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O.C.G.A.Title 24Chapter 3

O.C.G.A. § 24-3-8 (2023)

Original or subsequent voidness of writing

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2023 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest cited 1983–2012 25citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 25 opinions since 1983.

Parol evidence shall be admissible to show that a writing either was originally void or subsequently became void.

History

Code 1981, § 24-3-8, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, § 3725, former Code 1868, § 3749, former Code 1882, § 3802, former Civil Code 1895, § 5203, former Civil Code 1910, § 5790, former Code 1933, § 38-503, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-8 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Failure of consideration. - It may be shown that a note sued on was in fact without legal consideration of any kind, and that the actual basis of the undertaking was wholly illegal and the resultant

promise absolutely void. Simmons v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 22 Ga. App. 358, 96 S.E. 9, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 336 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5790); see also Miller v. Whitesburg Banking Co., 58 Ga. App. 84, 197 S.E. 906, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 192 (1938); S. & S. Bldrs., Inc. v. Equitable Inv. Corp., 219 Ga. 557, 134 S.E.2d 777, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 323 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503). Writing which undertakes to contract about a fictitious thing, even though it be denominated a consideration in the writ-

ing is in fact without consideration, is void, and the fact that it is void may be shown by parol under the rule of evidence. Jewell v. Norrell, 66 Ga. App. 11, 16 S.E.2d 797, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 94 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503). When the promise as stated in the writing is admitted, the promisor can show that there was no consideration or that there was a consideration which has failed wholly or in part, and therefore the promise is no longer supported, and must fail either in whole or in part, according to the facts. First Nat’l Bank v. Harrison, 408 F. Supp. 137, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16330 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff’d, 529 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503). Consideration of a contract may be always inquired into in order to show that the promise is no longer binding according to its tenor; but in inquiring into the consideration the promisor cannot deny that the promisor made the promise evidenced by the writing. First Nat’l Bank v. Harrison, 408 F. Supp. 137, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16330 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff’d, 529 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503). Different consideration may be shown by parol evidence. Harris v. Tisereau, 52 Ga. 153, 1874 Ga. LEXIS 256 (1874) (decided under former Code 1863, § 3725). Nonperformance of condition precedent. - Written document may by parol or other extrinsic evidence be shown not to be a contract at all because of the nonperformance of a condition precedent as to which the writing is silent. Rudder v. Belle Isle, 46 Ga. App. 336, 167 S.E. 753, 1933 Ga. App. LEXIS 54 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5790). Violation of public policy. - When a contract apparently valid on the contract’s face was attacked on the ground that the contract was entered into in violation of public policy, a court, when called upon to approve such a contract, will closely examine the terms of the contract and the circumstances under which the contract was entered into, before permitting the agreement to be made the judgment of the court. Beverly v. Beverly, 209 Ga. 468, 74 S.E.2d 89, 1953 Ga. LEXIS 297 (1953)

(decided under former Code 1933, § 38503); Funderburk v. Funderburk, 229 Ga. 457, 192 S.E.2d 262, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 646 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503). Fraud. - Parol evidence was admissible to show that a writing was void on account of fraud. Hinkle v. Hixon, 154 Ga. 193, 113 S.E. 805, 1922 Ga. LEXIS 328 (1922) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5790); Johnson v. Sherrer, 197 Ga. 392, 29 S.E.2d 581, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 278 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503); S. & S. Bldrs., Inc. v. Equitable Inv. Corp., 219 Ga. 557, 134 S.E.2d 777, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 323 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503); Hinson v. Hinson, 221 Ga. 291, 144 S.E.2d 381, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 437 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503); Cone Mills Corp. v. A.G. Estes, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 938, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13112 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503); Lewis v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 139 Ga. App. 855, 229 S.E.2d 765, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2021 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38503); Thompson v. Wilkins, 143 Ga. App. 739, 240 S.E.2d 183, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2483 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503). Fraud in beneficiary designation. Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to a child in a suit brought by a sibling seeking a determination that the sibling was the sole beneficiary of their parent’s life insurance policy as the sibling sufficiently alleged fraud and/or forgery with regard to a second beneficiary designation form allegedly signed by the parent. As such, the trial court should have permitted the sibling to introduce two affidavits that supported the sibling’s allegations that the second beneficiary designation form was void. Weatherly v. Weatherly, 292 Ga. App. 879, 665 S.E.2d 922, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 889 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-8). Promise by bank not to enforce promissory note. - There is no confidential relationship between a bank and a customer borrowing funds and therefore an oral agreement not to enforce a promissory note, which is a contract in writing, is not a type of fraud constituting an

