...App. 751 (307 SE2d 538) (1983). Very recently the General Assembly has provided that a competent adult may make a “living will” to instruct his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition. OCGA § 31-32-1 et seq., Ga....

...The opinion did not preclude considering the propriety of deescalation under other circumstances. During the years since we considered In re L. H. R., the legislature has enacted or amended several statutes governing the legal propriety of proxy health care decisions. See OCGA § 31-32-1 et seq....

...His right to have a sedative (a medication that in no way causes or accelerates death) administered before the ventilator is disconnected is a part of his right to control his medical treatment. 3. We point out that the legislature has enacted the Living Will Act, OCGA § 31-32-1 et seq., which allows a competent adult to execute a document directing that should he have a terminal condition as defined by the Act, life-sustaining procedures will be withheld....

...ion 1 of its opinion, although we conclude that the court skipped over one important point. The correct analysis makes it even clearer, however, that the Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on their claim of immunity under OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment as to that issue....

...Catalano’s attention to Stephenson’s Advance Directive and the notation in the progress notes regarding intubation. Following discovery, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending among other things that they were immune from liability based on the March 7 surgical procedure under OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3).5 On May 20, 2014, the trial court denied summary judgment on that issue, but granted the Defendants a certificate of immediate review.6 The Court of Appeals granted the Defendants’ application for 5...

...13 interlocutory appeal and affirmed in relevant part. In Division 1 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment that they had immunity under § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3) for the failure to comply with Alicea’s direction to contact her and obtain permission before intubating Stephenson and placing her on a ventilator on March 7, 2012....

...We express no opinion on any of those issues. 14 reliance” on the designated health care agent’s directions and decisions in order to qualify for the immunity from civil liability provided in OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3). Our rejection of this argument depends in part on our understanding of the Act’s overall purpose and operation, so we will outline those features before turning to a detailed examination of § 31-32-10 (a). (a) In 2007, the General Assembly enacted the statute that contains the Advanced Directive Act to replace two prior legislative schemes concerning end-of-life care, seeking to update the law in this area and eliminate inconsistencies and confusion. See Ga. L. 2007, p. 133, § 1 (b); former OCGA §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-12 (“Living Will Act”); former OCGA §§ 31-36-1 to 31- 36-13 (“Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act”)....

...See OCGA § 31-32- 19 14 (d). The health care agent also has priority over any other person, including a guardian, to act for the patient in matters covered by the advance directive, unless the directive says otherwise. See OCGA § 31-32-14 (e). The health care decision now at issue in this case is the decision that needed to be made on March 7, 2012, about whether Stephenson should be intubated and put on a ventilator to prolong her life....

...s arranged by the agent – presumably a transfer to a provider (who may be in the same facility) who will comply with the agent’s decision. (c) The Advance Directive Act then includes a series of immunity provisions in OCGA § 31-32-10. The Defendants seek to rely on § 31-32-10 (a), and in particular on subsections (a) (2) and (3).10 10 Subsections (b) and (c) of OCGA § 31-32-10 relate to immunity from civil and criminal liability and professional discipline involving the patient’s instructions concerning the withholding 21  OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) begins with a general release of liability for [e]ach health care provider, health care facility, and any other person who acts in good faith reliance on any direction or decision by the health care agent ....

...of the health care agent and each such health care provider, health care facility, and any other person acting in good faith reliance on such direction or decision: . . . . After the colon come five specific immunity provisions. See OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) (1)-(5).11 or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures, nourishment, or hydration as discussed in § 31-32-9. Subsection (d) addresses the immunity of witnesses to an advance directive, and subsection (e) specifies that immunity is...

...Corresponding to the first clause of § 31-32-8 (2), which requires that “[a] health care decision made by a health care agent in accordance with the terms of an advance directive for health care shall be complied with by every health care provider to whom the decision is communicated,” § 31-32-10 (a) (1) grants providers immunity from civil or criminal liability or professional discipline “solely for complying with any direction or decision by the health decision by the health care agent....

...23 care agent, even if death or injury to the declarant ensues.” And corresponding to the proviso in § 31-32-8 (2) for health care providers who are “unwilling to comply with the health care agent’s decision,” § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3) give such providers similarly broad immunity – so long as they promptly inform the agent of the “refusal or failure” to comply with the agent’s direction or decision and assist with the patient’s continued car...

...ral compliance duty in § 31-32-8 (2) – so a separate link to the introductory clause was not needed. Indeed, to reiterate that only health care providers who act in good faith reliance on the agent’s directions are entitled to immunity under § 31-32-10 (a), the introductory clause speaks of “each such health care provider ....

...s, “[e]ach health care provider who acts in good faith reliance on any direction or decision by the health care agent.” Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, [t]aken together, the language, grammar, and structure of OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) reflect that the requirement of “good faith reliance” on a health care agent’s direction or decision referenced in the introductory clause was intended to apply to the subsections that follow it, includin...

...OCGA § 31-32-8 (2) plainly authorizes a health care provider to make no effort to comply with an agent’s direction – to refuse or fail entirely to comply – so long as the provider promptly informs the agent of that choice and takes the other steps of care and cooperation that the Act requires. And OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3) give such a provider immunity for doing just what the statute allows him to do....

...as decided, and then proceeds as the statute mandates in § 31-32-8 (2) – either by complying with that decision or by taking the steps required when he is unwilling to comply with the decision – then he may look to the immunity provisions in § 31-32-10 (a) for protection. But a provider cannot claim this immunity when his action was not based in good faith on the agent’s direction, just because the decision he made for the 28 patient happen...

...Put another way, when the health care provider makes the patient’s health care decisions on his own, without relying in good faith on what the patient’s agent directed, the provider must defend his actions without the immunity given in OCGA § 31-32-10 (a). 3. When we apply these legal principles to the current record in this case, construed in favor of Alicea as the non-moving party, it is clear that the Defendants were properly denied summary judgment on their immunity claim based on OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3)....

...without reliance on Alicea’s directions may subject them to liability. For the reasons discussed above, the trial court correctly denied the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to their claim of immunity from civil liability under OCGA § 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed that ruling. Judgment affirmed....

...Cornwell and that the Shumates represented to medical personnel that Mr. Cornwell had expressed similar desires, the appellants contend such evidence would allow a jury to conclude that the Shumates acted as if Mr. Cornwell had executed a living will under the provisions of OCGA § 31-32-1 et seq., or as if they held a health care power of attorney under the provisions of OCGA § 31-36-1 et seq. The appellants further contend that such conduct would violate the criminal provisions of OCGA § 31-32-10 and OCGA § 31-36-9(2), subjecting the Shumates to disinheritance under § 53-4-6. In this regard, § 31-32-10 provides in relevant part that [a]ny person who falsifies or forges the living will of another ......

...Section 31-36-9(2) contains a similar provision concerning a person who falsifies or forges a health care agency. We find that the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to these contentions. First, by basing criminal liability upon the act of falsifying or forging a living will or health care agency, both § 31-32-10 and § 31-36-9(2) clearly contemplate that a written, but forged or falsified, living will or health care agency must be the cause of the withholding of life-sustaining procedures....