Adequate remedy at law not ground for dismissal of petition with legal cause of action when filed in superior court.

- A petition which sets forth a legal cause of action, though using terms appropriate to an equitable proceeding, insofar as the same does not seek any extraordinary relief, is not demurrable (now subject to motion to dismiss) on the ground that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy by bringing an action at law. Arteaga v. Arteaga, 169 Ga. 595, 151 S.E. 5 (1929); Woodall v. Williams, 176 Ga. 343, 167 S.E. 886 (1933); Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 16 S.E.2d 591 (1941); Pardue Medicine Co. v. Pardue, 194 Ga. 516, 22 S.E.2d 143 (1942); Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Ga. 33, 35 S.E.2d 908 (1945); Parnell v. Wooten, 202 Ga. 443, 43 S.E.2d 673 (1947); Echols v. Thompson, 210 Ga. 37, 77 S.E.2d 521 (1953).

This section changed the rule that a petition praying for only ordinary equitable relief is demurrable (now subject to motion to dismiss) on the ground that the plaintiff has a complete and adequate remedy at law. Teasley v. Bradley, 110 Ga. 497, 35 S.E. 782, 78 Am. St. R. 113 (1900); Booth & Co. v. Mohr & Sons, 122 Ga. 333, 50 S.E. 173 (1905); Georgia Peruvian Ochre Co. v. Cherokee Ochre Co., 152 Ga. 150, 108 S.E. 609 (1921); Logue & Co. v. Gardner, 152 Ga. 356, 110 S.E. 25 (1921); Grimmett v. Barnwell, 184 Ga. 461, 192 S.E. 191 (1937).

So petition not demurrable (now subject to motion to dismiss) on certain grounds.

- Since the passage of this section a petition which sets forth a legal cause of action, though using terms appropriate to an equitable proceeding, is not demurrable (now subject to motion to dismiss) on the grounds: (a) that it sets forth no cause of action; (b) that there is no equity in the petition; and (c) that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222, 136 S.E. 52 (1926).

Because legal and equitable cases may be joined in the same action. Concrete Coring Contractors v. Mechanical Contractors & Eng'rs, 220 Ga. 714, 141 S.E.2d 439 (1965).

Also, misjoinder of claims not ground for objection.

- The joining against the same defendants of legal and equitable rights and remedies which are connected with or dependent upon each other does not render a petition subject to the objection of duplicity or misjoinder of claims. Center v. Arp, 198 Ga. 574, 32 S.E.2d 308 (1944).

And despite statutory remedies at law, a superior court could settle the whole controversy to avoid a multiplicity of actions. Haney v. Sheppard, 207 Ga. 158, 60 S.E.2d 453 (1950).

Purpose of article.

- This and kindred legislation (this article and §§ 23-4-2 and23-4-3) was intended to afford a party the opportunity to have all his rights in regard to the subject matter tried in one action in the superior court, without the necessity of having two distinct actions to settle his legal rights and his equitable rights against the adverse party. Sometimes equitable pleadings by one of the parties may require the making of additional parties, in order that full relief may be granted. Delaney v. Sheehan, 138 Ga. 510, 75 S.E. 632 (1912); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Taggart, 38 Ga. App. 509, 144 S.E. 400 (1928); Cummings v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 336, 21 S.E.2d 627 (1942); Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 55 S.E.2d 711 (1949); Earney v. Owen, 213 Ga. 412, 99 S.E.2d 201 (1957).

So, a plaintiff shall not be harassed by other actions growing out of the same controversy, although they are based upon independent claims, legal or equitable, which the defendant might have against the plaintiff in reference to the cause of the controversy. McCall v. Fry, 120 Ga. 661, 48 S.E. 200 (1904).

Section construed with § 23-3-2. - Referring to this section and to § 23-3-2, the Georgia Supreme Court said: "these Acts (this article and §§ 23-4-2 and23-4-3) have been construed with the utmost liberality, to the end that all the remedies and relief to which the respective parties might be entitled should be applied and accorded in one action." Douglas v. Jenkins, 146 Ga. 341, 91 S.E. 49, 1918C Ann. Cas. 322 (1916); Durden v. Youmans, 37 Ga. App. 182, 139 S.E. 91 (1927); Star Laundry Co. v. May Dry Cleaning Co., 176 Ga. 34, 166 S.E. 655 (1932); Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 16 S.E.2d 591 (1941).

