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O.C.G.A.Title 32Chapter 3

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 (2019)

Power of judge to set aside, vacate, and annul declaration of taking; issuance and service on condemnor of rule nisi; hearing

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2019 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest cited 1983–2024 47citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 47 opinions since 1983, 4 of them in the last five years.

(a) Upon proper pleadings and evidence, under the applicable rules of law, the judge of the superior court shall have the authority to set aside, vacate, and annul the declaration of taking, together with any title acquired thereby, in the same way and manner and for the same reasons as are provided by Code Sections 23-2-60 and 9-11-60. The power of the court in this respect shall not be construed as extending to a determination of questions of necessity, but there shall be a prima-facie presumption that the property or interest condemned is taken for and is necessary to the public use provided for in this article.

(b) The power of the court as described in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be restricted to the following questions:

(1) Fraud or bad faith, as contemplated by Code Sections 23-2-60 and 9-11-60;

(2) The improper use of the powers of this article, such as are not contemplated by this article;

(3) The abuse or misuse of the powers of this article; and

(4) Such other questions as may properly be raised, including the question of whether or not this article has been invoked in some respect beyond the privileges conferred by this article or by an unauthorized agency, county, or municipality.

(c) If the condemnee desires to raise such questions as are outlined in subsection (b) of this Code section, the same shall be done by proper pleadings, in the form of a petition addressed to the judge of the superior court having jurisdiction thereof, filed in the same proceedings not later than 30 days subsequent to the date of service upon the condemnee of the declaration of taking. The presiding judge shall thereupon cause a rule nisi to be issued and served upon the condemnor, requiring him to show cause at a time and place designated by the judge why the title acquired by the declaration of taking should not be vacated and set aside in the same way and manner as is now provided for setting aside deeds acquired by fraud. Such hearing shall be had not earlier than 15 days from the time of service of the rule nisi upon the condemnor, nor later than 60 days from the date of filing of the declaration of taking, and with the right of appeal by either party, as in other cases.

History

Code 1933, § 95A-607, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of zoning and land use law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2005). For annual survey of

zoning and land use law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (2006). For annual survey on real property, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 255 (2012). For annual survey on real property, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 251 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Issue must be raised within 30 days. - Condemnees waived any challenge to the legality of a condemnor’s declaration of taking and any right to urge that the taking is ineffective in order to commence proceedings which are otherwise subject to the five-year dismissal rule under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e) by failing to raise any issue of a defective declaration of taking within the 30-day period mandated under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11. Parker v. Department of Transp., 184 Ga. App. 882, 363 S.E.2d 156 (1987), cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910, 363 S.E.2d 156 (1988). Subsection (c) hearing requirement. - Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 requires that a hearing be held, not that a ruling be made, within the 60-day time period. DOT v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 305, 380 S.E.2d 265 (1989). Georgia legislature did not intend to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the motion to set aside if the hearing was not held within 60 days because, once the condemnee had fulfilled

the obligation to file a timely motion to set aside, O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c) contemplates action by the court, not by the condemnee. As such, the trial court did not err when the court refused to dismiss the motion to set aside. Cobb County v. Robertson, 314 Ga. App. 455, 724 S.E.2d 478 (2012). Transfer set aside. - When, in a proceeding to condemn property for highway purposes, the evidence was that the Department of Transportation by this taking would create a grave and unusual risk to the safety of the public, the transfer of defendant’s property to the department was set aside unless or until the department became bound to implement a plan of construction that would provide adequate protection against ice falling from defendant’s broadcasting tower and guy wires under which the property condemned lies. Cox Communications, Inc. v. DOT, 256 Ga. 455, 349 S.E.2d 450 (1986). Remedy for bad faith finding. - Although the trial court properly found that Georgia Department of Transporta-

