Section not applicable to suits to set aside judgments.

- Rule that fraud may be shown by slight circumstances, contained in this section, is not applicable to suits to set aside judgments. Leventhal v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 249 Ga. 390, 291 S.E.2d 222 (1982).

Fraud may not be presumed, and while it may be proved by circumstances, it must nevertheless be proved. Adams v. Higginbotham, 194 Ga. 292, 21 S.E.2d 616 (1942); Kazakos v. Soteres, 120 Ga. App. 258, 170 S.E.2d 50 (1969); Henry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 223, 199 S.E.2d 338 (1973).

Though a transaction between near relatives is to be scanned closely, yet some proof of its fraudulent nature must appear, and until that proof appears this rule has no application. Kamlapat v. Purvis-Wade Carpet Mills, 112 Ga. App. 781, 146 S.E.2d 138 (1965).

Circumstances creating a mere suspicion are not sufficient to prove fraud. Watson v. Brown, 186 Ga. 728, 198 S.E. 732 (1938); Kamlapat v. Purvis-Wade Carpet Mills, 112 Ga. App. 781, 146 S.E.2d 138 (1965).

Fraud is "in itself subtle," and circumstances apparently trivial or almost inconclusive, if separately considered, may by their number and joint operation be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof. Grainger v. Jackson, 122 Ga. App. 123, 176 S.E.2d 279 (1970); McNeil v. Cowart, 186 Ga. App. 411, 367 S.E.2d 291 (1988); Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998).

Transfers of assets before death.

- Evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict under the plaintif's theory of fraudulent transfer and civil conspiracy as some evidence authorized the jury to find that a deed conveying the property owner's sole interest to the real property to the owner and one defendant as joint tenants with right of survivorship without any money exchanged prior to death was to evade the plaintiff before a promissory note was paid. Bloom v. Camp, 336 Ga. App. 891, 785 S.E.2d 573 (2016).

Fraud in post-nuptial agreements.

- After the husband engaged counsel to draw up a formal post-nuptial agreement, and the husband moved to enforce the agreement when the wife filed for divorce, the post-nuptial agreement was unenforceable as the wife testified that the wife signed the agreement because the husband represented to the wife that, if the wife signed the agreement, the husband would understand that the wife loved the husband, and the husband would tear up the agreement; the husband procured the wife's signature on the agreement under the pretense that the agreement would never be enforced and, in fact, that the agreement would be destroyed, and the evidence was sufficient to establish the existence of fraud in procuring the agreement. Murray v. Murray, 299 Ga. 703, 791 S.E.2d 816 (2016).

Cited in Haas & Howell v. Godby, 33 Ga. App. 218, 125 S.E. 897 (1924); Carter v. Moody, 160 Ga. 849, 129 S.E. 163 (1925); Boyles v. Morgan, 168 Ga. 804, 149 S.E. 149 (1929); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Kontz, 185 Ga. 131, 194 S.E. 536 (1937); Dwight v. Acme Lumber & Supply Co., 189 Ga. 473, 6 S.E.2d 586 (1939); Durham Iron Co. v. Durham, 62 Ga. App. 361, 7 S.E.2d 804 (1940); Horton v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 338, 15 S.E.2d 605 (1941); Quinton v. Peck, 195 Ga. 299, 24 S.E.2d 36 (1943); Jones v. Hogans, 197 Ga. 404, 29 S.E.2d 568 (1944); Scott v. Gillis, 202 Ga. 220, 43 S.E.2d 95 (1947); Boney v. Smallwood, 202 Ga. 411, 43 S.E.2d 271 (1947); Hinchcliffe v. Pinson, 87 Ga. App. 526, 74 S.E.2d 497 (1953); Rountree v. Davis, 90 Ga. App. 223, 82 S.E.2d 716 (1954); Tillman v. Byrd, 211 Ga. 918, 89 S.E.2d 479 (1955); Griffin v. Kelley, 227 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1955); Sutton v. McMillan, 213 Ga. 90, 97 S.E.2d 139 (1957); Leverett v. Awnings, Inc., 97 Ga. App. 811, 104 S.E.2d 686 (1958); Walker v. General Ins. Co., 214 Ga. 758, 107 S.E.2d 836 (1959); Powell v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 56, 153 S.E.2d 434 (1967); Patterson v. Castellaw, 119 Ga. App. 712, 168 S.E.2d 838 (1969); Parker v. Spurlin, 227 Ga. 183, 179 S.E.2d 251 (1971); Darden v. Darden, 227 Ga. 647, 182 S.E.2d 480 (1971); W.H. Mulherin Constr. Co. v. Betterton, 135 Ga. App. 223, 217 S.E.2d 454 (1975); Clark v. Aenchbacher, 143 Ga. App. 282, 238 S.E.2d 442 (1977); Tolar Constr. Co. v. GAF Corp., 154 Ga. App. 127, 267 S.E.2d 635 (1980); Bob Maddox Dodge, Inc. v. McKie, 155 Ga. App. 263, 270 S.E.2d 690 (1980); Rose Mill Homes, Inc. v. Michel, 155 Ga. App. 808, 273 S.E.2d 211 (1980); Sanders v. Looney, 247 Ga. 379, 276 S.E.2d 569 (1981); Marriott Corp. v. American Academy of Psychotherapists, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497, 277 S.E.2d 785 (1981); Everson v. Franklin Disct. Co., 248 Ga. 811, 285 S.E.2d 530 (1982); McGaha v. Kwon, 161 Ga. App. 216, 288 S.E.2d 289 (1982); Plough Broadcasting Co. v. Dobbs, 163 Ga. App. 264, 293 S.E.2d 526 (1982); Marshall v. York, 165 Ga. App. 795, 302 S.E.2d 711 (1983); Lenny's, Inc. v. Allied Sign Erectors, Inc., 170 Ga. App. 706, 318 S.E.2d 140 (1984); Macon ChryslerPlymouth v. Sentell, 179 Ga. App. 754, 347 S.E.2d 639 (1986); Jackson v. Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 502, 359 S.E.2d 412 (1987); Graham v. Hogan, 185 Ga. App. 842, 366 S.E.2d 219 (1988); Harden v. Vertex Assocs., 226 Ga. App. 322, 487 S.E.2d 12 (1997); Chandler v. MVM Constr., Inc., 232 Ga. App. 385, 501 S.E.2d 533 (1998); ReMax North Atlanta v. Clark, 244 Ga. App. 890, 537 S.E.2d 138 (2000).