Actions arising out of general plan between parties must be asserted in one action.

- Where proceeding to enjoin an action against plaintiff to cancel a sale of plaintiff's property by defendant as well as the note on which the defendant is suing arose out of same general plan between the parties to develop and operate a recreational place, defendant in action on note by answer and counterclaim must assert all his claims for legal and equitable relief arising out of the general plan between the parties, and could not bring an independent action to enjoin action on the note and litigate those matters. Clay v. Smith, 207 Ga. 610, 63 S.E.2d 602 (1951).

Where a trover action was filed in a superior court, and thereafter the defendant filed, in a different superior court, an equitable action, to enjoin the trover action, and for other relief, so far as the petition alleged any defense or cause of complaint against any of the parties named as defendants, the same could have been asserted as effectually by way of defense or counterclaim in the trover proceeding, and the allegations did not show any necessity for an independent equitable action. Hamilton v. First Nat'l Bank, 180 Ga. 820, 180 S.E. 840 (1935).

Effect of

§ 9-5-6 on proceedings under this article. - Although under this article a creditor may in one action proceed for judgment on his debt and to set aside a fraudulent conveyance made by his debtor, still, under § 9-5-6, creditors who have not reduced their demands to judgment, and who have no lien otherwise, cannot, as a general rule, enjoin their debtors from selling or disposing of their property. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 196 Ga. 204, 26 S.E.2d 283 (1943).

All distinction between legal and equitable remedies and relief and the modes of administering them are not abolished. Except in providing that both kinds shall be applied for by one form of petition, and may be administered by the court in one and the same proceeding, it leaves the mode of trial as to each unchanged. Mackenzie v. Flannery & Co., 90 Ga. 590, 16 S.E. 710 (1892).

This section does not give to the superior courts an unlimited power to "give effect to all the rights of the parties, legal or equitable, or both," but the exercise of the power is restricted to instances when the nature of the case may allow or require it. Rogers v. Rogers, 183 Ga. 131, 187 S.E. 633 (1936).

Collateral matters not within scope of original proceedings not encompassable by equitable jurisdiction.

- While a court of equitable jurisdiction, when it has all the necessary parties before it and has once taken jurisdiction of a particular subject matter, will ordinarily proceed to do complete justice, and finally administer the rights of each of the respective parties, it will not extend its jurisdiction in such manner as to draw to itself collateral matters not appropriately comprehended within the scope of the original proceedings under which, in the first instance, it assumed jurisdiction. Rogers v. Rogers, 183 Ga. 131, 187 S.E. 633 (1936).

Lack of jurisdiction of nonresident party prevents superior court from taking jurisdiction.

- A separate and distinct equitable cause of action against the resident defendant will not give the superior court of the county of his residence jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant against whom the plaintiff has another, independent, separate and distinct equitable cause of action; this is especially true where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law on his cause of action against the nonresident defendant. Shaheen v. Dunaway Drug Stores, Inc., 246 Ga. 790, 273 S.E.2d 158 (1980).

Application of legal and equitable principles.

- When both legal and equitable principles are united in one petition, the court applies legal principles to legal rights and equitable principles to equitable rights. Thomas v. Walker, 115 Ga. 11, 41 S.E. 269 (1902); Bentley v. Crummey & Hamilton, 119 Ga. 911, 47 S.E. 209 (1904).

The difference is one of substance, and not of form, and this was the practice of the courts in this state even prior to the passage of the Uniform Procedure Act of 1887 (this article and §§ 23-4-2 and23-4-3). Baker & Hall v. Gladden, 72 Ga. 469 (1884); Crawford v. Williams, 76 Ga. 792 (1886); Berrie v. Smith, 97 Ga. 782, 25 S.E. 757 (1896).

Showing prerequisites to maintenance of petition.

