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2018 Georgia Code 24-3-6 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 24-3-6 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 24-3-6

TITLE 24 EVIDENCE

Section 3. Parol Evidence, 24-3-1 through 24-3-10.

ARTICLE 2 LEGISLATIVE FACTS; ORDINANCES OR RESOLUTIONS

24-3-6. Rebuttal of equity; discharge of contract; proof of subsequent agreement; change of time or place of performance.

Parol evidence shall be admissible to rebut an equity, to discharge an entire contract, to prove a new and distinct subsequent agreement, to enlarge the time of performance, or to change the place of performance.

(Code 1981, §24-3-6, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Discharge of Contract

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, § 3729, former Code 1868, § 3753, former Code 1873, § 3806, former Code 1882, § 3806, former Civil Code 1895, § 5207, former Civil Code 1910, § 5794, former Code 1933, § 38-507, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-6 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Plea of accord and satisfaction may be supported by parol evidence that the notes sued on were paid in full and satisfied by the surrender of the property described in the mortgage deed (given to secure the debt) in full and complete satisfaction of the debt; that the owner and holder of the note accepted the property in settlement of the notes sued on; and that the settlement was beneficial to the then owners and the holders of the notes, in that it enabled the owners to obtain property without the expense of foreclosure. Butts v. Maryland Cas. Co., 52 Ga. App. 838, 184 S.E. 774 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).

Subsequent Agreement

Admissible testimony generally.

- When there is strong presumptive evidence that, subsequently to the execution of a written contract, the parties agreed orally upon a new contract, which was a modification of the former, testimony may be received of negotiations and conversations between these parties previous to the written contract for the purpose of throwing light upon, and showing more clearly, the nature and character of the subsequent agreement. Collins v. Lester, 16 Ga. 410 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).

Agreement must be based on valuable consideration.

- While parol evidence was admissible to prove a new and distinct agreement subsequent to the original written contract in reference to the same subject matter, such new agreement must be based upon a valuable consideration. Phelps v. Belle Isle, 29 Ga. App. 571, 116 S.E. 217 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); Guthrie v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S.E. 93 (1925); Moon Motor Car Co. v. Savannah Motor Car Co., 41 Ga. App. 231, 152 S.E. 611 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); Alexander Film Co. v. Brittain, 63 Ga. App. 384, 11 S.E.2d 66 (1940); P & O Mach. Works, Inc. v. Pollard, 115 Ga. App. 96, 153 S.E.2d 631 (1967) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); American Century Mtg. Investors v. Bankamerica Realty Investors, 246 Ga. 39, 268 S.E.2d 609 (1980); Llop v. National Bank, 154 Ga. App. 504, 268 S.E.2d 777 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).

Agreement must embody essentials of new contract. Phelps v. Belle Isle, 29 Ga. App. 571, 116 S.E. 217 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794); Guthrie v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S.E. 93 (1925);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794).

All previous verbal negotiations respecting a sale were merged in the subsequently written contract, and it was not permissible to prove a prior or contemporaneous parol agreement which had the effect of varying the terms of the written contract. Cottle v. Tomlinson, 192 Ga. 704, 16 S.E.2d 555 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).

Agreement to give collateral security.

- Parol agreement of parties subsequent to the execution of a contract of sale that the purchaser would turn over to the vendor a certain paper as collateral security was admissible. Loveless v. Bridges, 136 Ga. 338, 71 S.E. 166 (1911) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794).

Agreement as to time of delivery.

- When a written contract for the purchase and sale of goods fixed no time for performance, it will be construed as implying that delivery will be made and accepted within a reasonable time, but parol evidence was admissible to prove a new and distinct subsequent agreement, mutually acted upon, that the deliveries would be made in installments at certain stated intervals. Breman v. Rodbell, 31 Ga. App. 358, 120 S.E. 697 (1923) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5794).

Evidence of agreement to rescind contract held admissible.

- See Manry v. Selph, 77 Ga. App. 808, 50 S.E.2d 27 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507); Flatauer v. Goodman, 84 Ga. App. 881, 67 S.E.2d 794 (1951);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-507).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1125.

