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2018 Georgia Code 32-6-75 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 32-6-75 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 32-6-75

TITLE 32 HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND FERRIES

Section 6. Regulation of Maintenance and Use of Public Roads Generally, 32-6-1 through 32-6-248.

ARTICLE 3 CONTROL OF SIGNS AND SIGNALS

32-6-75. Restrictions on outdoor advertising authorized by Code Sections 32-6-72 and 32-6-73; multiple message signs on interstate system, primary highways, and other highways.

  1. No sign authorized by paragraphs (4) through (6) of Code Section 32-6-72 and paragraph (4) of Code Section 32-6-73 shall be erected or maintained which:
    1. Advertises an activity that is illegal under Georgia or federal laws or regulations in effect at the location of such sign or at the location of such activity;
    2. Is obsolete;
    3. Is not structurally safe, clean, and in good repair;
    4. Is not securely affixed to a substantial structure which is permanently attached to the ground;
    5. Is attached to, drawn, or painted upon trees, rocks, or other natural features;
    6. Moves or has any moving or animated parts, except as expressly allowed under subsection (c) of this Code section;
    7. Emits or utilizes in any manner any sound capable of being detected on the main traveled way by a person with normal hearing;
    8. If illuminated, contains, includes, or is illuminated by any flashing, intermittent, or moving light or lights except those giving public service information such as time, date, temperature, weather, or other similar information except as expressly permitted under subsection (c) of this Code section. The illumination of mechanical multiple message signs is not illumination by flashing, intermittent, or moving light or lights, except that no multiple message sign may include any illumination which is flashing, intermittent, or moving when the sign is in a fixed position;
    9. If illuminated, is not effectively shielded so as to prevent beams or rays of light from being directed at any portion of the traveled way, which beams or rays are of such intensity or brilliance as to cause glare or to impair the vision of the driver of any motor vehicle or which otherwise interfere with the operation of a motor vehicle;
    10. If illuminated, is illuminated so that it obscures or interferes with the effectiveness of an official traffic sign, device, or signal;
    11. Contains an area, to be measured by the smallest square, rectangle, triangle, circle, or combination thereof, which encompasses the entire sign, in excess of 1,200 square feet or exceeding 30 feet in height or 60 feet in length, inclusive of any border and trim but excluding the base, apron, supports, and other structural members; provided, however, that, in counties having a population greater than 500,000 according to the United States decennial census for 1970 or any such future census, the maximum size of 1,200 square feet, the maximum height of 30 feet, and the maximum length of 60 feet may be exceeded, but in no event shall any such sign exceed 3,000 square feet; provided, further, that no such oversize signs shall be erected after July 1, 1973;
    12. Contains more than two faces visible from the same direction on the main traveled way; provided, however, that after July 1, 2006, no sign shall be erected that contains more than one face vertically stacked visible from the same direction on the main traveled way. Double-faced, back-to-back, and V-type constructed signs shall, for the purpose of determining compliance with size and spacing limitations, be considered as one sign;
    13. Is in an area not zoned for commercial or industrial activity and within 300 feet of a residence without the written consent of the owner;
    14. Is within 500 feet in any direction of a public park, public playground, public recreation area, public forest, scenic area, or cemetery; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 500 feet of a public park, public playground, public recreation area, public forest, scenic area, or cemetery when the sign is separated by buildings or other obstructions so that the sign located within the 500 foot zone is not visible from the public park, public playground, public recreation area, public forest, scenic area, or cemetery;
    15. Is located so as to obscure or otherwise interfere with the effectiveness of an official traffic sign, signal, or device;
    16. Is located so as to obscure or otherwise interfere with a motor vehicle operator's view of approaching, merging, or intersecting traffic;
    17. Is located adjacent to an interstate highway and which is within 500 feet of another sign on the same side of the highway; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 500 feet of another sign when the signs are separated by buildings or other obstructions so that only one sign face located within the 500 foot zone is visible from the interstate highway at any time;
    18. Is located outside of the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to an interstate highway within 500 feet of an interchange, intersection at grade, or safety rest area. The foregoing 500 foot zone shall be measured along the interstate highway from the point at which the pavement commences or ceases to widen at exits from or entrances to the main traveled way. In circumstances where both the exit and entrance ramps on one side of an interchange constitute continuous lanes of travel to the exit and entrance ramps of the adjacent interchange, this side of the interchange shall be treated as if no ramps exist and the foregoing 500 foot zone on this side of the interchange shall be measured from the survey centerline of the main traveled way and crossroad forming the interchange or intersecting road. In all circumstances where this definition conflicts with any agreement with the United States secretary of transportation pursuant to Code Section 32-6-87, said agreement shall be deemed to control for purposes of this Code section;
    19. Is located outside of the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to a highway on the primary system and which is within 300 feet of another sign on the same side of the highway; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 300 feet of another sign when the signs are separated by buildings or other obstructions so that only one sign face located within the 300 foot zone is visible from the primary system highway at any one time;
    20. Is located within the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to a highway on the primary system and which is within 100 feet of another sign on the same side of the highway; provided, however, that such sign may be located within 100 feet of another sign when the signs are separated by buildings or other obstructions so that only one sign face located within the 100 foot zone is visible from the primary system highway at any one time; or
    21. Depicts any material which is obscene as such term is defined in Code Section 16-12-80.
  2. Reserved.
    1. Multiple message signs shall be permitted on the interstate system, primary highways, and other highways under the following conditions:
      1. Each multiple message sign shall remain fixed for at least ten seconds;
      2. When a message is changed mechanically, it shall be accomplished in three seconds or less;
      3. No such multiple message sign shall be placed within 5,000 feet of another mechanical multiple message sign on the same side of the highway;
      4. Any such sign shall contain a default design that will freeze the sign in one position if a malfunction occurs;
      5. Any maximum size limitations shall apply independently to each side of a multiple message sign; and
      6. Nonmechanical electronic multiple message signs that are otherwise in compliance with this subsection and are illuminated entirely by the use of light emitting diodes, back lighting, or any other light source shall be permitted under the following circumstances:
        1. Each transitional change occurs within two seconds;
        2. If the department finds an electronic sign or any display or effect thereon to cause glare or to impair the vision of the driver of any motor vehicle or to otherwise interfere with the safe operation of a motor vehicle, then, upon the department's request, the owner of the sign shall promptly and within not more than 48 hours reduce the intensity of the sign to a level acceptable to the department; and
        3. The owner of any existing or nonconforming electronic sign shall have until October 31, 2006, to bring the electronic sign in compliance with this subparagraph and to request a permit from the department.
    2. If a multiple message sign on a primary highway or other highway is in violation of any of the above conditions, its permit shall be revoked and the sign shall be removed. During the appeal of any violations of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the sign shall remain fixed until the matter is resolved. The commissioner may allow the continued operation of a multiple message sign during part or all of the appeals process.
    3. After April 15, 1996, all persons, firms, or corporations who have signs that were illegal signs under previous law, but which are legal signs under the provisions of this subsection, shall have a one-year period during which time they shall be required to file an application for a permit issued by the department. Applications for such permits shall be made upon forms prescribed and provided by the department and shall contain the signature of the applicant and such other information as may be required by the department rules and regulations. The department shall have a period of 60 days from the date such an application is received to process it. If, at the end of this 60 day period, the department has failed to approve or deny an application in proper form, it shall be conclusively presumed for all purposes that the sign can be permitted and the department must issue the permit within a reasonable time. Should the department deny the application, the applicant may seek relief in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act." In cases where the applicant fails to exhaust the procedures prescribed by Chapter 13 of Title 50, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act," the department's denial of the permit request will be final and the sign shall then become an illegal sign as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71 and shall be subject to removal under the terms of this part. If the owner of the sign fails to apply properly for a permit and it is conclusively presumed that the sign has been abandoned, the sign shall remain an illegal sign as defined by paragraph (6) of Code Section 32-6-71 and the sign shall be subject to removal under the terms of this part.