- Since the passage of the Uniform Procedure Act of 1887 (now this article, §§ 23-4-2 and23-4-3), it is not necessary, in order to maintain the petition, that the plaintiff should make it appear that it has no remedy at law. DeLacy v. Hurst, Purnell & Co., 83 Ga. 223, 9 S.E. 1052 (1889); Georgia Iron & Coal Co. v. Etowah Iron Co., 104 Ga. 395, 30 S.E. 878 (1898); Ray v. Home & Foreign Inv. & Agency Co., 106 Ga. 492, 32 S.E. 603 (1899); Teasley v. Bradley, 110 Ga. 497, 35 S.E. 782, 78 Am. St. R. 113 (1900); Brooks v. Stroud, 111 Ga. 875, 36 S.E. 960 (1900); Evans v. Piedmont Nat'l Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 117 Ga. 940, 44 S.E. 2 (1903).

The nature of the relief prayed for is immaterial. Troup v. Martin, 158 Ga. 178, 122 S.E. 611 (1924).

But the superior court has no more power or jurisdiction by the combination of courts of law and equity, than those two courts had before the Uniform Procedure Act of 1887 (now this article, §§ 23-4-2 and23-4-3). Broomhead v. Grant, 83 Ga. 451, 10 S.E. 116 (1889).

Therefore this section does not purport to create rights otherwise unauthorized or prohibited. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Taggart, 38 Ga. App. 509, 144 S.E. 400 (1928).

Grounds for extraordinary relief unchanged.

- Since this article and §§ 23-4-2 and23-4-3, permitting parties to obtain all necessary and proper legal and equitable relief in the same case, did not create any new ground for extraordinary remedies, the settled general rule stills obtains that the remedy of injunction does not lie in favor of one who has a complete and adequate remedy at law, such as an ordinary attachment. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Provident Sav. Life Assurance Soc'y, 126 Ga. 50, 54 S.E. 929 (1906); Campbell v. Deal, 185 Ga. 474, 195 S.E. 432 (1938); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 196 Ga. 204, 26 S.E.2d 283 (1943).

The aid of the superior court may be invoked to protect an equitable interest necessary to an action to recover damages. Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867, 115 S.E. 801 (1923).

The right of equitable set-off may be granted in the superior courts, but not city courts which cannot grant affirmative equitable relief. Hecht v. Snook & Austin Furn. Co., 114 Ga. 921, 41 S.E. 74 (1902).

Enjoining nuisances.

- A court of equitable jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to enforce the common right of all of the plaintiffs to enjoin an alleged nuisance, will seek to do complete justice by granting them all appropriate relief, whether legal or equitable. Knox v. Reese, 149 Ga. 379, 100 S.E. 371 (1919).

Enjoining counterclaim proper.

- The plaintiff, by bringing the action for divorce in the Superior Court of Fulton County, had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court even though he did not live in the state. The relief sought in the counterclaim that action be enjoined because plaintiff was not a citizen and was not of the state was pertinent and could be rightfully urged against the plaintiff and it was not necessary that he be served with the counterclaim. Callaway v. Jones & Quattlebum, 19 Ga. 277 (1856); Ray v. Home & Foreign Inv. & Agency Co., 106 Ga. 492, 32 S.E. 603 (1849); Markham v. Huff, 72 Ga. 874 (1884); Caswell v. Bunch, 77 Ga. 504 (1886); Moore, Marsh & Co. v. Medlock, 101 Ga. 94, 28 S.E. 836 (1897); Home Mixture Guano Co. v. Woolfolk, 148 Ga. 567, 97 S.E. 637 (1918); Shorter v. Shorter, 150 Ga. 109, 102 S.E. 863 (1920).

Article 3, Ch. 2, T. 22 makes adequate provision for anyone claiming an interest in the subject property to assert equitable as well as legal rights to the property in the condemnation proceeding itself. Mitchell v. State Hwy. Dep't, 216 Ga. 517, 118 S.E.2d 88 (1961).

An action for land may be included in a petition for equitable relief. Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 16 S.E.2d 591 (1941).

Partition, accounting, settlement of title, in same suit.

- A tenant in common may have certain land so held partitioned and an accounting between the tenants in common under § 44-6-160. The court has power to determine the various matters in dispute between the parties, including their respective title to the land, to have an accounting for rents and profits, award partition, etc. Griffin v. Griffin, 153 Ga. 547, 113 S.E. 161 (1922).