tion acted in bad faith in issuing the department’s declaration of taking regarding the condemnees’ land, the department erred in setting aside, on the condemnees’ motion, only the limited access portion of the declarations of taking as the proper remedy was to set aside the declarations of taking in their entirety. DOT v. Bunn, 268 Ga. App. 712, 603 S.E.2d 2 (2004). Association failed to prove that the proposed road was unsafe; thus, the taking was not an improper use of the Department of Transportation’s condemnation powers. Habersham Downs Homeowners’ Ass’n v. DOT, 212 Ga. App. 686, 442 S.E.2d 868 (1994). Superior court erred by not setting aside a declaration of taking on the basis of a county’s bad faith exercise of the county’s power of eminent domain, since the condemnees’ property was condemned to avoid inconveniencing a lumber company which was the owner of adjacent land. Brannen v. Bulloch County, 193 Ga. App. 151, 387 S.E.2d 395 (1989). No abuse or misuse of powers found. - Under the facts of this case, assertions that the condemnation of a permanent construction easement was an abuse and misuse of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) powers of condemnation were without merit. Skipper v. DOT, 197 Ga. App. 634, 399 S.E.2d 538 (1990). Compensation limited. - Department of Transportation would not be required both to provide compensation for a diminution in the value of the amenities package and to construct a barrier so as to eliminate such diminution in value. Habersham Downs Homeowners’ Ass’n v. DOT, 212 Ga. App. 686, 442 S.E.2d 868 (1994). Recovery of attorney’s fees and costs by condemnee. - Condemnee’s claim for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses based on the fraud and bad faith that condemnor allegedly exhibited during the condemnor’s acquisition of the property in question could only be raised in a proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 and not in an action seeking to establish just and reasonable compensation only. DOT v. Franco’s Pizza & Delica-

tessen, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 497, 297 S.E.2d 72 (1982). Action in which landowners sought to vacate a condemnation and requested attorney fees for litigation spawned from the misuse and improper use of the powers of the department of transportation was a ‘‘proper case’’ for the recovery of attorney fees. DOT v. B & G Realty, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 613, 398 S.E.2d 762 (1990). Requirement that a request for fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 be made in the complaint is consistent with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11. DOT v. Georgia TV Co., 244 Ga. App. 750, 536 S.E.2d 773 (2000). Error to apportion damages without evidence in support of claim. - Award for condemned land utilized for a road right-of-way was just and adequate compensation, but the trial court erred in apportioning damages to one plaintiff without receiving evidence in support of the plaintiff ’s claim for damages. Whitfield v. DOT, 248 Ga. App. 172, 546 S.E.2d 308 (2001). Pending valuation issue in trial court results in no appellate court jurisdiction. - Appellate court had to dismiss the company’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of the company’s motion to set aside, vacate, and annul the county’s declaration of taking in a condemnation action as the issue of the property’s valuation was still pending before the trial court; accordingly, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the record did not show that the company followed the procedures for bringing an interlocutory appeal and the trial court had not issued a final judgment from which the company could appeal. TJW Enters. v. Henry County, 261 Ga. App. 547, 583 S.E.2d 144 (2003). Rule nisi. - Trial court erred in dismissing the Georgia Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) condemnation petition for the department’s failure to submit a properly attested affidavit with the department’s petition as the condemnees were estopped from challenging the taking of their property because the condemnees withdrew the money deposited by DOT in the court registry. Ga. DOT v. Bowles, 292 Ga. App. 829, 666 S.E.2d 92 (2008).

Application of 60-day requirement. - Pursuant to the clear language of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c), it is the duty of the court, not the condemnee, to issue a rule nisi and schedule the required hearing. The Supreme Court of Georgia disapproves of the portion of Lopez-Aponte v. City of Columbus, 267 Ga. App. 65 (2004), which places the burden of issuing a rule nisi and obtaining a timely hearing upon the condemnee. Adkins v. Cobb County, 291 Ga. 521, 731 S.E.2d 665 (2012). Petition to set aside properly denied. - Trial court properly denied a condemnee’s petition to set aside a declaration of taking filed by a county under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 because the road at issue was open for use by the general public despite only a few private citizens most likely using the road, but so long as the general public was not excluded, the power of eminent domain could be exer-

