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Call Now: 904-383-7448Evidence of known and established usage shall be admissible to aid in the construction of contracts as well as to annex incidents.
(Code 1981, §24-3-5, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, § 3728, former Code 1868, § 3752, former Code 1873, § 3805, former Code 1882, § 3805, former Civil Code 1895, § 5206, former Civil Code 1910, § 5793, former Code 1933, § 38-506, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-5 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
To make a proof of a custom as such proper testimony, it should appear by the proof itself that such custom is a general one, and that it is so well known and recognized within the sphere of the custom's operation, as to be usually considered a part of all contracts made in that particular locality in business transactions to which such custom relates. Hardeman v. English, 79 Ga. 387, 5 S.E. 70 (1887) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3805).
Custom can only be proved by word of mouth from the men engaged in the business. Wood v. Frank Graham Co., 91 Ga. App. 621, 86 S.E.2d 691 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-506).
Evidence thereof is necessarily in parol. Wood v. Frank Graham Co., 91 Ga. App. 621, 86 S.E.2d 691 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-506).
- If a witness is shown to have knowledge of a custom, the witness can state what it is, not as a matter of opinion or law, but as a fact. Farmers Ginnery & Mfg. Co. v. Thrasher, 144 Ga. 598, 87 S.E. 804 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5793).
- Custom or usage, while admissible to explain an ambiguous written agreement, is inadmissible if repugnant to or inconsistent with a clear, express agreement. Stamey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 92 Ga. 613, 18 S.E. 1008, 44 Am. St. R. 95 (1894) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3805).
When the intent and meaning of the parties are clear, evidence of a usage to the contrary is irrelevant and unavailing. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 176 Ga. 91, 167 S.E. 79 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5793); TBS v. Europe Craft Imports, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 286, 367 S.E.2d 99 (1988);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-5).
While proof of a custom is sometimes admissible to aid in the construction of a contract, such proof is not admissible when the contract is clear and unambiguous. Atlantic Fertilizer Co. v. Southern States Phosphate & Fertilizer Co., 53 Ga. App. 798, 187 S.E. 237 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-506).
- Custom may sometimes be invoked as entering into a contract or supplying incidents, but not to change the law. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Butler, 130 Ga. 225, 60 S.E. 851, 16 L.R.A. (n.s.) 994 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5206); Happ Bros. Co. v. Hunter Mfg. & Comm'n Co., 145 Ga. 836, 90 S.E. 61 (1916);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5793).
Usage cannot make a contract when there is none nor prevent the effect of the settled rules of law. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 176 Ga. 91, 167 S.E. 79 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5793).
In the absence of knowledge of the existence of the custom, it cannot be said that there was any meeting of the minds on this item. Franco v. Bank of Forest Park, 118 Ga. App. 700, 165 S.E.2d 593 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-506).
If there was no evidence tending to show a contract by known and established usage, it was error to charge on known usage or custom. Craig v. Augusta Roofing & Metal Works, Inc., 78 Ga. App. 514, 51 S.E.2d 565 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-506).
- It was not admissible to show that it was the custom in a particular business for one party making sales, or its agent representing it in such a transaction, to sign the name of the other party to a contract therefor, so as to bind the latter. Happ Bros. Co. v. Hunter Mfg. & Comm'n Co., 145 Ga. 836, 90 S.E. 61 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5793).
- Usage in business as to time of performance of contract for services is admissible in suit for breach thereof. Beck v. Thompson & Taylor Spice Co., 108 Ga. 242, 33 S.E. 894 (1899) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5206).
- On the trial of a suit against warehousemen to recover the value of certain cotton which had been burned, and which plaintiff alleged the warehousemen had agreed to keep insured for plaintiff's benefit, but had failed to do so, proof, in their behalf, that it was their custom to insure cotton only to the extent of the advances the warehousemen had made thereon and for the warehousemen's own benefit, unless instructed by the customer to insure for full value, was primarily inadmissible; but after testimony had been allowed, without objection, in favor of plaintiff, tending to show it was the warehousemen's custom to insure cotton on which the warehousemen had made advances to its full value, such proof was properly admitted. Hardeman v. English, 79 Ga. 387, 5 S.E. 70 (1887) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3805).
If a general custom existed on the part of the warehouses in a certain municipality to insure to its full value the cotton of patrons stored with them with the necessary characteristics, patrons who stored cotton with one of such warehousemen, knowing of the custom, and relying upon the custom, can assert a duty on the part of such warehouseman to so insure one's cotton. Farmers Ginnery & Mfg. Co. v. Thrasher, 144 Ga. 598, 87 S.E. 804 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5793).
It was not necessary that a witness should be a warehouseman in order to have sufficient knowledge to render the witness competent to testify as to the existence of such usage or custom among the warehouses of a particular town or city. If a person has been accustomed to deal with such warehouses, and to deposit cotton with those warehouses, so as to know those warehouses usage or custom on that subject, the witness was competent to testify as to that usage or custom. Farmers Ginnery & Mfg. Co. v. Thrasher, 144 Ga. 598, 87 S.E. 804 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5793).
- It was well settled that insurers were bound to know the customs of a place where insurers transact business; and were assumed to have made contracts in reference to such customs. Todd v. German-American Ins. Co., 2 Ga. App. 789, 59 S.E. 94 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5206).
