Syfert Injury Law Firm
Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448(Orig. Code 1863, § 3156; Code 1868, § 3168; Code 1873, § 3235; Code 1882, § 3235; Civil Code 1895, § 4896; Civil Code 1910, § 5471; Code 1933, § 37-1503; Ga. L. 1952, p. 90, § 1.)
- For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982).
Cited in McKinney v. Daniels, 135 Ga. 157, 68 S.E. 1095 (1910); Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Lattimore, 168 Ga. 547, 148 S.E. 396 (1929); Bonner v. Merchants' Bank, 168 Ga. 782, 149 S.E. 133 (1929); Ewing v. Tanner, 184 Ga. 773, 193 S.E. 243 (1937); Freeman v. Atlanta Police Relief Ass'n, 62 Ga. App. 523, 8 S.E.2d 711 (1940); Finney v. Green, 90 Ga. App. 321, 83 S.E.2d 65 (1954); Morris v. Fulton County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 211 Ga. 900, 89 S.E.2d 489 (1955); Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Block, 215 Ga. 602, 112 S.E.2d 616 (1960); Ayers v. Baker, 216 Ga. 132, 114 S.E.2d 847 (1960); Adrian Lumber Co. v. Gillis, 219 Ga. 180, 132 S.E.2d 186 (1963); Russell v. Ware, 108 Ga. App. 628, 134 S.E.2d 48 (1963); Hudson v. Hudson, 220 Ga. 730, 141 S.E.2d 453 (1965); Algernon Blair, Inc. v. Trust Co., 224 Ga. 118, 160 S.E.2d 395 (1968); Adler v. Ormond, 117 Ga. App. 600, 161 S.E.2d 435 (1968); Sanders v. Carney, 224 Ga. 429, 162 S.E.2d 351 (1968); Gill v. Myrick, 228 Ga. 253, 185 S.E.2d 72 (1971); Leon Inv. Co. v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 668, 182 S.E.2d 151 (1971); Williams v. Overstreet, 230 Ga. 112, 195 S.E.2d 906 (1973); Farris v. United States, 230 Ga. 862, 199 S.E.2d 782 (1973); C & S Land, Transp. & Dev. Corp. v. Grubbs, 141 Ga. App. 393, 233 S.E.2d 486 (1977); Blaylock v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Ga. 462, 238 S.E.2d 105 (1977); Paulding County v. City of Hiram, 240 Ga. 220, 240 S.E.2d 71 (1977); Johnson v. Mayor of Carrollton, 249 Ga. 173, 288 S.E.2d 565 (1982); Taylor v. Mosley, 252 Ga. 325, 314 S.E.2d 184 (1984); Evans v. Cushing Properties, 197 Ga. App. 380, 398 S.E.2d 306 (1990); McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 95, 508 S.E.2d 471 (1998); Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570 (2015).
- Before a claim will be held to be of such character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the holder to act, there must be a close question of law or fact. Almand v. Reese, 209 Ga. 138, 71 S.E.2d 223 (1952).
A state depository having state funds on deposit when the state treasurer is suspended and another is appointed to the office pending the suspension may discharge its obligation to the state by accounting for the funds to the appointee, in such case an interpleader will not lie on behalf of the state depository to determine to whom it shall pay the money, whether to the suspended officer or to the appointee, because the law is clear that the appointee is entitled to receive the funds. Daniel v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 182 Ga. 384, 185 S.E. 696 (1936).
A bank which has rented a deposit box to which widow and administrator of deceased husband's estate claim right of entry need not decide at its peril either close questions of fact or nice questions of law; nevertheless, when it is in possession of all the facts and the questions of law are not intricate or debatable, a petition for interpleader will be denied. Mandeville v. First Nat'l Bank, 206 Ga. 426, 57 S.E.2d 553 (1950); Gunby v. Harper, 216 Ga. 94, 114 S.E.2d 856 (1960).
