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Call Now: 904-383-7448Specific performance of a contract, if within the power of the party, will be decreed, generally, whenever the damages recoverable at law would not be an adequate compensation for nonperformance.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 3118; Code 1868, § 3130; Code 1873, § 3186; Code 1882, § 3186; Civil Code 1895, § 4036; Civil Code 1910, § 4633; Code 1933, § 37-801.)
This section includes parol as well as written contracts. Valdosta Mach. Co. v. Finley, 164 Ga. 706, 139 S.E. 337 (1927); Richards v. Plaza Hotel, Inc., 171 Ga. 827, 156 S.E. 809 (1931).
- An oral contract by the terms of which a person agrees for a valuable consideration that he will make a will giving property to the other contracting party may be enforced by specific performance in this state. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Falligant, 208 Ga. 479, 67 S.E.2d 473 (1951).
Alleged oral contract by decedent to provide a college education for child and give jewels to her at decedent's death, if child were named after her, did not measure up to the strict rules of law governing suits to specifically perform alleged contracts of this kind. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Falligant, 208 Ga. 479, 67 S.E.2d 473 (1951).
- To obtain equitable relief, plaintiff must allege some element or feature of the contract or in the conduct of the defendant to show that the relief at law would not be adequate; he may show that in case the contract is not specifically performed, his damages will be irreparable, or he may show that the measure of damages resulting from the nonperformance of the contract is uncertain or difficult of ascertainment; he may show that the thing contracted for has some intrinsic or special value, such as is possessed by an heirloom, having a special and peculiar value to its owner over and above any market value that can be placed upon it in accordance with strict legal rules; or he may show that the property, though personal, is not of common class, but is unique of its kind, and cannot be readily reproduced, so that others of a similar nature and equal value cannot be procured by damages assessed by means of legal rules, as is the case with paintings or other works of art. Gabrell v. Byers, 178 Ga. 16, 172 S.E. 227 (1933).
Where the landlord covenants to maintain the roof in good repair but fails to do so, the remedy of the tenant is to make the repairs himself and look to the landlord for reimbursement, or to occupy the premises without repair and hold the landlord responsible for damages by action or by recoupment to an action for the rent, which remedies are adequate at law. Borochoff Properties, Inc. v. Creative Printing Enters., 233 Ga. 279, 210 S.E.2d 809 (1974).
Monetary damages were not an adequate remedy at law for a county in the county's suit against a contractor seeking specific performance of an agreement to donate to the county a completed wastewater treatment facility for which the county had paid. Moreover, the county was not required to use the county's powers of eminent domain as if the contract had never existed. Forsyth County v. Waterscape Servs., LLC, 303 Ga. App. 623, 694 S.E.2d 102 (2010).
As a general rule, equity will not decree specific performance of contracts relating to personal property. Black v. American Vending Co., 239 Ga. 632, 238 S.E.2d 420 (1977).
An agreement for equal division of property is one which equity will specifically perform since land is involved and damages would not be adequate to compensate for nonperformance. Hancock v. Hancock, 223 Ga. 481, 156 S.E.2d 354 (1967).
A contract which does not provide for a down payment can nevertheless be specifically enforced. Beller & Gould v. Lisenby, 246 Ga. 15, 268 S.E.2d 611 (1980).
- An order of specific performance as to a merely private debt in the form of an unincorporated settlement agreement in a divorce proceeding cannot be deemed to be a more adequate remedy than an action at law for breach of contract damages, since that order cannot constitutionally be enforced by contempt and would not obviate the necessity of the obligee's resort to successive lawsuits for the obligor's future breaches. Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 263 Ga. 498, 435 S.E.2d 914 (1993).
- Property owners were entitled to specific performance under O.C.G.A. § 23-2-130 of a settlement agreement by which a seller agreed to re-purchase their property for $1 million. The agreement was not procured by duress because the seller was owned by a sophisticated business person who consulted legal counsel. Hampton Island, LLC v. HAOP, LLC, 306 Ga. App. 542, 702 S.E.2d 770 (2010).