cised. Emery v. Chattooga County, 325 Ga. App. 587, 753 S.E.2d 149 (2014). Cited in Coffee v. Atkinson County, 236 Ga. 248, 223 S.E.2d 648 (1976); Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Trussell, 247 Ga. 148, 273 S.E.2d 859 (1981); Texaco, Inc. v. DOT, 165 Ga. App. 338, 301 S.E.2d 59 (1983); Stephens v. Department of Transp., 170 Ga. App. 784, 318 S.E.2d 167 (1984); Brooks v. DOT, 254 Ga. 60, 327 S.E.2d 175 (1985); Cox Communications, Inc. v. DOT, 178 Ga. App. 499, 343 S.E.2d 765 (1986); DOT v. Hudson, 179 Ga. App. 842, 348 S.E.2d 106 (1986); Chamlee v. DOT, 189 Ga. App. 334, 375 S.E.2d 626 (1988); DOT v. Rasmussen, 244 Ga. App. 245, 534 S.E.2d 573 (2000); Whitfield v. DOT, 248 Ga. App. 172, 546 S.E.2d 308 (2001); City of Atlanta v. Yusen Air & Sea Serv. Holdings Inc., 263 Ga. App. 82, 587 S.E.2d 230 (2003).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Constitutionality of statute or ordinance denying right of property own-