Trial court properly granted relief sought by amended petition for interpleader and for certain injunctive relief against contractor and other named persons who had supplied him building material and performed labor for him in repairing a building which the petitioners owned, and who had instituted proceedings to foreclose liens against the repaired property. Bryant v. Haygood, 216 Ga. 561, 118 S.E.2d 469 (1961).
- It is essential to the maintenance of a petition for interpleader that there be at least two persons, having conflicting claims, each apparently well founded, to a fund in the hands of a person having no interest in or claim thereon, and who, as between the conflicting claimants, is perfectly indifferent. Davis v. Davis, 96 Ga. 136, 21 S.E. 1002 (1895); Miller Hotel Co. v. Chastaine, 183 Ga. 172, 188 S.E. 4 (1936); Mullins v. Autry, 200 Ga. 645, 38 S.E.2d 390 (1946).
The general doctrine is, that interpleader lies, where two or more persons claim the same thing, under different titles, or in separate interests, from another person, who, not claiming any title or interest therein himself, and not knowing to which of the claimants he ought of right to render the duty claimed, or to deliver the property claimed, is either molested by an action or actions brought against him, or fears he may suffer injury, from the conflicting claims of the parties against him. Johnson v. Harbison-Walker Mining Co., 181 Ga. 630, 183 S.E. 791 (1936).
Conflicting claims must be of such character as to justify a reasonable doubt or reasonable apprehension of danger in order that resort may be had to a court of equity. Reed v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Ga. 604, 58 S.E.2d 183 (1950).
Petition for interpleader brought by insurer, alleging that the insured changed the beneficiary named in the policy prior to his death, without alleging when or how the change was made, setting forth a copy of the policy, or stating whether or not the insured reserved to himself the right to change the beneficiary, was insufficient to inform the court of the nature, character, and foundation of the claim so as to enable the court to determine whether or not an interpleader was essential to the plaintiff's protection, and the trial court erred in overruling the general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to the petition. Lowery v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 209 Ga. 753, 76 S.E.2d 5 (1953).
- Trial court properly granted a bank's petition for interpleader with regard to a dispute between church members over funds held by the bank because interpleader was the appropriate method to resolve the dispute over control of the funds since the dispute was secular and not of a religious nature and the resolution of the dispute did not necessitate an impermissible intrusion or excessive entanglement into ecclesiastical matters. The bank was authorized to file the petition based on the terms of the bank's deposit agreement and O.C.G.A. § 23-3-90 once the bank learned of the dispute over the church funds. Nash v. United Bank-Thomaston, 319 Ga. App. 179, 734 S.E.2d 238 (2012).
- In the case of a petition of strict interpleader, the petitioner must be an indifferent stakeholder, without interest in the subject matter. Phillips v. Kelly, 176 Ga. 111, 167 S.E. 281 (1932).
A necessary ingredient of equitable interpleader is that the stakeholder must be disinterested. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 121 Ga. App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211 (1970).
One who seeks the aid of a court by petition for interpleader must claim no right in opposition to the claimants to the fund. Holland v. Sterling, 214 Ga. 583, 105 S.E.2d 894 (1958).
Where the defendant is not disinterested, as where he denies liability to the plaintiff as well as the other two parties, the action cannot be classified as a pleading for equitable interpleader. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 121 Ga. App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211 (1970).
The petition in the nature of interpleader cannot be maintained where plaintiffs allege that neither of defendants has any right or title to, or any interest in, the subject matter of the action, nor unless the relief sought is equitable relief. Phillips v. Kelly, 176 Ga. 111, 167 S.E. 281 (1932).
It is essential to an interpleader that the plaintiff be liable to only one of the defendants and never by any possibility to both. Finance Co. v. Jones Co., 141 Ga. 619, 81 S.E. 1033 (1914); Lilley v. Nixon, 214 Ga. 548, 105 S.E.2d 716 (1958).
To entitle a person to a petition of interpleader, he must be in a position in which he is liable to one of two or more persons, who claim from him the same debt or duty; and he claims no right in opposition to the claimants or either of them; and he does not know to whom he ought, of right, to render the debt or duty. Phillips v. Kelly, 176 Ga. 111, 167 S.E. 281 (1932).
