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2018 Georgia Code 24-3-2 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 24-3-2 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 24-3-2

TITLE 24 EVIDENCE

Section 3. Parol Evidence, 24-3-1 through 24-3-10.

ARTICLE 2 LEGISLATIVE FACTS; ORDINANCES OR RESOLUTIONS

24-3-2. Proof of unwritten portions of contract admissible where not inconsistent.

If the writing does not purport to contain all the stipulations of the contract, parol evidence shall be admissible to prove other portions thereof not inconsistent with the writing; collateral undertakings between parties of the same part among themselves would not properly be looked for in the writing.

(Code 1981, §24-3-2, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, § 3726, former Code 1868, § 3750, former Code 1873, § 3803, former Code 1882, § 3803, former Civil Code 1895, § 5204, former Civil Code 1910, § 5791, former Code 1933, § 38-504, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Requirements for application.

- To bring a case within the rule admitting parol evidence to complete an entire agreement of which a writing is only a part, two things are essential. First, the writing must appear on inspection to be an incomplete contract; and, second, the parol evidence must be consistent with and not contradictory of the written instrument. Forsyth Mfg. Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 37 S.E. 485, 81 Am. St. R. 28 (1900) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5204); McCreary v. Acton, 29 Ga. App. 162, 114 S.E. 230 (1922); Rauschenberg v. Peeples, 30 Ga. App. 384, 118 S.E. 409 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5791) Bowen v. Swift & Co., 52 Ga. App. 793, 184 S.E. 625 (1936) See also Harden v. Orr, 219 Ga. 54, 131 S.E.2d 545 (1963) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5791);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

Writing must have essential elements of contract.

- While it is true that parol evidence as to all attendant and surrounding facts and circumstances may be admitted to explain ambiguities in a written contract and that if it appears from the contract itself that it was not intended that the instrument should embrace the entire agreement, parol evidence is admissible to set up collateral agreements not inconsistent with the terms of the writing, in order for these principles of law to have application, the instrument relied on must embrace within itself the essential elements of a contract. Jones v. Knight Mercantile Co., 51 Ga. App. 57, 179 S.E. 569 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

Mere unsigned slip of paper, although in the handwriting of the president of the plaintiff corporation, containing only the words "Contract price, $2,950 - J.A. Glass, carpenter, San Verner, plumber and elect," wholly failed to disclose the subject matter of the alleged contract, did not purport to bind anyone with reference thereto, and cannot be construed as such an instrument as, when aided by parol, would constitute a binding agreement. Jones v. Knight Mercantile Co., 51 Ga. App. 57, 179 S.E. 569 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

Contracts within the statute of frauds.

- Parol evidence rule does not apply to contracts covered by the statute of frauds. Douglass v. Bunn, 110 Ga. 159, 35 S.E. 339 (1900) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5204); Shinall Bros. v. Skelton, 28 Ga. App. 527, 112 S.E. 163 (1922);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5791).

Provision of former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2 that if a writing did not purport to be entire agreement between parties, parol evidence was admissible to prove other portions thereof not inconsistent with the writing, was inapplicable to a contract of guaranty because such contracts are required to be entirely in writing under O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(2), statute of frauds. Builder's Supply Corp. v. Taylor, 164 Ga. App. 127, 296 S.E.2d 417 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2).

In action to recover on contract of guaranty, parol evidence was not admissible to prove identity of principal debtor, the identity not having been provided by the subject written agreement. Builder's Supply Corp. v. Taylor, 164 Ga. App. 127, 296 S.E.2d 417 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2).

Contract, partly oral and partly written, for a period of one year is valid and enforceable. Empire Box, Inc. v. Moore, 87 Ga. App. 57, 73 S.E.2d 63 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

Collateral agreement which is inducement for written agreement.

