CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 5, 2020 | 310 Ga. 32
...tient
program.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 111-2-2-.26 (1) (a), (2) (c). This
case is about whether the Department can, through the Rule,
require a licensed hospital with a psychiatric/substance-abuse
program that is authorized by a CON, see OCGA §
31-6-40 et seq.,
to obtain an additional CON to redistribute inpatient beds in excess
of those identified in its CON to operate a psychiatric/substance-
abuse program, but within its total licensed bed capacity....
...Department of Community Health was authorized to
promulgate a rule, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 111-2-2-.26 (1)
(a), to create a category of institutional health services
requiring a certificate of need, when such category is not
listed in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a).
For the reasons explained below, we answer that question “yes,” and
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1....
...Department issued a cease-and-desist letter to Flint River.
1 It is undisputed that Flint River’s CON-approved psychiatric program
is authorized to operate psychiatric and/or substance-abuse inpatient beds.
Flint River appealed to the Department, arguing that OCGA
§
31-6-40 (a) (pertaining to when a CON is required) governs when
a “new institutional health service” requires CON approval, and
that because Flint River’s redistribution of beds within its total
approved inpatient bed capacity did not fall within OCGA §
31-6-40
(a)’s definition of a new institutional health service requiring CON
approval, no CON was required for the bed redistribution....
...Southern Crescent intervened in the administrative
appeal, arguing that Flint River’s operation of more than 12
psychiatric/substance-abuse beds was beyond the scope of its CON
in violation of OCGA §
31-6-41 (a) (pertaining to the valid “scope” of
CONs), and that Flint River was required under OCGA §
31-6-40 (a)
and the Psychiatric Rule to obtain a new CON before redistributing
psychiatric/substance-abuse beds....
...the flexing of beds between categories,” and concluded that “the
controlling statute governing analysis of whether [Flint River]
impermissibly expanded the number of beds in its acute care adult
psychiatric and substance abuse inpatient program is . . . OCGA
§
31-6-40.”
Southern Crescent filed a Petition for Judicial Review, arguing
that the Department’s order was inconsistent with the Psychiatric
Rule and that the Rule should control....
...defined within that Rule to mean ‘the addition of beds to an existing
CON-authorized or grandfathered psychiatric and/or substance
abuse inpatient program.’” Id. (quoting Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 111-
2-2-.26 (1) (a), (2) (c)). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that
“OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) does not specifically include the expansion of
existing programs in its list of ‘new institutional health services’
that are required to obtain a CON,” but concluded that the “list is
not exclusive.” Id....
...at 43 (emphasis in original)
(quoting OCGA §
31-6-41 (a)).
The Court of Appeals thus concluded that the Rule was not “an
unauthorized ‘enlargement’ of the scope of the CON statute,” but
rather that,
in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole, the
most sensible interpretation of OCGA §
31-6-40 is that
“includes” introduces a nonexclusive list, with the
Department free to promulgate by rule additional
categories of “new institutional health services,” but only
so as to administer and implement the [CO...
...at 44, 46 (emphasis in original).
2. Statutory and regulatory background.
In determining whether the Department was authorized to
promulgate a rule to create a category of “new institutional health
service” requiring a CON, see OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), we first look to
the relevant legal texts. Those include a comprehensive statutory
scheme defining and establishing the CON program, as well as
regulations the Department has promulgated with respect to CONs.
(a) Current statutory landscape.
OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) establishes when a new institutional
health service requires a CON....
...(B) Biliary lithotripsy;
(C) Surgery in an operating room
environment, including but not limited to
ambulatory surgery; and
(D) Cardiac catheterization.
OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (2009) (emphasis supplied).3
The enumerated list of new institutional health services that
require a CON has changed over time....
...capacity of a health care facility which increases the total number of
beds or which redistributes beds among various categories[.]” Ga.
Code Ann. § 88-3302 (s) (1979) (emphasis supplied). But in 1983,
3 In 2019, the General Assembly amended OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) to include
an eighth new institutional health service requiring CON approval: “(8) The
conversion of a destination cancer hospital to a general cancer hospital.”
OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (8).
the General Assembly removed the language expressly requiring
CON approval for bed redistribution, see OCGA §
31-6-2 (14) (1983),
and it did not add that language back into the CON statute when it
amended and moved the provision defining “new institutional
health services” from the Article’s general definition statute, OCGA
§
31-6-2, to its current home in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a).
OCGA §
31-6-40 (b) provides that “[a]ny person proposing to
develop or offer a new institutional health service or health care
facility shall, before commencing such activity, ....
...anded’” as “the addition
of beds to an existing CON-authorized or grandfathered psychiatric
and/or substance abuse inpatient program.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r.
111-2-2-.26 (1) (a), (2) (c).
3. Analysis
The plain text of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) requires a CON for “any
new institutional health service” and specifically prescribes that
“[n]ew institutional health services include” an enumerated list of
items, one of which is “[a]ny increase in the bed capacity of a health
care facility except as provided in Code Section
31-6-47[.]” Id....
...111-
2-2-.26 (1) (a), (2) (c). Thus, there is potential tension between the
statute and the Rule.4 As a result of this possible tension, we must
construe the statute and examine the interplay between the statute
and the Rule to determine whether OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) controls, or
whether the requirements of the Rule (Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 111-
2-2-.26 (1) (a), (2) (c)), supplement the list in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) on
4 We note that the Department has filed an amicus curiae brief arguing
that the Psychiatric Rule should not be read to “‘enlarge’ the scope of ‘new
institutional health services’ as set forth in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) by requiring
CON approval for a redistribution of beds that does not increase a facility’s
total bed capacity,” which “would render the rule an unconstitutional attempt
to add to the ‘legislative list’ of ‘new institutional health services.’” (quoting
North Fulton Med....
...e to more than one
interpretation.
Whether redistribution of beds within a facility’s total licensed
bed capacity constitutes a new institutional health service that
requires a CON turns largely on whether “include,” as used in OCGA
§
31-6-40 (a), is a term of limitation introducing an exhaustive list
of seven “new institutional health services” for which a CON is
5 In some circumstances, an agency’s statutory interpretation may
warrant deference by courts considering ambiguous statutes....
...is
at an end.” Id. at 173 (citation and punctuation omitted). But when
the language of a statute or regulation “is not obvious on its face,”
6 Notably, Southern Crescent did not argue at any stage of the
proceedings below that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) constitutes a non-exhaustive list of
new institutional health services for which a CON is required. However,
because the Court of Appeals concluded that the list of new institutional health
services enumerated in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) is not exclusive, see UHS of
Anchor, 351 Ga....
...used ‘including’ in a particular statute depends on the exact
language, context, and subject matter of the statute.” Wetzel,
298
Ga. at 32 (citing Berryhill,
281 Ga. at 440-442).
(c) In context, “include,” followed by seven specifically
enumerated examples in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), introduces an
exhaustive list of “new institutional health services” for which a CON
is required.
At its most basic level, Flint River’s textual argument is that
OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) sets out the exclusive “statutory list of ‘new
institutional health services’ for which a CON is required,” that this
list — which is established by the General Assembly — “does not
include reconfiguration of beds when...
...new clinical health service and when the facility’s total number of
beds does not increase,” and that “only the General Assembly” —
and not the Department — “can add to that statutory list.” We agree
that “include,” as it is found in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), is used in a
limiting sense, introducing an exhaustive list of new institutional
health services for which a CON is required.
A number of textual and contextual indicators lead us to that
conclusion. First and foremost, the structure of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a):
the list of new institutional health services for which a CON is
required is comprised of seven (now eight) specific, detailed, and
considerably distinctive items, and is introduced by the term
“include.” In other words, because the general phrase “any new
institutional health service shall be required to obtain a certificate
of need pursuant to this chapter[,]” OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), is “followed
by the word ‘includ[e],’ which is itself followed by specific phrases, .
....
...it clearly is reasonable to read the word ‘includ[e]’ as meaning ‘is
equivalent to,’ and to conclude that the specific phrases . . . set forth
the entire definition,” see Berryhill,
281 Ga. at 441. Thus, the
meaning of “include” in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) more closely mirrors our
interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statute we construed in Berryhill
— “where ‘includes’ was followed by two very detailed specific
phrases,” Wetzel, 298 Ga....
