
Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation
Call Now: 904-383-7448The businesses of manufacturing, distributing, selling, handling, and otherwise dealing in or possessing alcoholic beverages are declared to be privileges in this state and not rights; however, such privileges shall not be exercised except in accordance with the licensing, regulatory, and revenue requirements of this title.
(Code 1933, § 5A-501, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1573, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1118, § 2.)
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- For article on local government law and liquor licensing, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 1039 (1981). For article, "Lawyers Who Represent Local Governments," see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 58 (1987). For comment on Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964), overturning the mere privilege doctrine by applying due process requirement to liquor licensing, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 250 (1968).
- A liquor license holder has a sufficient property interest in holding license to date of its automatic termination that revocation of that license must be accompanied by rudimentary due process protections. Liquor license revocation procedures which provide for a hearing, preceded by advance notice setting forth charge forming basis for revocation, are sufficient to comport adequately with due process mandates. Page v. Jackson, 398 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess. p. 103 does not confer a right upon anyone; it is expressly limited to the granting or refusal of a mere privilege. Hudon v. North Atlanta, 108 Ga. App. 370, 133 S.E.2d 58 (1963) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess. p. 103 applies to issuance and transfer of licenses granting to persons the privilege of engaging in sale of such commodities. Allen v. Carter, 226 Ga. 727, 177 S.E.2d 245 (1970) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
A license to sell spirituous liquors is neither a contract nor a property right in licensee, but a mere permit to do what would otherwise be an offense against the general law. Smith v. Nix, 206 Ga. 403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
The authority to regulate traffic in liquor in state is solely within police power of state, and privilege of possessing and selling liquor in state can be obtained only by strict compliance with state's laws regulating traffic and sale of liquors. Akins v. State, 224 Ga. 650, 164 S.E.2d 125 (1968) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
Since no one has inherent right to engage in intoxicating liquor business, licensing regulation is not proper subject for enforcement by writ of mandamus. Lindsey v. Hill, 221 Ga. 518, 145 S.E.2d 556 (1965) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).
- Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-2-2-.38 is not shown to be derived from any statute, constitutional provision, or judicial decision apart from the Georgia Department of Revenue's mandate under the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code (Act), O.C.G.A. § 3-1-1, to make rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Act and the collection of revenues under the Act; although the parties intended to circumvent Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-2-2-.38 by issuing corporate stock to an employee's wife, the stock agreement was not illegal or immoral; thus, a trial court erred in voiding the stock interest of the employee's wife, and summary judgment in favor of the corporation in the wife's action for an accounting, dissolution, and other relief was reversed. Edwards v. Grapefields, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 399, 599 S.E.2d 489 (2004).
Cited in Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 600, 284 S.E.2d 416 (1981).
- 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 276. 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 18 et seq., 152.
- 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 21, 24 et seq., 93.
- What constitutes manufacturing and who is a manufacturer under tax laws, 17 A.L.R.3d 7.
Warning: 'results' key not found in API response
Total Results: 20
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2025-06-24
Snippet: ’ and thus we have jurisdiction under OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (4).”); Henderson v. State, 303 Ga. 241, 244
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2025-05-06
Citation: 915 S.E.2d 634, 321 Ga. 530
Snippet: concluded that she had violated Rules 1.2 (a),2 1.3,3 1.4 (a),4 and 1.55 of the GRPC. The maximum sanction
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2025-03-18
Citation: 914 S.E.2d 311, 321 Ga. 330
Snippet: involving extraordinary remedies. See OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (4). 14
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-01-17
Citation: 318 Ga. 145
Snippet: 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II-III; OCGA § 15-3-3.1, it is transferred to the Court of Appeals. If
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-10-11
Citation: 317 Ga. 512
Snippet: whether Head had withdrawn; and (3) Rules 1.16 (a) (3),3 1.16 (c),4 and 1.16 (d),5 by failing to timely withdraw
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-09-06
Citation: 892 S.E.2d 761, 317 Ga. 255
Snippet: alleged to have violated Rules 1.1,1 1.2 (a),2 1.3,3 1.4,4 1.16 (d),5 8.4 (a) (4),6 and 9.27 of the Georgia
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-12-20
Citation: 315 Ga. 319
Snippet: ]” which are reserved to this Court. OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (2) (enacted by Ga. L. 2016, pp. 883, 892,
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-08-24
Citation: 312 Ga. 337
Snippet: 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II, III; OCGA § 15-3-3.1. 5 See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (Direct appeals are
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-08-24
Snippet: 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II, III; OCGA §15-3-3.1. 5 See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (Direct appeals are
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-06-21
Citation: 860 S.E.2d 543, 312 Ga. 60
Snippet: Art. VI, Sec. VI, Pars. II and III; OCGA § 15-3- 3.1, we transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2020-11-02
Citation: 850 S.E.2d 735, 310 Ga. 358
Snippet: 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II and III; OCGA § 15-3-3.1, appellant’s equal protection argument fails to
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24
Citation: 306 Ga. 301
Snippet: finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA § 3-3-1 et seq., permits the City to impose alcoholic beverage
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24
Citation: 830 S.E.2d 179, 306 Ga. 301
Snippet: finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA § 3-3-1 et seq., permits the City to impose alcoholic beverage
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-05-21
Citation: 303 Ga. 729
Snippet: and thus we have jurisdiction under OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (4). Nevertheless, Brock’s appeal must be dismissed
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-05-21
Citation: 814 S.E.2d 736
Snippet: " and thus we have jurisdiction under OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (4). Nevertheless, Brock's appeal must be dismissed
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-03-05
Citation: 303 Ga. 209
Snippet: transferred to the Court of Appeals. See OCGA § 15-3-3.1. Because the application for discretionary review
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-03-05
Citation: 303 Ga. 241
Snippet: jurisdiction in light of the changes imposed by OCGA § 15-3-3.1 on appeals filed after January 1, 2017. We conclude
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-03-05
Citation: 303 Ga. 211
Snippet: 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (3); OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (3); Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, § 6-1 (c). After the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-03-05
Citation: 303 Ga. 428
Snippet: “concerning proceedings in [murder cases].” OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (2).
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-03-05
Citation: 811 S.E.2d 388
Snippet: jurisdiction in light of the changes imposed by OCGA § 15-3-3.1 on appeals filed after January 1, 2017. We conclude