exception to the parol evidence rule. Boatman v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 848, 273 S.E.2d 190, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2813 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-503). Colorable scheme between husband and wife. - If a wife did not in fact purchase and was not to receive the machinery under the contract sued on, but the whole transaction was merely a colorable scheme or device by which the wife was induced by the plaintiff to assume the previous debt of the husband, without any consideration flowing to her, she would have the right to repudiate the entire illegal and void transaction, no matter by what device its true inwardness and purpose had been concealed. Simmons v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 22 Ga. App. 358, 96 S.E. 9, 1918 Ga. App. LEXIS 336 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5790). Evidence that party signed blank paper. - Evidence tending to prove that a party only signed a blank sheet of paper, instead of signing a written and printed contract, was admissible. Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Butler, 139 Ga. 816, 78 S.E. 244, 1913 Ga. LEXIS 620 (1913) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5790). Contract to evade usury, penalty, or forfeiture. - Parol evidence was admissible to show the circumstances attending the execution of papers and the sayings of the parties at the time for the purpose of

ascertaining their intention as to a shipment of the cotton and enabling a jury to determine whether the contract of shipment was a device to evade the law relating to usury. Dwelle & Daniel v. Blackwood, 106 Ga. 486, 32 S.E. 593, 1899 Ga. LEXIS 710 (1899) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5203). While a valid written contract cannot be contradicted or varied by parol, it is competent by such evidence to show that the writing is but a cover for usury, penalty, or forfeiture. Lytle v. Scottish Am. Mtg. Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 239 (1905) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5203). What is called rent may be shown to have been really a part of the purchase money, or a device to obtain a penalty. Lytle v. Scottish Am. Mtg. Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 239 (1905) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5203). It was always permissible to show by parol evidence that a paper was but a cover for usury, penalty, forfeiture, or other illegal advantage to one of the parties. For if the law did not sedulously disregard form and seek for substance, nothing would be easier than the law’s evasion by giving innocent names to prohibited acts. Flood v. Empire Inv. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 133 S.E. 60, 1926 Ga. App. LEXIS 690 (1926) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5790).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1090 et seq. C.J.S. 32A C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 1149, 1156, 1159 et seq. ALR. Parol evidence rule; right to show fraud in inducement or execution of written contract, 56 A.L.R. 13. “Contractual” consideration as regards parol evidence rule, 100 A.L.R. 17. Parol evidence rule as applied to lease, 151 A.L.R. 279. Election by beneficiary to take under or