...by a list of anything close to seven specific and distinctive items,
results in that portion of the statute being interpreted expansively
rather than exhaustively.
Second, “a broad[er] construction of the term ‘include[ ]’ would
render the specific phrases in” OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (1)-(7)
“superfluous” insofar as it would have been “wholly unnecessary for
the legislature to state that the general phrase encompasses [so
many] particular acts,” Berryhill, 281 Ga....
...after “including” as “the only prohibited way of ‘allowing access to
information stored in a computer,’ [would render] the general phrase
preceding ‘including’ . . . surplusage”) (emphasis in original).
Third, the broader statutory context of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a)
reveals that the General Assembly used the phrase “including but
not limited to” elsewhere in the very same statutory provision to
introduce illustrative examples. See, e.g., OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C)
(“Clinical health services which are offered in or through a
diagnostic, treatment, or rehabilitation center which were not
offered on a regular basis in or through that center within the 12
month period prior to the time...
... limited to ambulatory surgery[.]”) (emphasis supplied).13 Unlike the
Court of Appeals, see UHS of Anchor,
351 Ga. App. at 42-47, we
13 The General Assembly similarly used the phrase “including but not
limited to” throughout the same Code chapter. See, e.g., OCGA §§
31-6-40.3
(c) (1) (“The general cancer hospital may continue to provide all institutional
health care services and other services it provided as of the date of such
conversion, including but not limited to inpatient beds, outpatient services,
surgery, radiation therapy, imaging, and positron emission tomography (PET)
scanning, without any further approval from the department[.]”) (emphasis
supplied);
31-6-40.3 (c) (2) (“The destination cancer hospital shall be classified
as a general cancer hospital under this chapter and shall be subject to all
requirements and conditions applicable to hospitals under this article,
including but not limited to...
...1122 program of the federal Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, including,
but not limited to, any application for approval under Section 1122. . . .”)
(emphasis supplied).
conclude that the use of “including but not limited to” in one
subprovision of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) but not in another indicates that
the General Assembly intended for “including but not limited to” to
introduce a list of illustrative examples, whereas the use of “include”
followed by an enumerated list of items introduces an exhaustive
list.14 See Berryhill, 281 Ga....
...broad term of illustration or
enlargement, it presumably would have appended the phrase ‘but is
not limited to,’ just as it supplied the phrase ‘but not limited to’ after
14 Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a)
“does not specifically include the expansion of existing programs in its list of
‘new institutional health services’ that are required to obtain a CON” and that
the term “‘include’ may be interpreted as a word of limitation or enlargement,”
and likewise recognized the many instances in which the General Assembly
used the phrase “including but not limited to” in the very same Code chapter
where OCGA §
31-6-40 is located, it assigned little weight to the text and the
statutory context of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) and instead placed undue reliance on
the General Assembly’s delegation of regulatory authority to the Department
to “adopt, promulgate, and implement rules and regulations sufficient to
administer the provisions” of the relevant Code chapter. See UHS of Anchor,
351 Ga. App. at 42-47 (citations and punctuation omitted). Similarly, Southern
Crescent points to the Department’s “broad authority to promulgate rules
under the CON Statute” as a reason why OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) is merely
illustrative, reasoning that “[i]nterpreting OCGA §
31-6-40 to be an exhaustive
list would frustrate that authority.” We discuss the Court of Appeals’s and
Southern Crescent’s reliance on the General Assembly’s delegation below in
Division 3 Error! Reference source not found..
the word ‘...
...of the very same anti-SLAPP
statute being construed in this case.”).