- Distinct, collateral oral agreement that is consistent with and usually forms part of the consideration or inducement for the second written agreement, may be established by parol evidence. Diamondhead Corp. v. Robinson, 144 Ga. App. 60, 240 S.E.2d 572 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

When the evidence showed the existence of a separate and independent collateral agreement, the renewal of which, for three consecutive years, induced appellee to renew a written agreement with appellant and that the appellant honored this agreement, the appellant could not now keep the agreement from evidence under the sanction of the parol evidence rule. Diamondhead Corp. v. Robinson, 144 Ga. App. 60, 240 S.E.2d 572 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

Filling blanks.

- Parol evidence is admissible to fill blanks in the writing not inconsistent with the writing itself. Westbrook v. Griffin, 24 Ga. App. 808, 102 S.E. 453 (1920) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5791).

When, in a special contract in writing between a common carrier and a shipper of livestock, the amount of freight is left blank, the blank may be filled by parol evidence showing the actual amount contracted for and paid by the shipper. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Reid, 91 Ga. 377, 17 S.E. 934 (1893) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3803).

Subscription for stock.

- Parol evidence rule applies to a written subscription for stock. Hendrix v. Academy of Music, 73 Ga. 437 (1884) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3803).

Receipt given by attorney.

- Parol evidence rule applies to a receipt given by an attorney for a note placed in the attorney's hands for collection. Barclay v. Hopkins, 59 Ga. 562 (1877) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3803).

Contract excluding other representations.

- If a written contract of sale stated that the writing was "made under inducements and representations herein expressed and no others," it could not be proved by parol that plaintiff's agent made any other representation or warranty. Shinall Bros. v. Skelton, 28 Ga. App. 527, 112 S.E. 163 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5791).

Unambiguous maturity date not waived.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2 permitted parol evidence of collateral undertakings between the parties only when the writing did not purport to contain all the stipulations of the contract and only when such evidence was not inconsistent with the writing. In this case, defendant's testimony that the maturity date was waived by parol agreement was directly inconsistent with the certain and unambiguous maturity date stipulated in the written note. Moreover, the general rule prohibiting parol evidence may not be avoided on the theory of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties. Barton v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 204 Ga. App. 346, 419 S.E.2d 342 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2).

Letter reciting writer's understanding of oral contract.

- Letter written by vice-president of corporation reciting the vice-president's understanding of the oral contract of employment between the president of corporation and the recipient of the letter, since it did not purport to be the contract itself, did not prevent the use of parol evidence to show what the full contract was. Marston v. Downing Co., 73 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

When written part may be varied.

- When a contract is entire, part of which is in writing and part in parol, the written part cannot be varied by parol evidence in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake. Rauschenberg v. Peeples, 30 Ga. App. 384, 118 S.E. 409 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5791).

Contract held complete on contract's face.

- See McCann v. Glynn Lumber Co., 199 Ga. 669, 34 S.E.2d 839 (1945) (timber lease);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

Effect of part performance.

- Acceptance of the benefits and part performance of the contract by the plaintiff would preclude the defendant from attacking the alleged oral portion of a contract which appeared to be an explanation of the entire contract rather than conflicting with any written provisions. Consumers Fin. Corp. v. Lamb, 217 Ga. 359, 122 S.E.2d 101 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-504).

Admitting contract in answer.

- When the defendants admitted in their answer that the written order and notes constituted the entire contract, the defendants were precluded from offering evidence of any other contract. Shinall Bros. v. Skelton, 28 Ga. App. 527, 112 S.E. 163 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5791).

Assignment of note to secure assignor's debts to bank.

- For application of former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2 to a situation where debts secured by an assignment of a note included only the assignor's debts on notes signed by the assignor as maker or also to notes on which the assignor might be liable as an endorser or accommodation party, see National City Bank v. Busbin, 175 Ga. App. 103, 332 S.E.2d 678 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2).

Promissory note held complete.

- If the promissory note constituted an unconditional promise to pay, defendants were prohibited from proving the lender's alleged oral promise which, if proven, would clearly have contradicted the terms of the note requiring payment. Devin Lamplighter, Ltd. v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 206 Ga. App. 747, 426 S.E.2d 645 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2).

Written part may not be varied.

