Purpose of section.

- The principle upon which courts exercising equitable jurisdiction interfere and grant relief is to suppress useless litigation; to prevent multiplicity of suits; to restrain oppressive litigation and to prevent irreparable mischief. Bond v. Little, 10 Ga. 395 (1851); Sutton v. Adams, 180 Ga. 48, 178 S.E. 365 (1934); Consumers Fin. Corp. v. Lamb, 217 Ga. 359, 122 S.E.2d 101 (1961); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hill, 218 Ga. 430, 128 S.E.2d 321 (1962).

The complainant's right must be satisfactorily established at law before equity will interfere. Bond v. Little, 10 Ga. 395 (1851).

Trial court approval for suit required.

- Trial court properly summarily dismissed an attorney's living trust's action against a beach cottage purchaser because a bill of peace and perpetual injunction had been entered and the trust sued the purchaser without obtaining trial court approval, as required by the bill of peace and perpetual injunction. Moreton Rolleston, Jr., Living Trust v. Kennedy, 277 Ga. 541, 591 S.E.2d 834, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042, 124 S. Ct. 2168, 158 L. Ed. 2d 732 (2004).

And where the relief can be clearly afforded at law, this section does not apply. Guess v. Stone Mt. Granite & Ry., 67 Ga. 215 (1881); Mayor of Gainesville v. Dean, 124 Ga. 750, 53 S.E. 183 (1906).

While avoidance of a multiplicity of suits may, in a proper case, be considered as an independent ground of equitable jurisdiction, and not a mere auxiliary to other equities present, it does not alone create an equitable cause of action, regardless of other circumstances. Dobbs v. FDIC, 187 Ga. 569, 1 S.E.2d 672 (1939).

Where the acts of the heir's agent, in charge of operating the decedent's corporation, in mismanaging the corporation, substantially the entire stock of which was owned by the estate, were continuous, still threatened and directly affected the value of the stock, whether the alleged acts are deemed trespasses or waste, it was unnecessary to go further and allege that the defendant was insolvent, since equity is empowered to enjoin such acts, where they would otherwise be likely to give rise to multiplicity of separate suits by the individual heirs against the agent. Shingler v. Shingler, 184 Ga. 671, 192 S.E. 824 (1937).

Cited in Mayer & Ullman v. Coley, 80 Ga. 207, 7 S.E. 164 (1887); Orton v. Madden, 75 Ga. 83 (1885); Lightner v. Belk, 178 Ga. 766, 174 S.E. 349 (1934); Hollingsworth v. People's Bank, 179 Ga. 704, 177 S.E. 743 (1934); Banner v. Cohen, 182 Ga. 271, 185 S.E. 333 (1936); Grimmett v. Barnwell, 184 Ga. 461, 192 S.E. 191 (1937); Shingler v. Shingler, 184 Ga. 671, 192 S.E. 824 (1937); Ewing v. Tanner, 184 Ga. 773, 193 S.E. 243 (1937); Groover v. Brandon, 200 Ga. 153, 36 S.E.2d 84 (1945); Harris v. Rowe, 200 Ga. 265, 36 S.E.2d 787 (1946); Avary v. Avary, 202 Ga. 22, 41 S.E.2d 314 (1947); Worley v. Gaston, 210 Ga. 350, 80 S.E.2d 304 (1954); Kirchman v. Kirchman, 212 Ga. 488, 93 S.E.2d 685 (1956); Montgomery v. Pierce, 212 Ga. 545, 93 S.E.2d 758 (1956); Ayers v. Baker, 216 Ga. 132, 114 S.E.2d 847 (1960); Maddox v. Dixie Feeds, Inc., 218 Ga. 378, 127 S.E.2d 918 (1962); Timeplan Loan & Inv. Corp. v. Morehead, 220 Ga. 762, 141 S.E.2d 420 (1965); Gill v. Myrick, 228 Ga. 253, 185 S.E.2d 72 (1971); C & S Land, Transp. & Dev. Corp. v. Grubbs, 141 Ga. App. 393, 233 S.E.2d 486 (1977).

Justices of the peace may not issue bills of peace.

- Since the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over equity matters and a bill of peace is an equitable remedy, justices of the peace do not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for such relief; it follows that any such bill of peace issued by a justice of the peace would be void and of no effect. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 66.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of statute conferring on chancery courts power to abate public nuisance, 22 A.L.R. 542, 75 A.L.R. 1298.

Avoidance of multiplicity of suits as ground of jurisdiction in equity of a suit by one out of possession to quiet title against persons in possession of different portions of the land in severalty, 30 A.L.R. 109.

Propriety of permanently enjoining one guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from engaging in sale or manufacture of device in question, 38 A.L.R.3d 572.