O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 (2019)

Declaration of policy

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) The General Assembly declares it to be the policy of this state that the erection or maintenance of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the rights of way of roads of the state highway system, which roads are also a part of the interstate and primary systems of highways within the state, shall be regulated in accordance with the terms of this part and the regulations promulgated by the commissioner pursuant thereto and that all outdoor advertising which does not conform to the requirements of this part is a public nuisance. The General Assembly recognizes that the outdoor advertising industry is a bona fide commercial function. However, in no manner shall any outdoor advertising sign be defined as a commercial or industrial activity or be used for the purposes of administering this part. It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide a statutory basis for the

regulation of outdoor advertising, such basis to be consistent with the public policy relating to areas adjacent to roads of the state highway system which also form a part of the interstate and primary systems of highways declared by the Congress in Title 23, Section 103, United States Code. (b) The General Assembly further declares it to be the policy of this state to avert substantial economic hardship by the retention, in specific areas defined by the board, upon request made by the Department of Transportation and approved by the United States Secretary of Transportation, of directional signs, displays, and devices which were lawfully erected under state law in force at the time of their erection, which were in existence on May 5, 1976, and which do not conform to the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (5) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraphs (1) through (3) of Code Section 32-6-73, where it can be demonstrated that such signs, displays, and devices (1) provide directional information about goods and services in the specific interest of the traveling public and (2) are such that removal would work a substantial economic hardship in such defined area.

History

Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, § 1; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-913, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1979, p. 1086, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32.

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Recommendations Regarding Control of Outdoor Advertising Along the Interstate Highway System in Georgia,’’ see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 308 (1963). For annual survey on business corporations, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 61

(2012). For annual survey on administrative law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2018). For note, ‘‘Regulation and Ownership of the Marshlands: The Georgia Marshlands Act,’’ see 5 Ga. L. Rev. 563 (1971). For comment on State Hwy. Dep’t v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d 372 (1966), discussing regulation of outdoor advertising and billboards as a constitutional ‘‘taking,’’ see 18 Mercer L. Rev. 499 (1967).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - The 1983 Constitution carried forward power exclusively in the counties and municipalities from former constitutional provisions; the Outdoor Advertising Act, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70, does not conflict with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. IV. Patrick v. Head, 262 Ga. 654, 424 S.E.2d 615 (1993). Owner had to be in compliance with then-existing ordinance. - Property owner did not have a vested right to erect a sign because the sign had not been erected in accordance with zoning regulations in force when the owner applied for the permit; accordingly, the owner’s failure to comply with the permit rendered the owner outside of the scope of protection afforded by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX,

Sec. II, Para. IV. Although the Outdoor Advertising Control Act, O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70, also afforded protections, such protection was again not applicable to the property owner because the owner had not erected the owner’s sign in compliance with the legal requirements of the existing ordinances; accordingly, the owner had no property rights in the sign. DeKalb County v. DRS Invs., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 225, 581 S.E.2d 573 (2003). Outdoor advertising. - O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70, in no uncertain terms, delegated the regulation of outdoor advertising to the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) as the statute provided in part that it was the intention of the General Assembly to provide a statutory basis

for the regulation of outdoor advertising, such basis to be consistent with the public policy relating to areas adjacent to roads of the state highway system, under § 32-6-70(a), and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-90 further authorized the DOT to promulgate regulations governing permits for outdoor advertising. Walker v. DOT, 279 Ga. App. 287, 630 S.E.2d 878 (2006). Signs inside the building. - After a company installed three signs inside the windows of a building, the superior court erred in concluding that the Georgia Outdoor Advertising Control Act (OACA),

O.C.G.A. § 32-6-70 et seq., regulated the company’s signs because the OACA regulated outdoor signs, and it was undisputed that the company’s signs were located inside the building, and the signs could not be characterized as outdoor signs. Monumedia II, LLC v. DOT, 343 Ga. App. 49, 806 S.E.2d 215 (2017). Cited in Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. DOT, 242 Ga. App. 835, 531 S.E.2d 719 (2000); Fulton County v. Action Outdoor Adver., JV, LLC, 289 Ga. 347, 711 S.E.2d 682 (2011).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Advertising, §§ 2, 7, 23, 24. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 324. Am. Jur. Proof of Facts. - Outdoor Advertising Sign or Billboard as Nuisance, 37 POF2d 141. ALR. - Nature and extent of right granted by contract for use of wall or roof for advertising purposes, 10 A.L.R. 1108; 119 A.L.R. 1523. Advertising rights on leased premises, 22 A.L.R. 800; 20 A.L.R.2d 940. Constitutional power to regulate outdoor and street car advertising, 79 A.L.R. 551.

Power of highway officer in respect of billboards or other conditions on adjoining property which are deemed dangerous to travel or offensive esthetically to travelers, 81 A.L.R. 1547. Validity and construction of statute or ordinance relating to distribution of advertising matter, 114 A.L.R. 1446. Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting the erection or maintenance of advertising structures within a specified distance of street or highway, 81 A.L.R.3d 564.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1984–2024 · leading case: Monumedia II, LLC v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 806 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Monumedia II, LLC v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 806 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4× “And one month later, the Georgia Department of Transportation ("DOT") similarly informed Monumedia that the signs violated the Georgia Outdoor Advertising Control Act ("OACA"), OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq. Monumedia challenged the City's decision before the Board of Zoning Adjustment…”
Walker v. Dep't of Transp., 630 S.E.2d 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “In addition, OCGA§ 32-6-70, in no uncertain terms, delegates the regulation of outdoor advertising to the DOT.”
Eagle West, LLC v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 720 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq. (Emphasis supplied.”
State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 732 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 4× “The State of Georgia appeals from a ruling of the trial court striking down as violative of the right to free speech under the Federal and Georgia Constitutions, a 1996 amendment to the Outdoor Advertising Control Act of 1971, OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq. In essence, the challenged…”
Garden Club of Georgia, Inc. v. Shackelford, 463 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. 1995). · cites it 4× “[7] OCGA § 32-6-70 (codifying 1967 Ga.Laws, p.”
Fulton Cnty. v. Action Outdoor Advert., Jv, LLC., 711 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. 2011). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq., the Georgia Outdoor Advertising Control Act.”
Patrick v. Head, 424 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. 1993). · cites it 12× “Patrick then leased the property to Adams Outdoor Advertising which applied to the DOT for a permit to construct the sign under the Outdoor Advertising Act, OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq. The DOT denied Adams’ application for a permit on the grounds that it did not comply with the 1984…”
Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. DOT, 531 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “7 OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq. 8 Dept. of Transp.”
DeKalb Cnty. v. DRS Investments, Inc., 581 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “18 There, the Supreme Court held that the Outdoor Advertising Control Act, OCGA § 32-6-70, was constitutional and could be applied retroactively to a billboard owner who had erected signs in violation of restrictions contained in a statute in effect when he received a permit.”
Dep't of Transp. v. Shiflett, 310 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. 1984). · cites it 2× “(Extraordinary Session); OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq. (Code Ann. § 95A-913 et seq.”
Whidby v. Mr. B's Food Mart, 356 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 3× “” OCGA § 32-6-70. The record in this case is wholly devoid of any evidence that Highway 96 in Houston County is part of the “primary systems of highways” mentioned in § 32-6-70 and defined in OCGA § 32-6-71 (16).”
Victory Media Grp., LLC v. Georgia Dep't of Transp. (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 8× “The Outdoor Advertising Control Act (OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq.) grants the GDOT the power to regulate outdoor advertising along Georgia’s roadways.”
Show all 13 citing cases →
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.