O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67 (2019)

Decree; effect of recordation

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Upon the receipt of the master’s report or upon a jury verdict, the court shall issue a decree which shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county or counties wherein the land affected lies and which, when recorded, shall operate to bind the land affected according to the tenor thereof and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons named therein, known or unknown. A marginal reference to the recorded judgments and decree shall be entered upon any recorded instrument stated to be affected thereby.

History

Ga. L. 1966, p. 443, § 7.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Demand for jury trial deemed untimely unless filed prior to consideration by special master. - Where a petitioner fails to file a demand for a jury trial prior to the time the case is heard by a special master, the demand is considered untimely, and will be denied. Brown v. Wilson, 240 Ga. 856, 242 S.E.2d 603 (1978). Court retained jurisdiction despite role of special master. - In a quiet title action, there was no merit to the contention that only the special master had jurisdiction to rule upon a motion for summary judgment. In submitting a quiet title case to a special master, a trial court did not cede jurisdiction to render a final decision; O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67 gave only the trial court authority to issue the final decree. Harbuck v. Houston County, 284 Ga. 4, 662 S.E.2d 107, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 641, 172 L.Ed.2d 613 (2008). Appointment of special master required. - In a quiet title action, the trial court erred by failing to appoint a special master because Georgia’s Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., requires a trial court to appoint a special master and for that special master to make a report of the special master’s findings to the trial court. DOCO Credit Union v. Chambers, 330 Ga. App. 633, 768 S.E.2d 808 (2015). Adoption of special master’s report. - Trial court did not err by failing to grant an investment company’s motion for an oral hearing on the company’s exceptions to a special master’s report because a trial court was entitled to enter judgment at any time the court chose and could have done so before any exceptions were filed by the company. Therefore, if a trial court may adopt the special master’s report and enter judgment even before a

party has a chance to file exceptions to the report, then it cannot be error for the trial court to fail to hold an oral hearing on any exceptions before entering judgment. MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485 (2011). Dismissal for failure to describe land triggers res judicata in later action. - Where petition to quiet title was dismissed for failure to describe land, petitioner was barred by res judicata from instituting a subsequent action for declaratory and injunctive relief based on same facts; res judicata applies not only when case was decided on merits, but also when it could have been so decided, had the case been handled appropriately by the litigants in the original case. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Woelper, 269 Ga. 109, 498 S.E.2d 255 (1998). Appellant did not waive objections. - Quiet title case was remanded to the trial court for it to address the merits of the appellant’s motion for a new trial as the appellant’s failure to file objections before the trial court adopted a special master’s report did not bar the appellant from objecting to the trial court’s judgment in a motion for new trial or on appeal since O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67 made no provision for filing exceptions to the special master’s report and did not require a trial court to provide notice to the parties and to conduct a hearing before adopting the special master’s report. Steinichen v. Stancil, 281 Ga. 75, 635 S.E.2d 158 (2006). No provision for filing exceptions. - O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67 makes no provision for filing exceptions to a special master’s report in a suit seeking to quiet title, and does not require a trial court to provide notice to the parties and to conduct a hearing before adopting a special master’s

report; although a trial court is not required to hear exceptions to a special master’s report, the trial court must independently evaluate the correctness of the report before adopting it as the judgment of the trial court. Steinichen v. Stancil, 281 Ga. 75, 635 S.E.2d 158 (2006). Cited in Thornton v. Reb Properties, Inc., 237 Ga. 59, 226 S.E.2d 741 (1976);

Heath v. Stinson, 238 Ga. 364, 233 S.E.2d 178 (1977); Glenn v. Allen, 239 Ga. 646, 238 S.E.2d 438 (1977); Capers v. Camp, 244 Ga. 7, 257 S.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass’n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Keever v. Dellinger, 291 Ga. 860, 734 S.E.2d 874 (2012).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 13 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1996–2025 · leading case: Steinichen v. Stancil, 635 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 2006).

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Steinichen v. Stancil, 635 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 2006). · cites it 6× “3 OCGA § 23-3-67 provides that “[u]pon the receipt of the master’s report or upon a jury verdict, the court shall issue a decree which shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county or counties wherein the land affected lies.”

Martin v. Patton, 483 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “On March 1, 1996, the trial court entered a decree based upon the jury verdict pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-67. The motion for new trial was a general form motion.”

Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 498 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 23-3-67. On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court, citing the Woelpers’ “complete lack of diligence” in complying with OCGA § 23-3-62 (b), as well as their failure to provide a transcript of the hearing before the special master which might have shown that…”

Woelper v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1996). · cites it 2× “The Woelpers contend that the superior court erred in denying their motions to extend discovery and to conduct a survey because, by so doing, the court abrogated the special master’s right to require pertinent evidence to be filed so that he could render a complete decision.…”

GHG, INC. v. Bryan, 566 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 2002). · cites it 2× “GHG claims that OCGA § 23-3-67 violates due process because it compels the trial court to issue its decree upon receipt of the special master’s report and does not provide any means by which a party can contest that report.”

Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes, Inc., 686 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2009). · cites it 2× “or to remove any particular cloud or clouds upon the title to the land and to make a report of his findings to the judge of the court[,] (OCGA § 23-3-66), the trial court is not divested of its overall jurisdiction of the case and its sole authority under OCGA § 23-3-67 to issue…”

Harbuck v. Houston Cnty., 662 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. 2008). · cites it 2× “Similarly, Harbuck’s contention that appellees lack standing is unsubstantiated.”

MPP Investments, Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 707 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 2× “However, OCGA § 23-3-67 “does not require a trial court .”

Doco Credit Union v. Chambers Et Al., 768 S.E.2d 808 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “or to remove any particular cloud or clouds upon the title to the land and to make a report of his findings to the judge of the court, the trial courtis not divested of its overall jurisdiction of the case *639 and its sole authority under OCGA § 23-3-67 to issue the final…”

Keever v. Dellinger, 734 S.E.2d 874 (Ga. 2012). · cites it 2× “Keever initially argues that the superior court erred when it rejected the Special Master’s finding that he had gained title to the property by adverse possession.”

Smith Et Al. v. Mitchell Cnty., 779 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “While the quiet title statutory scheme provides that the special master, once appointed, shall have complete jurisdiction within the scope of the pleadings to ascertain and determine the validity, nature, or extent of petitioner’s title and all other interests in the land or to…”

Wells Fargo Bank, N..a. v. Richmond (M.D. Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “§ 9-13-173 and an order per O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67. WRIT OF POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AS TO RH FUND, XVI, LLC Per Count II of the Complaint, the Judgment and Fed.”

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