O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 3-3-1 (2019)

Declaration of business of manufacturing, selling, and other dealings in alcoholic beverages as privilege subject to regulatory requirements

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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The businesses of manufacturing, distributing, selling, handling, and otherwise dealing in or possessing alcoholic beverages are declared to be privileges in this state and not rights; however, such privileges shall not be exercised except in accordance with the licensing, regulatory, and revenue requirements of this title.

History

Code 1933, § 5A-501, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1573, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1118, § 2.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article on local government law and liquor licensing, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 1039 (1981). For article, ‘‘Lawyers Who Represent Local Governments,’’ see 23 Ga. St. B. J. 58 (1987).

For comment on Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964), overturning the mere privilege doctrine by applying due process requirement to liquor licensing, see 19 Mercer L. Rev. 250 (1968).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Liquor licenses may not be revoked during period of their effectiveness without some rudimentary due process protections. - A liquor license holder has a sufficient property interest in holding license to date of its automatic termination that revocation of that license must be accompanied by rudimentary due process protections. Liquor license revocation procedures which provide for a hearing, preceded by advance notice setting forth charge forming basis for revocation, are sufficient to comport adequately with due process mandates. Page v. Jackson, 398 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103). Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess. p. 103 does not confer a right upon anyone; it is expressly limited to the granting or refusal of a mere privilege. Hudon v. North Atlanta, 108 Ga. App. 370, 133 S.E.2d 58 (1963) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103). Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess. p. 103 applies to issuance and transfer of licenses granting to persons the privilege of engaging in sale of such commodities. Allen v. Carter, 226 Ga. 727, 177 S.E.2d 245 (1970) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103). A license to sell spirituous liquors is neither a contract nor a property right in licensee, but a mere permit to do what would otherwise be an offense against the general law. Smith v. Nix, 206 Ga. 403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950) (decided

under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103). The authority to regulate traffic in liquor in state is solely within police power of state, and privilege of possessing and selling liquor in state can be obtained only by strict compliance with state’s laws regulating traffic and sale of liquors. Akins v. State, 224 Ga. 650, 164 S.E.2d 125 (1968) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103). Since no one has inherent right to engage in intoxicating liquor business, licensing regulation is not proper subject for enforcement by writ of mandamus. Lindsey v. Hill, 221 Ga. 518, 145 S.E.2d 556 (1965) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103). Stock agreement not illegal. - Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-2-2-.38 is not shown to be derived from any statute, constitutional provision, or judicial decision apart from the Georgia Department of Revenue’s mandate under the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code (Act), O.C.G.A. § 3-1-1, to make rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Act and the collection of revenues under the Act; although the parties intended to circumvent Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-2-2-.38 by issuing corporate stock to an employee’s wife, the stock agreement was not illegal or immoral; thus, a trial court erred in voiding the stock interest of the employee’s wife, and summary judgment in favor of the corporation in the wife’s action for an accounting, dissolution, and other relief was reversed. Edwards v. Grapefields, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 399, 599 S.E.2d 489 (2004). Cited in Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 600, 284 S.E.2d 416 (1981).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 285, 286, 287. 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 1, 2, 3 et seq., 15 et seq., 26 et seq., 90 et seq. C.J.S. - 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 45 et seq., 63 et seq., 77 et seq.,

138 et seq., 158 et seq., 425 et seq., 436 et seq. ALR. - What constitutes manufacturing and who is a manufacturer under tax laws, 17 A.L.R.3d 7.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 12 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1984–2026 · leading case: Whelchel v. Laing Props., Inc., 378 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).

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Whelchel v. Laing Props., Inc., 378 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 12× “" Code § 5A-501 (OCGA § 3-3-1). The chapter then imposes controls, including licensing requirements, primarily on the commercial establishments described.”

Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 482 S.E.2d 347 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 4× “Accordingly, we examine the issue of whether appellants have a protectable property interest in their licenses.”

Harris v. Ent. Sys., Inc., 386 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. 1989). · cites it 4× “Furthermore, often, as in this case, substantial amounts of property are invested in the business that is dependent on the continuation of the license for its term. The U. S. Supreme Court has stated: Once licenses are issued .”

City of Coll. Park v. Clayton Cnty., 830 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “ngs, finding that sovereign immunity does not apply to the City's claims or the taxpayer defendants' cross-claims for indemnity and contribution, that the doctrine of laches does not bar the City's claims, and that to the extent the statute of limitation in OCGA § 36-11-1…”

Clayton Cnty. v. City of Coll. Park, 803 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “4 The court granted the City’s motion for partial summary judgment on the declaratory judgment counts, finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA § 3-3-1 et seq., permits the City to impose alcoholic beverage tax only within its municipal limits and the County to impose such…”

S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Altman, 359 S.E.2d 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 4× “Although Sutter involved a social host in a private home providing alcohol to an intoxicated minor, the Supreme Court applied a statute (OCGA § 3-3-23) which was enacted by the Legislature to apply to commercial purveyors of alcoholic beverages, i.”

Tibbs v. Studebaker's of Savannah, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 4× “" OCGA § 3-3-1. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., supra at 613.”

Georgia Oilmen's Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue, 582 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “Bridges, 18 citing OCGA § 3-3-1 with approval. (b) The Association contends that Rule 560-2-2-.”

Johnson v. Brown, 584 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Ga. 1984). “, § 3-3-1 et seq. (formerly Ga.Code Ann. § 5A-501).”

Clayton Cnty. v. City of Coll. Park (Ga. 2017). · cites it 2× “3 Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA § 3-3-1 et seq., permits the City to impose alcoholic beverage tax only within its municipal limits and the County to impose such a tax only in the unincorporated areas of the County, that neither can impose and collect alcoholic beverage taxes…”

City of Coll. Park v. Clayton Cnty., 306 Ga. 301 (Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “The court granted the City’s motion for partial summary judgment on the declaratory judgment counts, finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA § 3-3-1 et seq., permits the City to impose alcoholic beverage tax only within its municipal limits and the County to impose such a…”

Cox Store Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Tucker (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “Cox claimed that the City’s interpretation of its ordinance resulted in that ordinance being more restrictive than 4 the distance requirements applicable to the types of alcohol it sells under both OCGA § 3-3-1 and City Ordinance section 4-136.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.