Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1 and former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Purpose.

- Law creates a stream-lined procedure permitting laymen to introduce bills incurred for treatment of injuries resulting from the subject of litigation without requiring an expert witness to testify that such charges were reasonable and necessary. Lester v. S.J. Alexander, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 470, 193 S.E.2d 860 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1); Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc. v. Tucker, 139 Ga. App. 873, 229 S.E.2d 804 (1976);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9 was only a statutory rule of evidence regarding the admission of medical bills. It does not purport to obviate a plaintiff's further satisfaction of the evidentiary obligation to demonstrate the liability of the defendant for the damages being sought. Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516, 352 S.E.2d 832 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

Scope.

- Law accomplishes three goals: (1) it eliminates the necessity of having the person submitting the bill to testify; (2) it makes it unnecessary to produce an expert witness to prove such charges were reasonable and necessary; and (3) it makes laymen competent witnesses to identify such bills. Lester v. S.J. Alexander, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 470, 193 S.E.2d 860 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Statute not exclusive.

- Law was not intended as the sole means of proving medical damages in personal injury suits. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc. v. Tucker, 139 Ga. App. 873, 229 S.E.2d 804 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Rules of evidence apply.

- Ga. L. 1970, p. 225, § 1 and Ga. L. 1971, p. 441, §§ 1 and 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-9-902) deal with the method of authenticating records which were otherwise admissible and were not new rules of admissibility eliminating the hearsay rule. Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425, 226 S.E.2d 292 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1); Moody v. State, 244 Ga. 247, 260 S.E.2d 11 (1979);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Right to cross-examine not limited.

- Law allows a thorough and sifting cross-examination for the purpose of undermining the credibility of the lay witness, but the fact that the witness's accuracy is impugned does not affect the admissibility of the exhibits. Atlanta Transit Sys. v. Smith, 141 Ga. App. 87, 232 S.E.2d 580 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Law does not require the showing that a hospital is licensed as a prerequisite to admission of hospital and medical bills from that institution. Kamman v. Seabolt, 149 Ga. App. 167, 253 S.E.2d 842 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Irrelevant items in records.

- When a submitted bill includes without differentiation items having no relevance to the automobile collision, the proffered evidence not only fails to meet the statutory requisites but may be properly rejected under the rule that testimony offered as a whole without separating the relevant from that which is irrelevant and inadmissible is to be repelled in its entirety. Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 193 S.E.2d 19 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1); Lester v. S.J. Alexander, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 470, 193 S.E.2d 860 (1972); Jordan v. Hagewood, 133 Ga. App. 958, 213 S.E.2d 85 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Expenses from hospital and nursing home.

- Trial court properly admitted a deceased patient's medical bills in support of the patient's claims against a nursing home under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9, because the patient's expert subtracted from the total hospital bills the amount that would have been incurred had the patient remained in the nursing home receiving treatment for previous problems. Tucker Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Mosby, 303 Ga. App. 80, 692 S.E.2d 727 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

Admission of medical bills.

- No error occurred in admitting the edited medical bills over the defendant's objection because the plaintiff provided lay testimony that the edited bills admitted into evidence were related solely to the injury at issue in the present litigation and the defendant elected not to cross-examine the witness regarding those bills. Emory Healthcare, Inc. v. Pardue, 328 Ga. App. 664, 760 S.E.2d 674 (2014).

Physician's action for services.

- Physician in an action to recover for professional services rendered has the burden of proving the value as represented by the ordinary and reasonable fee for the services, despite this statute whereby in certain cases it shall not be necessary for an expert to testify that the medical charges were reasonable and necessary. Bouldin v. Baum, 134 Ga. App. 484, 214 S.E.2d 734 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Authentication of canceled checks.

- Former statute did not mention authentication of canceled checks and, as a result, canceled checks could be authenticated in the traditional manner. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc. v. Tucker, 139 Ga. App. 873, 229 S.E.2d 804 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Canceled checks as evidence.

- Since neither the spirit nor the literal application of the former statute placed a limitation upon the admission of canceled checks in evidence, the checks' admission would be assessed by the jury in light of testimony showing the checks had been drawn for payment of treatment of injuries which plaintiff received due to defendant's negligence. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc. v. Tucker, 139 Ga. App. 873, 229 S.E.2d 804 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Testimony on reasonableness of charges.

- When testimony of plaintiff describes the plaintiff's injuries arising out of an auto collision and number of visits to a named doctor for treatment and the spouse identifies the doctor's bill and states the spouse's payment thereof, it is not necessary to have the physician testify that the charges were reasonable and necessary. Rutledge v. Glass, 125 Ga. App. 549, 188 S.E.2d 261 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-706.1)

Testimonial foundation was sufficient for the admission of evidence.

- See Harper v. Samples, 164 Ga. App. 511, 298 S.E.2d 29 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9); Zack's Properties, Inc. v. Gafford, 241 Ga. App. 43, 526 S.E.2d 80 (1999);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

Testimonial foundation was insufficient for admission of evidence.

- Plaintiff in a personal injury action failed to lay the proper foundation for admission of a summary of plaintiff's medical expenses, where the plaintiff introduced a summary sheet that listed only the medical providers by name, a range of dates, the total amount per provider, and the final total of services from multiple sources, but the plaintiff admitted that the plaintiff did not and could not compile the totals, and the plaintiff did not provide specific testimony substantiating the various subtotals. Hossain v. Nelson, 234 Ga. App. 792, 507 S.E.2d 243 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

Error in admission of bills held harmless.

- See Binns v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 168 Ga. App. 261, 308 S.E.2d 674 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 289, 313 S.E.2d 104 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

Medical bills not speculative evidence.

- In a personal injury suit brought by a married couple, evidence of the cost of medical treatment that the injured spouse received from all of the various medical providers was not speculative and was properly considered by the jury when the injured spouse testified as to the medical treatment received and introduced the medical bills into evidence. Hart v. Shergold, 295 Ga. App. 94, 670 S.E.2d 895 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0582, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 230 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

Expert medical testimony not required to withstand defendant's motion for directed verdict.

- Causal connection, requiring expert medical testimony, must be established when the "potential continuance of a disease" is at issue. However, if there is no significant lapse of time between the injury sustained and the onset of the physical condition for which the injured party seeks compensation, and the injury sustained is a matter which jurors must be credited with knowing by reason of common knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required in order for a plaintiff to establish a personal injury case sufficient to withstand a defendant's motion for directed verdict. Jordan v. Smoot, 191 Ga. App. 74, 380 S.E.2d 714 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

Clarification of opposing counsel's semantics argument did not impact testimony on medical bills.

- In a premises liability case, the trial court did not prevent an invitee from identifying the invitee's medical bills through the invitee's own testimony. This contention was clearly belied by the record which demonstrated that the trial court simply clarified opposing counsel's semantics argument but allowed the invitee to testify regarding the invitee's medical bills and the total dollar amount incurred. Fuller v. Flash Foods, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 217, 679 S.E.2d 775 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-9).

ALR.

- Admissibility in personal injury action of hospital or other medical bill which includes expenses for treatment of condition unrelated to injury, 89 A.L.R.3d 1012.