Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

This section deals with extraordinary relief which may be sought and granted during the interim between filing of a complaint and final adjudication of a case on the case's merits. Times-Journal, Inc. v. Jonquil Broadcasting Co., 226 Ga. 673, 177 S.E.2d 64 (1970).

Power of trial court to protect rights of parties.

- Trial judge whose ruling is sought to be reviewed is empowered to impose such terms and conditions as in the judge's judgment are necessary to preserve and protect the rights of the parties until the Supreme Court can finally rule upon the question. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 209 Ga. 274, 71 S.E.2d 659 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

When judgment refusing an interlocutory injunction is brought to the Supreme Court for review, the trial judge is authorized to grant a supersedeas upon such terms as the trial judge deems necessary to preserve the rights of the parties until the judgment of the Supreme Court can be had; it is left, however, in the sound legal discretion of the judge to grant or refuse it. J.C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 210 Ga. 591, 82 S.E.2d 132 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Failure of court to ensure preservation of status quo as error.

- Trial judge, by issuing rule nisi and granting supersedeas without requiring bond or making other provision to preserve the status quo, effectively deprives the plaintiff who prevailed in the suit for an injunction of the fruits of the plaintiff's victory and thereby commits error. Abney v. Harris, 208 Ga. 184, 65 S.E.2d 905 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Issuance of injunctive relief without notice and hearing.

- Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) absolutely prohibits issuance of an interlocutory injunction or temporary restraining order without service of notice and hearing thereon, except that a temporary restraining order may issue ex parte as provided in subsection (b) of this section. Paine v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 124 Ga. App. 233, 183 S.E.2d 474 (1971), overruled on other grounds, Chancey v. Hancock, 233 Ga. 734, 213 S.E.2d 633 (1975).

Because a homeowner asked for a hearing on the permanent injunctive relief the homeowner was seeking, the homeowner would not be heard to argue a lack of notice that the hearing would be a final hearing on the merits of the injunction. Meacham v. Franklin-Heard County Water Auth., 302 Ga. App. 69, 690 S.E.2d 186 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0865, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 427 (Ga. 2010).

Although other parties had filed summary judgment motions regarding the disputed ownership of equipment, no one had raised the issue of injunctive relief before the hearing, and another party, who did not participate in the hearing, could not be bound by an interlocutory injunction issued against that party without notice under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a)(1). Abel & Sons Concrete, LLC v. Juhnke, 295 Ga. 150, 757 S.E.2d 869 (2014).

Responsibility to file responsive pleadings.

- This section cannot be construed so that in actions seeking a permanent injunction the defendant is relieved of the responsibility of filing responsive pleadings. Times-Journal, Inc. v. Jonquil Broadcasting Co., 226 Ga. 673, 177 S.E.2d 64 (1970).

Entitlement of plaintiff to injunction when no defensive pleadings filed.

- When no defensive pleadings are filed, the plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction is entitled to such injunction as a matter of law if the facts alleged authorize such relief. Times-Journal, Inc. v. Jonquil Broadcasting Co., 226 Ga. 673, 177 S.E.2d 64 (1970).

Right to recover actual damage resulting from a wrongful restraint is recognized by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 by requiring the applicant to give security against such damages. Moody v. Harris, 170 Ga. App. 254, 316 S.E.2d 781 (1984).

Trial court granted the employee leave to amend the answer to include a claim for wrongful restraint, which remained pending below, and thus, the appellate court had to decide whether the restrictive covenant actually enforced against the employee was illegal; if the restrictive covenant was, then the employee's wrongful restraint claim was meritorious, and the employee could recover such costs and damages, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(c), as the employee may have suffered during the period of the injunction's enforcement. Therefore, the ex-employer's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(b)(3) was denied. Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 706 S.E.2d 660 (2011).

Insufficient evidence of damages resulting from wrongful order.

- When the only evidence of actual damages resulting from a wrongful restraining order was testimony by the parties affected as to how much the parties lost without any basis upon which the jury could determine the extent of the losses suffered, such evidence was insufficient to support a damages award. Moody v. Harris, 170 Ga. App. 254, 316 S.E.2d 781 (1984).

Issuance of permanent injunction upheld despite failure to request such relief.

- Issuance of permanent injunction preventing city officials from making any further charitable donations was upheld despite the fact that the resident did not request such relief as there was nothing improper in the prohibition of improper practice. Harris v. Gilmore, 265 Ga. App. 841, 595 S.E.2d 651 (2004).

Permanent injunction to preserve property owners association's covenants.

- Trial court properly entered an injunction against a husband and wife requiring them, as homeowners and members of a neighborhood property owners association, to remove a chain link fence that was not allowed pursuant to the association's covenants and the association did not waive enforcement, nor did estoppel apply to grant the husband and wife an exception from the association's rules. Wright v. Piedmont Prop. Owners Ass'n, 288 Ga. App. 261, 653 S.E.2d 846 (2007).

Contempt adjudication for violation of restraining order not error.

- After the trial court issued a restraining order which was personally served on the defendant and thereafter violated by the defendant, the court did not abuse the court's discretion in adjudging the defendant in contempt of court after the hearing, the defendant's only defense being that the court was without jurisdiction to grant the restraining order. Martin v. Harris, 216 Ga. 350, 116 S.E.2d 558 (1960).

Insureds could not be held in contempt for violating an invalid injunction.

- Georgia insured, who had been specifically excluded from an Alabama class action, lacked standing to challenge the Alabama settlement, either in an individual capacity or a representative capacity; an injunction that was granted at the insured's' request was invalid as the insured lacked a legal right to relief and the insurers could not be held in contempt for violating the injunction. Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Parker, 279 Ga. 201, 612 S.E.2d 261 (2005).

Dissolving temporary restraining order to allow bank foreclosure proceeding.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by dissolving a temporary restraining order and allowing a bank to proceed with the bank's foreclosure action as it was within the trial court's discretion to condition the extension of injunctive relief upon the mortgagor's placement of an amount of money in escrow reflecting past-due payments on the mortgage, which the mortgagor declined to do. Morgan v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 322 Ga. App. 357, 745 S.E.2d 290 (2013).

Injunction sufficiently specific.

- Injunction which stated that the defendants were not permitted to continue with the salary and position reductions at issue and were not allowed to interfere with the chief magistrate's ability to interview and hire personnel sufficiently described what was and was not permitted so as to allow for enforcement of the injunction. Pike County v. Callaway-Ingram, 292 Ga. 828, 742 S.E.2d 471 (2013).

Security bond requirement.

- Trial court's decision under subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 to require the giving of a security bond is not a prerequisite to a wrongfully restrained party's right to recover damages. Hogan Mgmt. Servs., P.C. v. Martino, 242 Ga. App. 791, 530 S.E.2d 508 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1075, 121 S. Ct. 770, 148 L. Ed. 2d 670 (2001).

Appellate review.

- Trial court properly entered a temporary restraining order directing that the north entrance to a shopping center be opened instanter because a 2004 easement was clear and unambiguous and provided for full enjoyment of the easement of ingress and egress to the shopping center. Nat'l Hills Exch. v. Thompson, 319 Ga. App. 777, 736 S.E.2d 480 (2013).