Where there is a question of double liability and not of double vexation for one liability, the plaintiff is not in that disinterested attitude as to the conflicting claimants which is essential to a petition of interpleader. Lilley v. Nixon, 214 Ga. 548, 105 S.E.2d 716 (1958).
If the question is not to which one of two or more claimants a single duty or debt should be rendered or paid or the same property should be delivered, but whether the person filing the proceeding is liable to each of two holders of different negotiable promissory notes transferred to them respectively before due, on which separate suits have been brought, whether they are not bona fide holders for value and without notice, and whether the debtor has a defense as against each or either of them, arising out of transactions with the original payee, this presents no case of a double claim to one debt or liability but a case of whether there is a double liability, and does not authorize a proceeding for interpleader proper. Gardner v. Haas, Howell & Dodd, Inc., 178 Ga. 685, 173 S.E. 863 (1934).
Petition by the owner of a tract of real estate, seeking to require two brokers with whom the plaintiff had listed the property, to interplead and set up their claims for one commission growing out of a sale of the property, failed to set forth a cause of action for interpleader, since two separate contracts of listing were alleged and there was a possibility under the allegations of the petition that the plaintiff might be liable to both parties. Lilley v. Nixon, 214 Ga. 548, 105 S.E.2d 716 (1958).
Where the proceeds of a life insurance policy are claimed by the insured's mother, as the original beneficiary, by the insured's wife, as the new beneficiary at the insured's direction to the insurer, and by the children, based on an instrument by the wife and mother establishing a trust for the benefit of the children, the essential for interpleaders are present. Kimbrell v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 217 Ga. 335, 122 S.E.2d 94 (1961).
- It must appear from the allegations of the petition that the conflicting claims of the defendants are of such character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the plaintiff to act; and in order to do this it is necessary that such claims be set forth so as to inform the court of their nature, character, and foundation, certainly to the extent of enabling the court to determine whether or not an interpleader is essential to the plaintiff 's protection. Mullins v. Autry, 200 Ga. 645, 38 S.E.2d 390 (1946); Lilley v. Nixon, 214 Ga. 548, 105 S.E.2d 716 (1958).
When two or more persons claim the same thing, by different and separate interests, and another person, not knowing to which of the claimants he ought of right to render a debt or duty, or to deliver property in his custody, fears he may be hurt by some of them, he may exhibit a petition of interpleader against them. Johnson v. Harbison-Walker Mining Co., 181 Ga. 630, 183 S.E. 791 (1936).
But a stakeholder is not entitled to protection by a court to the extent of being saved from all shadow of risk; and so where he is in possession of all the facts and there is no question of law which is reasonably debatable, his petition for interpleader should be denied. Citizens Bank v. Middlebrooks, 209 Ga. 330, 72 S.E.2d 298 (1952); Lowery v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 209 Ga. 753, 76 S.E.2d 5 (1953); Lilley v. Nixon, 214 Ga. 548, 105 S.E.2d 716 (1958).
In order for a mere stakeholder to invoke the aid of a court of equity by interpleader, it is not necessary that suits actually be filed by all of the claimants, or that there will necessarily be double liability; one of the objects to be accomplished by interpleader is to avoid the danger of a double vexation against a single liability. Johnson v. Harbison-Walker Mining Co., 181 Ga. 630, 183 S.E. 791 (1936).
If a holder knows all the facts, and the questions of law are not intricate or debatable, a petition for interpleader will not lie; but it is not incumbent upon the holder "to decide at his peril either close questions of fact, or nice questions of law"; and in such a case he may require the parties at interest to set up their claims for determination. Cannon v. Williams, 194 Ga. 808, 22 S.E.2d 838 (1942).
Therefore, the doubt or danger that would authorize an interpleader must be reasonable. Daniel v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 182 Ga. 384, 185 S.E. 696 (1936).
