O.C.G.A. § 24-3-9 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 3754, former Code 1873, § 3807, former Code 1882, § 3807, former Civil Code 1895, § 5208, former Civil Code 1910, § 5795, former Code 1933, § 38-508, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Definition. - Receipt was a written admission or acknowledgment of payment or delivery. It was not required by law to be in a particular form. Crider v. City Supply Co., 16 Ga. App. 377, 85 S.E. 350, 1915 Ga. App. LEXIS 635 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). Receipt was not a contract, but merely an admission in writing of the fact of payment or other settlement between a debtor and a creditor. Hamlin v. Lupo, 24 Ga. App. 408, 101 S.E. 5, 1919 Ga. App. LEXIS 691 (1919) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). Exception to general rule. - Receipt for money mentioned in the former provisions was, as a general rule, an exception to the principle that parol evidence was inadmissible to explain or contradict a writing. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 38 Ga. 554, 1868 Ga. LEXIS 119 (1868) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3754); Jewell v. Norrell, 66 Ga. App. 11, 16 S.E.2d 797, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 94 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508). For admission rules when receipt was also contract, see Dunagan v. Dunagan, 38 Ga. 554, 1868 Ga. LEXIS 119 (1868) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3754). If a receipt was a contract and not simply a receipt, there was no reason why the receipt should be susceptible of attack or explanation by parol more than any

other contract. Jewell v. Norrell, 66 Ga. App. 11, 16 S.E.2d 797, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 94 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508). No receipt was conclusive evidence, and evidence may be introduced to show the receipt did not correctly express the truth of the case. Parker v. Wellons, 43 Ga. App. 721, 160 S.E. 109, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 531 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). Receipt may be explained. - It was held not error to permit the maker of a receipt in evidence to explain the items in the receipt, or to cast upon the various amounts and testify to the sum total for which the receipt was given. Bigham v. Coleman, 71 Ga. 176, 1883 Ga. LEXIS 159 (1883) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807). Defendant may show that the defendant received less on certain promissory notes made by the defendant than the receipt shows. New England Mtg. Sec. Co. v. Gay, 33 F. 636, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2031 (C.C.D. Ga. 1888), cert. dismissed, 145 U.S. 123, 12 S. Ct. 815, 36 L. Ed. 646, 1892 U.S. LEXIS 2125 (1892) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807). On an action on an open account, the trial court did not violate the parol evidence rule by admitting evidence that explained a “paid” notation on invoices. An invoice for goods delivered on open account was not “a valid written instrument” as that term was used in former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1); furthermore, former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9 specifically provided that receipts for money were always only prima facie evidence of payment and could be denied or explained by parol. Wheeler v. IDN-Armstrong’s, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 253,

653 S.E.2d 835, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1185 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9). Combination receipt and contract. - Written instrument may sometimes partake of the nature of both a receipt and a contract. Insofar as it was merely a receipt, the former statute was applicable; but insofar as it was a contract, it cannot be changed, modified, or have its terms enlarged by parol evidence. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co. v. Smith, 129 Ga. 558, 59 S.E. 215, 1907 Ga. LEXIS 509 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5208); Graham v. Peacock, 131 Ga. 785, 63 S.E. 348, 1909 Ga. LEXIS 8 (1909) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5208); see also Riverside Milling & Power Co. v. Bank of Cartersville, 141 Ga. 578, 81 S.E. 892, 1913 Ga. LEXIS 279 (1913). Acknowledgment in form of affidavit. - Fact that an acknowledgment of payment was in the form of an affidavit did not render the affidavit inadmissible when offered in evidence as a receipt. Crider v. City Supply Co., 16 Ga. App. 377, 85 S.E. 350, 1915 Ga. App. LEXIS 635 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). Letter and a reply amounting to nothing more than a receipt was explainable by parol evidence. Hall’s SelfFeeding Cotton Gin Co. v. Black, 71 Ga. 450, 1883 Ga. LEXIS 196 (1883) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807). Ancient receipt. - When a receipt, as any other written instrument, was more than 30 years old, the receipt’s execution need not be proved to admit the receipt in evidence, although the subscribing witness may be living. Settle v. Alison, 8 Ga. 201, 1850 Ga. LEXIS 35 (1850) (decided under former law). Administrator’s receipt. - Receipt in full given by the administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, to the administratrix of the deceased executor, was open to explanation. Watts v. Baker, 78 Ga. 622, 3 S.E. 773, 1887 Ga. LEXIS 41 (1887) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3807). Receipts by wards to guardian. - Receipts in full by wards to their guardian which, in express terms, discharge the guardian from all liability, may be ex-