Petition for accounting maintainable even though proof for injunctive relief not shown.

- A petition for an injunction and an accounting, alleging that the defendant had excluded the petitioner from the management of his business and had acquired and failed to account for considerable moneys derived from its profits, while failing to allege any fraud or insolvency of the defendant, and thus not showing any ground for injunctive relief, sufficiently stated a cause of action for an accounting. Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Ga. 33, 35 S.E.2d 908 (1945).

Also, where a plaintiff seeks by way of accounting to recover an amount alleged to be due him upon a contract, and to that extent may have prima facie an adequate remedy at law, and it also appears from the allegations of the petition that his action for damages is not an adequate remedy, or that his legal remedy will be nugatory without the cooperation of equity, the aid of a court of equity may be invoked. Alexis, Inc. v. Werbell, 209 Ga. 665, 75 S.E.2d 168 (1953).

And, while the general rule is that, for a plaintiff to maintain an equitable petition to remove a cloud upon his title, he must allege and prove possession in himself, nevertheless since it is competent for the plaintiff to obtain both legal and equitable relief in the same action where a plaintiff seeks to have the title to land declared to be in herself, in addition to cancellation and injunction, the fact that the plaintiff fails to show possession in herself does not prevent her from having the title to the property adjudged to be in her, although such fact would defeat the cancellation sought. Moody v. McHan, 184 Ga. 740, 193 S.E. 240 (1937).

Reformation of deed, recovery of possession, and damages maintainable in one action.

- The owner of land who has to have reformation of one or more deeds in his title chain before he can recover, by ejectment or other legal remedy, the possession of land held adversely to him may bring an action in superior court to reform the deed and in the same action pray for recovery of the possession of the land and for damages for its detention. Mims v. Lifsey, 192 Ga. 366, 15 S.E.2d 440 (1941).

Heirs' suit against administrator.

- Heirs at law may sue an administrator and his sureties upon his bond, and may, by way of amendment to the action, pray for an accounting and settlement with the administrator. DeLacy v. Hurst, Purnell & Co., 83 Ga. 223, 9 S.E. 1052 (1889); Williams v. Lancaster, 113 Ga. 1020, 39 S.E. 471 (1901).

A demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to a prayer for injunction against a levy on property should be sustained where the invalidity of the levy could be set up in a claim case. Atlanta Mut. Ass'n v. Swift & Co., 153 Ga. 722, 113 S.E. 8 (1922).

The foreclosure of mortgages permissible in equity, can be accomplished in a court of law. Block v. Allen, 99 Ga. 417, 27 S.E. 733 (1896).

Manner of setting up equitable defenses at law.

- Littleton v. Spell, 77 Ga. 227, 2 S.E. 935 (1886).

Different judgments against different parties.

- Where an equitable defense is set up by the defendant in an action of ejectment and prevails against the right of any one or more of the plaintiffs to recover, the common-law rule as to actions of ejectment, that all the plaintiffs shall recover or none, does not apply. Rumph v. Truelove, 66 Ga. 480 (1881); Milner v. Vandivere, 86 Ga. 540, 12 S.E. 879 (1891).

An amendment in a claim case may bring in new parties. The fraudulent nature of the claimant's deed may be set up. Ford v. Holloway, 112 Ga. 851, 38 S.E. 373 (1901).

Hence, a court may allow recovery of a debt in a petition to cancel a deed. Lanier v. Elder, 154 Ga. 707, 115 S.E. 81 (1922); Harper v. Atlanta Milling Co., 203 Ga. 608, 48 S.E.2d 89 (1948).

Where proceeding to enjoin an action against plaintiff to cancel a sale of plaintiff's property by defendant as well as the note on which the defendant is suing arose out of same general plan between the parties to develop and operate a recreational place, defendant in action on note by answer and counterclaim must assert all his claims for legal and equitable relief arising out of the general plan between the parties, and could not bring an independent action to enjoin action on the note and litigate those matters. Clay v. Smith, 207 Ga. 610, 63 S.E.2d 602 (1951).