against will as predictable upon initiation of, or participation in, court proceedings, 166 A.L.R. 316. Admissibility of declarations by testator on issue of revocation of will, 172 A.L.R. 354. Failure to object to parol evidence, or voluntary introduction thereof, as waiver of defense of statute of frauds, 15 A.L.R.2d 1330. Admissibility of oral evidence to show that a writing was a sham agreement not intended to create legal relations, 71 A.L.R.2d 382.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 24-3-8 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCole v. Cole, 422 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 24-3-8 8×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“” OCGA § 24-3-8. However, “ ‘[declarations of a person since deceased, wholly in favor of the interest of the declarant, and which are not a part of the res gestae, are mere hearsay and not admissible in evidence.”
2
GREENBrown v. State, 734 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. 2012).
cites § 24-3-8 4×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“See OCGA § 24-3-8. 3 In assessing whether an out-of-court statement has sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, this Court looks at the totality of the circumstances; the initial determination as to whether a statement is trustworthy is a matter for the trial court’s discretion,…”
The case’s holding
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is sufficient if the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence except guilt.
Later courts cite it for
“phone records showed that the defendant and the victim were communicating prior to the shooting and that the defendant was in the vicinity of the hotel where the shooting occurred during that time,” · 1 citing court
3
GREENHoran v. Pirkle, 397 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 24-3-8 4×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“Appellant alleges the trial court erred in admitting in evidence certain hearsay testimony under the provisions of OCGA § 24-3-8. Appellant asserts, inter alia, that the statements of the deceased were inadmissible, because they were made while litigation actually was pending…”
The case’s holding
A jury verdict and judgment will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by any evidence in the absence of any material error of law.
Later courts cite it for
“a jury verdict, after approval by the trial court, and the judgment thereon will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by any evidence, in the absence of any material error of law.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENBennett v. State, 414 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1992).
cites § 24-3-8 4×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“OCGA § 24-3-8. 7. Bennett raises various complaints about the guilt-phase charge: (a) Bennett requested a charge on insanity which placed the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the prosecution.”
The case’s holding
A juror with a prior non-infamous felony conviction is not subject to a challenge propter delictum if the offense is not recent and the defense fails to raise the issue immediately.
5
GREENLilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
cites § 24-3-8 1×cited by 1,179 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“804(b)(3) (1998) (no such exception); Ga. Code Ann. §24-3-8 (1995) (exception only if declarant is deceased and statement was not made with view toward litigation); State v.”
The case’s holding
Courts must independently review whether the government's proffered guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the Confrontation Clause when deciding to admit an out-of-court statement.
Later courts cite it for
“accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our confrontation clause jurisprudence.” · 55 citing courts
6
GREENBarksdale v. State, 453 S.E.2d 2 (Ga. 1995).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 36 cases
The case’s holding
A prior statement is inadmissible as a prior inconsistent statement if the witness provides no in-court testimony with which to compare it.
7
GREENLongstreet v. Decker, 717 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“718, 719-720 ( 420 SE2d 379 ) (1992) (statements of donor/decedent to donee were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule in that donor’s death created the necessity for the admission of the statements, and a circumstantial guaranty for the trustworthiness of the donor’s…”
Later courts cite it for
“if the language is clear the contract shall be enforced according to its clear terms. in fact, no construction is even permitted when the language employed by the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENWiley v. Luke, 389 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. 1990).
cites § 24-3-8 6×cited by 4 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
9
REDTyson v. State, 526 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 24-3-8 4×cited by 6 cases
Reversed by State v. Tyson (2001): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“See OCGA § 24-3-8 (declarations against interest by one since deceased admissible).”
10
GREENCoastal Health Servs., Inc. v. Rozier, 335 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 24-3-8 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“Moreover, Fletcher's holding is somewhat governed by the caveat set out in Division 4 of that opinion, namely, that the court viewed the evidence very liberally because of the particular issues in that case.”
11
GREENHarrison v. Martin, 444 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“” OCGA § 24-3-8. See Fountain v. Cabe, 242 Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“a party must show harm as well as error to prevail on appeal” · 1 citing court
12
GREENBanks v. Echols, 691 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“See OCGA §§ 24-3-8; 24-3-14 (b). See generally Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“evidence of a debtor's repeated late, irregular payments, which are accepted by the seller, creates a factual dispute as to whether a quasi new agreement was created under ocga 13- 4-4” · 1 citing court
13
GREENFenimore v. State, 463 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“: (1) Ferguson’s statements to his job supervisor were admissible as declarations against his pecuniary interest in continued employment, OCGA § 24-3-8, and any other statements he made about these credit card charges were admissible since they were intertwined with these…”
Later courts cite it for
“because we have decided the main appeal, the appeal from the denial of bond pending post-trial relief is moot.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENUrban v. Lemley, 501 S.E.2d 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“221, 224-225 ( 173 SE2d 691 ) (1970); OCGA § 24-3-8. As hearsay lacks probative value in a summary judgment proceeding, this testimony does not support Urban’s position.”
15
GREENDodd v. Scott, 550 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“Private statements made to relatives by a person since deceased that he owned certain property or that certain property he had transferred was in fact held in trust for him or his estate are in his interest and are not a matter of public interest and thus are hearsay not subject…”
16
GREENMattison v. Travelers Indem. Co., 307 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 9 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
17
GREENMashburn v. Wright, 420 S.E.2d 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 8 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
18
REDWatts v. State, 541 S.E.2d 41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 8 cases
Reversed by Watts v. State (2001): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“151 -152 (1) ( 397 SE2d 734 ) (1990) (mere “hearsay” objection insufficient to preserve claim that statement was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-8, where, after trial court indicated that statement was admissible as declaration against interest, counsel failed to raise specific…”
Later courts cite it for
“lack of resistance induced by fear is not consent but constitutes force.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENBoehm v. Abi-Sarkis, 438 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“She told her sister details about the alleged affair on other occasions.”
20
GREENHamrick v. Greenway, 357 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1987).
cites § 24-3-8 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 24-3-8
“OCGA § 24-3-8 provides that “[t]he declarations and entries by a person, since deceased, against *289 his interest, and not made with a view to pending litigation, shall be admissible in any case.”

Show all 25 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198319972012

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1990. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.19Ga.5SCOTUS1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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