plained by parol evidence. Alexander v. Alexander, 46 Ga. 283, 1872 Ga. LEXIS 55 (1872) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3754). Attorney’s receipts. - When an attorney gave a receipt for a note to collect, in which the note is described, but omitting the fact that the note was endorsed in an action for damages, it was competent to prove by parol the fact of the indorsement. Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144, 1849 Ga. LEXIS 112 (1849) (decided under former law); Barclay v. Hopkins, 59 Ga. 562, 1877 Ga. LEXIS 335 (1877) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3807). Recital in lease that rent paid. - When a written lease states that the rent was a certain amount and contained a mere recital that it was paid, it was permissible to show by parol testimony that only a part of the rent was paid at the execution of the agreement and that the balance was still unpaid. Googe v. York, 38 Ga. App. 62, 142 S.E. 562, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 36 (1928) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). Words in a release placed upon a recorded security instrument importing payment of the secured indebtedness are not a contract but constitute a receipt, or evidence of payment of money, and can be contradicted by parol evidence. Security Fin. Corp. v. Blackwood, 111 Ga. App. 850, 143 S.E.2d 515, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 1114 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508). Parol agreement at variance with contract as to time of payment. - When a contract calls for the payment of money at a certain time, evidence of a parol agreement at variance with the writing as to such matter was not admissible. Googe v. York, 38 Ga. App. 62, 142 S.E. 562, 1928 Ga. App. LEXIS 36 (1928) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). Effect of accepting incorrect receipt. - When a passenger accepts an incorrect receipt for fare paid, the passenger was not estopped from asserting that the passenger paid a different amount. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Thomas, 14 Ga. App. 619, 82 S.E. 299, 1914 Ga. App. LEXIS 407 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). Province of jury to disregard receipt. - If an explanation given by au-

thority of the law was satisfactory, the receipt may be disregarded by the jury. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Blalock, 8 Ga. App. 44, 68 S.E. 743, 1910 Ga. App. LEXIS 19 (1910) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795). As receipts for money were only prima facie evidence of payment and may be denied or explained by parol, if an explanation was given, the existence of the receipt may be disregarded by the trier of fact. Meadows v. Phillips, 188 Ga. App. 377, 373 S.E.2d 27, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1045 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-6-9). Instructions. - Court should instruct the jury, in addition to the statutory language, that it was a question for the jury

to say whether or not the party’s evidence sufficiently explained the receipts. McJenkin Ins. & Realty Co. v. Thompson, 79 Ga. App. 473, 54 S.E.2d 336, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 673 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508). Application. - See Newsom v. Reynolds Chevrolet Co., 43 Ga. App. 376, 158 S.E. 763, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 373 (1931) (recital in written contract of sale of personalty concerning purchase-money) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5795); Greeson v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank, 50 Ga. App. 566, 179 S.E. 191, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 223 (1935) (deposit slip) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-508).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1109. C.J.S. 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1149. ALR. Admissibility of parol evidence to vary or explain contract implied from the regular endorsement of a bill or note, 92 A.L.R. 721.

Parol evidence rule as applied to deposit of funds in name of depositor and another, 33 A.L.R.2d 569. Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain or contradict bank deposit slips, deposit entries in passbooks, certificates of deposit, or similar instruments, 42 A.L.R.2d 600.