Proof of fraud generally.

- Since proof of fraud is seldom if ever possible by direct evidence, recourse to circumstantial evidence is a necessity, and there is no kind of action wherein it can be held with greater reason that the fact in issue may be inferred from other facts proved. Durrence v. Durrence, 224 Ga. 620, 163 S.E.2d 740 (1968).

Rarely, if ever, can a fraudulent intent be shown by direct proof, and where transactions between relatives are under review, slight circumstances are often sufficient to induce belief on the part of the jury that there was fraud between the parties. Bucher v. Murray, 212 Ga. 259, 91 S.E.2d 610 (1956).

An attack on a will as having been obtained by undue influence may be supported by a wide range of testimony, since such influence can seldom be shown except by circumstantial evidence. Thus, a confidential relation between the parties, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the disposition of the testator's estate, old age, or disease affecting the strength of the mind, tending to support any other direct testimony or any other proven fact or circumstance going to show the exercise of undue influence on the mind and will of the testator, are relevant. While the quantity of influence varies with the circumstances of each case, according to the relations existing between the parties and the strength or weakness of mind of the testator, the amount of influence necessary to dominate a mind impaired by age or disease may be decidedly less than that required to control a strong mind. Bowman v. Bowman, 205 Ga. 796, 55 S.E.2d 298 (1949).

According to the relations existing between the parties and the strength or weakness of mind of a testator, the amount of influence necessary to dominate a mind impaired by age or disease may be decidedly less than that required to control a strong mind. Fowler v. Fowler, 197 Ga. 53, 28 S.E.2d 458 (1943).

Where the grantor of an "improvident or profuse" deed was not wholly incapable of entering into such a contract, but was possessed of little or no will power and was greatly under the influence of the nephew to whom the deed was executed, an inference of fraud could have been drawn by the jury, and, the evidence for the defendant grantee not being such as to rebut the inference as a matter of law, the court was authorized to charge the jury upon the subject of fraud. Stanley v. Stanley, 179 Ga. 135, 175 S.E. 496 (1934).

While the broad statement that the conduct of the defendant constituted fraud would be insufficient without an allegation of circumstances from which the court might determine whether the pleader reached the right conclusion in saying that a fraud was committed, still it is not essential to state more facts than may be necessary to carry conviction of the existence of fraud. Wall v. Wall, 176 Ga. 757, 168 S.E. 893 (1933).

"Great inadequacy of consideration, joined with great disparity of mental ability in contracting a bargain, may justify equity in setting aside a sale or other contract." Under that principle, a deed may be set aside in equity, on proof to the two elements stated, "without proof of anything else" as to fraud. A fortiori, the same rule would apply with at least equal force in case of such mental disparity and a total absence of consideration. Stow v. Hargrove, 203 Ga. 735, 48 S.E.2d 454 (1948).

The evidence showing that a 75-year old woman, uneducated, with neither the ability to read nor write, was dealing with an experienced businessman under circumstances indicating a fraud establishes that there was an imbalance or "disparity of mental ability in contracting a bargain." Top Quality Homes, Inc. v. Jackson, 231 Ga. 844, 204 S.E.2d 600 (1974).

Circumstances apparently trivial or almost inconclusive, if separately considered, may by their number and joint operation, especially when corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof. Kelly v. Cubbedge, 143 Ga. App. 830, 240 S.E.2d 162 (1977).