Similarly, we reject the Court of Appeals’s and Southern
Crescent’s assertions that a change from a prior version of the CON
statute indicates that the current OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) is not
exhaustive. Specifically, they point to prior versions of the CON
statute, see Ga. Code Ann. § 88-3302 (s) (1979); OCGA §
31-6-2 (14)
(1983) — provisions that were updated and re-codified in 2008 as
OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) — which provided that “‘new institutional
health service’ means,” followed by six specific acts or services, see
id. (emphasis supplied), as compared to OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), which
uses “include” instead of “means” and introduces a list of seven (now
eight) specific acts or services, arguing that “means” is exclusive
whereas “include” is not. According to this logic, the change in
wording from “means” to “include” indicates the General Assembly’s
intent for OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) to represent an illustrative list of
examples for which a CON is required....
...and is
currently comprised of eight specific acts or services, we cannot say
that the prior use of “means” to introduce that multi-item
enumerated list is a distinction with any real difference.
(d) Statutory history indicates that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) sets
forth an exhaustive list that does not include bed redistribution as a
new institutional health service for which a CON is required.
We have also considered the history of a statute’s enactment
and amendments in evaluating the meaning of that statute....
...amendment in 1983, thus eliminating any reference to bed
“redistribut[ion]” requiring CON approval. See OCGA §
31-6-2 (14)
(1983); Ga. L. 1983, pp. 1566, 1571, § 1. And the absence of language
pertaining to bed redistribution, which is still reflected in the
version of OCGA §
31-6-40 at issue in this case, reinforces our
conclusion that the General Assembly does not require CON
approval for bed reconfiguration under these circumstances....
...ise serious questions about
the constitutionality of the Department’s rulemaking authority.
(e) The constitutional doubt canon further weighs in favor of
interpreting “include” as introducting an exhaustive list as it is used
in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a).
We have concluded that there are strong textual and
contextual indicators that the term “include,” as used in OCGA § 31-
16 Southern Crescent also argues that the Psychiatric Rule is consistent
with exemptions fou...
...so long as the project does not result in . . . [a]ny redistribution of existing beds
among existing clinical health services”) (added in 2019). But those provisions
actually undermine, rather than support, Southern Crescent’s argument
because they, unlike OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), expressly enumerate bed
redistribution as a specific circumstance that would require CON approval.
6-40 (a), serves as a limiting term that introduces an exhaustive list
of new institutional health services for which a CON is required, and
that the statutory history of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) supports that
interpretation....
...rulemaking authority to the Department, the canon of constitutional
doubt tips the balance of our statutory analysis in favor of that
interpretation.
(f) Serious questions about the non-delegation doctrine being
violated counsel in favor of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) being construed as
an exclusive list of new institutional health services for which a CON
is required.
The constitutional non-delegation doctrine is “rooted in the
principle of separation of powers”17 and “mandates that...
...concluded that it did. Twenty-five years ago, in HCA Health Svcs.
of Ga., Inc. v. Roach,
265 Ga. 501 (458 SE2d 118) (1995), this Court
examined an agency rule that authorized a health care facility’s
relocation without any CON approval under OCGA §
31-6-40 (a)’s
But the guidance the General Assembly provided the Department in
OCGA §
31-6-21 (a) (8), which provides a number of factors the Department
must consider in developing methodologies, does not provide the guidance
necessary for the Psychiatric Rule to avoid non-delegation concerns....
...Assembly’s power to define the thing to which the statute . . . is to
be applied.” Id. at 543 (citation and punctuation omitted).
Flint River contends that under the logic of Roach and
Stephenson, the Psychiatric Rule is invalid because it adds to OCGA
§
31-6-40 (a), by administrative rule, a new category of “new
institutional health service” for which CON approval is required —
i.e., the reallocation of beds without exceeding a facility’s authorized
total bed capacity — when the Gene...
...We agree that the Psychiatric Rule, as the Department initially
attempted to apply it here, raises serious doubts about the
constitutionality of the General Assembly’s delegation of authority.
Specifically, we agree that an expansive interpretation of OCGA
§
31-6-40 (a) very well may violate the non-delegation doctrine.
Indeed, just as the Department’s predecessor agency attempted to
add to a statutory list of exemptions from CON approval a category
of health care facility for which the CON statute did not provide an
exemption, see Stephenson, 269 Ga....