(Ga. L. 1967, p. 423, §§ 3, 4, 6; Ga. L. 1971, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 4; Code 1933, § 95A-916, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 1422, §§ 25, 26, 27, 28, 30; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1017, § 4; Ga. L. 1996, p. 6, § 32; Ga. L. 1996, p. 831, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1052, § 3; Ga. L. 1998, p. 1132, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 691, §§ 3-6/HB 1097.)

Cross references.

- False advertising, § 10-1-420 et seq.

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1991, a comma was inserted following "flashing" in paragraph (a)(8).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, subsection (b), which was added by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1052, § 3, was redesignated as subsection (c) in view of the fact that Ga. L. 1996, p. 831 also enacted a subsection (b). As a result, the reference in paragraph (a)(6) to "subsection (b)" was changed to be a reference to "subsection (c)".

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, "April 15, 1996" was substituted for "the effective date of this subsection" in the first sentence of paragraph (c)(3).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2006, "until October 31, 2006," was substituted for "180 days from the effective date of this subparagraph" in division (c)(1)(F)(iii).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2006, p. 691, § 7/HB 1097, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of law on administrative law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2010). For annual survey on administrative law, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 39 (2012). For review of 1996 highways, bridges, and ferries legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 180 (1996).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75 is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech as the statute's absolute proscription against any form of off-site advertising impedes the free flow of information and far exceeds the state's legitimate interest in preventing hazards to the traveling public. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 270 Ga. 97, 507 S.E.2d 732 (1998).

