CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2015 | 773 S.E.2d 728
...Seeking to avoid the Doraville Code entirely, Oasis argues that SB
532, which amended the City of Doraville’s charter by redefining the City’s
boundaries to encompass the land on which Oasis operates, is invalid because
the notice requirement of OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) was not satisfied. We conclude
that Oasis lacks legal standing to pursue this claim.
OCGA §
28-1-14 implements the provision of the 1983 Georgia
Constitution stating that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide by law for the
advertisement of notice of intention to introduce local bills.” Art. III, Sec. V,
Par. IX. With regard to a local bill amending a municipal charter, the statute
requires that notice must be given in two different ways before the bill becomes
law. Subsection (a) of §
28-1-14, which applies to all local bills, requires that
notice of the intention to introduce such a bill be advertised in the local
newspaper for legal notices one time no later than the week before the bill is
introduced....
...nt
referred to in the bill during the calendar week in which such notice
is published as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section or
during the seven days immediately following the date of publication
of such notice.
OCGA §
28-1-14 (b).7
7
OCGA §
28-1-14 says in full:
(a) No local bill shall become law unless notice of the intention to introduce such
bill shall have been advertised in the newspaper in which the sheriff's advertisements
for the locality affected are published one time before the bill is introduced....
...d shall become a
6
SB 532 amended Doraville’s incorporating act to revise the corporate
limits, so the bill was subject to both notice requirements. It is undisputed that
the requirement in §
28-1-14 (a) was satisfied....
...change the corporate limits of the city of Doraville and for other
purposes.
SB 532 was introduced two calendar weeks after that, on Tuesday, March 20;
the bill passed on March 29.
Oasis contends that the notice requirement in OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) was
not satisfied....
...Doraville’s Mayor and City Council members an email on February 29 discussing her plan to run
the newspaper notice and another email on March 11 saying that the notice had run and that she
planned to have the bill finalized the next day. However, subsection (b) of OCGA §
28-1-14
7
injured by SB 532, which brought it within the domain of Doraville’s Code, it
imposes a separate requirement that the notice required by subsection (a) be transmitted to the local
government....
...e seven days after
publication, and while the March 11 email was sent within the statutorily required time and
referenced the newspaper notice, it did not include a “copy of the notice” or a “restatement of the
contents of such notice.” OCGA §
28-1-14 (b).
Then again, the emails do show that Doraville’s governing authority had actual notice of SB
532’s impending introduction, and it is possible that this substantial compliance with the objective
of subsection (b) was enough....
...462, 464-465 (712 SE2d 831) (2011) (“[W]here a
statute is ‘plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, . . . the legislature’s
clear intent . . . will not be thwarted by invocation of the rule of “substantial compliance.”’” (citation
omitted)). Then again, OCGA §
28-1-14 (c) casts doubt on the proposition that any part of the
statute can be satisfied by substantial compliance, by requiring that a copy of the notice as published
and an affidavit by the author of the bill “stating that the notice has been...
...irements” were met
might be deemed to “conclusively” establish that fact. See Bleckley,
225 Ga. at 594.
8
has an interest in ensuring compliance with all of the procedures required by
OCGA §
28-1-14....
...But a party only has standing to assert a procedural right “so
long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened
concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 573 n.8 (122 SCt 2130, 119 LE2d 351)
(1992).9
OCGA §
28-1-14 (a) is clearly designed to protect the interests of the
public that may be affected by the amendment of a local law, by requiring notice
to the local public of the introduction of such a bill. Oasis, as a business in the
area that stood to be affected by SB 532, would have standing to complain had
the notice required by subsection (a) not been given – but that notice was
properly given. OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) is clearly designed to protect a different
interest – the interest of a local government entity in notice of a potential
amendment to its organic law....
...in OCGA § 24-1-14.
In 1996, however, the government notice requirement was separated from
the public notice requirement, with the addition to the statute of subsection (b).
See Ga. L. 1996, p. 1198. The title of the 1996 act explained that §
28-1-14 was
being amended “to provide that a notice of intention to introduce local
legislation be provided to the governing authority of any county, municipality,
or consolidated government affected by such legislation.” Id....
...This understanding is supported by the original subsection (b) (3) of the 1996 statute,
which said that direct notice to the local government was not required when the local bill was
“requested by resolution or other written notification of the governing authority.” OCGA §
28-1-14
(b) (3) (1996)....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2015 | 339 S.E.2d 236
...Seeking to avoid the Doraville Code entirely, Oasis argues that SB
532, which amended the City of Doraville’s charter by redefining the City’s
boundaries to encompass the land on which Oasis operates, is invalid because
the notice requirement of OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) was not satisfied. We conclude
that Oasis lacks legal standing to pursue this claim.
OCGA §
28-1-14 implements the provision of the 1983 Georgia
Constitution stating that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide by law for the
advertisement of notice of intention to introduce local bills.” Art. III, Sec. V,
Par. IX. With regard to a local bill amending a municipal charter, the statute
requires that notice must be given in two different ways before the bill becomes
law. Subsection (a) of §
28-1-14, which applies to all local bills, requires that
notice of the intention to introduce such a bill be advertised in the local
newspaper for legal notices one time no later than the week before the bill is
introduced....