...usurpation of the General Assembly’s power” in Stephenson,
269 Ga.
at 543.23
We thus conclude that if the Department were authorized to
expand through rulemaking the statutory definition of “new
institutional health service” requiring CON approval set forth in
OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), sufficient doubt would be raised about the
constitutionality of the type and amount of authority delegated to
that the agency in those cases attempted to create exemptions to statutory
requirements via rule, whereas the Departmen...
...Psychiatric Rule. See footnote 4, above.
the Department under OCGA §
31-6-21 in this context that we
should avoid such an interpretation. And although we conclude that
the canon of constitutional doubt therefore weighs in favor of
interpreting OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) narrowly, we also emphasize that
we are not required to determine whether any particular statute
actually violates non-delegation or separation of powers to reach
that conclusion.24
24 That this Court has already suggested that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) may
be pressing the outer limits of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority
to regulate the healthcare industry further supports our conclusion. In
Women’s Surgical Center, LLC v. Berry,
302 Ga. 349 (806 SE2d 606) (2017),
which upheld OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) against, among other things, a
substantive due process challenge under rational basis review, we
“emphasize[d] that this is a case about the General Assembly’s ability to
regulate healthcare....
...on,
and therefore reject the request for administrative deference.”).
(g) OCGA §
31-6-41 (a)’s “scope” provision does not enable
expansion of the enumerated list of new institutional health services
requiring CON approval under OCGA §
31-6-40 (a).
Finally, Southern Crescent contends that the Psychiatric Rule
is valid and requires Flint River to obtain a CON to redistribute beds
for psychiatric/substance-abuse patients because the Rule is
“necessitated” by OCGA § 3...
...pital
exceeds the number of psychiatric beds its CON authorizes, then the
hospital has exceeded the “scope” of the CON the Department
approved. See OCGA §
31-6-41 (a). According to Southern Crescent,
that is because the Rule harmonizes OCGA §
31-6-40, which
“prescribes when a CON is needed,” and OCGA §
31-6-41 (a), which
“limits a CON to its defined scope.” The Court of Appeals agreed,
reasoning that “the Department saw fit to require by its Rules that
the expansion of a...
...to operate
requires its own CON. Southern Crescent fervently contends that it
does, arguing that “before a psychiatric healthcare facility can
exceed its number of CON-authorized beds, it needs a new CON.”
But that argument ignores that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), not OCGA § 31-
6-41 (a), governs which services constitute a new institutional
health service that requires a CON, and — as we determined above
— the reallocation of beds is not one of them.25 In other words,
OCGA §
31-6-41 (a) — a statute through which the General
Assembly has generally ensured that Department-approved CONs
are limited in scope — does not alter the text of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a),
a statute through which the General Assembly has specified an
exhaustive list of new institutional health services for which a CON
is required....
...116, 124 (839 SE2d 560)
(2020) (noting that typically, more general statutory provisions do
not override more specific ones). Rather, OCGA §
31-6-41 (a)
ensures that new institutional health services that do require CON
approval, as required by OCGA §
31-6-40 (a), do not then exceed the
scopes of the CONs as they are approved by the Department....
...he facility, the Rule is
invalid because it purports to create a new category of new
institutional health service that is not enumerated in OCGA § 31-6-
40 (a).
4. Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that OCGA §
31-6-40
(a) provides an exhaustive list of new institutional health services
for which a CON is required....
...The General Assembly’s delegation of
legislative authority to the Department to promulgate rules as part
of its administration of the CON program does not include the
authority to define additional new institutional health services
requiring a CON, beyond those listed in OCGA §
31-6-40 (a)....
...importantly, I see no need to say anything at all about that
constitutional question to decide the statutory interpretation issue
before us. As the remainder of the majority opinion persuasively
demonstrates, the text, context, and history of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a)
make it clear that this statutory provision’s long and diverse list of
“new institutional health services” for which a CON is required is
exclusive, so the Psychiatric Rule could not add “bed redistribution”
to that list....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 16, 2017 | 806 S.E.2d 606
...s. However, any such change to the Center could only be legally accomplished if the Center sought and was granted a certificate of need (“CON”)1 by the Georgia Department of Community Health (the “Department”). Specifically, pursuant to OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C):
On and after July 1, 2008, any new institutional health service shall be required to obtain a certificate of need pursuant to this chapter....