- Trial court properly struck a paragraph in an estate executrix's affidavit in opposition to the decedent's nephew's motion for summary judgment, arising from an action regarding estate assets and joint venture agreements, as the executrix's assertions regarding a handwritten note by the husband constituted parol evidence which could not be used to alter the meaning of the unambiguous language of the agreements, and necessity was not shown for admission of the hearsay evidence; accordingly, the handwritten notation that the properties at issue were to be sold for "market value" could not change the contractual language that indicated that the properties would be sold for a predetermined price. Zaglin v. Atlanta Army Navy Store, Inc., 275 Ga. App. 855, 622 S.E.2d 73 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-2).

Cited in Stallings v. State, 319 Ga. App. 587, 737 S.E.2d 592 (2013); Bulloch v. State, 293 Ga. 179, 744 S.E.2d 763 (2013); Carter v. State, 324 Ga. App. 118, 749 S.E.2d 404 (2013); Miller v. State, 296 Ga. 9, 764 S.E.2d 823 (2014); Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. v. Anduro Holdings, LLC, Ga. App. , 816 S.E.2d 695 (2018).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1128 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 32A C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 1176, 1195, 1196, 1219, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1255 et seq., 1269.

ALR.

- Competency of parol evidence to show a money consideration additional to that stipulated in a written contract, 12 A.L.R. 354.

Competency of parol evidence to vary, contradict, or add to terms of ticket or token issued by carrier for transportation or accommodation of passenger, 62 A.L.R. 655.

Parol evidence rule: tests for determining whether entire agreement is embodied in the writing (rule of integration), 70 A.L.R. 752.

Admissibility of parol or extrinsic evidence to show promise of employment or other consideration not embodied in written release of claim for bodily injury or death, 92 A.L.R. 248.

Admissibility of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter or supplement written records of local legislative bodies, 98 A.L.R. 1229.

"Contractual" consideration as regards parol evidence rule, 100 A.L.R. 17.

Parol evidence rule as applied to rights or liabilities of coparties to contract as between themselves or their privies, 129 A.L.R. 673.

Election by beneficiary to take under or against will as predictable upon initiation of, or participation in, court proceedings, 166 A.L.R. 316.

Performance of work previously contracted for as consideration for promise to pay greater or additional amount, 12 A.L.R.2d 78.

Parol evidence to show duration of written contract for support or maintenance, 14 A.L.R.2d 897.

Failure to object to parol evidence, or voluntary introduction thereof, as waiver of defense of statute of frauds, 15 A.L.R.2d 1330.

Admissibility of oral agreement as to specific time for performance where written contract is silent, 85 A.L.R.2d 1269.

Admissibility of oral agreement respecting duration of employment or agency where written contract is silent, 85 A.L.R.2d 1331.

Effectiveness of stipulation of parties or attorneys, notwithstanding its violating form requirements, 7 A.L.R.3d 1394.

Enforceability of voluntary promise of additional compensation because of unforeseen difficulties in performance of existing contract, 85 A.L.R.3d 259.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Vega v. State, 673 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 340 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 9, 2009 | 285 Ga. 32, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 439

...he was not present at the scene of the crime but that a person identified as "Nicaragua" told Padilla what happened. Relying on Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867, 294 S.E.2d 482 (1982), Vega urges that the officer's testimony is admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2 to explain his conduct and motives with regard to his lack of further investigation into potentially exculpatory evidence....
...es equally: "[W]here the conduct and motives of the actor are not matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are irrelevant to the issues on trial) then the information, etc., on which he or she acted shall not be admissible under" OCGA § 24-3-2....
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Brown v. State, 549 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 70 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 2, 2001 | 274 Ga. 31, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2070

...ed appellant in 1996 with respect to the information he was given regarding the anonymous tip. The trial court admitted the testimony under an exception to the hearsay rule to explain the conduct of the police officer in apprehending appellant. OCGA § 24-3-2 provides "When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence." In Momon v....
...find the truth of what a defendant did, and, on occasion, of why he did it. It is most unusual that a prosecution will properly concern itself with why an investigating officer did something. If the hearsay rule is to remain a part of our law, then O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2 (Code Ann....
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Harris v. State, 615 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2005 | 279 Ga. 522, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 2017

