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2018 Georgia Code 23-3-67 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 23 EQUITY

Section 3. Equitable Remedies And Proceedings Generally, 23-3-1 through 23-3-127.

ARTICLE 3 QUIA TIMET

23-3-67. Decree; effect of recordation.

Upon the receipt of the master's report or upon a jury verdict, the court shall issue a decree which shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county or counties wherein the land affected lies and which, when recorded, shall operate to bind the land affected according to the tenor thereof and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons named therein, known or unknown. A marginal reference to the recorded judgments and decree shall be entered upon any recorded instrument stated to be affected thereby.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 443, § 7.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Demand for jury trial deemed untimely unless filed prior to consideration by special master.

- Where a petitioner fails to file a demand for a jury trial prior to the time the case is heard by a special master, the demand is considered untimely, and will be denied. Brown v. Wilson, 240 Ga. 856, 242 S.E.2d 603 (1978).

Court retained jurisdiction despite role of special master.

- In a quiet title action, there was no merit to the contention that only the special master had jurisdiction to rule upon a motion for summary judgment. In submitting a quiet title case to a special master, a trial court did not cede jurisdiction to render a final decision; O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67 gave only the trial court authority to issue the final decree. Harbuck v. Houston County, 284 Ga. 4, 662 S.E.2d 107 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 641, 172 L. Ed. 2d 613 (2008).

Appointment of special master required.

- In a quiet title action, the trial court erred by failing to appoint a special master because Georgia's Quiet Title Act, O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq., requires a trial court to appoint a special master and for that special master to make a report of the special master's findings to the trial court. DOCO Credit Union v. Chambers, 330 Ga. App. 633, 768 S.E.2d 808 (2015).

Adoption of special master's report.

- Trial court did not err by failing to grant an investment company's motion for an oral hearing on the company's exceptions to a special master's report because a trial court was entitled to enter judgment at any time the court chose and could have done so before any exceptions were filed by the company. Therefore, if a trial court may adopt the special master's report and enter judgment even before a party has a chance to file exceptions to the report, then it cannot be error for the trial court to fail to hold an oral hearing on any exceptions before entering judgment. MPP Invs., Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 288 Ga. 558, 707 S.E.2d 485 (2011).

Dismissal for failure to describe land triggers res judicata in later action.

- Where petition to quiet title was dismissed for failure to describe land, petitioner was barred by res judicata from instituting a subsequent action for declaratory and injunctive relief based on same facts; res judicata applies not only when case was decided on merits, but also when it could have been so decided, had the case been handled appropriately by the litigants in the original case. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Woelper, 269 Ga. 109, 498 S.E.2d 255 (1998).

Appellant did not waive objections.

- Quiet title case was remanded to the trial court for it to address the merits of the appellant's motion for a new trial as the appellant's failure to file objections before the trial court adopted a special master's report did not bar the appellant from objecting to the trial court's judgment in a motion for new trial or on appeal since O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67 made no provision for filing exceptions to the special master's report and did not require a trial court to provide notice to the parties and to conduct a hearing before adopting the special master's report. Steinichen v. Stancil, 281 Ga. 75, 635 S.E.2d 158 (2006).

No provision for filing exceptions.

- O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67 makes no provision for filing exceptions to a special master's report in a suit seeking to quiet title, and does not require a trial court to provide notice to the parties and to conduct a hearing before adopting a special master's report; although a trial court is not required to hear exceptions to a special master's report, the trial court must independently evaluate the correctness of the report before adopting it as the judgment of the trial court. Steinichen v. Stancil, 281 Ga. 75, 635 S.E.2d 158 (2006).

