Liquor licenses may not be revoked during period of their effectiveness without some rudimentary due process protections.

- A liquor license holder has a sufficient property interest in holding license to date of its automatic termination that revocation of that license must be accompanied by rudimentary due process protections. Liquor license revocation procedures which provide for a hearing, preceded by advance notice setting forth charge forming basis for revocation, are sufficient to comport adequately with due process mandates. Page v. Jackson, 398 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess. p. 103 does not confer a right upon anyone; it is expressly limited to the granting or refusal of a mere privilege. Hudon v. North Atlanta, 108 Ga. App. 370, 133 S.E.2d 58 (1963) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess. p. 103 applies to issuance and transfer of licenses granting to persons the privilege of engaging in sale of such commodities. Allen v. Carter, 226 Ga. 727, 177 S.E.2d 245 (1970) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

A license to sell spirituous liquors is neither a contract nor a property right in licensee, but a mere permit to do what would otherwise be an offense against the general law. Smith v. Nix, 206 Ga. 403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

The authority to regulate traffic in liquor in state is solely within police power of state, and privilege of possessing and selling liquor in state can be obtained only by strict compliance with state's laws regulating traffic and sale of liquors. Akins v. State, 224 Ga. 650, 164 S.E.2d 125 (1968) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Since no one has inherent right to engage in intoxicating liquor business, licensing regulation is not proper subject for enforcement by writ of mandamus. Lindsey v. Hill, 221 Ga. 518, 145 S.E.2d 556 (1965) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Stock agreement not illegal.

- Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-2-2-.38 is not shown to be derived from any statute, constitutional provision, or judicial decision apart from the Georgia Department of Revenue's mandate under the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code (Act), O.C.G.A. § 3-1-1, to make rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Act and the collection of revenues under the Act; although the parties intended to circumvent Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-2-2-.38 by issuing corporate stock to an employee's wife, the stock agreement was not illegal or immoral; thus, a trial court erred in voiding the stock interest of the employee's wife, and summary judgment in favor of the corporation in the wife's action for an accounting, dissolution, and other relief was reversed. Edwards v. Grapefields, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 399, 599 S.E.2d 489 (2004).

Cited in Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 600, 284 S.E.2d 416 (1981).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 276. 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 18 et seq., 152.

C.J.S.

- 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 21, 24 et seq., 93.

ALR.

- What constitutes manufacturing and who is a manufacturer under tax laws, 17 A.L.R.3d 7.