford, Redfearn on Ga. Wills & Administration § 9:4 (B) (7th ed. 2008). Equity, which considers “that done which ought to be done,” OCGA § 23-1-8, will award the plaintiff child the equivalent from the deceased’s estate as she would have received had the deceased legally adopted her....

Sanders v. Riley, Adm'r (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 16, 2015 | 770 S.E.2d 570

...act where one takes and agrees to legally adopt the child of another, but fails to do so.” 1 Mary F. Radford, Redfearn on Ga. Wills & Administration § 9:4 (B) (7th ed. 2008). Equity, which considers “that done which ought to be done,” OCGA § 23-1-8, will award the plaintiff child the equivalent from the deceased’s estate as she would have received had the deceased legally adopted her....