Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448Parol evidence shall be admissible to rebut an equity, to discharge an entire contract, to prove a new and distinct subsequent agreement, to enlarge the time of performance, or to change the place of performance.
(Code 1981, §24-3-6, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, § 3729, former Code 1868, § 3753, former Code 1873, § 3806, former Code 1882, § 3806, former Civil Code 1895, § 5207, former Civil Code 1910, § 5794, former Code 1933, § 38-507, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-6 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Plea of accord and satisfaction may be supported by parol evidence that the notes sued on were paid in full and satisfied by the surrender of the property described in the mortgage deed (given to secure the debt) in full and complete satisfaction of the debt; that the owner and holder of the note accepted the property in settlement of the notes sued on; and that the settlement was beneficial to the then owners and the holders of the notes, in that it enabled the owners to obtain property without the expense of foreclosure. Butts v. Maryland Cas. Co., 52 Ga. App. 838, 184 S.E. 774 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).
- When there is strong presumptive evidence that, subsequently to the execution of a written contract, the parties agreed orally upon a new contract, which was a modification of the former, testimony may be received of negotiations and conversations between these parties previous to the written contract for the purpose of throwing light upon, and showing more clearly, the nature and character of the subsequent agreement. Collins v. Lester, 16 Ga. 410 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).
- While parol evidence was admissible to prove a new and distinct agreement subsequent to the original written contract in reference to the same subject matter, such new agreement must be based upon a valuable consideration. Phelps v. Belle Isle, 29 Ga. App. 571, 116 S.E. 217 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); Guthrie v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S.E. 93 (1925); Moon Motor Car Co. v. Savannah Motor Car Co., 41 Ga. App. 231, 152 S.E. 611 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); Alexander Film Co. v. Brittain, 63 Ga. App. 384, 11 S.E.2d 66 (1940); P & O Mach. Works, Inc. v. Pollard, 115 Ga. App. 96, 153 S.E.2d 631 (1967) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); American Century Mtg. Investors v. Bankamerica Realty Investors, 246 Ga. 39, 268 S.E.2d 609 (1980); Llop v. National Bank, 154 Ga. App. 504, 268 S.E.2d 777 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).
Agreement must embody essentials of new contract. Phelps v. Belle Isle, 29 Ga. App. 571, 116 S.E. 217 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); Guthrie v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S.E. 93 (1925);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794).
All previous verbal negotiations respecting a sale were merged in the subsequently written contract, and it was not permissible to prove a prior or contemporaneous parol agreement which had the effect of varying the terms of the written contract. Cottle v. Tomlinson, 192 Ga. 704, 16 S.E.2d 555 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).
- Parol agreement of parties subsequent to the execution of a contract of sale that the purchaser would turn over to the vendor a certain paper as collateral security was admissible. Loveless v. Bridges, 136 Ga. 338, 71 S.E. 166 (1911) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794).
- When a written contract for the purchase and sale of goods fixed no time for performance, it will be construed as implying that delivery will be made and accepted within a reasonable time, but parol evidence was admissible to prove a new and distinct subsequent agreement, mutually acted upon, that the deliveries would be made in installments at certain stated intervals. Breman v. Rodbell, 31 Ga. App. 358, 120 S.E. 697 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794).
- See Manry v. Selph, 77 Ga. App. 808, 50 S.E.2d 27 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507); Flatauer v. Goodman, 84 Ga. App. 881, 67 S.E.2d 794 (1951);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).
- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1125.
- 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1213 et seq.
- "Contractual" consideration as regards parol evidence rule, 100 A.L.R. 17.
Provision in sale contract to effect that only conditions incorporated therein shall be binding, 127 A.L.R. 132; 133 A.L.R. 1360.
Performance of work previously contracted for as consideration for promise to pay greater or additional amount, 12 A.L.R.2d 78; 85 A.L.R.3d 259.
Application of parol evidence rule in action on contract for architect's services, 69 A.L.R.3d 1353.
Enforceability of voluntary promise of additional compensation because of unforeseen difficulties in performance of existing contract, 85 A.L.R.3d 259.
Total Results: 17
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-10-25
Snippet: insurable interests that now appears at OCGA § 33-24-3.6 This statutory history tells us how to address
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-08-24
Snippet: admissible as a dying declaration under former OCGA § 24-3-6). On the other hand, this Court and others
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-05-11
Snippet: qualify as dying declarations under former OCGA § 24-3-6,3 which provided: “Declarations by any person
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-05-11
Citation: 297 Ga. 112, 772 S.E.2d 692, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 302
Snippet: *114 dying declarations under former OCGA § 24-3-6, 3 which provided: “Declarations by
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-09-22
Citation: 295 Ga. 684, 763 S.E.2d 484, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 720
Snippet: admissible as a dying declaration under former OCGA § 24-3-6, 3 the deceased must have been conscious
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-06-25
Citation: 291 Ga. 268, 728 S.E.2d 661, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1997, 2012 WL 2369407, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 625
Snippet: for admission as a dying declaration. See OCGA § 24-3-6 (“[d] eclarations by any person in the article
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-05-17
Citation: 695 S.E.2d 579, 287 Ga. 351, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 1625, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 395
Snippet: have been conscious of his condition.... OCGA § 24-3-6.[2] It need only appear to the court from the circumstances
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-06-30
Citation: 663 S.E.2d 149, 284 Ga. 215, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2176, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 527
Snippet: evidence in a prosecution for the homicide." OCGA § 24-3-6. For testimony to be admissible as a dying declaration
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2005-01-10
Citation: 607 S.E.2d 592, 278 Ga. 827, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 151, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 31
Snippet: evidence in a prosecution for the homicide." OCGA § 24-3-6. Before the deceased's statement is admitted into
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-09-27
Citation: 603 S.E.2d 263, 278 Ga. 432, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3150, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 804
Snippet: orally argued on July 12, 2004. [2] See OCGA § 24-3-6. [3] At trial, Roger Walton's choice not to testify
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2002-05-28
Citation: 564 S.E.2d 192, 275 Ga. 222
Snippet: have been "conscious of his condition...." OCGA § 24-3-6. "[I]t need only appear to the court from the circumstances
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1991-01-10
Citation: 399 S.E.2d 202, 260 Ga. 742
Snippet: evidence in a prosecution for homicide." OCGA § 24-3-6; Holcomb v. State, 249 Ga. 658, 660 (292 SE2d 839)
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1989-02-23
Citation: 376 S.E.2d 653, 258 Ga. 889, 1989 Ga. LEXIS 85
Snippet: identification of appellant as his killer. Under OCGA § 24-3-6 a statement made by a person regarding the cause
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1988-06-30
Citation: 369 S.E.2d 740, 258 Ga. 361, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 337
Snippet: qualifying the statement as admissible under OCGA § 24-3-6. 3. Enumerated error 3 contends that the admission
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-05-06
Citation: 355 S.E.2d 423, 257 Ga. 108, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 732
Snippet: victim's statements as dying declarations. OCGA § 24-3-6. The evidence, although conflicting, amply supported
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1986-04-30
Citation: 342 S.E.2d 320, 256 Ga. 1, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 666
Snippet: declarations exceptions to the hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-6. The statements which Jones made to Sheriff Cannon
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1985-06-10
Citation: 330 S.E.2d 358, 254 Ga. 484, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 737
Snippet: victim was aware of his impending death. See OCGA § 24-3-6. There was no error in admitting the statement