- Based on the date of a defaulted note, which was not superseded or cancelled by the parties' loan modification agreement, the former version of the statute that provided for the lender's attorney's fees controlled, such that a reasonableness determination under the newer version of the statute was not appropriate. Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2014) (Unpublished).
- Under the right for any reason rule, the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's claim for specific performance of a Redemption Agreement because the remaining 29 acres had not been sold; thus, no sales proceeds existed to be distributed. Bagwell v. Trammel, 297 Ga. 873, 778 S.E.2d 173 (2015).
- In a breach of contract action, the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to a bank on the bank's claim for specific performance because the bank did not show that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the adequacy of damages as the legal remedy for nonperformance. Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016).
Cited in Watters v. Southern Brighton Mills, 168 Ga. 15, 147 S.E. 87 (1929); Gabrell v. Byers, 178 Ga. 16, 172 S.E. 227 (1933); Hill v. Shaw, 189 Ga. 294, 5 S.E.2d 778 (1939); Averitt v. Swainsboro Methodist Church, 190 Ga. 549, 9 S.E.2d 888 (1940); Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 111, 11 S.E.2d 766 (1940); O'Rear v. Lamb, 194 Ga. 455, 22 S.E.2d 74 (1942); Hotel Candler, Inc. v. Candler, 198 Ga. 339, 31 S.E.2d 693 (1944); Silverman v. Alday, 200 Ga. 711, 38 S.E.2d 419 (1946); Washington Mfg. Co. v. Wickersham, 201 Ga. 635, 40 S.E.2d 206 (1946); Pearson v. George, 209 Ga. 938, 77 S.E.2d 1 (1953); Whiteway Neon-Ad, Inc. v. Maddox, 211 Ga. 27, 83 S.E.2d 676 (1954); Morgan v. Maddox, 216 Ga. 816, 120 S.E.2d 183 (1961); Vowell v. Carmichael, 235 Ga. 387, 219 S.E.2d 732 (1975); Heath v. Stinson, 238 Ga. 364, 233 S.E.2d 178 (1977); Sims v. Holtzclaw, 259 Ga. 537, 384 S.E.2d 656 (1989); Quadron Software Int'l Corp. v. Plotseneder, 256 Ga. App. 284, 568 S.E.2d 178 (2002); 2010-1 SFG Venture LLC v. Lee Bank & Trust Co., 332 Ga. App. 894, 775 S.E.2d 243 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1763, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 702 (Ga. 2015).
A plaintiff seeking to enforce a contract to make a will giving property to him must prove the precise contract beyond a reasonable doubt. Mann v. Moseley, 208 Ga. 420, 67 S.E.2d 128 (1951).
- A court will not decree the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land unless there is a definite and specific statement of the terms of the contract. The requirement of certainty extends not only to the subject matter and purpose of the contract, but also to the parties, consideration, and even the time and place of performance, where these are essential. Williams v. Manchester Bldg. Supply Co., 213 Ga. 99, 97 S.E.2d 129 (1957); Duvall v. Cox, 215 Ga. 163, 109 S.E.2d 593 (1959).
A court will not decree specific performance of a contract which is indefinite and uncertain in any material provision, or where the parties are not specified, or where, in case of lands or interest in lands, the description thereof, or key found therein, is insufficient to identify the same. Bacon v. Bacon, 176 Ga. 191, 167 S.E. 107 (1932); Cashin v. Markwalter, 208 Ga. 444, 67 S.E.2d 226 (1951).
A description of land as being parts of two named lots in certain district and section of county, that lie north of lessor's present place of business, bounded on the east by highway, on the north by the county line, on the west by lessor's lands, and on the south by the lands of another individual, is too indefinite to support a decree for possession of the lands by the lessee in an equitable action against the lessor. Harris v. Abney, 208 Ga. 518, 67 S.E.2d 724 (1951).
Contract for sale of all of the land known as Wilkinson Pond, consisting of 25 acres, more or less, with the exception of three acres, more or less, to be set aside as a home place containing the Wilkinson home, was void for want of necessary description of any particular land, and afforded no sufficient basis for the extraordinary equitable relief of specific performance. Smith v. Wilkinson, 208 Ga. 489, 67 S.E.2d 698 (1951).
