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O.C.G.A.Title 51Chapter 1

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29 (2019)

Liability of persons rendering emergency care

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2017 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1987–2026 24citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 24 opinions since 1987, 4 of them in the last five years.

(a) Any person, including any person licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 34 of Title 43 and any person licensed to render services ancillary thereto, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victims thereof without making any charge therefor shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission by such person in rendering emergency care or as a result of any act or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for the injured person.

(b) As used in this Code section, the term "emergency care" shall include, but shall not be limited to, the rescue or attempted rescue of an incapacitated or endangered individual from a locked motor vehicle.

History

(Ga. L. 1962, p. 534, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 598, § 2-1/HB 72.)

Annotations

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, designated the previously existing provisions of this Code section as subsection (a), and in such subsection, deleted "including" following "Title 43 and" near the beginning, and deleted "victim or" preceding "victims thereof" near the middle; and added subsection (b).

Cross references. - Emergency assistance to persons choking, § 26-2-374.

Implied consent to surgical or medical treatment in emergency situations, § 31-9-3.

Liability of persons licensed to furnish ambulance service who render emergency care to victims of accident or emergency, § 31-11-8.

Liability of law enforcement officers for actions taken while performing duties at scene of emergency, § 35-1-7.

Limitation of liability for death or injury relating to operation of "911" emergency telephone system, § 46-5-131.

Limitation of liability for persons rendering assistance at scene of boating collision, accident, or other casualty, § 52-7-14.

Law reviews. - For article, "The Good Samaritan Laws: A Reappraisal," see 16 J. Pub. L. 128 (1967). For article, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism," see 44 Ga. L. Rev. 607 (2010). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 63 (2015). For annual survey of tort laws, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 237 (2015).

For note, "Good Samaritan Laws - Good or Bad?," see 15 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (1964).

For comment, "Good Samaritan Laws - Legal Disarray: An Update," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1439 (1987).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Scope of section. - While medical practitioners are included in this section, it is manifest that "any person" who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency to the victims thereof "without making any charge therefor," although not a licensed medical practitioner, is exempt from civil liability as a "good Samaritan." Wallace v. Hall, 145 Ga. App. 610, 244 S.E.2d 129 (1978).

Good Samaritan Statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29, applied when a truck driver witnessed an accident on a highway in which two vehicles veered off the road into a ravine and the truck driver stopped in an emergency lane to run into the ravine to provide assistance; summary judgment in favor of the driver, the driver's employer, and the driver's insurer in a suit brought by passengers in a car which collided with the driver's truck within minutes was proper. Reid v. Midwest Transp., 270 Ga. App. 557, 607 S.E.2d 170 (2004).

Emergencies in which doctors are protected. - Doctors who by chance are called upon to render emergency care are protected by O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29; however, occurrence of an "emergency" will not invoke the immunity afforded by § 51-1-29; if it was the doctor's duty to respond to the emergency. Clayton v. Kelly, 183 Ga. App. 45, 357 S.E.2d 865 (1987).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a doctor in a medical malpractice action by a patient, based on the application of the "Good Samaritan" exemption from liability, as the patient was treated at the scene of an emergency as a result of tornado injuries, the patient received emergency care due to the unforeseen circumstance that called for immediate action, and the fact that the patient was not in a critical or life-threatening condition was not a dispositive fact because the physician did not have a contractual duty to render treatment, as the physician was not scheduled to be in the emergency room at that time, and the physician was not compensated for the services. Willingham v. Hudson, 274 Ga. App. 200, 617 S.E.2d 192 (2005).

Doctor present in hospital when emergency arises. - Physician is not deprived of immunity by the fact alone that the physician works at the hospital, or is present at the hospital, or is called to the hospital when the emergency arises. If there was no prior duty to respond and there was no prior doctor-patient relationship, one is not created by the event of the emergency. Clayton v. Kelly, 183 Ga. App. 45, 357 S.E.2d 865 (1987).