...The officer testified he had examined the freezer because he had "a weird feeling" and because the victim's neighbor and a friend of the victim had told him they had not seen the victim for several weeks. The trial court overruled the objection on the ground that the hearsay explained the officer's conduct. See OCGA § 24-3-2. To prevent an overly broad interpretation of OCGA § 24-3-2, this Court has ruled the statute is applicable only when "the conduct and motives of the actor are matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are relevant to the issues on trial)...." Momon v....
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White v. State, 546 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 7, 2001 | 273 Ga. 787

...54, 55(1), 537 S.E.2d 364 (2000). The Court of Appeals based this ruling on the principle that a law enforcement officer may testify, over a hearsay objection, to a vocal fact of identification witnessed by him. The Court of Appeals additionally stated that, pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-2 and Momon *516 v....
...Unlike the Court of Appeals, this Court held that "where the conduct and motives of the actor are not matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are irrelevant to the issues on trial) then the information, etc., on which he or she acted shall not be admissible under" OCGA § 24-3-2....
...Because the photographic lineups did not supply the investigator in this case with any new information or generate any relevant conduct on her part which needed to be explained to the jury, the State concedes that it cannot demonstrate how the identifications were admissible as original evidence under OCGA § 24-3-2....
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Gordon v. State, 541 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 5, 2001 | 273 Ga. 373

...police. The court overruled the hearsay objection and allowed the testimony, not for its veracity or truthfulness, but to show Hare's conduct in questioning Gordon and in ultimately notifying the police. The evidence was properly admitted under OCGA § 24-3-2....
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Character v. State, 674 S.E.2d 280 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 9, 2009 | 285 Ga. 112, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 776

...and thus was not hearsay; and (2) that, even if it was hearsay, it was admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. Lovejoy's out-of-court statements were non-hearsay and admissible as "original evidence" if the requirements of OCGA § 24-3-2 were satisfied....
...ents to a third party are thus not admissible to explain the victim's motives or conduct. [7] Similarly, we have held that a victim's out-of-court statements to a third party are not admissible to explain a defendant's conduct and motives under OCGA § 24-3-2 unless the defendant knew of those statements....
...nduct and motives unless (1) those statements are true; or (2) they are false, but the defendant knew that the victim was telling people they were having difficulties. As was correctly stated in Jackson: For conversations to be admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2 and Momon, the conversations must be known to the actor....
...Jackson [the victim] that were unknown to the appellant.... Ms. Jackson's conversations with others regarding statements made by the appellant or actions taken by the appellant were not admissible to explain the appellant's motive or conduct under OCGA § 24-3-2 or Momon....
...State, [10] however, reached a result that is contrary to the foregoing cases. It appears that Perry was a garden variety case involving prior difficulties in which the victim told her friends about the defendant's prior abuse of her. Relying on OCGA § 24-3-2, the Court concluded that the victim's out-of-court statements were admissible....
...cessity exception to the hearsay rule to admit evidence of prior difficulties. [11] For these reasons, we overrule Perry to the extent it holds that a victim's conversations with a witness are admissible to explain the defendant's conduct under OCGA § 24-3-2 even if they are unknown to the defendant....
...Moreover, to the extent Perry holds that the victim's conduct was a matter concerning which the truth had to be found and that the victim's statements were admissible to explain that conduct, it is overruled. Even though Lovejoy's statements were not admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2, we conclude the trial court properly admitted them under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule....
...right of confrontation. [13] Character further contends that Neason's testimony about Lovejoy's out-of-court statement constituted inadmissible hearsay. We conclude, however, that Lovejoy's statement was admissible as "original evidence" under OCGA § 24-3-2. The statement was known to the "actor" (Character), as the statement was made in Character's presence, and was admissible to explain Character's motive and conduct. [14] Finally, even if not admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2, Neason's testimony was admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule....
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Bailey v. Edmundson, 630 S.E.2d 396 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 17, 2006 | 280 Ga. 528, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1550