...nt
referred to in the bill during the calendar week in which such notice
is published as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section or
during the seven days immediately following the date of publication
of such notice.
OCGA §
28-1-14 (b).7
SB 532 amended Doraville’s incorporating act to revise the corporate
7
OCGA §
28-1-14 says in full:
(a) No local bill shall become law unless notice of the intention to introduce
such bill shall have been advertised in the newspaper in which the sheriff's
advertisements for the locality affected are published one time before the bill is
introduced....
...l
become a part of the bill. Such affidavit shall be made by the author of the bill.
6
limits, so the bill was subject to both notice requirements. It is undisputed that
the requirement in OCGA §
28-1-14 (a) was satisfied....
...change the corporate limits of the city of Doraville and for other
purposes.
SB 532 was introduced two calendar weeks after that, on Tuesday, March 20;
the bill passed on March 29.
Oasis contends that the notice requirement in OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) was
not satisfied....
...Doraville’s Mayor and City Council members an e-mail on February 29 discussing her plan to run
the newspaper notice and another e-mail on March 11 saying that the notice had run and that she
planned to have the bill finalized the next day. However, subsection (b) of OCGA §
28-1-14
imposes a separate requirement that the notice required by subsection (a) be transmitted to the local
government....
...seven days after
publication, and while the March 11 e-mail was sent within the statutorily required time and
referenced the newspaper notice, it did not include a “copy of the notice” or a “restatement of the
contents of such notice.” OCGA §
28-1-14 (b).
Then again, the e-mails do show that Doraville’s governing authority had actual notice of SB
532’s impending introduction, and it is possible that this substantial compliance with the objective
of subsection (b) was enough....
...462, 464-465 (712 SE2d 831) (2011) (“[W]here a
statute is ‘plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, . . . the legislature’s
clear intent . . . will not be thwarted by invocation of the rule of “substantial compliance.”’” (citation
omitted)). Then again, OCGA §
28-1-14 (c) casts doubt on the proposition that any part of the
statute can be satisfied by substantial compliance, by requiring that a copy of the notice as published
and an affidavit by the author of the bill “stating that the notice has been...
...8, 2012 and an affidavit from Senator Fran Millar, who was a sponsor of the bill, saying that notice
of the bill “was published in the Champion which is the official organ of DeKalb County on March
8, 2012, and that the notice requirements of Code Section
28-1-14 have been met.” Although the
affidavit says nothing specifically about notice to the City, under our case law, the enrollment of the
bill saying that the statutory “notice requirements” were met might be deemed to “conclusively”
establish that fact. See Bleckley,
225 Ga. at 594.
8
OCGA §
28-1-14....
...But a party only has standing to assert a procedural right “so
long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened
concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 573, n. 8 (122 SCt 2130, 119 LE2d 351)
(1992).9
OCGA §
28-1-14 (a) is clearly designed to protect the interests of the
public that may be affected by the amendment of a local law, by requiring notice
to the local public of the introduction of such a bill. Oasis, as a business in the
area that stood to be affected by SB 532, would have standing to complain had
the notice required by subsection (a) not been given — but that notice was
properly given. OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) is clearly designed to protect a different
interest — the interest of a local government entity in notice of a potential
amendment to its organic law....
...d
obligations being imposed on local governments without giving those in charge
of such governments an opportunity to oppose their passage.”). This continued
to be the law under the 1983 Constitution, with the notice requirement placed
in OCGA §
28-1-14.
In 1996, however, the government notice requirement was separated from
the public notice requirement, with the addition to the statute of subsection (b).
See Ga....
...The title of the 1996 act explained that OCGA § 28-
1-14 was being amended “to provide that a notice of intention to introduce local
legislation be provided to the governing authority of any county, municipality,
or consolidated government affected by such legislation.” Id. And the language
of OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) makes plain that the purpose of this additional notice
requirement was not to provide a second way for people in general to learn
about potential local legislation but rather to directly notify the local government
so that it could...
...This understanding is supported by the original subsection (b) (3) of the 1996 statute,
which said that direct notice to the local government was not required when the local bill was
“requested by resolution or other written notification of the governing authority.” OCGA §
28-1-14
11
Thus, only the local government whose interest OCGA §
28-1-14 (b)
protects — here, the City of Doraville — has standing to contest compliance
with that notice requirement. Doraville has not complained about a lack of
notice, or indeed about the enactment of SB 532. And Oasis has no legal
entitlement to complain. Consequently, we need not, and do not, determine
whether there was adequate compliance with OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) when SB 532
was introduced and passed into law.
3....
...This subsection was removed in 2002, when specific
notice procedures for annexation through local acts were repealed, see Ga. L. 2002, p. 985, §§ 1, 3,
but nothing in the repealing bill suggests that the purpose of the government notice requirement in
OCGA §
28-1-14 (b) changed or that it was now meant to provide a second way for the public to be
notified of impending local legislation.
12
(429 SE2d 663) (1993); Harris v....