Physician's skill does not create duty. - Fact that a physician is skilled in the subject matter in question or that the exigency lies within the physician's expertise does not create a duty when none existed before; in fact such persons are particularly encouraged by the Good Samaritan statute to volunteer their aid. Clayton v. Kelly, 183 Ga. App. 45, 357 S.E.2d 865 (1987).

Rule of sudden emergency is that one who in a sudden emergency acts according to one's best judgment or, because of want of time in which to form judgment, acts in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with negligence. Webb v. Perry, 158 Ga. App. 409, 280 S.E.2d 423 (1981).

Trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of an arts center in a widow's wrongful death action because the center owed no duty to provide emergency medical services to the husband; the widow pointed to no statutory enactment that would impose a duty on the center to provide emergency medical services to the patrons of the center's concerts, and no common law principle imposed such a duty. Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr., Inc., 311 Ga. App. 693, 716 S.E.2d 713 (2011).

Burden of proof is on the physician to establish a prima facie case in support of a Good Samaritan liability defense, and when genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the physician was a volunteer not under some preexisting duty to render medical care, summary judgment is precluded. Henry v. Barfield, 186 Ga. App. 423, 367 S.E.2d 289 (1988).

Summary judgment proper. - In a negligence action filed by the parents on behalf of their injured child, because jury questions remained as to whether a doctor had to provide immediate "emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency" to the child within the meaning of the Good Samaritan statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29, as well as the employer-hospital's immunity from any vicarious liability, summary judgment was erroneously entered against the parents and in favor of both the doctor and the hospital. Gilley v. Hudson, 283 Ga. App. 878, 642 S.E.2d 898 (2007).

In a tree trimmer's negligence suit against a friend and the property owners (the defendants) of certain land upon which the tree trimmer was cutting limbs off of trees and fell from a ladder, the trial court properly granted the defendants summary judgment as there were no genuine issues of material fact existing to establish that the defendants' actions in delaying medical care and allegedly improperly moving the tree trimmer after the fall caused any of the injuries that were incurred. Henderson v. Sargent, 297 Ga. App. 504, 677 S.E.2d 709 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1399, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 790 (Ga. 2009).

Summary judgment improper on doctor's motion for directed verdict. - Testimony of one of the patient's experts in a medical malpractice case, which described the patient's situation as an orthopedic emergency that had to be treated within six hours, was not evidence that warranted the grant of a directed verdict on the doctor's Good Samaritan defense under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29; a jury question existed as to whether the doctor provided the patient with emergency care upon circumstances requiring immediate action. The trial court properly charged the jury regarding the defense, and did not err in denying the doctor's motion for a directed verdict or post-trial motions on the Good Samaritan defense. Gilley v. Hudson, 299 Ga. App. 306, 682 S.E.2d 627 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1986, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 8 (Ga. 2010); cert. denied, No. S09C1987, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 24 (Ga. 2010).

Cited in Gordon v. Athens Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 146 Ga. App. 134, 245 S.E.2d 484 (1978); Gragg v. Neurological Assocs., 152 Ga. App. 586, 263 S.E.2d 496 (1979); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981); Gragg v. Spenser, 159 Ga. App. 525, 284 S.E.2d 40 (1981); Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 755 S.E.2d 805 (2014).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Certain persons rendering aid to accident victims protected by section. - Ga. L. 1962, p. 534, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29) appears to relieve one not at fault but involved in an automobile accident from liability because one is required under the provisions of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556, §§ 40, 41 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-270) to render aid and provide transportation to a hospital, even though one believes that one is not competent to undertake such responsibility. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-333.

Certain persons required by law to render aid not volunteers within scope of section. - Good Samaritan Law exempts volunteers aiding victims from liability for their negligence as long as the assistance is rendered in good faith; when, however, the victim is employed by an industry, which must comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1910, requiring the employer to maintain certain first-aid facilities, the employer and persons employed by the employer in a first-aid capacity are not volunteers, but are under a legal duty to assist; they are not protected by the Good Samaritan Law, and the employer and the employer's first-aid employees are responsible to exercise reasonable care. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-62.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 61 Am. Jur. 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, §§ 163 et seq.