Cited in National Life Ins. Co. v. Cady, 227 Ga. 475, 181 S.E.2d 382 (1971); Ford v. Herbermann, 227 Ga. 751, 183 S.E.2d 204 (1971); Lewis v. Citizens Exch. Bank, 229 Ga. 333, 191 S.E.2d 49 (1972); Akins v. Tucker, 231 Ga. 646, 203 S.E.2d 532 (1974); Fields v. Davies, 235 Ga. 87, 218 S.E.2d 828 (1975); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 403 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Styers v. Pico, Inc., 236 Ga. 258, 223 S.E.2d 656 (1976); Wilson v. Sermons, 236 Ga. 400, 223 S.E.2d 816 (1976); McGregor v. Town of Fort Oglethorpe, 236 Ga. 711, 225 S.E.2d 238 (1976); Shelton v. Peppers, 237 Ga. 101, 227 S.E.2d 29 (1976); Geld-Halden Indus., Inc. v. Parr, 237 Ga. 773, 229 S.E.2d 620 (1976); Nelson v. Bloodworth, 238 Ga. 264, 232 S.E.2d 547 (1977); Saul v. Vaughn & Co., 240 Ga. 301, 241 S.E.2d 180 (1977); Thomas v. Fairburn Banking Co., 244 Ga. 741, 262 S.E.2d 58 (1979); Cheek v. Savannah Valley Prod. Credit Ass'n, 244 Ga. 768, 262 S.E.2d 90 (1979); Fayette County v. Seagraves, 245 Ga. 196, 264 S.E.2d 13 (1980); Gervin v. Reddick, 246 Ga. 56, 268 S.E.2d 657 (1980); Coffey Enters. Realty & Dev. Co. v. DOT, 248 Ga. 224, 281 S.E.2d 611 (1981); Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981); King v. Ingram, 250 Ga. 887, 302 S.E.2d 105 (1983); Shiver v. Benton, 251 Ga. 284, 304 S.E.2d 903 (1983); Regency Club v. Stuckey, 253 Ga. 583, 324 S.E.2d 166 (1984); Bell v. King, Phipps & Assocs., 176 Ga. App. 702, 337 S.E.2d 364 (1985); Clayton v. Deverell, 257 Ga. 653, 362 S.E.2d 364 (1987); Columbus v. Diaz-Verson, 258 Ga. 698, 373 S.E.2d 208 (1988); Revels v. Hair, 260 Ga. 889, 401 S.E.2d 520 (1991); Georgia Canoeing Ass'n v. Henry, 263 Ga. 77, 428 S.E.2d 336 (1993); Mosley v. H.P.S.C., Inc., 267 Ga. 351, 477 S.E.2d 837 (1996); Ebon Found., Inc. v. Oatman, 269 Ga. 340, 498 S.E.2d 728 (1998); Bootery, Inc. v. Cumberland Creek Properties, Inc., 271 Ga. 271, 517 S.E.2d 68 (1999); Byelick v. Michel Herbelin USA, Inc., 275 Ga. 505, 570 S.E.2d 307 (2002); Kace Invs., L.P. v. Hull, 263 Ga. App. 296, 587 S.E.2d 800 (2003); Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634 (2011); Davis v. Wallace, 310 Ga. App. 340, 713 S.E.2d 446 (2011).

Possibility of failure on merits not determinative.

- It is not the function of a preliminary injunction to decide a case on the merits, and the possibility that the party obtaining a preliminary injunction may not win on the merits at trial is not determinative of the propriety or validity of granting the preliminary injunction. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 441 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1971).

Trial courts have the authority to convert an application for an interlocutory injunction into a motion for summary judgment.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a)(2), when a trial court has given notice of a hearing on an interlocutory injunction, the court may determine the merits of the issues after the interlocutory hearing, but it may do so only if the parties have not objected or have acquiesced. RTS Landfill, Inc. v. Appalachian Waste Sys., LLC, 267 Ga. App. 56, 598 S.E.2d 798 (2004).

Notice to the adverse party is all that is required by paragraph (a)(1) of this section. Consortium Mgt. Co. v. Mutual Am. Corp., 246 Ga. 346, 271 S.E.2d 488 (1980).

Trial court erred in granting permanent injunctive relief at the interlocutory hearing as the defendant had no notice that the trial court intended at that hearing to consider the merits of permanent injunctive relief. McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC v. PruittHealth-Toccoa, LLC, 297 Ga. 94, 772 S.E.2d 660 (2015).

There is no requirement of personal service prior to issuance of an interlocutory injunction. Consortium Mgt. Co. v. Mutual Am. Corp., 246 Ga. 346, 271 S.E.2d 488 (1980).

Order held valid.

- When initial restraining order is void for want of notice, second order termed a continuance of the prior order, granted after notice and opportunity to be heard, is valid and has the effect of an interlocutory injunction under subsection (a) of this section. Finney v. Pan-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 123 Ga. App. 250, 180 S.E.2d 253 (1971).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting an interlocutory injunction upon finding that a home builder was causing a private nuisance by allowing water to run-off from the builder's property, damaging the property of an adjoining property owner, since the builder was in default in the action and the property owner's pleadings established that the owner was entitled to the relief sought; the trial court could issue the court's order without giving the builder notice and an opportunity to be heard. Wallace v. Lewis, 253 Ga. App. 268, 558 S.E.2d 810 (2002).

Permanent injunction generally improper after interlocutory hearing.

- General rule is that unless there is an order consolidating the trial on the merits with the hearing on the application for interlocutory injunction as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65, then the entry of permanent relief after an interlocutory hearing is improper. Gwinnett County v. Vaccaro, 259 Ga. 61, 376 S.E.2d 680 (1989).

Trial court's injunction ordering that former employee be enjoined perpetually from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer was improper because a permanent injunction cannot issue following an interlocutory hearing, and the record established that the trial court did not enter an order consolidating the trial of the action on the merits with the hearing on the former employer's application for the interlocutory injunction. Ward v. Process Control Corp., 247 Ga. 583, 277 S.E.2d 671 (1981).

Limitations on preservation of jury trial.

- Last sentence of paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 preserves the right to a jury trial as to claims for damages when tried with an equity case. It does not create a right to trial by jury in permanent injunction hearings. This is consistent with the second sentence of paragraph (a)(2) of that section, because if there were a right to a jury trial in permanent injunction hearings, then the evidence received at the earlier hearing would have to be reintroduced and repeated. Cawthon v. Douglas County, 248 Ga. 760, 286 S.E.2d 30 (1982). See also 20/20 Vision Ctr., Inc. v. Hudgens, 256 Ga. 129, 345 S.E.2d 330 (1986).

Determination on merits.

- When there is notice of an interlocutory injunction hearing, the court may determine the issues on their merits after the interlocutory hearing when there is no objection or when the parties have acquiesced. Georgia Kraft Co. v. Rhodes, 257 Ga. 469, 360 S.E.2d 595 (1987); Gwinnett County v. Vaccaro, 259 Ga. 61, 376 S.E.2d 680 (1989); Dortch v. Atlanta Journal, 261 Ga. 350, 405 S.E.2d 43 (1991); A & D Asphalt Co. v. Carroll & Carroll of Macon, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 829, 520 S.E.2d 499 (1999).

In the absence of a transcript of a hearing on a request for an interlocutory injunction, it would be assumed that, consistent with the court's order, the trial court timely exercised the court authority under paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 and that the court did so with the landowners' consent. Sapp v. Owens, 270 Ga. 36, 504 S.E.2d 665 (1998).

After a trial court held a hearing on the companies' requests for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and to compel arbitration regarding a former executive's decision to accept employment with a competitor, and the TRO hearings were not consolidated with a trial on the merits, nor did the companies acquiesce in any decision to issue a final ruling on the merits pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a)(2), there was no error in the trial court's determination that the covenant not to compete in the executive's employment agreement was not enforceable as the court was authorized to make such a determination in considering the likelihood of the companies' success on the merits. Once the covenant was found to be unenforceable on the convenant's face, the trial court was authorized to enter a definitive ruling as to the covenant's unenforceability. BellSouth Corp. v. Forsee, 265 Ga. App. 589, 595 S.E.2d 99 (2004).

Evidence at hearings on interlocutory injunctions.

- In hearings on interlocutory injunctions, rules of evidence are not in all respects as rigidly enforced as on final trials, and admission of some secondary evidence, or admission of some hearsay or opinion evidence, will not necessarily require reversal. State Hwy. Bd. v. City of Baxley, 190 Ga. 292, 9 S.E.2d 266 (1940); Kniepkamp v. Richards, 192 Ga. 509, 16 S.E.2d 24 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Treatment of fact issues on hearing of application for interlocutory injunction.

- On the hearing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, the presiding judge should not undertake to finally adjudicate issues of fact, but should pass on such questions only so far as to determine whether the evidence authorizes the grant or refusal of the interlocutory relief. Kniepkamp v. Richards, 192 Ga. 509, 16 S.E.2d 24 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

In an action arising out of an alleged breach of a land sales contract, given that the trial court relied on findings of fact that had been resolved only in the context of the ruling on an interlocutory injunction filed by the buyer, and that issues of material fact plainly remained as to whether the seller fulfilled the contractual obligations to designate land adjacent to the buyer's property for use as a city or county road, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the seller had to be reversed. Taylor v. Thomas, 286 Ga. App. 27, 648 S.E.2d 426 (2007).

Discretion of judge as to grant of interlocutory injunction.