ers to defeat a proposed street improvement by protest, 52 A.L.R. 883.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCobb Cnty. v. Robertson, 724 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 32-3-11 40×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“After that 60-day period passed, the County moved to dismiss Robertson’s motion, asserting inter alia that the hearing had not been held within the *456 60-day time limit mandated by OCGA § 32-3-11 (c). 3 The court denied the County’s motion to dismiss as to the 60-day…”
2
GREENShiv Aban, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 784 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 32-3-11 12×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“The DOT further contends that under the circumstances, Shiv Aban’s avenue for reliefregardingSimshauser’s appraisal was OCGA § 32-3-11, which provides the trial court with “the authority to set aside, vacate, and annul the declaration of taking, together with any title acquired…”
3
GREENHabersham Downs Homeowners' Ass'n v. Dep't of Transp., 442 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 32-3-11 10×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“See OCGA § 32-3-11 (c). The trial court denied the petition, and this appeal followed.”
4
GREENAdkins v. Cobb Cnty., 731 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. 2012).
cites § 32-3-11 32×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“We granted an application for interlocutory appeal in this condemnation case to determine whether application of OCGA § 32-3-11 (c) 1 to bar appellants’ motion to set aside or vacate a declaration of taking violates their due process rights and to consider whether that statute…”
5
GREENDep't of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1989).
cites § 32-3-11 8×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“Following a hearing the trial court entered an order which, inter alia, enjoined the DOT from further construction on the Presidential Parkway project until the merits of appellees' motion to set aside the declaration of taking could be determined.”
6
GREENFincher Road Investments, LLLP v. City of Canton, 726 S.E.2d 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 32-3-11 14×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“Pursuant to OCGA § 32-3-11, the Condemnees timely filed petitions to set aside the declarations on November 22, 2010, and a hearing was scheduled for December 7, 2010.”
7
REDLopez-Aponte v. City of Columbus, 599 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 32-3-11 8×cited by 4 cases
Disapproved (citation reading): 2 citing references read disapproved, the strongest is Adkins v. Cobb County (2012). No later court annotation says how far.
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“On October 4, 2002, Aponte filed a “motion to dismiss,” which, pursuant to OCGA § 32-3-11, the trial court treated *66 as a petition to set aside, vacate, and annul the petition and declaration of taking filed by Columbus.”
8
GREENBryde v. City of Atlanta., 828 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 32-3-11 8×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“Pursuant to OCGA § 32-3-11, the trial court has "the authority to set aside, vacate, and annul the declaration of taking, together with any title acquired thereby," upon a showing of fraud or bad faith, the improper use of powers granted in the condemnation act, the abuse or…”
9
GREENBrannen v. Bulloch Cnty., 387 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 32-3-11 8×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“The Brannens petitioned the Superior Court of Bulloch County to set aside the declaration of taking solely on the basis of OCGA § 32-3-11 (b). The superior court denied the petition and the Brannens appeal.”
Later courts cite it for
“was an extreme case in which 'the evidence established that the project was undertaken with the improper intent to benefit one private powerful entity,' id. at 156 , and its holding is limited to its extreme facts.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENDep't of Transp. v. B & G Realty, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 32-3-11 14×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“The trial court then held that all of the above-stated actions by the DOT showed a pattern of bad faith and abuse and misuse of powers under OCGA § 32-3-11, granted the annulment of the taking and awarded appellees attorney fees and costs in the amount of $8,964.”
11
GREENStephens v. Dep't of Transp., 318 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 32-3-11 6×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“Thus, the opportunity to contest legal issues is afforded to condemnees by OCGA § 32-3-11, which authorizes the superior court, rather than a special master, to set aside, vacate, and annul the declaration of taking and any title acquired thereby on certain specified grounds.”
Later courts cite it for
“proceedings instituted pursuant to ocga 22-2-100 et seq. , the special master method, and those instituted pursuant to ocga 32-3-1 et seq. , the declaration of taking method, are each separate and distinct special statutory proceedings and, as such, are subject to their own unique special statutory procedural provisions. cits.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENParker v. Dep't of Transp., 363 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 32-3-11 13×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“Although appellants now urge that the declaration of taking did not comport with the requirements of OCGA § 32-3-6, they did not invoke a ruling on this contention by complying with the provisions of OCGA § 32-3-11. Instead, appellants merely filed a timely notice of appeal…”
13
GREENTJW Enter. v. Henry Cnty., 583 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 32-3-11 6×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“TJW contested the valuation, requesting that a jury determine the amount of compensation, and also moved the court under OCGA § 32-3-11 to set aside, vacate, and annul the declaration of taking.”
14
GREENSkipper v. Dep't of Transp., 399 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 32-3-11 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“(b) On the merits, appellant first argues that the taking of permanent construction easements by the DOT was an improper use, abuse and misuse of the powers of condemnation under OCGA § 32-3-11 (b) (2) and (3). Appellant essentially argues that the DOT is taking more, or a…”
Later courts cite it for
“no foundation was established as to when the photograph was taken or who took it and no one testified who was present when the picture was taken.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENChamlee v. Dep't of Transp., 375 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 32-3-11 6×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“In his seventh enumeration of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in its statement that there is a “prima facie presumption that the property or interest condemned is taken for and is necessary to the public use,” the basis of his argument being that OCGA §…”
16
GREENDep't of Transp. v. Georgia Television Co., 536 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 32-3-11 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“The requirement that a request for fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 be made in the complaint is consistent with OCGA § 32-3-11 (c). That statute provides, in pertinent part, that if the condemnee desires to raise questions such as those outlined in subsection (b) (i.”
Later courts cite it for
“awards under ocga 13-6-11 must be specifically pleaded and prayed for in the complaint.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENCity of Atlanta v. Yusen Air & Sea Serv. Holdings, Inc., 587 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 32-3-11 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“Yusen subsequently moved to set aside the taking under OCGA § 32-3-11. The trial court granted Yusen’s motion, and the City appeals.”
18
GREENBrunswick Landing, LLC v. Glynn Cnty., 687 S.E.2d 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 32-3-11 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“The Landing also contends that the trial court should have applied the abuse of discretion standard, OCGA § 32-3-11 (b) (3), in reviewing the County’s condemnation in this case.”
19
GREENDep't of Transp. v. Hudson, 348 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 32-3-11 6×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“OCGA § 32-3-11 (a) in fact provides for a “primafacie presumption that the property or interest condemned is taken for and is necessary to the public use .”
20
GREENWindsor v. City of Atlanta, 695 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. 2010).
cites § 32-3-11 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 32-3-11
“Windsor filed a “notice of appeal” to the trial court under OCGA § 32-3-14 and a motion under OCGA § 32-3-11 to “set aside, vacate, and annul the declaration of taking, together with any title acquired thereby.”
Later courts cite it for
“the five-year rule furthers the dual statutory goals of preventing trial court dockets from becoming cluttered with unresolved and inactive litigation and protecting parties from dilatory adversaries.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320032024

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1990. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.42Ga.5
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2019 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2019 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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