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2018 Georgia Code 31-8-44 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 31 HEALTH

Section 8. Care and Protection of Indigent and Elderly Patients, 31-8-1 through 31-8-306.

ARTICLE 2A HOSPITAL CARE FOR PREGNANT WOMEN

31-8-44. Immunity of hospital or health care provider from liability.

No physician, nurse, or other such medical assistant, nor the hospital or any of its agents or employees shall be guilty of malpractice or civilly liable therefor for treatment rendered under this article unless the physician, nurse, or other medical assistant, or the hospital, its agent, or employee has been grossly negligent in the provision of such services or has willfully failed to comply with the provisions of this article. No action shall be brought in connection with treatment rendered under this article without a specific allegation of gross negligence or willful failure to comply.

(Code 1981, §31-8-44, enacted by Ga. L. 1984, p. 1389, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 829, § 3.)

Cross references.

- Actions for medical malpractice generally, § 51-1-27.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 31-8-44

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Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 694 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2010 | 287 Ga. 7, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 706

...Moreover, like OCGA § 51-1-29.5(c), that Act provides that there is no civil liability thereunder unless a physician, nurse, medical assistant, hospital or its agent or employee "has been grossly negligent in the provision of such services. . . ." OCGA § 31-8-44....
...s a showing of gross negligence before a physician, nurse, medical assistant or a hospital or any of its agents or employees can be found civilly liable for malpractice in connection with treatment afforded indigent *82 pregnant women in labor. OCGA § 31-8-44....
...fails." Terrell County, 256 Ga. at 630, 352 S.E.2d 378 (emphasis supplied). The majority in this case, due to the Terrell County court's use of the abbreviation "et seq.," concludes that, although the gross negligence standard of care found in OCGA § 31-8-44 was not specifically attacked in Terrell County, "that provision was enacted as part of the legislation that was expressly found not to be a special law." Maj. Op. at 77-78. There is no doubt that the Terrell County Court's use of the term "et seq." is confusing and misleading. However, one plain, simple fact remains: The Terrell County court did not hold—nor could it have held—that OCGA § 31-8-44 is a general law because Terrell County did not have standing to raise such an attack....
...Standing is a "`prerequisite to attacking the constitutionality of a statute.'" Perdue v. Lake, 282 Ga. 348, 348, 647 S.E.2d 6 (2007). A litigant has standing "only if that law has an adverse impact on that litigant's own rights." In the Interest of A.C., 285 Ga. 829, 832(1), 686 S.E.2d 635 (2009). OCGA § 31-8-44 did not adversely affect Terrell County's rights—the Terrell County record is devoid of any reference to medical malpractice or harm to any patient at all. It is impossible for anyone, let alone a county, to allege harm under OCGA § 31-8-44, a statute that lowers the standard of care in certain medical malpractice cases, without attempting to show some form of malpractice or patient injury in the first place. Furthermore, an attack on OCGA § 31-8-44 was not raised and ruled upon at the trial court in Terrell County....
...No doubt due to Terrell County's failure to raise any attack on the standard of care provision as a special law, the Terrell County trial court merely ruled on the issue of the uniformity of the economic impact on counties. Thus, no constitutional attack on the standard of care provision in OCGA § 31-8-44 was raised and ruled upon in the Terrell County trial court....