- When, in a suit for injunction, evidence introduced at an interlocutory hearing consisted only of an original petition and the defendant's answer, which considered together presented an issue of fact as to the truth of the allegations made by the plaintiff as a basis for the relief sought, the presiding judge was not bound to grant an interlocutory injunction, and the judge's judgment refusing the injunction would not be disturbed. Spivey v. Pope, 180 Ga. 609, 180 S.E. 118 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Absent any findings that the status quo was endangered or in need of preservation, and because an interlocutory injunction did not in fact preserve the status quo but forced a dog kennel owner to cease operations, the trial court abused the court's discretion in granting relief to an adjacent neighbor of the business, especially since that business had been in operation for several years without complaint. Green v. Waddleton, 288 Ga. App. 369, 654 S.E.2d 204 (2007).

In hearings on an application for interlocutory injunctions when the evidence on material issues of fact is in conflict, grant or refusal of the application is within the discretion of the judge, and the exercise of the judge's discretion in granting or refusing the relief prayed for will not be controlled unless manifestly abused. Turner v. Trust Co., 214 Ga. 339, 105 S.E.2d 22 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in issuing an interlocutory injunction enjoining officers from disposing of any of the documents or assets of a corporation and continuing a receivership because the officers controlled the assets that were a subject of the litigation, raising the possibility that the assets could be dissipated before the litigation is resolved; although the officers made several vague arguments about the powers granted to the receiver, the officers failed to show that the trial court abused the court's discretion in granting those powers. Pittman v. State, 288 Ga. 589, 706 S.E.2d 398 (2011).

Appeal will lie to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction. Walker v. Ful-Kalb, Inc., 181 Ga. 574, 183 S.E. 776 (1935); Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga. 865, 136 S.E.2d 329 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Appeal will lie to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction, and to any judgment which would have constituted a final determination of the cause. Hagans v. Excelsior Elec. Membership Corp., 207 Ga. 53, 60 S.E.2d 162 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

When, after interlocutory hearing, a trial judge passes an order continuing in effect a previous restraining order until further order of the court, such order is in effect the granting of an interlocutory injunction and may be appealed directly. Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga. 865, 136 S.E.2d 329 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Appeal from dissolution of temporary injunction after notice and hearing.

- Appeal will lie from the order of the trial court, rendered after notice and hearing, dissolving a temporary injunction previously granted by the court, after notice and hearing. Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga. 865, 136 S.E.2d 329 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Order held erroneous for lack of notice and hearing.

- Order in a pending suit making additional parties defendant and granting an interlocutory injunction as to the parties, without any notice, rule nisi, or hearing, is erroneous. Fitzpatrick v. Bloodworth, 205 Ga. 366, 53 S.E.2d 917 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Trial court erred in broadly and permanently enjoining two partners, who had been accused of wrongfully dissolving the partnership, from taking certain business actions on behalf of the partnership because the trial court failed to provide notice that the court was considering an award of preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prior to the hearing. Petrakopoulos v. Vranas, 325 Ga. App. 332, 750 S.E.2d 779 (2013).

Manifest abuse of trial court's discretion found.

- In a cause of action involving a dispute between joint venturers, the trial court manifestly abused the court's discretion in granting a temporary injunction which prohibited the plaintiff from engaging in any act which would have the effect of contesting the voting rights of investors in plaintiff's member entities, when those investors wanted to use the votes to gain control of the plaintiff and dismiss the lawsuit. The injunction did not maintain the status quo and failed to balance the equities of the parties properly. Hampton Island Founders v. Liberty Capital, 283 Ga. 289, 658 S.E.2d 619 (2008).

Order denying interlocutory injunction held erroneous.

- In a suit brought by a property owner seeking to specifically perform an oral agreement to purchase a strip of real estate, the trial court properly denied the property owner's request for an interlocutory judgment based on a violation of the statute of frauds and because another held a first right of refusal over the sale/purchase of the property. However, the trial court erred by concluding that the property owner had not obtained a parol license to use the strip since the property owner had made expenditures to improve the land and, as to the right of first refusal held by another, the grant of a parol license was not the equivalent to a sale of the property to have in anyway interfered with that right. Meinhardt v. Christianson, 289 Ga. App. 238, 656 S.E.2d 568 (2008).

Consolidated hearing necessary for final determination of issues.

- Trial court can grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the status quo, but cannot make a final determination of the issues at an interlocutory hearing unless there is a consolidated hearing as authorized by paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Miller v. Wells, 235 Ga. 411, 219 S.E.2d 751 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Wheatley Grading Contractors v. DFT Invs., Inc., 244 Ga. 663, 261 S.E.2d 614 (1979).

Grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction, as well as the affirmance thereof by the appellate court without opinion, does not establish the law of the case for a trial on the merits. Sneakers of Cobb County v. Cobb County, 265 Ga. 410, 455 S.E.2d 834 (1995).

Consolidation not required.

- Paragraph (a)(2) of this section permits, but does not require, consolidation of a trial on the merits with hearing on the application for interlocutory injunction. Kirk v. Hasty, 239 Ga. 362, 236 S.E.2d 667 (1977).

Consolidation not permitted when party objects.

- Trial court is not permitted to consolidate a hearing on an injunction with a hearing on the merits over the objection of one of the parties. Brevard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ford Mt., Inc., 261 Ga. 619, 409 S.E.2d 36 (1991); Fontaine Condominium Ass'n v. Schnacke, 230 Ga. App. 469, 496 S.E.2d 553 (1998).

In an action by a city to, inter alia, compel a county tax commissioner to pay school tax receipts, a trial court erred in converting a hearing on an interlocutory injunction into a final hearing on a permanent injunction and a writ of mandamus without the proper notice under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-27(a); the commissioner was only given two days' notice and also did not consent to having any mandamus issue heard by the trial court without a jury under § 9-6-27(c) or to having the request for permanent injunctive relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(a)(2) heard at the same time. Ferdinand v. City of Atlanta, 285 Ga. 121, 674 S.E.2d 309 (2009).

Judgment was vacated and the case was remanded because the trial court consolidated an initial hearing on a landowner's application for an interlocutory injunction against a neighbor with a hearing on the merits of the landowner's complaint, and issued a permanent injunction in favor of the landowner over the neighbor's objection to the hearings being consolidated. Smith v. Guest Pond Club, Inc., 277 Ga. 143, 586 S.E.2d 623 (2003).

In a feud between siblings over their aunt's estate, the parts of the trial court's order that granted permanent relief were vacated because the motion that the order purported to resolve asked for interlocutory relief; although the trial court stated that the requested interlocutory injunction had been converted to a permanent injunction by the court pursuant to notice provided at the hearings, no such notice was found in the record; and the failure to give such notice could not be overlooked as the appellants made clear at several points during the hearing that the appellants objected to the court's granting permanent relief. Barnes v. Channel, 303 Ga. 88, 810 S.E.2d 549 (2018).

Trial on merits held proper absent objection by adverse parties.

- When lessors in a landlord/tenant case were on notice of the hearing on their motion for interlocutory injunction and did not object at trial to the trial judge's hearing the merits of the case at the interlocutory injunction hearing, the trial court did not err in advancing the trial on the merits without prior notice to the parties. Wilkerson v. Chattahoochee Parks, 244 Ga. 472, 260 S.E.2d 867 (1979).

Consolidation of hearing for an interlocutory injunction with the final hearing on the merits.

- In an action to abate a nuisance and for injunctive relief against the owner and operator of a spa, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in advancing the trial on the merits and consolidating the trial with the hearing on the interlocutory injunction. Kim v. State, 272 Ga. 343, 528 S.E.2d 798 (2000).

Section to be strictly construed.

- Because ex parte temporary restraining orders are harsh remedies, statutes authorizing such remedies must be strictly construed; therefore, statutory notice requirements were determined to be mandating and jurisdictional. United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Amberjack Ltd., 253 Ga. 438, 321 S.E.2d 736 (1984).

Compliance with subsection (b) of this section is jurisdictional and mandatory. Board of Comm'rs v. Allgood, 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975).

Requirements of subsection (b) of this section are jurisdictional and unless the movant or applicant complies with such conditions precedent for granting a restraining order without notice to the opposite party as are set forth therein, the judge to whom the application is made acquires no jurisdiction to issue such order. Mar-Pak Mich., Inc. v. Pointer, 226 Ga. 189, 173 S.E.2d 206 (1970).