C.J.S. - 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons, § 51.

ALR. - Liability for medical or surgical services rendered inmates of public institutions, 44 A.L.R. 1285.

Negligence of third person, other than physician or surgeon, in caring for injured person or in failing to follow instructions in that regard as affecting damages recoverable against person causing injury, 101 A.L.R. 559.

Hospital's liability as to diagnosis and care of patients brought to emergency ward, 72 A.L.R.2d 396.

Construction and application of "Good Samaritan" statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 294.

Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently attempting to rescue persons or property, 73 A.L.R.4th 737.

Modern status of sudden emergency doctrine, 10 A.L.R.5th 680.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENRosenbaum v. State, 907 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. 2024).
cites § 51-1-29 12×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“An instruction on accident was warranted because there was some evidence showing that, while rendering emergency care to 2 In relevant part, OCGA § 51-1-29 provides as follows: Any person .”
Later courts cite it for
“counsel's choice to rely solely on the defense of accident, and not to request a jury charge on justification, was not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that choice” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENBoller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr., Inc., 716 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 51-1-29 6×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“The court rejected Boiler’s argument that the Arts Center voluntarily undertook to provide on-site medical care by reason of the contract calling for a stand-by ambulance, reasoning that imposing liability on this ground would conflict with the “Good Samaritan” statute, OCGA §…”
The case’s holding
An event organizer owes no legal duty to provide emergency medical services to a patron who suffers a medical emergency not caused by the organizer.
Later courts cite it for
“a legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence is 'either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENWillingham v. Hudson, 617 S.E.2d 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 51-1-29 10×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“1 Appellee moved for summary judgment on the basis of the “Good Samaritan” and “Hospital” immunity exemptions from civil liability pursuant to OCGA §§ 51-1-29 and 51-1-29.1 respectively.”
Later courts cite it for
“does not require that the victim be in a critical or life-threatening condition.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENWashington v. State, 873 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. 2022).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“es as a government officer or employee; (3) When the person’s conduct is the reasonable discipline of a minor by his parent or a person in loco parentis; (4) When the person’s conduct is reasonable and is performed in the course of making a lawful arrest; (5) When the person’s…”
The case’s holding
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both professionally deficient performance and resulting prejudice under the Strickland test.
Later courts cite it for
“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.” · 9 citing courts
5
GREENClayton v. Kelly, 357 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 51-1-29 6×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“, and Anesthesia Associates of Macon, apparently upon the basis of immunity provided by the Georgia “Good Samaritan” statute, OCGA § 51-1-29. The plaintiffs appeal. Held: We reverse.”
Later courts cite it for
“cjlearly the occurrence of an 'emergency' will not invoke the immunity, if it was the doctor's duty to respond to the emergency.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENGilley v. Hudson, 642 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 51-1-29 10×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Hudson provided Patrick “emergency care at the scene *879 of an accident or emergency” within the meaning of the Good Samaritan statute, OCGA § 51-1-29, and as to Archbold’s immunity from liability under the doctrine of vicarious liability.”
7
GREENAbdel-Samed v. Dailey, 755 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 2014).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“”); OCGA § 51-1-29 (“Any person, including any person licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 34 of Title 43 and including any person licensed to render services ancillary thereto, who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an…”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment is improper when evidence permits a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that a provider committed gross negligence during emergency medical care.
Later courts cite it for
“review of the grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENHerrin Bus. Prods., Inc. v. Ergle, 563 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 51-1-29 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Herrin contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because it is exempt from civil liability as a “Good Samaritan” pursuant to OCGA § 51-1-29. We agree with the trial court that the Good Samaritan statute does not apply.”
9
GREENMultimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 51-1-29 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Defendant suggests we should nonetheless rule in its favor on policy grounds, perhaps fashioning a rule analogous to the Good Samaritan Statute (OCGA § 51-1-29) which would provide that broadcasters should be insulated from liability for anything that happens as a result of…”
