O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 (2019)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Consolidation of condemnation cases when entire property has common use. - Whether it is appropriate to consolidate two condemnation proceedings depends upon the use of the property, and when the entire property had a common use so as to entitle the landowners to the consequential damages calculated as resulting to the whole of the property rather than to separate parcels, the trial court’s order consolidating the two cases was not in error - especially where to allow two different actions to be brought regarding the one property could have resulted in great harm and injustice to the condemnees’ substantive rights. Department of Transp. v. Defoor, 173 Ga. App. 218, 325 S.E.2d 863 (1984). Restriction on court’s power to appoint special master. - O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 does not give the superior court the authority to make a sua sponte appointment of a special master to resolve all issues in the proceedings as if the issues had been brought under O.C.G.A. § 22-2-100 et seq. Stephens v. Department of Transp., 170 Ga. App. 784, 318 S.E.2d 167 (1984). Evidentiary hearing required for mixed questions of law and fact. - In a proceeding by a lessor for compensation for an easement on condemned property, the issue of the lessor’s interest involved mixed questions of law and fact and could only be dealt with by the court on evidentiary hearing, trial on non-value issues, or summary judgment and not under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1. S & S Food Servs., Inc. v. DOT, 222 Ga. App. 579, 475 S.E.2d 197 (1996). Amendment of defective declaration of taking. - When the Department of Transportation filed a declaration of taking pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 et seq., which included the taking of a tem-

porary work easement to be used in the demolition of a building on the condemned property, the department did not adequately describe the easement as the department’s plat attached to the department’s declaration did not describe the easement, and there was no description of the easement’s width nor any limitation regarding a pathway which had to be used when traversing land not condemned; the issue was not rendered moot by the fact that the condemnees did not obtain a stay pending appeal and the work was completed during the appeal’s pendency because O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1 authorized a trial court to order a condemnor to amend a defective declaration of taking. Ga. 400 Indus. Park, Inc. v. DOT, 274 Ga. App. 153, 616 S.E.2d 903 (2005). Business loss damages need not be specifically pled in notice of appeal. - Because there was no legislative requirement that, in a condemnation proceeding, a party seeking business loss damages had to specifically and separately plead for such in the notice of appeal, in accordance with the consent judgment that the Georgia Department of Transportation was bound by, a lessee’s appeal was to proceed to trial on the lessee’s claims for business loss, damages to trade fixtures, and relocation expenses. DOT v. Camvic Corp., 284 Ga. App. 321, 644 S.E.2d 171 (2007). Condemnee has no vested right in attorney fees granted by court. - Trial court does not have authority, under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-17.1, to require payment of reasonable and necessary attorney fees and expenses of litigation for proceedings before an appellate court of this state. DOT v. Franco’s Pizza & Delicatessen, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 723, 409 S.E.2d 281, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 895, 409 S.E.2d 281 (1991), overruled on other grounds, 264 Ga. 393, 444 S.E.2d 734 (1994).