Release agreement giving plaintiff option of selecting two acres on east side for release was not too indefinite to be specifically enforced. Jarrard v. Lawson, 244 Ga. 419, 260 S.E.2d 329 (1979).
Specific performance of a contract will not be decreed unless the contract is definite and specific, based upon a sufficient legal consideration, and the proof of it is strong, clear, and satisfactory; if the contract is one entire contract, and one portion of the contract is indefinite, the entire contract fails. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Falligant, 208 Ga. 479, 67 S.E.2d 473 (1951).
A contract upon which specific performance is sought must be certain, definite, and clear, and so precise in its terms that neither party can reasonably misunderstand it. Bullard v. Bullard, 202 Ga. 769, 44 S.E.2d 770 (1947); Wehunt v. Pritchett, 208 Ga. 441, 67 S.E.2d 233 (1951); Harris v. Trippi, 209 Ga. 369, 72 S.E.2d 704 (1952).
Where the terms of an option were so vague, uncertain, and indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement, the petition failed to set forth a cause of action for specific performance. Erwin v. Hardin, 187 Ga. 275, 200 S.E. 159 (1938); Williams v. Manchester Bldg. Supply Co., 213 Ga. 99, 97 S.E.2d 129 (1957).
A petition requesting specific performance of a contract for the sale of land which contains no allegation showing the value of the property involved so as to enable this court to determine whether or not the contract is fair, just, and equitable and can, in good conscience, be decreed to be specifically performed, fails to state a cause of action for specific performance. Crown Corp. v. Galanti, 220 Ga. 660, 140 S.E.2d 898 (1965).
Because a handwritten loan agreement did not sufficiently describe the land to be conveyed in the event of a default, and because the lender had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a monetary judgment, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant specific performance. Kirkley v. Jones, 250 Ga. App. 113, 550 S.E.2d 686 (2001).
To constitute a valid sale of real estate which a court will require to be specifically performed, the following are the essentials to the contract of such sale: (1) the memorandum of contract must specify the parties, that is, the seller and the buyer; (2) the memorandum must sufficiently describe the subject matter of the contract; and (3) the memorandum must name the consideration. The consideration need not be expressly stated if the memorandum of contract furnishes a key by which the amount of the purchase price can be ascertained. If the consideration is not all to be paid in cash, then the times and amounts of deferred payments must be specified. When the contract expressly states the amount of purchase money or furnishes a key by which it can be ascertained, then the contract is sufficient. Beller & Gould v. Lisenby, 246 Ga. 15, 268 S.E.2d 611 (1980).
A document that was simply a purchase offer lacked the elements needed to create a binding and enforceable contract, and neither specific performance nor damages were obtainable based on it. Lee v. Green Land Co., 245 Ga. App. 558, 538 S.E.2d 189 (2000).
Specific performance may properly be refused if a substantial part of the agreed exchange for the performance to be compelled is as yet unperformed and its concurrent or future performance is not well secured to the satisfaction of the court. F. & C. Inv. Co. v. Jones, 210 Ga. 635, 81 S.E.2d 828 (1954).
The person seeking specific performance of a contract to make a will giving property to him must show, in addition to the contract, a substantial compliance with his part of the agreement. Mann v. Moseley, 208 Ga. 420, 67 S.E.2d 128 (1951).
- While there must be a tender of the purchase price before equity will decree specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, where the petition alleges that the defendants, when notified by the plaintiff that he had purchased from original party his contract with them for the sale of the property, repudiated the contract, notified him that they had no intention of complying with its terms, and that they would refuse to accept the tender of any money under the contract, the tender is waived. Gilleland v. Welch, 199 Ga. 341, 34 S.E.2d 517 (1945); Todd v. Bivins, 215 Ga. 402, 110 S.E.2d 768 (1959).
Before equity will decree specific performance of a contract for the sale of land at the instance of the purchaser, there must, in the absence of waiver, be an unconditional tender of the purchase price. Gilleland v. Welch, 199 Ga. 341, 34 S.E.2d 517 (1945).