While subsection (b) of this section does not specifically use the word "jurisdiction," the statute's language is not subject to any interpretation other than that the statute denies authority to the judges of the superior courts to issue ex parte restraining orders unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to an applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. Mar-Pak Mich., Inc. v. Pointer, 226 Ga. 189, 173 S.E.2d 206 (1970).

Mootness.

- Because a suspect was indicted, and the case was before an assigned trial court, an order granting the suspect's motion to restrain extra-judicial statements to the media was vacated, and a new order addressing non-disclosure was entered, the media's appeal of the restraining order was moot. AJC Gwinnett News v. Corbin, 279 Ga. 842, 621 S.E.2d 753 (2005).

Officers' argument that a temporary restraining order (TRO) was invalid was moot because the TRO had been superseded by an interlocutory injunction, and the officers did not argue that any alleged error in entering the TRO somehow infected the interlocutory injunction, which was entered after notice to the officers and a full hearing. Pittman v. State, 288 Ga. 589, 706 S.E.2d 398 (2011).

Force of temporary restraining order.

- Temporary restraining order granted to remain of force until hearing of application for interlocutory injunction has all the force of an injunction, until rescinded or modified by the court. Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333, 39 S.E.2d 861 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 2, T. 55).

Affidavit or verified complaint required.

- Restraining order is not issued in compliance with subsection (b) of this section if there is no affidavit or verified complaint making the required factual showing. Finney v. Pan-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 123 Ga. App. 250, 180 S.E.2d 253 (1971).

Grant of restraining order void when conditions precedent not complied with.

- Failure of applicant to comply with conditions precedent in subsection (b) of this section for the granting of a temporary restraining order without notice renders issuance of a temporary restraining order utterly void. Finney v. Pan-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 123 Ga. App. 250, 180 S.E.2d 253 (1971).

Amendment of restraining order without notice to plaintiffs.

- Any error in amending a temporary restraining order without notice to the plaintiffs is harmless when the amended order does not permit anything which the plaintiffs had sought to have enjoined. Grafton v. Turner, 227 Ga. 809, 183 S.E.2d 458 (1971).

County and county's employees had immunity from damages.

- Employee was not entitled to damages arising out of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(b) in obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the employee as the county had sovereign immunity and the county manager and the county attorney had sovereign immunity in their official capacities; the county manager and the county attorney had official immunity in their individual capacities as obtaining the TRO was a discretionary action that they undertook to protect the public and workplace safety after they were advised of the employee's actions. Wallace v. Greene County, 274 Ga. App. 776, 618 S.E.2d 642 (2005).

Temporary restraining order valid against corporation.

- Temporary restraining order entered against a corporation and the corporation's officers was not invalid because the verified complaint and the state's attorney's certification were sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 to show that immediate and irreparable injury would result unless relief was granted before the officers could be heard in opposition and why notice would not be required. Pittman v. State, 288 Ga. 589, 706 S.E.2d 398 (2011).

Automatic dissolution of temporary restraining order is not an appealable judgment. Clements v. Kushinka, 233 Ga. 273, 210 S.E.2d 804 (1974).

Dissolution only appealable when heard on merits.

- Issue of dissolution of a temporary restraining order must have been heard and determined on its merits before a judgment dissolving or refusing to dissolve the restraining order is subject to interlocutory appeal. Clements v. Kushinka, 233 Ga. 273, 210 S.E.2d 804 (1974).

Temporary protective order obtained under the Family Violence Act was not subject to the 30-day expiration period applicable to temporary restraining orders. Carroll v. State, 224 Ga. App. 543, 481 S.E.2d 562 (1997).

Late perfection of service.

- Fact that service is not perfected on a party until four days after a temporary restraining order has been issued does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction when the statutory requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 have been met. Stewart v. McLean, 252 Ga. 455, 314 S.E.2d 439 (1984).

Applicability of specificity requirement of subsection (d).

- Specificity requirement of subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 applies equally to mandated acts and acts of restraint. Caring Hands, Inc. v. Department of Human Resources, 214 Ga. App. 853, 449 S.E.2d 354 (1994), appeal dismissed, appeal after remand, 222 Ga. App. 608, 475 S.E.2d 660 (1996).

Personal care home could not be held in contempt for failure to comply with an order to relocate residents from its premises which failed to set forth a reasonably detailed plan for the relocation and a reasonable time limit for the relocation. Caring Hands, Inc. v. Department of Human Resources, 214 Ga. App. 853, 449 S.E.2d 354 (1994), appeal dismissed, appeal after remand, 222 Ga. App. 608, 475 S.E.2d 660 (1996).

Party is bound by restraining order of which a party has notice, despite the fact that personal service of the order upon the party may have been defective in some respect. Cameron v. Richards, 246 Ga. 231, 271 S.E.2d 146 (1980).

Duty of defendant to determine meaning of order.

- If the defendant is in doubt as to what acts the defendant may or may not do under an order granted pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the defendant should request modification or construction of the statute's terms; if the defendant proceeds under the defendant's own construction, the defendant does so at the defendant's own peril. General Teamsters Local 528 v. Allied Foods, Inc., 228 Ga. 479, 186 S.E.2d 527 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041, 92 S. Ct. 1313, 31 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1972).

City of Atlanta's argument that the permanent injunction issued against the city lacked specificity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(d), despite the fact that the city later withdrew a motion seeking the trial court's clarification of the injunction, failed as the motion for clarification in the trial court was the proper procedure. City of Atlanta v. S. States Police Benevolent Ass'n, 276 Ga. App. 446, 623 S.E.2d 557 (2005).

Subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 requires a specific description of the property or assets which are the subject of the injunction to appear on the face of the order. Hendrix v. Hendrix, 254 Ga. 662, 333 S.E.2d 596 (1985).

Injunctive order which refers to the complaint for its sole description of the property which the defendant is restrained from encumbering or conveying attempts an impermissible incorporation by reference. Hendrix v. Hendrix, 254 Ga. 662, 333 S.E.2d 596 (1985).

Injunction improper when order not specific in terms.

- Trial court's injunction ordering that a former employee be enjoined perpetually from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer was improper because of the undefined term "trade secrets" which violated the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 that every injunction order be specific in the order's terms. Ward v. Process Control Corp., 247 Ga. 583, 277 S.E.2d 671 (1981); Sanford v. RDA Consultants Ltd., 244 Ga. App. 308, 535 S.E.2d 321 (2000).

With regard to the disclosure of proprietary information, the trial court's order which granted an employer an interlocutory injunction enforcing non-solicitation and non-disclosure clauses against an employee lacked the specificity mandated by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(d) as the trial court's order lacked sufficient detail to fully apprise the employee of which materials could not be used or disclosed. Pregler v. C&Z, Inc., 259 Ga. App. 149, 575 S.E.2d 915 (2003).

Order enjoining the construction of a cell phone tower on leased property was vacated because the order did not comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(d) by describing the property subject to the injunction in reasonable detail; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(d) was to be strictly applied in the context of interests in land, and the order's attempt to describe the property subject to the injunction by making reference to a lease attempted an impermissible incorporation by reference. Verticality, Inc. v. Warnell, 282 Ga. App. 873, 640 S.E.2d 369 (2006).

Details of injunctive order need not reveal trade secrets.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65 does not require that a trial court's injunction against the disclosure of a trade secret itself disclose the trade secret; rather, the trial court's injunction need only include a general description of the trade secret sought to be protected. Ward v. Process Control Corp., 247 Ga. 583, 277 S.E.2d 671 (1981).

Nature of reasonable detail.

- Trial court's injunction against property owners who refused to allow a power company access to conduct surveys for a planned electrical transmission line was proper because the injunction was in "reasonable" detail when the injunction specified the land affected and the acts that the property owners were not to interfere with. Bearden v. Ga. Power Co., 262 Ga. App. 550, 586 S.E.2d 10 (2003).

Preservation of marital asset.

- In divorce proceedings, a trial court was within the court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(e) to order that a former wife pay the amount remaining from a line of credit the wife took out on the parties' marital residence into the court registry as evidence was presented that the wife had been dissipating a significant marital asset without notice to the former husband. Hunter v. Hunter, 289 Ga. 9, 709 S.E.2d 263 (2011).

Trial court could enjoin non-parties over whom court lacked personal jurisdiction.