An ancillary petition may be filed after as well as before a decree to enable a superior court to effectuate its own decree by ordering one put in possession of property where entitled thereto under its original decree, in order to avoid the further litigation of questions once settled between the same parties. Voyles v. Federal Land Bank, 182 Ga. 569, 186 S.E. 405 (1936).

Fraudulent release.

- An amendment setting up that a release pleaded in defense to an action for personal injuries was fraudulent, and should be set aside is permissible. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Atkins, 141 Ga. 743, 82 S.E. 139 (1914).

An amendment to a petition to enforce promissory notes may set up that defendant was adjudged a bankrupt and pray for special judgment against exempted property. Wright v. Horne, 123 Ga. 86, 51 S.E. 30 (1905).

A defendant in ejectment may set up an equitable defense to an action at law. Clewis v. Hartman, 71 Ga. 810 (1883); Woffard v. Wyly, 72 Ga. 863 (1884).

Action at law against trust estates.

- A petition at law, with proper allegation, may suffice to enforce any kind of a just demand against a trust estate. Miller v. Smythe, 92 Ga. 154, 18 S.E. 46 (1893).

Affirmative relief.

- The defendant may obtain affirmative relief by an answer in an action for specific performance, cancellation, injunction and damages to land. Becker v. Donalson, 133 Ga. 864, 67 S.E. 92 (1910).

When dismissal of answer not authorized.

- By striking from a petition that portion making a defendant who has prayed for affirmative relief, a party thereto, will not authorize a dismissal of the answer. Troup v. Martin, 158 Ga. 178, 122 S.E. 611 (1924).

Effect of failure to make equitable defense at law.

- A party who has an equitable defense must make it or he will be concluded by the judgment. Field v. Price, 52 Ga. 469 (1874); Thomason v. Fannin, 54 Ga. 361 (1975); Turner v. Rives, 75 Ga. 606 (1885); McCall v. Fry, 120 Ga. 661, 48 S.E. 200 (1904).

But it has been held that the defendant is not obligated to do so, if he prefers, he may file his petition. Elder v. Allison, 45 Ga. 13 (1872).

However, there is authority suggesting that the defendant had better set up all defenses he has or stand barred. Thomason v. Fannin, 54 Ga. 361 (1875).

Upon an application for an interlocutory injunction, the superior court is without jurisdiction to enter a decree finally fixing the amount of money to be paid by either of the parties to the other. Leary v. First Nat'l Bank, 177 Ga. 179, 170 S.E. 84 (1933).

Counter-claim not affected by dismissal of original claim.

- Dismissal of an action for want of prosecution, where the defendant has filed a cross-claim (now counter-claim) seeking equitable relief, does not dismiss the issues raised by the cross-claim; this is true where the relief sought affects codefendants in the proceeding. Winn v. Armour & Co., 184 Ga. 769, 193 S.E. 447 (1937); Byrd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 185 Ga. 628, 196 S.E. 63 (1938).