Where a petitioner sought specific performance of a conditional contract for the purchase of a described house and lot, but the petition failed to allege that the express condition had been met, no right to the relief sought was set forth. Wehunt v. Pritchett, 208 Ga. 441, 67 S.E.2d 233 (1951).
Where a contract for the purchase of land provided that the purchaser, upon obtaining a deed from the seller, would execute a deed to secure an unpaid balance of the purchase price, and the seller's deed was delivered, but the purchaser refused to execute the security deed, equity would have jurisdiction of a suit by the seller for specific performance, to enforce the terms of the purchaser's agreement. Waters v. Tillman, 194 Ga. 552, 22 S.E.2d 173 (1942).
Specific performance and damages are not inconsistent remedies, and may be pursued in the same action. Loewus v. Eskridge & Downing, Inc., 175 Ga. 456, 165 S.E. 576 (1932).
Specific performance is not a remedy which either party may claim as a matter of absolute right, and mere inadequacy of price, or any other fact showing the contract to be unfair, unjust, or against good conscience, may justify the refusal of this remedy. Whitehead v. Dillard, 178 Ga. 714, 174 S.E. 244 (1934); Wehunt v. Pritchett, 208 Ga. 441, 67 S.E.2d 233 (1951).
Where a contract for the sale of land is in writing, is certain and fair in all its parts, is for an adequate consideration, and capable of being performed, it is just as much a matter of course for a court to decree a specific performance of it as it is for a court to give damages for it in other cases. Jones v. Smith, 206 Ga. 162, 56 S.E.2d 462 (1949).
- A petition for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, is sufficient as against general demurrer (now motion to dismiss), where it is alleged that the contract is in writing, signed by both of the parties, is certain and fair, and is for an adequate consideration and capable of being performed. Scheer v. Doss, 211 Ga. 7, 83 S.E.2d 612 (1954); Todd v. Bivins, 215 Ga. 402, 110 S.E.2d 768 (1959).
A court will not render a decree which is impossible of performance, or which the court has no power to enforce. Gabrell v. Byers, 178 Ga. 16, 172 S.E. 227 (1933).
- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, § 8.
22B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Specific Performance, § 3.
- 81 C.J.S., Specific Performance, § 6 et seq.
- Right of party who has once refused to perform to have specific performance of contract, 2 A.L.R. 416.
Dismissal of suit as affecting election of remedies as between damages and specific performance, 26 A.L.R. 111.
Specific performance of written executory contract for lease of real property, 31 A.L.R. 502, 173 A.L.R. 1161.
A provision in land contract for pecuniary forfeiture or penalty by a party in default as affecting the right of the other party to specific performance, 32 A.L.R. 584, 98 A.L.R. 877.
Right of beneficiary to enforce contract between third persons to provide for him by will, 33 A.L.R. 739, 73 A.L.R. 1395.
Infancy of party to contract as affecting his right to specific enforcement, 43 A.L.R. 120.
Obligation of assignee to vendor to perform contract on assignment by purchaser of contract to sell real property, 59 A.L.R. 954.
Specific performance of a contract as a matter of right, 65 A.L.R. 7.
Remedies during promisor's lifetime for breach of agreement to give property at death, 66 A.L.R. 1439.
Right to return in specie of the consideration received by a political subdivision under an invalid or unenforceable contract, or to declaration of trust or other right in respect of property into which consideration has been converted, 93 A.L.R. 441.
Remedy by mandatory injunction or specific performance for breach of contract to furnish one the requirements of his business, 98 A.L.R. 421.
Right to specific performance, or injunction against breach, of lease or sublease or of contract to make lease as affected by right of complainant to cancel lease before expiration of term for which other party is bound, 117 A.L.R. 256.
Specific performance of contract for sale of corporate stock, 130 A.L.R. 920.
Specific performance of contract for services, 135 A.L.R. 279.
Remedy of specific performance as available to vendee's assignee, 138 A.L.R. 205.
Contract for exclusive distribution or sales agency as subject of suit for specific performance, 145 A.L.R. 684.