- Trial court did not err in enjoining property managers who were the defendants in a suit involving a property management agreement from pursuing a suit regarding the same agreement in Virginia. Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65(d), the injunction also properly reached the defendants' associated entities over whom the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. Am. Mgmt. Servs. East, LLC v. Fort Benning Family Cmtys., LLC, 313 Ga. App. 124, 720 S.E.2d 377 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0630, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 386 (Ga. 2012).

Since the owner of the lot on which the road existed was in concert with the property owner and had notice of the action and the judgment entered against it, the trial court's injunction against the lot owner, who was not a party to the action, was valid. S-D Rira, LLC v. Outback Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Nov. 21, 2014).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§ 7, 243, 244, 249, 256, 257, 261 et seq., 276, 277, 280, 282 et seq., 299 et seq., 308, 331, 332.

14A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Injunctions, §§ 4, 105, 116, 152.

C.J.S.

- 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 1048, 1342, 1343, 1345. 43A C.J.S., Injunctions, §§ 8, 20 et seq., 121, 122, 226, 227, 232, 239, 240, 244 et seq., 259, 260, 263, 265 et seq., 280 et seq., 289, 309, 310, 368 et seq., 402 et seq.

ALR.

- Right of state or federal court to protect litigants by enjoining proceedings in bankruptcy, 32 A.L.R. 979.

May suit for injunction against a nonresident rest upon constructive service or service out of state, 69 A.L.R. 1038.

When preliminary order or temporary injunction deemed to have been dissolved within contemplation of statute providing for recovery of damages where injunction is dissolved, 123 A.L.R. 1235.

Constitutionality of statute or practice requiring or authorizing temporary restraining order or injunction without notice, 152 A.L.R. 168.

Decree granting or refusing injunction as res judicata in action for damages in relation to matter concerning which injunction was asked in first suit, 26 A.L.R.2d 446.

Furnishing of bond as prerequisite to issuance of temporary restraining order, 73 A.L.R.2d 854.

Dismissal of injunction action or bill without prejudice as breach of injunction bond, 91 A.L.R.2d 1312.

Period for which damages are recoverable or are computed under injunction bond, 95 A.L.R.2d 1190.

Who, under Federal Rule 65(d) and state counterparts, are persons "in active concert or participation" with parties to action so as to be bound by order granting an injunction, 97 A.L.R.2d 490.

Appealability of order granting, extending, or refusing to dissolve temporary restraining order, 19 A.L.R.3d 403.

Appealability of order refusing to grant or dissolving temporary restraining order, 19 A.L.R.3d 459.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit, §§ 15 et seq., 32, 36 et seq. 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, §§ 78 et seq., 116 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 27 C.J.S., Dismissal and Nonsuit, § 11. 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 64. 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 757.

ALR.

- Right to bring action against corporation, or prosecute pending action, as affected by the appointment of a receiver for the corporation, 8 A.L.R. 441.

Prejudgment and postjudgment interest.

- In a contract action, a party was not entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest when deposits were made pursuant to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67. Sacha v. Coffee Butler Serv., Inc., 215 Ga. App. 280, 450 S.E.2d 704 (1994).

Trial court's order granting the motion for supercedeas bond was reversed to the extent that the order abated post-judgment interest because abatement of the post-judgment interest was prohibited by the supersedeas, and the trial court erred in so ordering. Northside Bank v. Mountainbrook of Bartow County Homeowners Ass'n, 338 Ga. App. 126, 789 S.E.2d 378 (2016).

Unconditional deposit required to relieve defendant from liability.

- Check deposited in the clerk's office without leave of court, which was made out to the plaintiffs with an endorsement that "the undersign [sic] payees accept the amount of this payment in full satisfaction of all claims against drawer to property located at [the premises in issue]," failed to comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67 because it attempted to impose conditions on its acceptance, thereby rendering the money unavailable to the plaintiffs for withdrawal. Thus, the deposit did not relieve the defendant from all liability for postjudgment interest on the sums deposited in the court, and the trial court did not err by entering judgment therefor. Gunnin v. Parker, 198 Ga. App. 864, 403 S.E.2d 822, cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 403 S.E.2d 822 (1991).

Failure to deposit funds into registry.

- Since the county in a condemnation proceeding did not deposit funds into the registry as required by a consent decree, the requirements of the statute were not complied with; therefore, the trial court did not have authority to abate prejudgment interest by making the court's order retroactive to the date of the consent decree. Threatt v. Forsyth County, 250 Ga. App. 838, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001).

Violation by attorney deemed contempt.

- When, in a divorce proceeding, the husband's attorney violated O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67 and pertinent court rules, the court properly awarded attorney's fees paid to the wife personally by the husband's attorney either on the basis that the actions of the latter constituted contempt, or as a sua sponte award of attorney's fees. Cohen v. Feldman, 219 Ga. App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Cooper, 280 Ga. 145, 625 S.E.2d 754 (2006).

Cited in Hudson v. Omaha Indem. Co., 183 Ga. App. 847, 360 S.E.2d 406 (1987); Cheeks v. Novatel Carcom, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 664, 409 S.E.2d 229 (1991); Great S. Midway, Inc. v. Hughes, 223 Ga. App. 643, 478 S.E.2d 400 (1996); Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga. App. 186, 585 S.E.2d 159 (2003); Schoenbaum Ltd. Co., LLC v. Lenox Pines, LLC, 262 Ga. App. 457, 585 S.E.2d 643 (2003); Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deposits in Court, § 1 et seq.

8B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Deposits In Court, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26B C.J.S., Deposits in Court, § 1 et seq. 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 1153.

ALR.

- Who bears loss of funds held by third person, or deposited in court, awaiting outcome of litigation, 2 A.L.R. 463.

Liability of clerk of court or his bond for money paid into his hands by virtue of his office, 59 A.L.R. 60.

Supreme court interpretation required.

- After motorists asserted that an insurer for a negligent driver failed to fully comply with the terms of the insurer's settlement offer, such that there was no acceptance, questions to the Georgia Supreme Court were certified with respect to the proper interpretation of a new statute that regulated settlements in such circumstances as there were no published state or federal cases that interpreted the statute, which was arguably ambiguous with respect to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 826 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2016).

Payment as condition of acceptance.

- Offerors can demand timely payment as a precondition to acceptance of their offer. Accordingly, because personal injury claimants expressly specified in a settlement offer that timely payment was an essential element of an insurer's acceptance, the insurer did not effectively accept the offer by mailing checks with incomplete addresses that were not received. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 861 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2017).

Constitutionality.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(1) does not merely prescribe the methods of enforcing rights and obligations, but rather affects the rights of parties by imposing an additional duty and obligation to pay an opposing party's attorney fees when a final judgment does not meet a certain amount or is one of no liability; by creating this new obligation, the statute operates as a substantive law, which is unconstitutional under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X, given the statute's retroactive effect to pending cases. Fowler Props. v. Dowland, 282 Ga. 76, 646 S.E.2d 197 (2007).

Trial court clearly erred in finding that the Tort Reform Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, impeded access to the courts and violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, because Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII was never intended to provide a right of access to the courts, but was intended to provide only a right of choice between self-representation and representation by counsel; § 9-11-68(b)(1) does not deny litigants access to the courts but simply sets forth certain circumstances under which attorney's fees can be recoverable and, therefore, even if a constitutional right of access to the courts provision did exist, the provision would not be applicable. Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010).

Trial court erred in finding that the Tort Reform Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, since the court permitted the recovery of attorney's fees absent the prerequisite showings of either O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 or O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, because there was no constitutional requirement that attorney's fees be awarded only pursuant to § 9-15-14 or § 13-6-11; in Georgia, attorney's fees are recoverable when authorized by some statutory provision or by contract, and § 9-11-68 is such a statutory provision authorizing the recovery of attorney's fees under specific circumstances. Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010).

Tort Reform Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, does not violate the uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), because § 9-11-68 is a general law since the statute applies uniformly throughout the state to all tort cases; the purpose of the general law to encourage litigants in tort cases to make and accept good faith settlement proposals in order to avoid unnecessary litigation is a legitimate legislative purpose, consistent with the state's strong public policy of encouraging negotiations and settlements, and the fact that the statute applies to tort cases, but not other civil actions, does not render the statute an impermissible special law. Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010).

Purpose.

- Clear purpose of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 is to encourage litigants in tort cases to make and accept good faith settlement proposals in order to avoid unnecessary litigation. Canton Plaza, Inc. v. Regions Bank, Inc., 325 Ga. App. 361, 749 S.E.2d 825 (2013).

