Entry of judgment.

- Language of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19, which explicitly directs the entry of judgment in three enumerated instances, is meaningless or mere surplusage, and that language does not implicitly prohibit the entry of judgment in unenumerated instances. DOT v. Petkas, 189 Ga. App. 633, 377 S.E.2d 166, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 911, 377 S.E.2d 166 (1988).

Legislative determination of prejudgment interest rate constitutional.

- Prejudgment interest rate specified by subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 compensates the condemnee for the use of funds generated in a condemnation action, not for the use of the property condemned; thus, this interest rate is not part of "just compensation," and legislative determination of the rate does not involve improper exercise of a judicial function. Brooks v. DOT, 254 Ga. 60, 327 S.E.2d 175 (1985).

Different percentages for prejudgment and postjudgment interest.

- If no suspect class of condemnees is involved, application of different statutory percentages to prejudgment and postjudgment interest in condemnation cases is not unconstitutional. Brooks v. DOT, 254 Ga. 60, 327 S.E.2d 175 (1985).

Interest on award.

- O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-12 and32-3-19 are to be construed together so that interest to the condemnee payable under these eminent domain proceedings is 7 percent between the date of taking and the final judgment and 12 percent thereafter until paid. Department of Transp. v. Cochran, 160 Ga. App. 583, 287 S.E.2d 599 (1981); DOT v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 162 Ga. App. 252, 291 S.E.2d 104 (1982).

Property owner was entitled to interest under the statute since the lump sum estimate of just and adequate compensation, when paid into the court by the defendant city, was not immediately subject to withdrawal by the property owner as the sum had not been apportioned among the property owner and the owner's tenants. Chouinard v. City of E. Point, 237 Ga. App. 266, 514 S.E.2d 220 (1999).

In a condemnation action, the trial court erred in denying a lessor's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the lessor's entitlement to statutory pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 because the fact that the trial court could later instruct the jury to disregard irrelevant evidence was not a reason to allow the jury to hear the irrelevant evidence; under the statutory framework of § 32-3-19, the amount of pre-judgment interest due a condemnee is determined after the jury enters a verdict. CNL APF Partners, LP v. DOT, 307 Ga. App. 511, 705 S.E.2d 862 (2010).

Trial court erred by failing to award prejudgment interest on $1.27 million from the date of the taking through the date that amount was deposited into court as that amount was not initially deposited by the Department of Transportation. Shiv Aban, Inc. v. Ga. DOT, 336 Ga. App. 804, 784 S.E.2d 134 (2016).

Term "just and adequate compensation" in subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 does not include prejudgment interest as an integral part which would make prejudgment interest subject to postjudgment interest. Department of Transp. v. Consolidated Equities Corp., 181 Ga. App. 672, 353 S.E.2d 603 (1987).

Post-judgment interest in condemnation actions is to be awarded in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 at 12 percent per annum rather than at 7 percent under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19, as the former is the more recent of the statutes. Department of Transp. v. Vest, 160 Ga. App. 368, 287 S.E.2d 85 (1981).

When jury's award is less than condemnor's deposit.

- In a condemnation case in which the jury awarded the property owner $86,000, because the DOT had initially paid $118,250 into the court's registry, the trial court properly entered judgment against the owner in the amount of $32,250. Curry v. DOT, 341 Ga. App. 482, 801 S.E.2d 95 (2017).

Jury verdict establishes value.

- Last word on value is the jury's verdict; the jury establishes the value. If the jury finds as a fact that the condemnor underestimated the value of the land, the condemnor must pay more; if it finds as a fact that the condemnor overestimated the value, the condemnee is not entitled to the proceeds of the government agency's mistake. Kellett v. Department of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 214, 329 S.E.2d 514 (1985).

Appeals.

- Mere filing of a timely motion for new trial or a notice of appeal, both of which contemplate the prior entry of a judgment on the jury's verdict, do not destroy the underlying viability of that prior judgment as a final appealable order in the case. DOT v. Petkas, 189 Ga. App. 633, 377 S.E.2d 166, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 911, 377 S.E.2d 166 (1988).

Cited in Department of Transp. v. Doss, 238 Ga. 480, 233 S.E.2d 144 (1977).

Just and adequate compensation interest vests on date of taking.

- Right to receive interest as part of just and adequate compensation vests on date of taking, which is the day the declaration of taking, accompanied by the payment of just and adequate compensation, is filed in a superior court. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-100.

Interest on amount recovered in condemnation cases.

- Condemnation cases filed before the effective date of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 bear interest at 7 percent on the amount recovered from the date of taking. Cases filed on and after the effective date of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12 bear interest at 7 percent from the date of taking to the date of final judgment and at 12 percent from the date of final judgment. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-100.

Surplus property not to be placed in court registry.

- Legislature intended that only money, and not surplus property, be placed into the court registry for satisfaction of any judgment resulting from a condemnation action. 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-8.