Proscription in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75 of "any outdoor advertising of a commercial establishment where nudity is exhibited" is not narrowly tailored to achieve the statute's purpose of preventing hazards to the safety of the traveling public since the statute is not directed solely at provocative images, but prohibits even a worded sign advertising the location of a business. State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 270 Ga. 97, 507 S.E.2d 732 (1998).

Purpose.

- Purpose of this section is to regulate the impact of the signs on the driver along the interstate. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436, 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75).

Intent of the General Assembly is to protect the public traveling along the highway from distractions, aesthetic desecration, and nuisances, all associated with the proliferation of signs in a concentrated area along the highway. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436, 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

Minimization of distractions by signs in the area of an interchange is precisely the intent and purpose behind the blocked-out zone contemplated in paragraph (a)(18) of this section. Department of Transp. v. Spells Sign Co., 141 Ga. App. 350, 233 S.E.2d 435 (1977); National Adv. Co. v. Department of Transp., 149 Ga. App. 334, 254 S.E.2d 571 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75).

Measurement of distances under paragraph (a)(18).

- In requiring that all signs be located at least 500 feet apart, the legislative intent would require that the measurement be made along the highway. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436, 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

"Crow flies" method of measurement is not intended to apply to every statute omitting the method of measuring. Rather, each statute is to be construed individually in order to ascertain the method of measurement which best fulfills the legislative intent. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436, 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976).

Impact on motorist more important than exact interval between signs.

- Distance requirement in this section for separation of signs is aimed at the impact on the traveling motorist, not at the literal distance between each sign. Turner Communications Corp. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 139 Ga. App. 436, 228 S.E.2d 399 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75).

Paragraph (a)(18) applicable to "Y" and "half-diamond" interchanges.

- Prohibition on signs within 500 feet of intersecting highways also applies in cases where the interchange is a "Y" or "half-diamond" type and the sign is to be located on the "no ramp" side of the interchange. National Adv. Co. v. Department of Transp., 149 Ga. App. 334, 254 S.E.2d 571 (1979).

Proposed interchange project constituted an interchange.

- Although ground had not been broken on a proposed interchange as of the date an applicant submitted applications for permits for outdoor advertising signs, the Georgia Department of Transportation's denial of the applications comported with O.C.G.A. §§ 32-1-2,32-6-74(a), and32-6-75(a)(18) because the interchange project had progressed to a point such that it constituted an interchange for purposes of § 32-6-75(a)(18) and the proposed sign locations were within the 500-foot blocked out zone established by § 32-6-75(a)(18). Eagle West, LLC v. Ga. DOT, 312 Ga. App. 882, 720 S.E.2d 317 (2011).

Superior court failed to address basis for conclusions of the Georgia Department of Transportation.

- Judgment reversing a decision of the Georgia Department of Transportation overruling an administrative law judge's finding that one owner had a valid multiple message permit for its sign and that a second owner's application for a permit was properly denied was remanded because the superior court ignored the basis for the GDOT's conclusion and reviewed the ALJ's decision instead, and the findings and conclusions of the Deputy Commissioner of the GDOT pertaining to governmental restrictions on commercial speech did not properly address and resolve the issues; in its final agency decision, the Deputy Commissioner essentially sidestepped the issues the ALJ addressed and resolved and did not directly address the issue of whether, applying the applicable provisions and regulations, the first owner failed to make the necessary revisions to its sign, and the GDOT's conclusion that allowing the first owner to keep its permit would be unduly restrictive was arbitrary and capricious. Lamar Co., LLC v. Whiteway Neon-Ad, 303 Ga. App. 495, 693 S.E.2d 848 (2010).

Cited in Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. DOT, 242 Ga. App. 835, 531 S.E.2d 719 (2000); Lamar Co., L.L.C. v. City of Marietta, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2008).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Abandonment of outdoor advertising device.

- No outdoor advertising device in this state may be considered abandoned until there is an expression, either by judicial determination or some affirmative act on the part of the owner, that the owner of the device has relinquished all intent of ever again using the device. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-134.

Compensation for prohibited outdoor advertising device.

- Lawfully erected outdoor advertising device which could not be permitted on March 28, 1974, or a device which cannot now be permitted because of changed conditions beyond the control of the owner, is due compensation. However, this rule applies only in the situation wherein there was a lawfully erected outdoor advertising device and a second device was later erected and permitted in such proximity to the first that the first cannot now receive a permit because of the spacing requirements of this section. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-134 (see O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75).

Outdoor advertising sign facings.

- Four outdoor advertising sign facings can be permitted at a given location. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-124.

Consent required for erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising sign.

- Owners of all residences within 300 feet of outdoor advertising sign must first consent to the sign's erection and maintenance. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-124.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Advertising, §§ 23, 24.