...exception to the hearsay rule, the statements of Ms. Bailey contained in those messages should have been allowed into evidence as party admissions pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-31 or, in the alternative, as evidence of her conduct and motives under OCGA § 24-3-2....
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Jones v. State, 290 Ga. 576 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 27, 2012 | 722 S.E.2d 853

...ss had said the shooter was wearing an orange shirt. The trial court admitted the testimony to explain the detective’s conduct in looking for someone wearing an orange shirt at the crime scene. Out-of-court statements may be admissible under OCGA § 24-3-24 to explain an investigating officer’s conduct if that conduct is a matter concerning which the truth must be found, but we have said that only in rare instances will an officer’s conduct need to be explained in this way See Reeves v....
...ial under the prosecutor’s open file policy. We note, however, that the trial court found counsel’s testimony on this issue at the motion for new trial hearing to he “somewhat equivocal” and Appellant did not testify at the hearing. OCGA § 24-3-2 says that “[w]hen, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall he admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evide...
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Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 892 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 23, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3438

...This was consistent with, inter alia, Dixon’s testimony about Lovelace’s statements to him about his intent to rendezvous with Brown in regard to the troubled drug deal. As the note did not derive its evidentiary value solely from the credibility of its maker, it was admissible as original documentary evidence. See OCGA § 24-3-2;4 see Forrester v....
...Hearsay evidence is admitted only in specified cases from necessity. OCGA § 24-3-8 provides: Declarations and entries made by a person since deceased against his interest and not made with a view to pending litigation shall be admissible in evidence in any case. OCGA § 24-3-2 provides: When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence.
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State v. Hodges, 291 Ga. 413 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2012 | 728 S.E.2d 582, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1924

...The trial court refused to allow the testimony because there was no independent evidence about Turner’s alleged acts of violence available to make the requisite showing of admissibility. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the testimony was admissible, pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-2, as “original, admissible, competent evidence” of Hodges’s state of mind to explain his conduct, and that its exclusion was harmful error....
...He argued, that instead, “his situation was governed... by longstanding, statutorily-based evidentiary law’ relating to self-defense, namely permitting evidence of his motivation or state of mind at the time of the shooting, as permitted by OCGA § 24-3-2.” Render at 422 (2) (a). He contended that his trial counsel was deficient for not attempting to introduce such evidence under authority of OCGA § 24-3-2, as it “ ‘would have allowed the jury to understand the reasonable nature’ of his fear of the victim,” which he claimed was crucial to his sole defense of justification/self-defense. Render at 422 (2) (a). This Court acknowledged that OCGA § 24-3-2 would permit evidence of alleged threats from the victim in certain narrow circumstances and when such evidence is offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to show the victim’s violent state of mind; however, we caution...
...itted into evidence specific prior acts of violence by the victim in support of the defendant’s claim that the killing of the victim was justified was that the defendant prove that the victim committed the prior acts of violence. Id. at 609. OCGA § 24-3-2, upon which the Court of Appeals analysis relies and which is the basis of Hodges’s argument for permitting the sought testimony as original evidence rather then hearsay, by its express terms, requires that the evidence in question be “...
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Miller v. State, 296 Ga. 9 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 20, 2014 | 764 S.E.2d 823

...7 Detective Danny Agan testified that Officer Houston told Agan at the scene that a local resident said he had heard that “Little E” did it. Assuming that this evidence was inadmissible under former OCGA § 24-3-2, Miller has not shown how he was prejudiced....
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Reeves v. State, 705 S.E.2d 159 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 7, 2011 | 288 Ga. 545, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 213