Before one occupying the situation of a stakeholder can call upon adverse claimants of a fund in his hands to interplead, he must satisfactorily show to the court that their claims have such a foundation in law as will create a reasonable doubt as to his safety in undertaking to determine for himself to whom the fund belongs. Smith v. Folsom, 190 Ga. 460, 9 S.E.2d 824 (1940).
And the doubt or danger may arise either in law or in fact as to the person to whom the money should be paid. Daniel v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 182 Ga. 384, 185 S.E. 696 (1936).
It must appear from the allegations of the petition that the conflicting claims of the defendants are of such character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for the plaintiff to act; and in order to do this it is necessary that such claims be set forth so as to inform the court of their nature, character, and foundation, certainly to extent of enabling the court to determine whether or not an interpleader is essential to the plaintiff's protection. Gardner v. Haas, Howell & Dodd, Inc., 178 Ga. 685, 173 S.E. 863 (1934); Lowery v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 209 Ga. 753, 76 S.E.2d 5 (1953).
The complainant in a petition of interpleader merely stirs up a war and then leaves the real belligerents to fight it out, he retiring from the scene to repose in dignified ease, holding, the while, the prize which is to reward the victor. Perkins & Littlefield v. Trippe, 40 Ga. 225 (1869); Smith v. Folsom, 190 Ga. 460, 9 S.E.2d 824 (1940).
Where the owner of property has in his possession funds due under a contract for the erection of a house, which are claimed by the materialmen under an asserted equitable assignment from the contractor and by the trustee of the contractor, who has since been adjudicated a bankrupt, the owner may bring the funds into court and maintain a petition for interpleader to compel the conflicting claimants to litigate between themselves their respective rights thereto. Smith v. Folsom, 190 Ga. 460, 9 S.E.2d 824 (1940).
Where petition for interpleader showed that the defendant insurer owed the beneficiary of two life insurance policies purchased by the deceased an undisputed amount, that two persons have made demands on it for the payment of such proceeds, each claiming to be the legal beneficiary of the policies, and that their conflicting claims are of such a character as to render it doubtful or dangerous for it to act, the judgment permitting the defendant to pay the full amount due on the policies into the registry of the court and then be discharged from further liability was not erroneous. Sanders v. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 212 Ga. 674, 94 S.E.2d 871 (1956).
And on the trial of interpleader each of the claimants occupies the position of plaintiff, and must recover on the strength of his own title rather than on the weakness of the other's title. Johnson v. Harbison-Walker Mining Co., 181 Ga. 630, 183 S.E. 791 (1936).
After a decree has been entered, ordering the petitioner to pay the fund in question into court and ordering the claimants to interplead and set up their claims to the fund, a suit in interpleader becomes, in effect, a proceeding between the claimants alone as adversaries to determine who is entitled to the fund, and the verdict was properly limited to the determination of this issue. Smith v. Folsom, 190 Ga. 460, 9 S.E.2d 824 (1940).
Interpleader actions may be instituted in Georgia under this article or under § 9-11-22. Stone v. Davis, 242 Ga. 17, 247 S.E.2d 756 (1978).
The remedy for interpleader provided for in § 9-11-22 is in addition to and in no way supersedes or limits the remedy of equitable interpleader provided for in this article. Stone v. Davis, 242 Ga. 17, 247 S.E.2d 756 (1978).
Section9-11-22 has broadened and liberalized the rules relating to the remedy of interpleader so as to render the technicalities formally associated with the equitable remedy of a strict bill of interpleader no longer applicable to complaints tried under that section. Stone v. Davis, 242 Ga. 17, 247 S.E.2d 756 (1978).
Permission to interplead a trustee need not be secured from the court of bankruptcy which appointed him, since an interpleader suit is not an interference with, and cannot mature into a charge on, the assets of bankrupt. Smith v. Folsom, 190 Ga. 460, 9 S.E.2d 824 (1940).
