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- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, §§ 623, 748; former Civil Code 1910, §§ 757, 768; and former Code 1933, §§ 23-1901 through 23-1905, 95-1001, 95-1210, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Cited in Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 274 S.E.2d 464 (1981).
- Word "bridge" in this section, which gives a right of action against a county for defective construction, means a bridge used as an instrumentality for travel along a highway and for crossing streams or ravines. Hubbard v. Fulton County, 144 Ga. 363, 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717, 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (see O.C.G.A. § 32-4-71).
- Term "bridge" includes all the appurtenances necessary to the bridge's proper use, and embraces the bridge's abutments and approaches; that which is necessary as an approach, to connect the bridge with the highway, is an essential part of the bridge itself. Howington v. Madison County, 126 Ga. 699, 55 S.E. 941 (1906); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946).
Fill or embankment in road of approach to a bridge and which is necessary to make access to the bridge is a part of the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933).
- Contiguous embankment necessary to make access to a bridge, so as to pass teams and wagons over the bridge, is a part of the bridge, and title to the bridge covers such an embankment; but if the embankment is not a necessary part of the bridge, but a part of the streets of the municipality, the town, and not the county, would be bound to keep the bridge in repair. Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722, 168 S.E. 897, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933).
- While the word "bridge" does not include the public road leading thereto, or a drain or opening thereunder, it does include all the appurtenances necessary to the bridge's proper use, and embraces the bridge's abutments and approaches and that which is necessary as an approach to connect the bridge with the highway is an essential part of the bridge itself. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240, 172 S.E. 673 (1934).
- Culvert and a bridge are not the same, even though the culvert and bridge may serve the same purpose. Hubbard v. Fulton County, 144 Ga. 363, 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717, 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Floyd County v. Stewart, 97 Ga. App. 67, 101 S.E.2d 879 (1958).
- Piping and water boxes for drainage purposes across the public roads are not "bridges" within the meaning of the law. Montgomery County v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 41 Ga. App. 130, 152 S.E. 261 (1930).
- Defect in a bridge, which serves as the basis for liability by a county for injuries received by reason thereof, includes any condition of the bridge which renders the bridge unsafe for travelers passing over the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933).
- When in action against a county for damages from the falling of a truck through an opening where a public bridge had been, into a ravine below, the petition was not demurrable (now motion to dismiss), and the verdict for the plaintiff was not contrary to law or without evidence to support the verdict since the petition and the evidence showed that at the time of the injury at least a part of the bridge, i.e., the sills constituting a portion of its "approaches," still remained, and the rest of the bridge was being repaired. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240, 172 S.E. 673 (1934).
- When the county, or State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) negligently leaves road machinery on the abutment or approach to a bridge which causes injuries to a person undertaking to cross the bridge in an automobile, such dangerous condition in the bridge is a defect in the bridge, which makes a county liable for injuries caused by a defective bridge. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946).
- County is primarily liable for injuries caused by defective bridges, whether erected by contractors or county authorities. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946).
County authorities are bound to exercise ordinary care; county authorities are not insurers of the safety of county bridges. Warren County v. Evans, 118 Ga. 200, 44 S.E. 986 (1903) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 623).
- For a county to be liable for injuries resulting from defective bridge repairs there must have been a failure to take a bond from a contractor when such a bond was required, and the injury complained of must have occurred within the time which would have been covered by the contractor's bond, if such a bond had been given. Wolf v. Upson County, 44 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, §§ 757, 768).
- Since a public bridge was constructed under contract with the authorities of one county across a stream dividing that county from another (the authorities of the latter refusing to participate therein), it was the duty of the county authorities causing the construction of such bridge to take bond in accordance with this section. Cook v. County of DeKalb, 95 Ga. 218, 22 S.E. 151 (1894). See also Laurens County v. McLendon, 19 Ga. App. 246, 91 S.E. 283 (1917); Wells v. Jefferson County, 19 Ga. App. 455, 91 S.E. 943 (1917) (decided under former Code 1882, § 691 and former Civil Code 1910, § 768.
- Action may be brought either against the contractor or against the county; it is not necessary that the plaintiff should sue the contractor to insolvency before suing the county. Arnold, Estes & Co. v. Henry County, 81 Ga. 730, 8 S.E. 606 (1889) (decided under former Code 1882, § 691).
- Liability of the contractor is to keep the bridge in good repair for seven years, whether a bond is given for that purpose or not and the liability of the county does not extend beyond that. Monroe County v. Flint, 80 Ga. 489, 6 S.E. 173 (1888).
- After a county let out the contract for building a bridge to the lowest bidder, but took no bond from the contractor, and the injury complained of occurred ten years after the time of building the bridge, there was no legal liability on the part of the county because of such injury. Monroe County v. Flint, 80 Ga. 489, 6 S.E. 173 (1888).
- When the bond and security required and taken limited the period to three years, this may be treated as a "sufficient guarantee" so as to exempt the county from liability for damages sustained within such period of three years. Mappin v. County of Washington, 92 Ga. 130, 17 S.E. 1009 (1893).
- Liability for defects in a county-line bridge attaches only for failure of the county to take a sufficient bond from the contractor. Thus, since the petition showed that such a bridge was rebuilt by the county without a contract, and without taking a bond, no liability for injuries caused by defects in such a bridge attached against the county. Jones v. Appling County, 90 Ga. App. 386, 83 S.E.2d 53 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 23-1901 through 23-1905, 95-1001, 95-1210).
When county itself undertakes bridge work, O.C.G.A. § 32-4-71 is inapplicable and provides for no county liability for defective bridges. Kordares v. Gwinnett County, 220 Ga. App. 848, 470 S.E.2d 479 (1996).
- Measure and elements of damages for injury to bridge, 31 A.L.R.5th 171.
No results found for Georgia Code 32-4-71.