Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) does not violate the uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), because it is a general law; it operates uniformly upon all health care liability claims arising from emergency medical care, and classification of the designated class is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).

Because the legislative purpose of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) is legitimate, and the classification drawn has some reasonable relation to furthering that purpose, the classification passes constitutional muster, and, although § 51-1-29.5(c) raises the burden of proof in certain cases, it does not deprive one of the right to a jury trial or any other fundamental right. Promoting affordable liability insurance for health care providers and hospitals, and thereby promoting the availability of quality health care services, are legitimate legislative purposes, and it is entirely logical to assume that emergency medical care provided in hospital emergency rooms is different from medical care provided in other settings and that establishing a standard of care and a burden of proof that reduces the potential liability of the providers of such care will help achieve those legitimate legislative goals. Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) satisfies due process requirements because it is not so vague and indefinite in its meaning that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at the subsection's meaning and differ as to the subsection's application. Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).

Phrase "in a hospital emergency department."

- Georgia General Assembly's use of the phrase "in a hospital emergency department" in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 to mean the physical location in which a patient is treated is reflected by its inclusion in the statute of two other locations within which a patient may be treated for an emergency. Nisbet v. Davis, 327 Ga. App. 559, 760 S.E.2d 179 (2014).

Medical care is an objective, rather than subjective, test. Nguyen v. Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C., 298 Ga. 75, 779 S.E.2d 334 (2015).

Question of fact remained whether statute applied.

- In a malpractice suit alleging that emergency department physicians failed to diagnose and treat an infant's skull fracture, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the medical defendants because the record showed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the heightened proof standards set forth in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) applied in the case. Nguyen v. Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C., 298 Ga. 75, 779 S.E.2d 334 (2015).

Application when husband remained symptomatic.

- Trial court properly determined that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) applied to a couple's negligence claims because the services rendered by the defendants constituted emergency medical care defined by § 51-1-29.5(a)(5) as the husband remained symptomatic throughout the entire time of being treated in the emergency room and the couple did not show that the husband was ever capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient. Quinney v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., 325 Ga. App. 112, 751 S.E.2d 874 (2013).

Question as to whether delay in treatment constituted emergency medical care.

- In a medical malpractice action, the trial court's grant of the defendants' motion for summary judgment was erroneous because, although the evidence reflected that the patient presented to the emergency room with an emergency condition, a question of fact existed as to whether the defendants' actions in delaying necessary treatment constituted emergency medical care under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c). Dailey v. Abdul-Samed, 319 Ga. App. 380, 736 S.E.2d 142 (2012).

Trial court did not err in allowing the jury to interpret O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 when the court allowed the jury to determine whether the medical care provided to the patient arose out of the provision of "emergency medical care," as the jury had to determine whether the patient's claims rose out of the provision of the emergency medical care and the trial court charged the jury on the definition of "emergency medical care," which was not beyond the ken of the average juror. Howland v. Wadsworth, 324 Ga. App. 175, 749 S.E.2d 762 (2013).

Question of fact remained whether patient was provided emergency medical care.

- In the plaintiffs' negligence action against the defendants for the treatment of the plaintiffs' child, the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion was improperly granted because a question of fact remained as to whether the child was provided emergency medical care since nothing in the record suggested that the physician assistant who evaluated the child in the emergency room (ER) was not acting in good faith when the physician assistant diagnosed the child as suffering from a mere contusion; and the circumstances of the child's admission, readmission, and permanent injuries required a jury to consider whether, when the child presented at the ER with a large red-purple lump on the head, the child was suffering from an actual emergency. Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C. v. Nguyen, 330 Ga. App. 156, 767 S.E.2d 818 (2014), aff'd, 298 Ga. 75, 779 S.E.2d 334 (2015).

Factual questions existed as to whether an emergency room doctor provided a patient with emergency medical care, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(a)(5), and whether the patient's act in jumping out of a car and being killed on the interstate was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the doctor's failure two days earlier to diagnose and treat the patient's psychosis. Everson v. Phoebe Sumter Med. Ctr., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 182, 798 S.E.2d 667 (2017).

Whether the patient at some point was stable and capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient within the meaning of the emergency medical care statute was a question for the trier of fact and, thus, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the hospital and emergency room physicians on the issue of whether the emergency medical care statute applied to the claims against them. Kidney v. Eastside Medical Center, LLC, 343 Ga. App. 401, 806 S.E.2d 849 (2017).

No evidence emergency room physician acted with gross negligence.

- Patient sued an emergency room physician for malpractice for failing to diagnose a leg fracture. As the physician sought no orthopedic consult because a radiologist opined that the x-rays showed no serious fracture, the patient could not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the physician acted with gross negligence, as required under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c); thus, the physician was entitled to summary judgment. Pottinger v. Smith, 293 Ga. App. 626, 667 S.E.2d 659 (2008).

Even assuming there was evidence sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether the doctor's actions were negligent, there was no evidence, and certainly no clear and convincing evidence, by which a jury could reasonably conclude that the doctor failed to exercise even slight care and was therefore grossly negligent. Johnson v. Omondi, 318 Ga. App. 787, 736 S.E.2d 129 (2012).

Evidence of emergency room doctor's gross negligence was sufficient for jury.

- Services provided by an emergency room physician to a patient who presented with a high pressure puncture wound to one hand were "bona fide emergency services" under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(a)(5), and the physician was therefore only liable if grossly negligent; evidence that the physician failed to contact a hand surgeon for seven hours after determining that emergency surgery was necessary was sufficient to go to the jury. Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 755 S.E.2d 805 (2014).

Application of non-emergency exception.

- Whether a patient, who originally needed emergency services, had stabilized and was capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient was a question for the trier of fact and, thus, the trial court erred by granting the doctor summary judgment on the issue of whether the exception for non-emergency care applied. Bonds v. Nesbitt, 322 Ga. App. 852, 747 S.E.2d 40 (2013).

Trial court erred in determining that the emergency medical care statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5, did not apply since the doctor gave care in the actual emergency room of a hospital, but properly denied the defendant's summary judgment because a question of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the doctor was grossly negligent. Nisbet v. Davis, 327 Ga. App. 559, 760 S.E.2d 179 (2014).

Genuine issues of fact as to gross negligence.

- Trial court erred by granting the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment because the appellate court found that the court could not say as a matter of law that a reasonable jury would be unable to find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants were not grossly negligent based on the plaintiffs' expert evidence and because the emergency room doctor, at the time a radiologist's report was relied upon, had facts that called into question the reliability of the CT scan results. Quinney v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., 325 Ga. App. 112, 751 S.E.2d 874 (2013).

Need for emergency medical care created heightened burden of proving gross negligence.

- Because a doctor provided care to a patient who had received a high pressure puncture wound to the patient's hand that required emergency surgery, it was clear that the heightened burden of proving gross negligence for emergency services in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) was applicable. The facts were sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of gross negligence. Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 755 S.E.2d 805 (2014).

Evidence of gross negligence sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

- In a medical malpractice claim, because the emergency department doctor's actions did not meet the standard of care in the medical profession as the diagnostic measures the doctor took did nothing to prove or disprove the presence of pulmonary embolism in the patient, and the proper standard of care required the doctor to administer a CT scan, or a lung scan, which the doctor did not do, a reasonable jury could find that the doctor acted with gross negligence, and summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the doctor. Johnson v. Omondi, 294 Ga. 74, 751 S.E.2d 288 (2013).