- A successor trustee that brought an interpleader action against the original trustee and a broker, involving $60,000 in compensation which the original trustee was entitled to under a court order, was not entitled to summary judgment. The claims of the two interpled parties were not adverse or competing. The original trustee only claimed compensation under the court order as a trustee, not in any other capacity, while the broker only claimed a fee as a broker. Trust Co. Bank v. Citizens & S. Trust Co., 260 Ga. 124, 390 S.E.2d 589 (1990).
- In an interpleader action, the trial court erred in the court's interpretation of the governing contracts as the funds held by the sheriff for a bail bond corporation were really held on behalf of the owners of the corporation in the owners' individual capacities; thus, a judgment creditor of the individuals was entitled to the funds. Freund v. Warren, 320 Ga. App. 765, 740 S.E.2d 727 (2013).
- The petition should be filed before either claimant has had his right established by judgment. Brown v. Wilson, 56 Ga. 534 (1876); Moore v. Hill, 59 Ga. 760 (1877). See 7 Enc. Dig. 753.
- Because a husband's counterclaim for reimbursement of the husband's premium payments did not make the insurer an interested stakeholder so as to preclude its interpleader action, the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion for discharge under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-90(a). Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Vance, 297 Ga. App. 677, 678 S.E.2d 135 (2009).
- This section could not justify an attorney's fee directly against the prevailing claimant to an interplead fund. Cable Atlanta, Inc. v. Project, Inc., 749 F.2d 626 (11th Cir. 1984).
The award to a personal injury plaintiff of attorney fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff (defendant's administrator) in bringing the action was within the court's discretion, since the trial court had already allowed the administrator to recover her costs from the fund deposited in the court. Cherokee Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 204 Ga. App. 152, 418 S.E.2d 616, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 921, 418 S.E.2d 616 (1992).
- Right of judgment debtor to interplead, 48 A.L.R. 966.
Nature and extent of relief of successful intervener or interpleader in attachment, 66 A.L.R. 908.
Right of owner to maintain bill of interpleader against contractor and lien claimants and others in respect of fund arising from construction contracts, 70 A.L.R. 515.
Right of trustee, executor, or administrator to maintain interpleader, 152 A.L.R. 1122.
Insurance: facility of payment clause, 166 A.L.R. 10.
Allowance of interest on interpleaded or impleaded disputed funds, 15 A.L.R.2d 473.
Corporation's right to interplead claimants to dividends, 46 A.L.R.2d 980.
Allowance of attorney's fees to party interpleading claimants to funds or property, 48 A.L.R.2d 190.
Amount of attorney's compensation in absence of contract or statute fixing amount, 57 A.L.R.3d 475; 57 A.L.R.3d 550; 57 A.L.R.3d 584; 58 A.L.R.3d 201; 58 A.L.R.3d 317; 17 A.L.R.5th 366; 23 A.L.R.5th 241.
Right of party who is an attorney and appears for himself to award of attorney's fees against opposing party as element of costs, 78 A.L.R.3d 1119.
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees in matters involving real estate - modern cases, 10 A.L.R.5th 448.
Calculations of attorneys' fees under Federal Tort Claims Act--28 USCS sec. 2678, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 866.
Total Results: 5
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-03-16
Snippet: later, AGAC did the same. See OCGA §§ 9-11-67, 23-3-90. On November 14, 2011, Curtis filed a petition
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-03-16
Citation: 296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 178
Snippet: later, AGAC did the same. See OCGA §§ 9-11-67, 23-3-90. *697 On November 14, 2011, Curtis
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-03
Citation: 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683
Snippet: equitable interpleader provided for in Code Sections 23-3-90 through 23-3-92. OCGA § 9-11-24, the CPA rule
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1990-04-25
Citation: 390 S.E.2d 589, 260 Ga. 124
Snippet: marketing the property. See OCGA §§ 9-11-22 & 23-3-90. The record does not support this argument, and
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1984-03-09
Citation: 252 Ga. 325, 314 S.E.2d 184, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 679
Snippet: an equitable interpleader pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-90 (Code Ann. § 37-1503), or an action under the Civil