Later courts cite it for
“unlike the identities of those involved in crimes, the identities of those suffering from aids are generally not a matter of public interest....” · 1 citing court
10
GREENHenry v. Barfield, 367 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 51-1-29 4×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Defendant Henry moved for summary judgment on the ground that he is exempt from civil liability as a “Good Samaritan” pursuant to OCGA § 51-1-29. We granted this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Henry’s motion.”
11
GREENNdlovu v. Pham, 723 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Morag actually cited “OCGA § 51-2-29,” but we are willing in this *340 case to assume that Ndlovu should have figured out that they meant to cite OCGA § 51-1-29 and the sections that follow it, inasmuch as there is no “OCGA § 51-2-29.”
Later courts cite it for
“the statute quite clearly, we think, permits dismissal only when the plaintiff fails to cure an inadequacy within 30 days of the filing of a motion to dismiss that identifies the same inadequacy 'with specificity.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENMinster v. Pohl, 426 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“*621 Accordingly, because the doctor-patient relationship was a necessary predicate for Minster’s claim of medical malpractice, and this element was lacking, see Division 1, supra, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Pohl.”
The case’s holding
A physician who views an x-ray at a nurse's request as a courtesy, without consent or communication with the patient, owes no malpractice duty absent a consensual doctor-patient relationship.
Later courts cite it for
“does not require that specific language be employed.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENAnderson v. Houser, 523 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“In that case, we held that a doctor who had an employment duty to treat an emergency room patient did not qualify as a “volunteer” so as to be entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan statute, OCGA § 51-1-29. We noted that “Good Samaritan statutes are directed at persons,…”
The case’s holding
A physician-patient relationship exists only when the patient knowingly seeks assistance and the physician knowingly accepts the individual as a patient.
Later courts cite it for
“in determining the existence of a doctor-patient relationship is whether the physician has knowingly accepted such individual as his patient.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENReid v. Midwest Transp., 607 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Also, OCGA § 51-1-29, the Good Samaritan Statute, applies to this situation.”
15
GREENRasnick v. Krishna Hosp., Inc., 690 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“878, 879-880 (1) ( 642 SE2d 898 ) (2007) (citing OCGA § 51-1-29).”
16
GREENOlde South Custom Landscaping, Inc. v. Mathis, 494 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“, OCGA §§ 51-1-29 through 51-1-30.1 (limitation of liability for persons rendering emergency care, for health care providers voluntarily rendering assistance, for those acting to minimize and repair damage resulting from catastrophic acts of nature and those assisting in…”
17
GREENJohnson v. Matviuw, 531 N.E.2d 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
cites § 51-1-29 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“( Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-29 (1987).) A court interpreted this statute to be applicable to emergency care rendered in a hospital by a doctor, but held that summary judgment was inappropriate nonetheless because issues of fact existed as to whether the doctors involved in this case…”
The case’s holding
A physician who provides emergency care in a hospital setting is immune from liability under the Good Samaritan statute if acting in good faith without charging a fee.
Later courts cite it for
“we deny defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's brief, preferring instead to disregard any material in the briefs and/or appendix that is not supported by the record so that the issues can be decided on their merits” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENHenderson v. Sargent, 677 S.E.2d 709 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 51-1-29 4×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Sargent is not immune from suit pursuant to the Georgia Good Samaritan Law because he did not act in good faith or provide “emergency care” as required by OCGA § 51-1-29. We *506 need not consider these arguments, however, because Henderson has failed to raise a genuine issue of…”
19
GREENWashington v. Clark, 550 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“And it purports to interpret OCGA § 51-1-29, the so-called Good Samaritan Statute, and not OCGA § 51-1-29.”
20
GREENGilley v. Hudson, 682 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 51-1-29 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 51-1-29
“Hudson, holding that he was entitled to immunity under the “Good Samaritan” statute, OCGA § 51-1-29. This court reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Dr.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198720062026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2012. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Ga. Ct. App.19Ga.4Ill. App. Ct.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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