In this state, when life insurance companies deal with the assured for a time sufficient to make it their usage and custom to give notice to the assured of the date when the premiums fall due, and fail to give notice thereof, the policy will not be forfeited if, within a period so reasonably short as to show an intent to continue one's policy, the assured take steps to inquire and pay the premium. Grant v. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co., 76 Ga. 575 (1886) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3805).
Cited in Dulcio v. State, 292 Ga. 645, 740 S.E.2d 574 (2013); Garcia-Carrillo v. State, 322 Ga. App. 439, 746 S.E.2d 137 (2013); Hernandez-Garcia v. State, 322 Ga. App. 455, 745 S.E.2d 706 (2013); Folston v. State, 294 Ga. 778, 755 S.E.2d 803 (2014); Lawrence v. State, 342 Ga. App. 396, 802 S.E.2d 859 (2017).
- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 1112, 1151, 1154 et seq.
- 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1207.
- "Contractual" consideration as regards parol evidence rule, 100 A.L.R. 17.
Validity and construction of "zoning with compensation" regulation, 41 A.L.R.3d 636.
Total Results: 20
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-05-06
Citation: 827 S.E.2d 887, 305 Ga. 744
Snippet: to the rule against hearsay. See former OCGA § 24-3-5 ("After the fact of conspiracy is proved, the declarations
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-03-11
Citation: 826 S.E.2d 7, 305 Ga. 429
Snippet: exception to the hearsay rule. See former OCGA § 24-3-5 ("After the fact of conspiracy is proved, the declarations
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-03-04
Citation: 825 S.E.2d 221
Snippet: for a decision on the briefs. See former OCGA § 24-3-5 (2010) ("After the fact of conspiracy is proved
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-10-09
Citation: 820 S.E.2d 16, 304 Ga. 532
Snippet: testimony admissible, thereby violating former OCGA § 24-3-5 ;10 and (c) Miller's testimony about Braithwaite's
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-10-09
Citation: 820 S.E.2d 10, 304 Ga. 547
Snippet: that question go to the jury." Under former OCGA § 24-3-5,6 the rule was that "the State must make a prima
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-10-02
Citation: 302 Ga. 156, 805 S.E.2d 868
Snippet: provision differs substantially from former OCGA § 24-3-5, which stated: “After the fact of conspiracy is
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-08-14
Citation: 301 Ga. 689, 804 S.E.2d 54, 2017 WL 3468466, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 616
Snippet: We disagree with this contention. Former OCGA § 24-3-5, applicable to this case,3 states: “After the fact
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-02-06
Citation: 300 Ga. 500, 796 S.E.2d 708, 2017 WL 473949, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 45
Snippet: to the rule against hearsay. See former OCGA § 24-3-5; Billings, 293 Ga. at 104 (4). See also OCGA §
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-11-07
Citation: 300 Ga. 81, 793 S.E.2d 411, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 729
Snippet: co-conspirator hearsay exception formerly codified at OCGA § 24-3-5,4 asserting that the State failed to establish
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-09-12
Citation: 299 Ga. 611, 791 S.E.2d 69
Snippet: existence of a conspiracy pursuant to former OCGA § 24-3-5. 3 Because Burks raises an issue on
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-06-20
Citation: 299 Ga. 534, 787 S.E.2d 734
Snippet: against all the conspirators. See former OCGA § 24-3-5 (now codified at OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E));
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-03-21
Citation: 298 Ga. 636, 784 S.E.2d 359, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 237
Snippet: co-conspirators, codified as of the time of trial at OCGA § 24-3-5 (2010) (“the declarations by any one of the conspirators
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-03-27
Citation: 296 Ga. 842, 770 S.E.2d 855, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 196
Snippet: exception to the hearsay rule. See former OCGA § 24-3-5 2 (once a conspiracy is shown, statements
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-01-20
Snippet: “statements are admissible [under former OCGA § 24-3-5] when the State establishes a prima facie case
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-01-20
Citation: 296 Ga. 406, 768 S.E.2d 494, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 5
Snippet: “statements are admissible [under the former OCGA § 24-3-5] when the State establishes a prima facie case
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-11-17
Citation: 296 Ga. 337, 766 S.E.2d 72
Snippet: Appellant Reed (S14A1163). (a) Under former OCGA § 24-3-5, “[ajfter the fact of the conspiracy is proved
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-06-02
Citation: 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 1425, 2014 WL 2451318, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 445
Snippet: never filed a motion to sever. Former OCGA § 24-3-5, which was in effect at the time of appellant’s
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-28
Citation: 295 Ga. 44, 757 S.E.2d 646
Snippet: shall be admissible against all.” Former OCGA § 24-3-5.3 Appellant does not appear to dispute that the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-28
Citation: 294 Ga. 898, 757 S.E.2d 102, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 736, 2014 WL 1266203, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 248
Snippet: statement was improperly admitted under former OCGA § 24-3-5, which at the time provided that “the declarations
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-10
Citation: 294 Ga. 778, 755 S.E.2d 803, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 459, 2014 WL 903365, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 194
Snippet: in the murder. Indeed, pursuant to former OCGA § 24-3-5, 2 “[a]fter the fact of conspiracy is