Cited in Thornton v. Reb Properties, Inc., 237 Ga. 59, 226 S.E.2d 741 (1976); Heath v. Stinson, 238 Ga. 364, 233 S.E.2d 178 (1977); Glenn v. Allen, 239 Ga. 646, 238 S.E.2d 438 (1977); Capers v. Camp, 244 Ga. 7, 257 S.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Rivermist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515, 260 S.E.2d 897 (1979); Keever v. Dellinger, 291 Ga. 860, 734 S.E.2d 874 (2012).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 23-3-67

Total Results: 8  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 498 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 23, 1998 | 269 Ga. 109, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 631

...Upon receipt of the special master's award, the trial court issued a decree "which, when recorded, shall operate to bind the land affected according to the tenor thereof and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons named therein, known or unknown." OCGA § 23-3-67....
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Woelper v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 1996 | 266 Ga. 472, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 865

...d so that he could render a complete decision. This contention is unavailing. The special master was not denied pertinent evidence. His responsibility ended when he completed and filed his findings of fact and conclusions of law with the court. OCGA § 23-3-67....
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Steinichen v. Stancil, 281 Ga. 75 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 18, 2006 | 635 S.E.2d 158, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 2892

.... Under OCGA § 23-3-66, if, as in this case, neither party demands a jury trial, the special master “decides all questions of law and fact in the case.”2 Once the special master issues his report, he must file it with the superior court.3 OCGA § 23-3-67 provides that “[u]pon the receipt of the master’s report or upon a jury verdict, the court shall issue a decree which shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county or counties wherein the land affected lies.” We have held that OCGA § 23-3-67 “makes no provision for filing exceptions to the special master’s report,”4 and does not require a trial court to provide notice to the parties and to conduct a hearing before adopting the special master’s report.5 Although a trial...
...105, 106 (231 SE2d 345) (1976). OCGA § 23-3-66. Higdon, 238 Ga. at 106; Thompson v. Cheatham, 244 Ga. 117, 119 (259 SE2d 62) (1979). Thompson, 244 Ga. at 119. In GHG, Inc. v. Bryan, 275 Ga. 336, 337 (566 SE2d 662) (2002), GHG contended that OCGA § 23-3-67 violated due process by not providing a way for parties to contest a special master’s report in superior court, but we declined to review the issue as it was not properly raised. Eardley v....
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GHG, INC. v. Bryan, 566 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 15, 2002 | 275 Ga. 336, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2097

...856(1), 242 S.E.2d 603 (1978); Thornton v. REB Properties, 237 Ga. 59, 226 S.E.2d 741 (1976); Griffeth v. Griffin, 245 Ga.App. 619, 538 S.E.2d 521 (2000). Accordingly, GHG was not entitled to a jury trial for any of the reasons advanced. 3. GHG claims that OCGA § 23-3-67 violates due process because it compels the trial court to issue its decree upon receipt of the special master's report and does not provide any means by which a party can contest that report....
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Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes, Inc., 686 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 23, 2009 | 286 Ga. 192, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3639

...or to remove any particular cloud or clouds upon the title to the land and to make a report of his findings to the judge of the court[,]" (OCGA § 23-3-66), the trial court is not divested of its overall jurisdiction of the case and its sole authority under OCGA § 23-3-67 to issue the final decree....
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Harbuck v. Houston Cnty., 662 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 19, 2008 | 284 Ga. 4, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 1698

...562, 564-565(2), 615 S.E.2d 744 (2005) ("in submitting a quiet title case to a special master, the trial court does not cede jurisdiction to render a final decision"); Heath v. Stinson, 238 Ga. 364, 233 S.E.2d 178 (1977) (special master could not grant summary judgment because OCGA § 23-3-67 gives only the trial court authority to issue the final decree)....
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MPP Investments, Inc. v. Cherokee Bank, N.A., 707 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 10, 2011 | 288 Ga. 558

...Thus, MPP Investments is not entitled to the protection accorded to bona fide purchasers. 6. MPP Investments next contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant its motion for an oral hearing on its exceptions to the special master's report. However, OCGA § 23-3-67 "does not require a trial court ......
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Keever v. Dellinger, 291 Ga. 860 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 874, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3430

...Keever initially argues that the superior court erred when it rejected the Special Master’s finding that he had gained title to the property by adverse possession. At this point, however, that issue is moot, as a jury has now rendered a verdict. See OCGA § 23-3-67. 2....