...onjectural or hypothetical” (Summers, supra), such that it has standing to pursue its declaratory action here. See Bruner, supra.
Because the Center has standing to pursue, and is in fact pursuing, a direct facial constitutional challenge to OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) (see Division 2, infra), the Center was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its declaratory action....
...e.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) King v. City of Bainbridge,
272 Ga. 427, 428 (2) (531 SE2d 350) (2000).
The trial court did not err in denying the Department’s motion to dismiss.
*352
Case No. S17A1317
2. The Center contends that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) is unconstitutional on its face because the statute (a) violates the Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution (see Ga....
...V (c) (1)), and (b) violates the Due Process Clauses of the Georgia and United States Constitutions (see U. S. Const. Amend. 14 and Ga. Const, of 1983 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I).6 As explained more fully below, both of these contentions are without merit.
In reviewing the Center’s facial challenges to OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C),
we recognize at the outset that all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature and that before an Act of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the f...
...113, 118 (3) (702 SE2d 145) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).
(Punctuation omitted.) Bello v. State,
300 Ga. 682, 685-686 (1) (797 SE2d 882) (2017).
With these principles in mind, we address each argument in turn:
(a) Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause: The Center asserts that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) violates the Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution because the Center is not allowed to effectively compete in the healthcare market by expanding its facilities if the Center does not first obtain the approval of the Department to receive a CON....
...800, 801 (2) (262 SE2d 106) (1979) (striking down provisions of Franchise Practices Act that authorized franchise agreements that permitted “franchised dealers to restrict competition and create a monopoly in the retail sale of motor vehicles”).
By its plain terms, OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) does not authorize monopolistic “contracts” relating to providers of new institutional health services....
...e that would encourage a monopoly Because the Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause simply does not apply here, the Center’s constitutional claim on this ground must fail. Young, supra,
258 Ga. at 863 (2).
(b) Due Process: The Center claims that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) violates substantive due process under the Georgia Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it restricts competition among healthcare providers by requiring them to seek a CON before adding new services....
...2013); Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F2d 251, 253 (II) (9th Cir. 1989). The government objectives with respect to Georgia’s CON laws as stated in OCGA §
31-6-1 are indeed legitimate.
Furthermore, on the record before us, the Center has not shown that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) does not bear a rational relationship to the legitimate government objectives outlined in OCGA §
31-6-1. By incorporating a review and approval process for the addition of new healthcare services in existing markets that might already have such services and those markets that may need such services, OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) potentially allows the Department to avoid the “unnecessary duplication of services,” which can in turn make health care more “cost effective” and “compatible with the . . . needs of the various areas and populations of the state.” OCGA §
31-6-1. The Center has not shown under the record that the requirements of OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) are arbitrary or discriminatory, and the fact that the legislature could have potentially come up with a different statute with a theoretically more effective means of accomplishing the stated goals of OCGA §
31-6-1 is irrelevant....
...Middle Georgia v. Deep South Sanitation,
296 Ga. 103, 107 (2), n. 5 (765 SE2d 364) (2014) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not empower the judiciary to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation”) (citation and punctuation omitted). OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) is the vehicle that was chosen, and the record before us does not show that this statute does not bear a rational relationship to the legitimate goals of government expressed in OCGA § 31-6-1.7 Accordingly, the Center’s due process challenges to OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) *356are without merit....
...While the Center initially appeared to be attempting to challenge the entire CON law statutory scheme in the trial court and in its brief to this Court, the Center conceded at oral argument before this Court that it is only seeking to challenge OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C).
We are addressing the cross-appeal first, because, if the trial court had erred in denying the Department’s motion to dismiss, there would be no need for us to reach the constitutional issues.
The denial of that CON is n...
...I (“Provision shall be made by law for the regulation of insurance.”). Nothing in today’s opinion should be understood to support sweeping economic regulation of this sort beyond this unique context.
To the extent that the Center argues that OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) violates due process pursuant to case law indicating that “a State legislature is without constitutional power to fix prices at which commodities may be sold, services rendered, or property used, unless the business or property i...
