Constitutionality.

- This section, insofar as it purports to allow termination of claims after service by publication on known claimants whose whereabouts are known and who are present within the state, violates due process. Suttles v. J.B. Withers Cigar Co., 194 Ga. 617, 22 S.E.2d 129 (1942); to the extent that it holds to the contrary, is hereby overruled. Johnson v. Mayor of Carrollton, 249 Ga. 173, 288 S.E.2d 565 (1982).

Purpose of this section is to fix a certain date when an estate being administered by an officer of the court, can be closed, rights fixed, and distribution of the assets made. If claims are to be recognized, either by way of amended claims or as new claims, after the date fixed in accordance with the provisions of this section, the very purpose of the law would be defeated. Cohen v. McCandless, 202 Ga. 231, 42 S.E.2d 739 (1947).

And, it was the intention of the legislature to correct the fact that no purchaser knew whether he would purchase property free of liens, and that no receiver could be sure of selling property free of liens. Jones v. Staton, 78 Ga. App. 890, 52 S.E.2d 481 (1949).

All cases, including equity cases, are excluded from this section where there are no assets to administer, marshal, or otherwise dispose of by the court. Pope v. Pope, 211 Ga. 74, 84 S.E.2d 43 (1954).

In order for the court to issue an order to bar the filing of interventions in equity cases after the date fixed in such order, it is essential that the court have in its control assets to administer, marshal, or otherwise dispose of. Maxwell v. Hollis, 216 Ga. 224, 115 S.E.2d 360 (1960).

Superior courts can issue bar orders only in cases where the courts have in hand assets that are being administered, marshaled, or otherwise disposed of by the court. Pope v. Pope, 211 Ga. 74, 84 S.E.2d 43 (1954).

Generally failure to comply with a "bar order" in receivership proceedings after notice precludes sharing in assets, similarly, failure to comply with a "bar order" directing claimants to appear and make known their objections to the receiver's final report and recommendations generally precludes later objections. Fibertex, Inc. v. Caldwell, 236 Ga. 136, 223 S.E.2d 111 (1976).

And, case must be pending before superior court.

- While this section refers to "all equity cases" now or hereafter pending, it joins thereto the qualifying provision, "wherein assets of either or both parties to the cause are being administered, marshaled, or otherwise disposed of by the court," thus plainly and conclusively showing that, before this section can be resorted to, the case must be pending in a superior court, and assets must then be in the custody of the court for the purpose of being administered, marshaled, or otherwise disposed of. Pope v. Pope, 211 Ga. 74, 84 S.E.2d 43 (1954); Maxwell v. Hollis, 216 Ga. 224, 115 S.E.2d 360 (1960).

Section applicable to tax execution.

- This section provides for circumstances under which all creditors may by inaction lose their rights, including creditors holding executions. It is therefore applicable to tax executions. Suttles v. J.B. Withers Cigar Co., 194 Ga. 617, 22 S.E.2d 129 (1942).

Effect of bar order on tax collector and taxes.

- A bar order passed by the court, and the advertisement pursuant thereto in reference to intervention in an execution sales places the tax collector, so far as taxes are concerned, as any other lienholder. Jones v. Staton, 78 Ga. App. 890, 52 S.E.2d 481 (1949).

Filing of required intervention not obviated by necessity and dignity of taxes.

- Neither the fact that all parties and intervenors might be chargeable, as a matter of law with notice that taxes have not been paid, nor that taxes are, under the law, of the highest dignity, obviates the necessity of the filing of an intervention as required by the statute. Suttles v. J.B. Withers Cigar Co., 194 Ga. 617, 22 S.E.2d 129 (1942).

Fact that a tax collector was not an actual party to the record does not take him out of the class of "parties interested" in the assets, so as to make the provision inapplicable to him. Suttles v. J.B. Withers Cigar Co., 194 Ga. 617, 22 S.E.2d 129 (1942).

When United States government can be joined as a party in state court without consent.

- While it is universally recognized that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from action except as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the action, yet where civil litigation involving conflicting claims of ownership of real and personal property and a receivership is pending in a state court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, wherein certain parties by interventions duly allowed seek the foreclosure of mortgages and loan deeds upon real and personal property on which the United States claims a lien under jeopardy assessments issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue for unpaid income taxes, the United States may be made a party to such proceeding under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a), by the issuance and proper service of a bar order such as is authorized under this section. United States v. Bullard, 209 Ga. 426, 73 S.E.2d 179 (1952).

Cited in Chas. S. Martin Distrib. Co. v. Cooper, 211 Ga. 64, 84 S.E.2d 1 (1954); Buford Com. Bank v. Luker, 126 Ga. App. 586, 191 S.E.2d 489 (1972).

ALR.

- Rule as to marshaling assets as affected by homestead law, 44 A.L.R. 758, 77 A.L.R. 371.

Joint bank account as subject to attachment, garnishment, or execution by creditor of one of the joint depositors, 11 A.L.R.2d 1465.