Construction.

- Georgia Court of Appeals recently decided the case of Richardson v. Locklyn, in which the Court adopted Florida's test for determining whether, in the trial court's discretion, an offer of settlement pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 was made in good faith. Therefore, in a legal mal- practice suit, the trial court's order deny- ing attorney fees and costs pursuant to the offer of settlement rule, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, was reversed and the case was remanded for a hearing and application of the new test. Ots, Inc. v. Weinstock & Scavo, P.C., 339 Ga. App. 457, S.E.2d (2016).

Construction with other law.

- Upon a proper appeal from a final order, while neither former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702) nor O.C.G.A. § 9-11-16 required that a complaint be dismissed or stricken for failing to comply with the terms of those statutes, unlike the Anti-SLAPP statute, codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, because the trial court did not enter a final judgment within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(1), attorney fees were properly denied; moreover, a right to dismiss voluntarily without prejudice would be meaningless if doing so would trigger the payment of the defendant's attorney fees. McKesson Corp. v. Green, 286 Ga. App. 110, 648 S.E.2d 457 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1602, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 656 (Ga. 2007).

Retroactive application of statute proper.

- Trial court did not err when the court applied the 2006 version of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 in the property owners' action against the builders because, inasmuch as the owners did not obtain any judgment amount in the owners' favor, it did not matter whether the original or amended version of the statute was applied, or whether the amendment was substantive or procedural in nature; under either version of the statute the owners were liable for the builders' reasonable fees and expenses from the date the offer of settlement was rejected. O'Leary v. Whitehall Constr., 288 Ga. 790, 708 S.E.2d 353 (2011).

Applicable to case filed after enactment despite injury predating effective date.

- Georgia's offer of settlement statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, applied to a negligence action in which the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the statute because the action was filed after that date; although § 9-11-68 involved substantial rights and could only apply prospectively, the statue only related to rights arising within the litigation; as a result, L. P. Gas Industrial Equipment Co. v. Burch, 306 Ga. App. 156, 701 S.E.2d 602 (2010) is overruled. Crane Composites, Inc. v. Wayne Farms, LLC, 296 Ga. 271, 765 S.E.2d 921 (2014).

Preemption.

- Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 did not preempt O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 because the two were not in direct collision, and there was no reason to believe § 9-11-68 could not be applied in harmony with Rule 68 and, also, because § 9-11-68 was substantive in nature and did not conflict with Rule 68, the Georgia statute was not preempted by the federal rule. Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008).

Court of Appeals upheld an award of attorney's fees under Georgia's offer of settlement statute based on the district court's findings that the statute was substantive and did not conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 and that a motion for fees could be filed and ruled upon before a final disposition was reached on appeal. Earthcam, Inc. v. Oxblue Corp., 658 Fed. Appx. 526 (11th Cir. 2016)(Unpublished).

Challenge to statute did not require service on Attorney General.

- Because a personal injury plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(d) was not required by Georgia law to serve the Attorney General with notice of the action, an order granting the defendants' motion for attorney fees under § 9-11-68(d) was reversed. Buchan v. Hobby, 288 Ga. App. 478, 654 S.E.2d 444 (2007).

Provision not retroactive.

- Plaintiffs in a medical malpractice and contract case were not entitled to attorney's fees because the plaintiffs did not specifically plead O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 and did not allege any bad faith by a doctor and clinic. Further, claims for fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 were properly dismissed on directed verdict because the statute was not in effect at the time the complaint was filed; because the statute added duties and obligations, the statute could not be retroactive. Morrison v. Mann, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 26, 2008)(Unpublished).

Statute had no application as statute became effective during pendency of litigation.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 did not apply as the statute became effective during the pendency of the litigation, because the trial court failed to include specific findings of fact to support an award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, and because neither the first driver nor the first driver's attorney were afforded an opportunity to be heard before sanctions were imposed, the trial court erred in awarding the second driver attorney's fees and costs of litigation. Olarsch v. Newell, 295 Ga. App. 210, 671 S.E.2d 253 (2008).

Because O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 was not in effect when an action a husband and wife filed against a company accrued, the couple was not entitled to a benefit conferred on the plaintiffs by the statute, which was the right to recover the couple's own attorney's fees and expenses of litigation if the company had rejected the couple's settlement demand and if the couple had obtained a final judgment in an amount greater than 125 percent of such offer of settlement. L. P. Gas Indus. Equip. Co. v. Burch, 306 Ga. App. 156, 701 S.E.2d 602 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying a company's motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 to recover the attorney fees and expenses of litigation the company incurred after a husband and wife rejected the company's settlement offer because § 9-11-68 was inapplicable. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b) operated as a substantive law, and it was not yet in effect when the substantive rights of the husband and wife became fixed; thus, the couple was entitled to seek compensation in tort from the company, free from any duty and obligation to pay attorney fees if the couple failed to obtain a final judgment that was at least 75 percent of any offer of settlement. L. P. Gas Indus. Equip. Co. v. Burch, 306 Ga. App. 156, 701 S.E.2d 602 (2010).

Rejection of second offer does not negate rejection of first offer.

- After an insurer made an offer of settlement to a widower and an estate administrator, the fact that the insurer made another offer of settlement, which was also rejected, did not negate the effect of the rejection of the first offer for purposes of seeking attorney fees and costs under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, after a jury rendered a verdict of no liability for the insurer. Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield, 303 Ga. App. 26, 693 S.E.2d 99 (2010).

Settlement offer not made in good faith.

- Truck driver's and owner's offer of settlement for $ 25,000 under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 was not made in good faith, although ultimately a second truck driver was found 100 percent liable to the decedent, because it was a wrongful death case in which the accident would not have occurred but for the first truck driver's admitted negligence. Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield, 313 Ga. App. 180, 721 S.E.2d 173 (2011).

Settlement offer not made in bad faith.

- School's offer of judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 to a parent to settle the parent's slander claims for $750 was not made in bad faith; the school reasonably and correctly anticipated that the school's exposure was minimal. Similarly, the fact that the school ultimately incurred $84,000 in fees and expenses did not preclude a finding of good faith. Cohen v. Alfred & Adele Davis Acad., Inc., 310 Ga. App. 761, 714 S.E.2d 350 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1795, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 976 (Ga. 2011); cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2106, 182 L. Ed. 2d 869 (2012).

Post-judgment motions for fees does not toll the time to appeal from final judgment.

- Supreme court was without jurisdiction to review the propriety or substance of the trial court's order denying the property owners' motion for new trial because the owners failed to timely file a notice of appeal in regard to that order, and the builders' post-judgment motions for fees under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-68 and9-15-14 did not toll the time for the owners' to appeal from the order denying the owners' motion for new trial; the trial court entered a final judgment on October 4, 2007, and the owners' filing of a motion for new trial tolled the time for appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a), but as soon as the trial court issued the court's order disposing of the motion for new trial, the thirty-day time period to file a notice of appeal began to run, and the owners' filed the motion for new trial on March 9, 2009. O'Leary v. Whitehall Constr., 288 Ga. 790, 708 S.E.2d 353 (2011).

Motion for attorney's fees meritless.

- That portion of the defendants' renewed motion for attorney's fees that sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation incurred on appeal was meritless since O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 expressly limited the award of fees and expenses to those incurred "from the date of the rejection of the offer of settlement through the entry of judgment". Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008).

Basis for denying fees and costs should be set forth in trial court's order.

- In a case in which: (1) a widower and an estate administrator rejected an insurer's offer of settlement; (2) the jury later entered a verdict in favor of the insurer; and (3) the trial court denied the insurer's motion for fees and costs, remand was required because the trial court did not set forth the basis for the court's determination as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(d)(2). Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield, 303 Ga. App. 26, 693 S.E.2d 99 (2010).

Court erred by failing to indicate whether court segregated fees and expenses.

- Award of attorney fees and expenses under Georgia's offer of settlement statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, to a defending bank was vacated because the trial court did not indicate whether the court was able to ascertain the fees and expenses attributable to the bank's defense of plaintiffs' claims as opposed to the bank's prosecution of its unsuccessful counterclaims; thus, there was no way to determine if the trial court segregated the recoverable fees and expenses from those which were nonrecoverable. Canton Plaza, Inc. v. Regions Bank, Inc., 325 Ga. App. 361, 749 S.E.2d 825 (2013).