Cited in Cox v. Cox, 48 Ga. 619 (1873); Manheim v. Claflin & Co., 81 Ga. 129, 7 S.E. 284 (1889); DeLacy v. Hurst, Purnell & Co., 83 Ga. 223, 9 S.E. 1052 (1889); Regenstein v. Tyler & Co., 84 Ga. 277, 10 S.E. 719 (1890); Stapler v. Hardeman, 91 Ga. 127, 16 S.E. 657 (1893); Georgia Iron & Coal Co. v. Etowah Iron Co., 104 Ga. 395, 30 S.E. 878 (1898); Brumby v. Harris, 107 Ga. 257, 33 S.E. 49 (1899); Ford v. Holloway, 112 Ga. 851, 38 S.E. 373 (1901); Hecht v. Snook & Austin Furn. Co., 114 Ga. 921, 41 S.E. 74 (1902); Perkins v. Castleberry, 119 Ga. 702, 46 S.E. 825 (1904); Carstarphen Whse. Co. v. Fried, 124 Ga. 544, 52 S.E. 598 (1905); Douglas v. Jenkins, 146 Ga. 341, 91 S.E. 49, 1918C Ann. Cas. 322 (1916); Real Estate Bank & Trust Co. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 148 Ga. 821, 98 S.E. 486 (1919); Beacham v. Nobles, 153 Ga. 718, 113 S.E. 6 (1922); Hopkins v. Vance, 153 Ga. 754, 113 S.E. 157 (1922); McMillian v. Spencer, 162 Ga. 569, 134 S.E. 921 (1926); Ocilla Grocery Co. v. Wilcox, Ives & Co., 37 Ga. App. 718, 141 S.E. 822 (1928); White v. First Nat'l Bank, 174 Ga. 281, 162 S.E. 701 (1932); Burgess v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 48, 169 S.E. 364 (1933); Reynolds v. Ingraham, 179 Ga. 398, 175 S.E. 918 (1934); Biddle v. Papa, 180 Ga. 468, 179 S.E. 357 (1935); Tanner v. Wilson, 183 Ga. App. 53, 187 S.E. 625 (1936); Harrell v. Parker, 186 Ga. 760, 198 S.E. 776 (1938); Hicks v. Atlanta Trust Co., 187 Ga. 314, 200 S.E. 301 (1938); Mize v. Harber, 189 Ga. 737, 8 S.E.2d 1 (1940); Lynch v. Harris County, 191 Ga. 132, 12 S.E.2d 293 (1940); Sawyer Coal & Ice Co. v. Kinnett-Odom Co., 192 Ga. 166, 14 S.E.2d 879 (1941); Lockwood v. Daniel, 193 Ga. 122, 17 S.E.2d 542 (1941); Beavers v. Mabry, 195 Ga. 169, 23 S.E.2d 672 (1942); Borum v. Deese, 196 Ga. 292, 26 S.E.2d 538 (1943); Clark v. Bandy, 196 Ga. 546, 27 S.E.2d 17 (1943); Alford v. Alford, 198 Ga. 424, 31 S.E.2d 785 (1944); Beavers v. Williams, 199 Ga. 114, 33 S.E.2d 343 (1945); Avary v. Avary, 202 Ga. 22, 41 S.E.2d 314 (1947); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 80 Ga. App. 750, 57 S.E.2d 301 (1950); Georgia Power Co. v. Mayor of Athens, 206 Ga. 513, 57 S.E.2d 573 (1950); Cashin v. Markwalter, 208 Ga. 444, 67 S.E.2d 226 (1951); Rockefeller v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. 493, 100 S.E.2d 279 (1957); Waters v. Waters, 217 Ga. 557, 123 S.E.2d 765 (1962); Ogletree v. Cathrall, 110 Ga. App. 100, 137 S.E.2d 799 (1964); Brown v. Granite Holding Corp., 221 Ga. 560, 146 S.E.2d 289 (1965); Jonesboro Area Athletic Ass'n v. Dickson, 227 Ga. 513, 181 S.E.2d 852 (1971); Kiser v. Georgia Power Co., 126 Ga. App. 551, 191 S.E.2d 311 (1972); Hudson v. Hudson, 258 Ga. 692, 373 S.E.2d 372 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 178.

C.J.S.

- 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 97 et seq.

ALR.

- Joinder of parties or causes of action in suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 13 A.L.R. 159.

A provision in land contract for pecuniary forfeiture or penalty by a party is default as affecting the right of the other party to specific performance, 32 A.L.R. 584, 98 A.L.R. 877.

Power of equity to require acceptance of damages in lieu of injunctive relief asked, 105 A.L.R. 1381.

Power of court to determine de jure title to office as incident of suit to protect possession of officer against claimant whose title is disputed, 114 A.L.R. 1147.

Power of equity to decree that party perform obligations of contract within fixed time upon pain of forfeiture, 114 A.L.R. 1389.

Jurisdiction of equity to protect personal rights; modern view, 175 A.L.R. 438.

Applications of rule permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over equity actions against foreign personal representatives where there are assets within forum, 53 A.L.R.2d 323.

Right to reformation of contract or instrument as affected by intervening rights of third persons, 79 A.L.R.2d 1180.

Injunction against exercise of power of eminent domain, 93 A.L.R.2d 465.

Punitive damages: power of equity court to award, 58 A.L.R.4th 844.