O.C.G.A. § 24-13-91 (2019)
Definitions
As used in this article, the term:
(1) “Penal institution” means a jail, prison, penitentiary, house of correction, or other place of penal detention.
(2) “State” means any state or territory of the United States and the District of Columbia.
(3) “Summons” means a subpoena, order, or other notice requiring the appearance of a witness.
(4) “Witness” means a person whose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in a criminal prosecution or proceeding held by the prosecution or the defense, including a person who is confined in a penal institution in any state.
History
Code 1981, § 24-13-91, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-91 are included in the annotations for this Code section. No counsel error in failing to secure witness for trial. - Because the only testimony in a hearing on a motion for a new trial with regard to defendant’s murder conviction regarding the content of defendant’s sister’s potential testimony showed that it would have merely reiterated defendant’s mother’s testimony, the trial court did not err by failing to secure the attendance of the sister through an interstate subpoena. Tollette v. State, 280 Ga. 100, 621 S.E.2d 742, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 770 (2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 893, 127 S. Ct. 199, 166 L. Ed. 2d 162, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5449 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-91). Determination of whether witness was necessary and material. - It was
the out-of-state judge who must decide whether the sought-after witness was necessary and material, not the requesting court in Georgia. The Georgia trial judge presented with a request for a certificate was charged with deciding whether the sought-after witness was a “material witness,” under the former Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Proceedings, former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-94(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-13-94); in light of the former Uniform Act, former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-97 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-1397), “material witness” was construed as a witness who could testify about matters having some logical connection with the consequential facts, especially if few others, if any, knew about these matters. Davenport v. State, 289 Ga. 399, 711 S.E.2d 699, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 502 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-1091).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses, §§ 50, 51.
C.J.S. 98 C.J.S. (Rev), Witnesses, § 1.