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2018 Georgia Code 24-3-9 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 24 EVIDENCE

Section 3. Parol Evidence, 24-3-1 through 24-3-10.

ARTICLE 2 LEGISLATIVE FACTS; ORDINANCES OR RESOLUTIONS

24-3-9. Explanation or denial of receipts.

Receipts for money shall always be only prima-facie evidence of payment and may be denied or explained by parol.

(Code 1981, §24-3-9, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 3754, former Code 1873, § 3807, former Code 1882, § 3807, former Civil Code 1895, § 5208, former Civil Code 1910, § 5795, former Code 1933, § 38-508, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Definition.

- Receipt was a written admission or acknowledgment of payment or delivery. It was not required by law to be in a particular form. Crider v. City Supply Co., 16 Ga. App. 377, 85 S.E. 350 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Receipt was not a contract, but merely an admission in writing of the fact of payment or other settlement between a debtor and a creditor. Hamlin v. Lupo, 24 Ga. App. 408, 101 S.E. 5 (1919) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Exception to general rule.

- Receipt for money mentioned in the former provisions was, as a general rule, an exception to the principle that parol evidence was inadmissible to explain or contradict a writing. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 38 Ga. 554 (1868) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3754); Jewell v. Norrell, 66 Ga. App. 11, 16 S.E.2d 797 (1941);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508).

For admission rules when receipt was also contract, see Dunagan v. Dunagan, 38 Ga. 554 (1868) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3754).

If a receipt was a contract and not simply a receipt, there was no reason why the receipt should be susceptible of attack or explanation by parol more than any other contract. Jewell v. Norrell, 66 Ga. App. 11, 16 S.E.2d 797 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508).

No receipt was conclusive evidence, and evidence may be introduced to show the receipt did not correctly express the truth of the case. Parker v. Wellons, 43 Ga. App. 721, 160 S.E. 109 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Receipt may be explained.

- It was held not error to permit the maker of a receipt in evidence to explain the items in the receipt, or to cast upon the various amounts and testify to the sum total for which the receipt was given. Bigham v. Coleman, 71 Ga. 176 (1883) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807).

Defendant may show that the defendant received less on certain promissory notes made by the defendant than the receipt shows. New England Mtg. Sec. Co. v. Gay, 33 F. 636 (S.D. Ga. 1888), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 145 U.S. 123, 12 S. Ct. 815, 36 L. Ed. 646 (1892) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807).

On an action on an open account, the trial court did not violate the parol evidence rule by admitting evidence that explained a "paid" notation on invoices. An invoice for goods delivered on open account was not "a valid written instrument" as that term was used in former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1); furthermore, former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9 specifically provided that receipts for money were always only prima facie evidence of payment and could be denied or explained by parol. Wheeler v. IDN-Armstrong's, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 253, 653 S.E.2d 835 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9).

Combination receipt and contract.

- Written instrument may sometimes partake of the nature of both a receipt and a contract. Insofar as it was merely a receipt, the former statute was applicable; but insofar as it was a contract, it cannot be changed, modified, or have its terms enlarged by parol evidence. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith, 129 Ga. 558, 59 S.E. 215 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5208); Graham v. Peacock, 131 Ga. 785, 63 S.E. 348 (1909); Riverside Milling & Power Co. v. Bank of Cartersville, 141 Ga. 578, 81 S.E. 892 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5208).See also (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Acknowledgment in form of affidavit.

- Fact that an acknowledgment of payment was in the form of an affidavit did not render the affidavit inadmissible when offered in evidence as a receipt. Crider v. City Supply Co., 16 Ga. App. 377, 85 S.E. 350 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Letter and a reply amounting to nothing more than a receipt was explainable by parol evidence. Halls Self-Feeding Cotton Gin Co. v. Black, 71 Ga. 450 (1883) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807).

Ancient receipt.

- When a receipt, as any other written instrument, was more than 30 years old, the receipt's execution need not be proved to admit the receipt in evidence, although the subscribing witness may be living. Settle v. Alison, 8 Ga. 201, 52 Am. Dec. 393 (1850) (decided under former law).

Administrator's receipt.