Proof of fraud is seldom, if ever, susceptible of direct proof; thus, recourse to circumstantial evidence usually is required. Brown v. Mann, 237 Ga. App. 247, 514 S.E.2d 922 (1999).

In every case slight circumstances must be considered, and may be sufficient to establish the existence of fraud, in transactions between husband and wife fraud might be so completely concealed that creditors could not expose it, and in order that the public might not suffer from such concealment, the law imposes upon the husband and wife the duty of affirmatively establishing their good faith when creditors attack such transactions for fraud. Arrington v. Awbrey, 190 Ga. 193, 8 S.E.2d 648 (1940).

Where transactions between relatives are under review, slight circumstances are often sufficient to induce belief on the part of a jury that there was fraud or collusion between the parties, and authorize them to find against the claimant and in favor of the plaintiff in fi. fa. A claimant must, generally speaking, come into court with hands unstained by any suggestion of collusion with the defendant in fi. fa. to defeat or defraud the creditors of the latter; and a claimant who fails to make a clear showing of both legal and moral right to the property in dispute must generally suffer the loss thereof at the hands of a jury, if there be any circumstances in proof, even though slight, which may be sufficient to authorize the inference of fraud or collusion. Scruggs v. Blackshear Mfg. Co., 49 Ga. App. 205, 174 S.E. 732 (1934).

Since fraud is inherently subtle, slight circumstances of fraud may be sufficient to establish a proper case. Brown v. Mann, 237 Ga. App. 247, 514 S.E.2d 922 (1999).

Evidence of fraud to be of "clear, unequivocal, and decisive" quality.

- In a diversity based suit in equity to set aside or deny res judicata effect to a prior state court judgment on the grounds of fraud and mutual mistake, the plaintiffs had to prove their claims by something more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. The evidence had to preponderate in the plaintiffs' favor, but it also had to be of "clear, unequivocal, and decisive" quality. Ahrens v. Katz, 595 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Sufficient evidence to create jury issue as to fraud.

- See Gibbs v. Jim Wilson Chevrolet Co., 161 Ga. App. 171, 288 S.E.2d 264 (1982); Horne v. Claude Ray Ford Sales, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 329, 290 S.E.2d 497 (1982); Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. Hedrick, 167 Ga. App. 453, 306 S.E.2d 718 (1983).

Where the evidence established that at time automobile was purchased by seller of automobile the certificate of ownership listed 14,229 miles as the car's mileage, that when it was sold by seller to buyer, the odometer read 14,179 miles, and when the buyers test-drove the car the odometer read approximately 7,000 miles, there is considerable conflict regarding the actual mileage of the car, and it is the province of the jury to determine whether seller altered or knew of the alteration of the odometer. Joseph Charles Parrish, Inc. v. Hill, 173 Ga. App. 97, 325 S.E.2d 595 (1984).

Jury could have found that at least some of the numerous repairs a buyer made to a house after discharging a contractor were to correct defects the contractor passively concealed that the buyer could not have reasonably discerned. Since O.C.G.A. § 23-2-57 provides that slight circumstances may be sufficient to prove fraud, the contractor was not entitled to a directed verdict in the contractor's favor on the buyer's fraud claim. Lumpkin v. Deventer N. Am., Inc., 295 Ga. App. 312, 672 S.E.2d 405 (2008).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a surety because jury questions existed as to whether two subcontractors were the same company, whether an owner acted as an agent on behalf of one of those subcontractors when the owner procured the bonds, and whether the bonds were intentionally written fraudulently based on admissions made by counsel for the surety during the hearing. Choate Constr. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 318 Ga. App. 682, 736 S.E.2d 443 (2012).

Evidence insufficient to go to the jury.

- In taxpayers' claim against a purchaser's assignee for rescission of a redemption agreement, the facts did not support rescission. The assignee's attorney did not defraud them or conceal any facts, but advised them to hire an attorney, and any failure to advise them of their legal rights was an opinion as to a matter of law and not a material fact. Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, LLC, 294 Ga. 640, 755 S.E.2d 675 (2014).

Evidence necessary to defeat abusive litigation claim.

- In a suit for fraud, misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy allegedly arising out of a real estate transaction, and a counterclaim for abusive litigation, where the record revealed hotly contested versions of what the parties considered to have transpired in the complex real estate transaction, given that the law requires only slight circumstances to establish fraud and conspiracy, the trial judge was authorized to find as a matter of law that the plaintiffs had pierced an essential element of the defendant's abusive litigation claim and were thus entitled to the grant of summary judgment thereon. Seckinger v. Holtzendorf, 200 Ga. App. 604, 409 S.E.2d 76, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 409 S.E.2d 76 (1991).

Whether a note or other writing was procured by fraud is a question of fact for the determination of a jury. Thompson v. Wilkins, 143 Ga. App. 739, 240 S.E.2d 183 (1977).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 20. 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 468 et seq.

Fraudulent Alteration of Odometer, 1 POF2d 677.

C.J.S.

- 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 48. 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 94 et seq.