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2018 Georgia Code 31-9-3 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 31-9-3 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 31-9-3

TITLE 31 HEALTH

Section 9. Consent for Surgical or Medical Treatment, 31-9-1 through 31-9-7.

ARTICLE 10 DRUG REPOSITORY PROGRAM

31-9-3. Emergencies.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term "emergency" means a situation wherein (1) according to competent medical judgment, the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures are reasonably necessary and (2) a person authorized to consent under Code Section 31-9-2 is not readily available and any delay in treatment could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the life or health of the person affected or could reasonably result in disfigurement or impaired faculties.
  2. In addition to any instances in which a consent is excused or implied at law, a consent to surgical or medical treatment or procedures suggested, recommended, prescribed, or directed by a duly licensed physician will be implied where an emergency exists.

(Code 1933, § 88-2905, enacted by Ga. L. 1971, p. 438, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Further provisions regarding liability for rendering of emergency care, §§ 31-11-8,51-1-29.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Cited in Winfrey v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 149 Ga. App. 488, 254 S.E.2d 725 (1979); Davis v. Charter By-The-Sea, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 213, 358 S.E.2d 865 (1987).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 71. 61 Am. Jur. 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, § 158.

C.J.S.

- 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, §§ 38, 40, 41, 46 et seq. 70 C.J.S., Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health Care Providers, § 90 et seq.

ALR.

- Consent as condition of right to perform surgical operation, 76 A.L.R. 562; 139 A.L.R. 1370.

Liability of physician or surgeon for extending operation or treatment beyond that expressly authorized, 56 A.L.R.2d 695.

Malpractice: questions of consent in connection with treatment of genital or urinary organs, 89 A.L.R.3d 32.

Malpractice in connection with electroshock treatment, 94 A.L.R.3d 317.

Power of court or other public agency to order medical treatment over parental religious objections for child whose life is not immediately endangered, 21 A.L.R.5th 248.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 31-9-3

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. Frame, 507 S.E.2d 411 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 70 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 14, 1998 | 269 Ga. 844

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Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Poss, 434 S.E.2d 488 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 20, 1993 | 263 Ga. 347, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 3384

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Bowden v. the Med. Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2015 | 773 S.E.2d 692

...treatment that obligated her to pay the hospital charges, the Court of Appeals said that Bowden’s mother signed such a form on Bowden’s behalf as authorized by OCGA § 31-9-2 (a) (3) and that in any event consent for emergency treatment is implied by law under OCGA § 31-9-3 (b)....
...own terms appears to obligate only Bowden’s mother to pay for the emergency care, as it said that “the undersigned [i.e., Bowden’s mother] is individually obligated to pay the account in full to the Hospital.” Nor do OCGA §§ 31-9-2 and 31-9-3 support the Court of Appeals’ 20 ruling....
...OCGA § 31-9-2 (a) (3) authorizes parents to consent to medical treatment on behalf of their adult children who are unable personally to consent in certain situations, but it does not say or even suggest that parents can bind their adult children to payment terms included in a treatment consent form. Similarly, OCGA § 31-9-3 (b) says only that when an emergency exists, consent to medical treatment recommended by a duly licensed physician may be implied by law; the statute does not address the patient’s obligation to pay for such treatment – much less pay...

Bowden v. the Med. Ctr., Inc. (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2015 | 773 S.E.2d 692

...that obligated her to pay the hospital charges, the Court of Appeals said that Bowden’s mother signed such a form on Bowden’s behalf as authorized by OCGA § 31-9-2 (a) (3) and that in any event consent for emergency treatment is implied by law under OCGA § 31-9-3 (b)....
...own terms appears to obligate only Bowden’s mother to pay for the emergency care, as it said that “the undersigned [i.e., Bowden’s mother] is individually obligated to pay the account in full to the Hospital.” Nor do OCGA §§ 31-9-2 and 31-9-3 support the Court of Appeals’ 20 ruling....
...OCGA § 31-9-2 (a) (3) authorizes parents to consent to medical treatment on behalf of their adult children who are unable personally to consent in certain situations, but it does not say or even suggest that parents can bind their adult children to payment terms included in a treatment consent form. Similarly, OCGA § 31-9-3 (b) says only that when an emergency exists, consent to medical treatment recommended by a duly licensed physician may be implied by law; the statute does not address the patient’s obligation to pay for such treatment — much less pay...