- Receipt in full given by the administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, to the administratrix of the deceased executor, was open to explanation. Watts v. Baker, 78 Ga. 622, 3 S.E. 773 (1887) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807).

Receipts by wards to guardian.

- Receipts in full by wards to their guardian which, in express terms, discharge the guardian from all liability, may be explained by parol evidence. Alexander v. Alexander, 46 Ga. 283 (1872) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3754).

Attorney's receipts.

- When an attorney gave a receipt for a note to collect, in which the note is described, but omitting the fact that the note was endorsed in an action for damages, it was competent to prove by parol the fact of the indorsement. Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144, 50 Am. Dec. 386 (1849) (decided under former law); Barclay v. Hopkins, 59 Ga. 562 (1877);(decided under former Code 1873, § 3807).

Recital in lease that rent paid.

- When a written lease states that the rent was a certain amount and contained a mere recital that it was paid, it was permissible to show by parol testimony that only a part of the rent was paid at the execution of the agreement and that the balance was still unpaid. Googe v. York, 38 Ga. App. 62, 142 S.E. 562 (1928) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Words in a release placed upon a recorded security instrument importing payment of the secured indebtedness are not a contract but constitute a receipt, or evidence of payment of money, and can be contradicted by parol evidence. Security Fin. Corp. v. Blackwood, 111 Ga. App. 850, 143 S.E.2d 515 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508).

Parol agreement at variance with contract as to time of payment.

- When a contract calls for the payment of money at a certain time, evidence of a parol agreement at variance with the writing as to such matter was not admissible. Googe v. York, 38 Ga. App. 62, 142 S.E. 562 (1928) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Effect of accepting incorrect receipt.

- When a passenger accepts an incorrect receipt for fare paid, the passenger was not estopped from asserting that the passenger paid a different amount. Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Thomas, 14 Ga. App. 619, 82 S.E. 299 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

Province of jury to disregard receipt.

- If an explanation given by authority of the law was satisfactory, the receipt may be disregarded by the jury. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Blalock, 8 Ga. App. 44, 68 S.E. 743 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795).

As receipts for money were only prima facie evidence of payment and may be denied or explained by parol, if an explanation was given, the existence of the receipt may be disregarded by the trier of fact. Meadows v. Phillips, 188 Ga. App. 377, 373 S.E.2d 27 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9).

Instructions.

- Court should instruct the jury, in addition to the statutory language, that it was a question for the jury to say whether or not the party's evidence sufficiently explained the receipts. McJenkin Ins. & Realty Co. v. Thompson, 79 Ga. App. 473, 54 S.E.2d 336 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508).

Application.

- See Newsom v. Reynolds Chevrolet Co., 43 Ga. App. 376, 158 S.E. 763 (1931) (recital in written contract of sale of personalty concerning purchase-money) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795); Greeson v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 50 Ga. App. 566, 179 S.E. 191 (1935) (deposit slip) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1141.

C.J.S.

- 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1206.

ALR.

- Admissibility of parol evidence to vary or explain contract implied from the regular endorsement of a bill or note, 92 A.L.R. 721.

Parol evidence rule as applied to deposit of funds in name of depositor and another, 33 A.L.R.2d 569.

Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain or contradict bank deposit slips, deposit entries in passbooks, certificates of deposit, or similar instruments, 42 A.L.R.2d 600.

Cases Citing Georgia Code 24-3-9 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 3

Moody v. Dykes

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1998-03-16

Citation: 496 S.E.2d 907, 269 Ga. 217

Snippet: under the exceptions to hearsay found in OCGA § 24-3-9 or in OCGA § 24-3-13, the trial court's rulings

Resseau v. Bland

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1997-10-14

Citation: 491 S.E.2d 809, 268 Ga. 634, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 3764, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 646, 1997 WL 629588

Snippet: or private boundary within the scope of OCGA § 24-3-9. Deaton v. Swanson, 196 Ga. 833, 837(3), 28 S.E

Willis v. Kennedy

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1996-10-07

Citation: 476 S.E.2d 246, 267 Ga. 165, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3536, 1996 Ga. LEXIS 720

Snippet: exceptions to the hearsay rule created by OCGA § 24-3-9 (declarations of deceased persons as to ancient