Award of fees premature.

- In an action for breach of contract and fraud, the trial court erred in prematurely awarding attorney fees under the offer-of-settlement statute, after a jury found in favor of the defendants fraud claim, while the arbitration of the doctor's breach of contract case was outstanding. Abdalla v. Atlanta Nephrology Referral Center, LLCLC, 338 Ga. App. 36, 789 S.E.2d 288 (2016).

It was error for the trial court to deny attorney fees under Georgia's offer of settlement statute as the amount of the consent decree was greater than 125% of the offer of settlement and the consent decree could serve as the basis for such an award. Strategic Law, LLC v. Pain Management & Wellness Centers of Georgia, LLC, 343 Ga. App. 444, 806 S.E.2d 880 (2017).

Award of attorney's fees and expenses proper.

- In calculating a reasonable fee amount, a district court did not abuse the court's discretion in finding that the rates requested by defendant companies were reasonable since the plaintiff oil company's bare assertion that a discount should have applied to the rates simply because the defendants actually negotiated a discount on the rates of the out-of-town lawyers the company hired was incorrect. Moreover, the district court did not abuse the court's discretion in awarding fees for hours for multiple-attorney meetings or for including time spent on unsuccessful claims. Gowen Oil Co. v. Abraham, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013)(Unpublished).

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(1) allowed a defendant to recover fees and expenses incurred not only by the defendant but also "on the defendant's behalf" and, thus, the defendants' insurance did not insulate the plaintiff from the payment of legal fees and expenses under § 9-11-68. Moreover, the defendants were entitled to fees that were incurred between the entry of summary judgment and the entry of judgment. Gowen Oil Co. v. Abraham, F.3d (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013)(Unpublished).

Franchisor showed that attorney's fees the franchisor sought under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(1) from the date of the rejection of the offer of settlement through the entry of judgment did not duplicate any part of the settlement, which reimbursed the franchisor for other attorney's fees incurred in defending against the claims. Eaddy v. Precision Franchising, LLC, 320 Ga. App. 667, 739 S.E.2d 410 (2013).

Award of attorney's fees and expenses proper but calculation not proper.

- While an inmate was entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b), the trial court erred in calculating the award based solely, as far as the record reflected, on the contingency agreement rather than on evidence of hours, rates, or other indications regarding the value of the attorneys' professional services actually rendered. Ga. Dep't of Corr. v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014).

Because a retroactive application of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 would have impaired the offeror's rights to recover attorney's fees and costs, the trial court did not err in applying the statute in effect at the time the offer was made. Kromer v. Bechtel, 289 Ga. App. 306, 656 S.E.2d 910 (2008).

Particularity requirement met.

- Offer of settlement met the particularity requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a)(4), even though acceptance of the offer required execution of a release, which was not attached to the settlement offer. Great West Cas. Co. v. Bloomfield, 303 Ga. App. 26, 693 S.E.2d 99 (2010).

Particularity requirement not met.

- Because the plaintiff asserted a claim for punitive damages, and such claim was pending at the time the offer of settlement was made, the defendant was required to state with particularity the amount proposed to settle that claim, which the defendant failed to do, thus, the defendant's offer did not meet the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a), and the trial court did not err in ruling that the defendant could not recover attorney fees for an offer of settlement pursuant to that Code section. Chadwick v. Brazell, 331 Ga. App. 373, 771 S.E.2d 75 (2015).

Application to State of Georgia in tort claims suit.

- In a suit brought by an inmate wherein a successful jury verdict was obtained against the Georgia Department of Corrections after the inmate was injured while working on a painting detail at the warden's house, the trial court properly denied the Department's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity because the state waived sovereign immunity for the torts of state employees while acting within the scope of the employees' official duties in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances; thus, since the Department rejected the inmate's offer of judgment, the Department was subject to the ramifications of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, including attorney fees. Ga. Dep't of Corr. v. Couch, 322 Ga. App. 234, 744 S.E.2d 432 (2013).

Offer failed to identify claims and did not meet particularity requirement in tort case.

- In a slip and fall case, an offer of settlement under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 for $1,000 was ambiguous as to whether accepting the offer required the plaintiff to relinquish the plaintiff's claims against a co-defendant, against whom the plaintiff already held a default judgment, and therefore the offer failed to comply with § 9-11-68(a)(3) and (4). The trial court therefore erred in ordering the plaintiff to pay the offeror's attorney's fees of $24,696. Tiller v. RJJB Assocs., LLP, 331 Ga. App. 622, 770 S.E.2d 883 (2015).

Necessity for hearing on motion for attorney's fees.

- Trial court did not err in awarding attorney's fees and expenses of $27,276 after a restaurant prevailed in a patron's action, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68; although the court suggested that a hearing was necessary under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-14 and14-2-1604, in this case, the patron waived a hearing by failing to request the hearing or otherwise challenge the reasonableness of the fees sought. Bell v. Waffle House, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 443, 771 S.E.2d 132 (2015).

Hearing is required for the award of attorney fees under Georgia's offer of settlement statute, which may include the consideration of whether the offer was made in good faith; although a party may waive a hearing expressly or by conduct, a timely objection to the motion, even without a specific request for a hearing, is generally sufficient to preclude a waiver by conduct of the right to an evidentiary hearing. Richardson v. Locklyn, 339 Ga. App. 457, 793 S.E.2d 640 (2016).

After the plaintiff rejected the defendant's formal offer under Georgia's offer of settlement statute to settle the plaintiff's claims for $12,500 when the plaintiff's medical expenses at that time were $18,927.25, and the jury returned a $6,948.25 verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court's judgment denying the defendant's motion for attorney fees was vacated and the case was remanded for a hearing on attorney fees because the plaintiff had to have an opportunity to confront and challenge whether the defendant's fees were reasonable, and the court had to determine whether the defendant's offer was made in good faith. Richardson v. Locklyn, 339 Ga. App. 457, 793 S.E.2d 640 (2016).

Motion for fees and costs not decided in same term as original judgment.

- Trial court did not err by amending the judgment to include attorney fees and costs under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 because, even though the trial court did not rule on the motion until the next court term, the store filed the motion to amend in the same term as the original judgment was entered. Stevens v. Food Lion, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 644, 801 S.E.2d 340 (2017).

Preservation for review.

- Court of Appeals declined to address the constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal by an offeree, and even if the issues had been raised below, jurisdiction would have been in the supreme court. Kromer v. Bechtel, 289 Ga. App. 306, 656 S.E.2d 910 (2008).

Because the appellees did not raise the issue that retroactive application of the Tort Reform Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, was unconstitutional in the trial court and obtain a distinct ruling on it from that court, the issue could not be considered for the first time in the supreme court. Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010).

Cited in Wildcat Cliffs Builders, LLC v. Hagwood, 292 Ga. App. 244, 663 S.E.2d 818 (2008); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 788 S.E.2d 810 (2016).

ALR.

- Recoverable costs under state offer of judgment rule, 34 A.L.R.6th 431.

Allowable questions.

- Any question which would lead to any property or sources of income of judgment debtor is pertinent and allowable. Fleming v. Busey, 153 Ga. App. 489, 265 S.E.2d 839 (1980); Miller v. United States Shelter Corp., 179 Ga. App. 469, 347 S.E.2d 251 (1986).

Attorney's fees statute did not apply to post-judgment proceedings.

- In post-judgment discovery proceedings, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to third parties (the judgment debtor's wife and her limited liability companies) from whom the judgment creditor sought information because O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 did not apply to post-judgment discovery according to the statute's plain language. RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC v. Workman, 341 Ga. App. 127, 798 S.E.2d 677 (2017).

There is no territorial limitation in discovery statutes as to location of witnesses, documents, assets, etc. Thrift v. Vi-Vin Prods., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 717, 215 S.E.2d 709 (1975).

Non-resident judgment debtor.

- Trial court had jurisdiction to compel a non-resident judgment debtor to attend a postjudgment deposition in Georgia; under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69, the judgment creditor was entitled to notice the deposition under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-30, and the geographical limitations of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 did not apply. Heard v. Ruef, Ga. App. , 815 S.E.2d 607 (2018).

Service by mail.

- "In the manner provided in this chapter" includes service by mail upon counsel pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(b), such that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's pleadings. Clinton Leasing Corp. v. Patterson, 209 Ga. App. 336, 433 S.E.2d 422 (1993).