C.J.S.

- 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1213 et seq.

ALR.

- "Contractual" consideration as regards parol evidence rule, 100 A.L.R. 17.

Provision in sale contract to effect that only conditions incorporated therein shall be binding, 127 A.L.R. 132; 133 A.L.R. 1360.

Performance of work previously contracted for as consideration for promise to pay greater or additional amount, 12 A.L.R.2d 78; 85 A.L.R.3d 259.

Application of parol evidence rule in action on contract for architect's services, 69 A.L.R.3d 1353.

Enforceability of voluntary promise of additional compensation because of unforeseen difficulties in performance of existing contract, 85 A.L.R.3d 259.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 24-3-6

Total Results: 17  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Morgan v. State, 564 S.E.2d 192 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 94 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 28, 2002 | 275 Ga. 222

...thus, that the trial court erroneously admitted the victim's statement as a dying declaration. One of the requirements for a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration is that the deceased must have been "conscious of his condition...." OCGA § 24-3-6....
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Ventura v. State, 663 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. 2008).

Cited 62 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 2008 | 284 Ga. 215, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2176

...he had been shot. However, "[d]eclarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, shall be admissible in evidence in a prosecution for the homicide." OCGA § 24-3-6....
...te. Specifically, the expert had been hired to show that Paguada might not have been coherent at the time that he made his alleged dying declarations to the Moradel brothers, which could have made Paguada's statements inadmissible at trial. See OCGA § 24-3-6 (person in the article of death must have been conscious of his condition for dying declarations to be admissible)....
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Walton v. State, 603 S.E.2d 263 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 45 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 27, 2004 | 278 Ga. 432, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 3150

...A motion for new trial was filed on June 19, 2003, and the motion was denied on March 9, 2004. A notice of appeal was filed on March 22, 2004, and the case was docketed in this Court on April 14, 2004. The appeal was orally argued on July 12, 2004. [2] See OCGA § 24-3-6....
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Mathis v. State, 291 Ga. 268 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 25, 2012 | 728 S.E.2d 661, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1997

...bligations. Hunt v. State, 278 Ga. 479 (2) (604 SE2d 144) (2004) (statutory obligation to produce witness statements does not apply to oral statements). Further, the statement satisfied the requirements for admission as a dying declaration. See OCGA § 24-3-6 (“[d] eclarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, shall be admissible in a prosecution for the homicide”)....
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Norris v. State, 376 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 23, 1989 | 258 Ga. 889

...In fact, he said appellant pumped his own gas, and it took him a long time to do it. The testimony was properly excluded. 2. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the victim's identification of appellant as his killer. Under OCGA § 24-3-6 a statement made by a person regarding the cause of his impending death and the person who killed him are admissible in a homicide prosecution when the victim is in the articles of death and conscious of his condition when the statement is made....
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Sanford v. State, 695 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 17, 2010 | 287 Ga. 351, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 1625

...1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), should be applied to find them inadmissible. However, the contentions are unavailing. One of the requirements for a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration is that the deceased must have been conscious of his condition.... OCGA § 24-3-6....
...A motion for new trial was filed on March 24, 2006, amended on March 20, 2009, and denied on July 17, 2009. A notice of appeal was filed on August 12, 2009, and the case was docketed in this Court on September 25, 2009. The appeal was submitted for decision on November 16, 2009. [2] OCGA § 24-3-6 provides: Declarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, shall be admissible in evidence in a prosecution for the homicide....
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Woodard v. State, 607 S.E.2d 592 (Ga. 2005).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 10, 2005 | 278 Ga. 827, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 151

...ious of his impending death. "Declarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, shall be admissible in evidence in a prosecution for the homicide." OCGA § 24-3-6....
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Richie v. State, 369 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 30, 1988 | 258 Ga. 361

...There was ample evidence to establish prima facie that the victim was aware that he was "in the article of death" when he subsequently confirmed his previous identification of his assailant by hand signals, thereby qualifying the statement as admissible under OCGA § 24-3-6....
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Lloyd v. State, 355 S.E.2d 423 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 6, 1987 | 257 Ga. 108