...me to court. "When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence." OCGA § 24-3-2. "`(W)here the conduct and motives of the actor are not matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are irrelevant to the issues on trial) then the information, etc., on which he or she acted shall not be admissible under' OCGA § 24-3-2....
...igation and indeed had specifically *163 elicited testimony that Polite had told the detective that Hawkins was present at the crime scene. Therefore, the statements of Hawkins and Heyward that they would not come to court were admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2 to explain that their lack of cooperation was the reason that the detective did not obtain further assistance from them in his investigation....
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Griffin v. State, 292 Ga. 321 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 22, 2013 | 737 S.E.2d 682

...Because defense counsel’s questions about why Griffin was not arrested for aggravated assault placed the officer’s conduct in issue and Rosson’s statements tended to explain the officer’s conduct, Rosson’s statements to police were admissible original evidence under OCGA § 24-3-2....
...ements to police. Even assuming counsel failed to object timely on hearsay grounds or to lodge any objection on confrontation grounds, Griffin has failed to meet his burden under Strickland. As discussed above, the evidence was admissible under OCGA § 24-3-2 and any confrontation error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt....
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Pruitt v. State, 559 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2002 | 274 Ga. 708, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 357

...Her motive for waiting nine years, as well as her motive for finally reporting the crime in 1995, were factors for the jury to consider in weighing her credibility. Therefore, we reject the defendant's contention that her testimony about why she went to police in 1995 was irrelevant. (b) OCGA § 24-3-2 provides that hearsay evidence may be admitted to explain motive or a course of conduct....
...Because the reasons that Sanders delayed nine years in reporting her husband's confession and finally went to police in 1995 were relevant issues for the jury to consider, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her testimony about the child molestation claim under OCGA § 24-3-2....
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Trim v. Shepard, 300 Ga. 176 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2016 | 794 S.E.2d 114

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Render v. State, 704 S.E.2d 767 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 10, 2011 | 288 Ga. 420, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 61

...ver, he urges that his situation was governed instead by "longstanding, statutorily-based evidentiary law" relating to self-defense, namely permitting evidence of his motivation or state of mind at the time of the *771 shooting, as permitted by OCGA § 24-3-2. [2] It is true that the exception under OCGA § 24-3-2 may allow evidence of a death threat against a defendant when the evidence is offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to show the victim's state of mind; however, such evidence is admissible only in the circumstances in...
...A motion for new trial was filed on October 2, 2008, amended on October 1, 2009, and denied on March 4, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed on March 31, 2010, the case was docketed in this Court for the September 2010 term, and the appeal was argued orally on September 13, 2010. [2] OCGA § 24-3-2 provides: When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence.
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Gomillion v. State, 298 Ga. 505 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 22, 2016 | 783 S.E.2d 103

...e for Chaney, his friend. 2 why he left the scene,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the neighbor’s statement to explain Bryant’s reason for leaving. See former OCGA § 24-3-22 (providing that, “[w]hen, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence”); McCoy v....
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Hager v. State, 297 Ga. 112 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 11, 2015 | 772 S.E.2d 692

...Nevertheless, appellant attempts to draw a distinction between the dying declarations statute, which states that such declarations “shall be admissible in evidence” in a homicide prosecution, and the types of evidence admissible pursuant to the former OCGA § 24-3-2.4 Pursuant to the terms of OCGA § 24-3-2: “When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence.”...
...victim’s dying declarations were admissible, they remained hearsay because the dying declarations statute does not specify they are not hearsay and that they are admissible as original evidence, unlike the examples of evidence set forth in OCGA § 24-3-2....
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Riley v. State, 321 Ga. 112 (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2025

Hager v. State (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 11, 2015

...Nevertheless, appellant attempts to draw a distinction between the dying declarations statute, which states that such declarations “shall be admissible in evidence” in a homicide prosecution, and the types of evidence admissible pursuant to former OCGA § 24-3-2.4 Pursuant to the terms of former OCGA § 24-3-2: “When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence not as hearsay but as original evidence.”...
...appellant, even though the victim’s dying declarations were admissible, they remained hearsay because the dying declarations statute does not specify they are not hearsay and that they are admissible as original evidence, unlike the examples of evidence set forth in OCGA § 24-3-2....