Inapplicability of privilege as to matters working forfeiture.

- Defendant is not privileged to refuse to answer on grounds that an answer would cause a forfeiture of the defendant's estate and interfere with the defendant's right to earn a living. Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788, 209 S.E.2d 234 (1974).

Privilege as to matters tending to work a forfeiture of an estate was inapplicable to post-judgment discovery proceedings geared toward uncovering or identifying assets to satisfy the judgment as the forfeiture did not result from answering questions or producing documents, but rather, results from a judgment already entered. Kushner v. Mascho, 143 Ga. App. 801, 240 S.E.2d 290 (1977).

Post-judgment discovery held only proper procedure.

- In action brought by bank against corporation seeking recovery on several notes and trade acceptances, as well as to recover an overdraft on a checking account, the trial court was without authority to direct the appellants, sole stockholders in the corporation, to either return all collateral to the premises of the corporation or to provide a list of the equipment; the proper procedure for obtaining such information is by post-judgment discovery in aid of execution, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69, and the appellee's contention that the order to provide a list was authorized pursuant to the trial court's inherent power to issue orders necessary to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction was without merit. Ponderosa Granite Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 Ga. App. 105, 325 S.E.2d 591 (1984).

Court may impose sanctions for failure to comply with post-judgment discovery orders, including contempt for not appearing at a deposition, notwithstanding the fact that the person to be deposed is a nonresident, although there is apparently no provision for the aggrieved party to move for a dismissal of an appeal. Ostroff v. Coyner, 187 Ga. App. 109, 369 S.E.2d 298 (1988).

Use of privilege against self-incrimination.

- When interrogatories in fieri facias do not constitute or evidence extensive questioning as to the judgment debtor's financial affairs which would tend, as a matter of law, to incriminate the debtor, work a forfeiture of the debtor's estate, or bring disgrace or infamy upon the debtor or the debtor's family, but are clearly within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69, the burden is on the debtor to state the general reason for the debtor's refusal to answer and to specifically establish that a real danger of incrimination exists with respect to each question. Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 169 Ga. App. 418, 312 S.E.2d 874 (1984).

Scope includes nonparties.

- Plain language of paragraph (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 works an express expansion of the permissible use of post-judgment written interrogatories to any person, regardless of whether the person is a party to the underlying action in which the money judgment was rendered. Esasky v. Forrest, 231 Ga. App. 488, 499 S.E.2d 413 (1998).

Impleader of persons not parties to the underlying judgment not permitted.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 does not authorize a judgment creditor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the underlying judgment. C-Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Ga. 624, 571 S.E.2d 383 (2002).

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 did not authorize a judgment creditor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the underlying judgment; a judgment creditor must initiate a separate civil action against persons the creditor claims are liable for a judgment to which they were not parties by filing a complaint and serving the defendants under the procedures set forth in the Civil Practice Act, see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9. Pazur v. Belcher, 272 Ga. App. 456, 612 S.E.2d 481 (2004).

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 did not authorize a judgment creditor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the underlying judgment; instead, the judgment-creditor had to initiate a separate civil action against persons the judgment-creditor claims were liable for a judgment to which they were not parties. However, in the instant case, the plaintiff judgment creditors were not seeking to hold the defendant transferee liable for the consent judgment, only to avoid an allegedly fraudulent transfer. Reyes-Fuentes v. Shannon Produce Farm, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. May 2, 2012).

Action against shareholder for piercing corporate veil.

- Employer's complaint alleged against one of the employer's shareholders for piercing the corporate veil was not subject to a seven-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 as the employee failed to first obtain a judgment against the employer and then file a separate action to pierce the corporate veil, but instead filed an amended complaint against that shareholder over six years after the original complaint was filed. Pazur v. Belcher, 272 Ga. App. 456, 612 S.E.2d 481 (2004).

Scope includes spouse of debtor.

- Spouse of a judgment debtor is within the scope of the post-judgment discovery process, subject to the limitations created by the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, provisions governing discovery generally. In re Callaway, 212 Ga. App. 500, 442 S.E.2d 309 (1994).

Judgment creditor was authorized to seek bank records of the debtor's wife in post-judgment discovery because the creditor was entitled to seek information that would lead to any property or other sources of income of the debtor; further, the wife had begun paying the husband's country club dues from her bank accounts after the judgment was entered. Hickey v. RREF BB SBL Acquisitions, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 411, 785 S.E.2d 72 (2016).

Non-party spouse.

- Non-party spouse of a judgment debtor is within the scope of post-judgment discovery, including post-judgment interrogatories. Esasky v. Forrest, 231 Ga. App. 488, 499 S.E.2d 413 (1998).

No supplementary proceedings against non-parties.

- District court erred when the court granted judgment-creditor's motion to commence supplementary proceedings against various third parties because in Georgia a judgment-creditor had to initiate a separate civil action against persons it claimed were liable for a judgment if they were not parties to the underlying action which granted the judgment. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. C-Staff, Inc., 318 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2003).

Cited in Tennesco, Inc. v. Berger, 144 Ga. App. 45, 240 S.E.2d 586 (1977); Johnson v. Heifler, 149 Ga. App. 860, 256 S.E.2d 143 (1979); Custom Form Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 157 Ga. App. 410, 278 S.E.2d 69 (1981); Chambers v. McDonald, 161 Ga. App. 380, 288 S.E.2d 641 (1982); Georgia Farm Bldgs., Inc. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327, 317 S.E.2d 229 (1984); Grant v. Newsome, 201 Ga. App. 710, 411 S.E.2d 796 (1991); Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga. App. 186, 585 S.E.2d 159 (2003); Roberts v. First Ga. Cmty. Bank, 335 Ga. App. 228, 779 S.E.2d 113 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Creditor's Bills, §§ 3, 31. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions and Enforcement of Judgments, § 530 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26B C.J.S., Depositions, § 28 et seq. 27 C.J.S., Discovery, § 74 et seq. 33 C.J.S., Executions, §§ 4 et seq., 529, 530. 35B C.J.S, Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 1303, 1319 et seq.

ALR.

- Judgment in replevin as implying a direction for return of property, 144 A.L.R. 1149.

Sufficiency and timeliness of notice by indemnitee to indemnitor of action by third person, 73 A.L.R.2d 504.

Decree granting a life estate in property took precedence over quitclaim deed.

- Husband's quitclaim deed of property to his second wife did not take priority over a recorded divorce decree stating that the husband had only a life estate in the property with his two children from his first marriage as remaindermen. Price v. Price, 286 Ga. 753, 692 S.E.2d 601 (2010).

Definite description of property required.

- Decree for specific performance operates as a deed and should therefore contain a description as definite as that required to support a deed. Plantation Land Co. v. Bradshaw, 232 Ga. 435, 207 S.E.2d 49 (1974); Scheinfeld v. Murray, 267 Ga. 622, 481 S.E.2d 194 (1997).

Because there was no clear identification of the land to be conveyed in a parents' divorce settlement, their son was not entitled to a decree of specific performance under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-70. Haffner v. Davis, 290 Ga. 753, 725 S.E.2d 286 (2012).

Suit for specific performance is prematurely brought when time for performance has not yet arrived. Kirkland v. Morris, 233 Ga. 597, 212 S.E.2d 781 (1975).

Superior court order reconveying land to a vendor under an option to repurchase is not one of specific performance and does not act as a deed to convey when the order makes the reconveyance of the land contingent on a sum of money being paid into the court registry. The court's order does not become a decree of specific performance until the contingency is met. Nelson v. Smothers, 168 Ga. App. 120, 308 S.E.2d 239 (1983).

Cited in McMichael Realty & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tysinger, 155 Ga. App. 131, 270 S.E.2d 88 (1980); Bootery, Inc. v. Cumberland Creek Properties, Inc., 271 Ga. 271, 517 S.E.2d 68 (1999).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, § 134 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 1307, 1309. 81A C.J.S., Specific Performance, §§ 1 et seq., 128 et seq.

ALR.

- Rights and remedies respecting improvements made in reliance on a decree or order as to title or possession of real property which is subsequently reversed, 30 A.L.R. 936.

Reversal as affecting purchase of property involved in suit, pending appeal without supersedeas, 36 A.L.R. 421.

Inability to comply with judgment or order as defense to charge of contempt, 120 A.L.R. 703.

Judgment in replevin as implying a direction for return of property, 144 A.L.R. 1149.