...Under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial on the general grounds. E.g., Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583 (247 SE2d 57) (1978). 2. We find no error in the admission in evidence of certain of the victim's statements as dying declarations. OCGA § 24-3-6....
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Kitchens v. State, 342 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1986).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 30, 1986 | 256 Ga. 1

...evidence the statements made by Jones to Sheriff Cannon, William Jones, and Joann Spillers. Following a pretrial hearing the trial court ruled that the statements could go to the jury under the dying declarations exceptions to the hearsay rule, OCGA § 24-3-6....
...Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2. In his second enumeration of error Kitchens contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine and in admitting the victim's statements into evidence as dying declarations. OCGA § 24-3-6 provides that "[d]eclarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, shall be admissible in evidence in a prosecution for homicide." Thus, Jesse...
...icle of death" at the time the statements were made, and, second, he was aware that he was in the article of death. Holcomb v. State, 249 Ga. 658, 660 (292 SE2d 839) (1982). "In determining whether the two-prong test of Code Ann. § 38-307 [now OCGA § 24-3-6] for admitting a hearsay statement as a dying declaration has been met, both the trial court and the jury are involved....
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State v. Gilmore, 862 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 24, 2021 | 312 Ga. 289

...684, 685-686 & n.2 (763 SE2d 484) (2014) (holding that a shooting victim “respond[ing] affirmatively by nodding his head” to a family member’s question about whether a particular person shot him was a statement (and thus hearsay) but was admissible as a dying declaration under former OCGA § 24-3-6). On the other hand, this Court and others have concluded that nonverbal conduct does not constitute a statement when it is not intended to be an assertion....
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Wright v. State, 330 S.E.2d 358 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 1985 | 254 Ga. 484

...In view of this, and the other evidence tying the appellant to the crimes, we find no error. 2. The second enumerated error is permitting state's witnesses to testify about the victim's statement — that "Steve and Don" had beaten him — made prior to the time that the victim was aware of his impending death. See OCGA § 24-3-6....
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Wiggins v. State, 295 Ga. 684 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 22, 2014 | 763 S.E.2d 484

...y testimony as the victim’s dying declarations because the victim was not in the “article of death” at the time such statements were made. Certainly, in order for a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration under former OCGA § 24-3-6,3 the deceased must have been conscious of his condition; however, “it need only appear to the court from the circumstances of the case that there was a probability that the deceased was conscious of his 2 Thomas’s brother visited Thomas around 5:00 a.m....
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Crum v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 880 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 25, 2022 | 315 Ga. 67

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Phillips v. State, 399 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 10, 1991 | 260 Ga. 742

...n to the hearsay rule. We agree. "Declarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, shall be admissible in evidence in a prosecution for homicide." OCGA § 24-3-6; Holcomb v....
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Hager v. State, 297 Ga. 112 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 11, 2015 | 772 S.E.2d 692

... of whether the evidence against appellant was sufficient to affirm his convictions. We find this assertion to be tortured logic and reject it. It is well-settled that a statement which qualifies as a dying declaration pursuant to the parameters set forth in OCGA § 24-3-6 is admissible as an exception to hearsay. See Walton v....

Hager v. State (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 11, 2015 | 772 S.E.2d 692

...Appellant was tried in 2012, under Georgia’s old Evidence Code, and all statutory references in this opinion are to the former Code.2 Appellant does not dispute that the statements the victim in this case made to those who testified about them at trial qualify as dying declarations under former OCGA § 24-3-6,3 which provided: “Declarations by any person in the article of death, who is conscious of his condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed 2 The new Evidence Code became effective January 1, 2013 (Ga....
...5 sufficient to affirm his convictions. We find this assertion to be tortured logic and reject it. It is well settled that a statement which qualifies as a dying declaration pursuant to the parameters set forth in former OCGA § 24-3-6 is admissible as an exception to hearsay....