Specific performance, or other equitable enforcement, of agreement for wife's support or alimony, 154 A.L.R. 323.
Insolvency of defendant as a reason for denying specific performance, 154 A.L.R. 1201.
Specific performance or injunction as proper remedy for breach of collective bargaining agreement, 156 A.L.R. 652.
Specific performance, or injunction against breach, of contract for organization or reorganization of corporation, 158 A.L.R. 997.
Specific performance of contracts requiring building or construction, 164 A.L.R. 802.
Remedies during promisor's lifetime on contract to convey or will property at death in consideration of support or services, 7 A.L.R.2d 1166.
Specific performance or injunctive relief against breach of contract, other than lease or agreement therefor, or contract for services, terminable by one party but not the other, 8 A.L.R.2d 1208.
Option executed simultaneously with mortgage for purchase of mortgaged property by mortgagee as subject of specific performance, 10 A.L.R.2d 231.
Change of conditions after execution of contract or option for sale of real property as affecting right to specific performance, 11 A.L.R.2d 390.
Mutuality of remedy as essential to granting of specific performance, 22 A.L.R.2d 508.
Specific performance of provisions of separation agreement other than those for support or alimony, 44 A.L.R.2d 1091.
Specific performance of compromise and settlement agreement, 48 A.L.R.2d 1211.
Uncertainty as to terms of mortgage or of accompanying note or bond contemplated by real-estate sales contract as affecting right to specific performance, 60 A.L.R.2d 251.
Specific performance: requisite definiteness of provision in contract for sale or lease of land, that vendor or landlord will subordinate his interest to permit other party to obtain financing, 26 A.L.R.3d 855.
Purchaser's misrepresentations as to intended use of real property as ground for vendor's equitable relief from contract and deed, 35 A.L.R.3d 1369.
Specific performance of lease of, or binding option to lease, building or part of building to be constructed, 38 A.L.R.3d 1052.
Specific performance of agreement for sale of private franchise, 82 A.L.R.3d 1102.
Specific performance of agreement to lend or borrow money, 82 A.L.R.3d 1116.
Requirements as to certainty and completeness of terms of lease in agreement to lease, 85 A.L.R.3d 414.
Special or consequential damages recoverable, on account of delay in delivering possession, by purchaser of real property awarded specific performance, 11 A.L.R.4th 891.
Total Results: 8
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-10-05
Citation: 297 Ga. 873, 778 S.E.2d 173, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 671
Snippet: performance ofthe Redemption Agreement, see OCGA § 23-2-130. After a three-day bench trial, the trial court
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-05-11
Snippet: the injured party for the other’s breach. OCGA § 23-2-130 (specific performance generally proper where
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-05-11
Citation: 297 Ga. 52, 772 S.E.2d 668, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 292
Snippet: the injured party for the other’s breach. OCGA § 23-2-130 (specific performance generally proper where “the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2000-02-28
Citation: 527 S.E.2d 204, 272 Ga. 107, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 812, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 128
Snippet: governed by its own unique principles. See OCGA § 23-2-130 et seq. “[R]elief, in the nature of specific performance
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-09-15
Citation: 489 S.E.2d 305, 268 Ga. 389, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 3413, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 505
Snippet: adequate to compensate for the breach. OCGA § 23-2-130. Geriner's entitlement to legal relief is based
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1993-10-25
Citation: 435 S.E.2d 914, 263 Ga. 498, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 3798, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 713
Snippet: adequate compensation for nonperformance.” OCGA § 23-2-130. Accordingly, [w]hen there is a mere breach of
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1989-10-25
Citation: 259 Ga. 537, 384 S.E.2d 656
Snippet: other than OCGA § 45-5-85. See for example OCGA § 23-2-130; Milton v. Milton, 192 Ga. 778 (16 SE2d 573) (1941);
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-12-01
Citation: 362 S.E.2d 364, 257 Ga. 653, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 1017
Snippet: does not have an adequate remedy at law. OCGA § 23-2-130. Gabrell v. Byers, 178 Ga. 16 (172 SE 227) (1933)