O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-15 (2019)

Interlocutory hearing on amount of compensation

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) An appeal having been filed as provided in Code Section 32-3-14, the appellant or appellants, at any time before the beginning of the trial of the issue formed on such appeal, but not later than 90 days after the date of service as provided in Code Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9, may file in the case a petition for an interlocutory hearing on the issue of whether the amount deposited in court as just and adequate compensation is sufficient. Such petition shall be served as may be directed by the court. The petition shall be verified and shall state the amount which is claimed by the petitioner to represent just and adequate compensation, together with a sworn, written statement of the facts upon which the claim is based. (b) Upon the presentation of the interlocutory petition to the judge of the court in which the case is pending, the court shall make such order as to the appointment of assessors as shall conform most nearly to Article 1 of Chapter 2 of Title 22 and shall give all interested persons equal rights in the selection thereof. If by reason of conflicting interests or otherwise such equality of right cannot be preserved, the judge shall make such order on the subject as shall secure a fair and impartial assessment. The board of assessors so appointed shall determine from all evidence offered by the parties, from personal inspection of the premises, and from its own professional judgment whether the condemnor should be required to deposit any additional amount as estimated compensation and shall, within 30 days of the date of reference to such board, make an interlocutory award based upon such determination. (c) Upon approval of the interlocutory award by the court and service of a copy upon the condemnor, as may be directed by the court, the condemnor shall within 15 days pay into court any additional amount required to be paid pursuant to the interlocutory award. (d) Upon the application of the party or parties in interest at any time before a jury verdict on the appeal, the court shall order that the additional money deposited in court be paid forthwith to the parties

found to be entitled thereto; provided, however, that any party or parties receiving any payment of any amount paid into court pursuant to an interlocutory award shall, before receiving such payment, file in the case a bond in the amount of such payment conditioned for the repayment of any amount so received by such party which may be in excess of the amount awarded by the jury upon the trial of the appeal. Such bond shall be executed by a surety company authorized to do business in this state; and, in the event the amount awarded by the jury on final trial of the appeal is less than the total amount paid into court by the condemnor, judgment may be entered against the principal and surety on the bond for the amount by which the total amount paid into court exceeds the amount awarded by the jury; and, if the amount awarded by the jury is less than the original deposit, judgment may be entered against the condemnee for that part of the judgment not covered by the bond. (e) The assessors shall be compensated as provided in Code Section (f ) The interlocutory award provided for in this Code section shall not be subject to exceptions to any higher court. (g) If the condemnee notifies the court in writing to dismiss the appeal filed by the condemnee pursuant to Code Section 32-3-14 within 15 days following the date the interlocutory award is approved by the court, that interlocutory award shall become the final judgment in the proceeding and shall not be vacated or modified, and that appeal shall be dismissed unless the condemnor files with the court a notice objecting to such dismissal within 15 days following the date the condemnee notified the condemnor of the notice to dismiss such appeal.

History

Code 1933, § 95A-611, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 332, § 1; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1539, § 12.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1991, p. 332, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment shall be

applicable to those proceedings in which the declaration of taking is filed with the court on or after July 1, 1991. Law reviews. - For review of 1998 legislation relating to eminent domain, see 15 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 115 (1998).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS For discussion of the constitutionality of this section, see Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560, 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977). Legislative intent to make interlocutory award available. - That the interlocutory award is not subject to being vacated or modified after 15 days indicates a legislative intent to make the interlocutory award quickly available to

the condemnee without further protracted dispute over the interlocutory amount. Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560, 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977). No intent to make interlocutory award of estimated compensation unappealable. - Interpretation of this section which would allow interlocutory awards of estimated compensation to become nonappealable final judgments is

contrary to the legislative scheme. Morgan v. Department of Transp., 239 Ga. 560, 238 S.E.2d 95 (1977). Court appointment of special master to hear all issues improper. - Trial court’s sua sponte appointment of a special master and the court’s submission of all issues to that master was contrary to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-15, which contemplates that only the condemnee can petition for an appointment of a special master and that such a master can consider only the issue of compensation. Stephens v. Department of Transp., 170 Ga. App. 784, 318 S.E.2d 167 (1984).

Condemnee required to post bond. - Same requirements pertaining to a condemnee’s obligation to post bond apply to a condemnee who seeks a greater award, whether the condemnee pursues an interlocutory hearing before a special master, or appeals directly to a jury, the sum initially awarded by the court. Kellett v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 214, 329 S.E.2d 514 (1985). Cited in Department of Transp. v. 0.144 Acres of Land, 167 Ga. App. 59, 306 S.E.2d 59 (1983).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Surplus property not to be placed in court registry. - Legislature intended that only money, and not surplus property, be placed into the court registry

for satisfaction of any judgment resulting from a condemnation action. 1992 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 92-8.

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Referee’s failure to file report within time specified by statute, court

order, or stipulation as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 1983–2016 · leading case: Shiv Aban, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 784 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
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Shiv Aban, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 784 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 70× “2 Here, because Shiv Aban was dissatisfied with the amount of compensation the DOT paid into court, Shiv Aban filed a notice of appeal demanding a trial by jury and sought an interlocutory hearing under OCGA § 32-3-15 on the issue of whether the amount the DOT deposited into…”
Stephens v. Dep't of Transp., 318 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 14× “condemnation proceedings, the appointment of a special master is addressed only in OCGA § 32-3-15. That statute provides that after an appeal as to compensation has been filed, the superior court shall, on petition of the condemnee, appoint a special master to conduct a hearing…”
Chouinard v. City of East Point, 514 S.E.2d 220 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 4× “As argued by the city, a bond may not have been required in this case by OCGA § 32-3-15. But we cannot agree that Chouinard was not entitled to interest under OCGA § 32-3-19 (c).”
Dep't of Transp. v. Woods, 494 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 2× “We agree with the Court of Appeals that if Woods was dissatisfied with the amount deposited as just and adequate compensation, the proper remedy would have been to seek an interlocutory hearing under OCGA § 32-3-15, wherein a special master could have determined whether the…”
Chouinard v. City of East Point, 546 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 32-3-19 (c) provides that the judgment shall include interest from the date of taking to the date of payment pursuant to final judgment at the rate of 7 percent per annum on the amount awarded by final judgment as the value of the property as of the date of taking; but…”
Kellett v. Dep't of Transp., 329 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “The additional award, upon application, must be paid to the con-demnees providing they file a bond conditioned for repayment of any in excess of that awarded by the jury on appeal; “and, if the amount awarded by the jury is less than the original deposit, judgment may be entered…”
Woods v. Dep't of Transp., 482 S.E.2d 396 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “If the condemnees were dissatisfied with the amount deposited, they could have utilized OCGA § 32-3-15 to file a petition for interlocutory hearing before a special master on the issue of whether that amount was sufficient compensation.”
Sewell v. Dep't of Transp., 578 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 32-3-15 (b). Following the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Sewell, determining that the value of the property taken and consequential damages to the remaining property totaled $81,787.”
Dep't of Transp. v. 0.144 Acres of Land, 306 S.E.2d 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “Appellant also contends that the order constituted a modification of the special master award more than 15 days after its entry (see OCGA § 32-3-15 (f) (Code Ann. § 95A-611)), and that the order was entered without adequate notice of hearing to appellant.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.