C.J.S.

- 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, § 38.

ALR.

- Building regulations as applicable to billboards and similar structures, 60 A.L.R. 1158.

Constitutional power to regulate outdoor and street car advertising, 79 A.L.R. 551.

Validity and construction of provision prohibiting or regulating advertising sign overhanging street or sidewalk, 80 A.L.R.3d 687.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance restricting outdoor rate advertising by motels, motor courts, and the like, 80 A.L.R.3d 740.

Validity and construction of state or local regulation prohibiting off-premises advertising structures, 81 A.L.R.3d 486.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75

Total Results: 5  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Outdoor Advert. Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. Garden Club of Georgia, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 2000 | 272 Ga. 146, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 937

...Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Ray O. Lerer, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cathy Cox-Brakefield, Assistant Attorney General, for Shackelford and the Department of Transportation. *857 THOMPSON, Justice. In 1998, the General Assembly enacted OCGA §§ 32-6-75.1 through 32-6-75.3, governing the issuance of permits for trimming vegetation and trees on Georgia rights-of-way to facilitate the viewing of outdoor advertising signs....
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State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 732 (Ga. 1998).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 2, 1998 | 270 Ga. 97, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 3675, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1221

...The State of Georgia appeals from a ruling of the trial court striking down as violative of the right to free speech under the Federal and Georgia Constitutions, a 1996 amendment to the Outdoor Advertising Control Act of 1971, OCGA § 32-6-70 et seq. In essence, the challenged legislation, codified as OCGA § 32-6-75(b); Ga....
...For purposes of advertising its business, Cafe Erotica, through Sunshine Outdoors, contracted for the construction and maintenance of several outdoor billboards, which are located on property other than the site of Cafe Erotica. The parties acknowledge that, if enforced, OCGA § 32-6-75(b) could subject Cafe Erotica and Sunshine Outdoors to criminal prosecution for erecting and maintaining off-site outdoor advertising. Appellees brought an action to enjoin enforcement of OCGA § 32-6-75(b), and for a declaration that the legislation unconstitutionally limits free speech in violation of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and Art....
...948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); or (2) that the statute impermissibly restricts commercial speech under Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). The trial court determined that it need not address plaintiffs' content-based argument because OCGA § 32-6-75(b) impermissibly infringed upon the right of free speech under the less-exacting test of Central Hudson Gas....
...Accordingly, the court permanently enjoined the statute's enforcement. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. Outdoor advertising within areas in specified proximity to the state highway system is restricted by the provisions of OCGA § 32-6-72. The addition of OCGA § 32-6-75(b) in 1996 sets out further restrictions on those previous limitations....
...may divert the attention of drivers and thus cause traffic hazards, it *734 is the intent of the General Assembly to protect the welfare and safety of the residents of this state and the traveling public by regulating outdoor advertising of commercial establishments where nudity is exhibited. [1] OCGA § 32-6-75(b)(1) defines "nudity," as the term is used in the statute. The substantive restrictions are contained in OCGA § 32-6-75(b)(3): (3) Any outdoor advertising of a commercial establishment where nudity is exhibited shall be limited to the property where such commercial establishment is located, and the size, type, and number of outdoor advertising devices on an...
...the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id., 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343. Accord Department of Transp. v. Shiflett, 251 Ga. 873, 874(1), 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984). Since OCGA § 32-6-75(b) applies to commercial advertising, as opposed to ideological or expressive speech, the Central Hudson Gas test is applicable: (a) The State acknowledges that the activity conducted at Cafe Erotica is lawful, and there is no claim that the desired advertising is misleading. (b) The governmental purpose in enacting the legislation is stated at OCGA § 32-6-75(b)(2)—advertising of nude entertainment establishments "may mislead the traveling public," cause "a devaluation of the [surrounding] property," and create "traffic hazards" by "divert[ing] the attention of drivers." As the State shows, an...
...son Gas —whether the complete suppression of off-site outdoor advertising of commercial establishments where nudity is exhibited is more extensive than necessary to achieve the State's asserted objectives. In this regard the State submits that OCGA § 32-6-75(b) is narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose in that it does not seek to ban all outdoor advertising, and allows for other advertising media. We do not read the restriction in that manner. By restricting " [a]ny outdoor advertising of a commercial establishment where nudity is exhibited," OCGA § 32-6-75(b)(3) has gone further than necessary in seeking to meet its ends....
...ell informed. To this end the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. Because the absolute proscription against any form of off-site advertising impedes the free flow of information and far exceeds the State's legitimate interest, OCGA § 32-6-75(b) is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment and the Georgia Bill of Rights. Although the trial court did not deem it necessary to reach the final criterion of Central Hudson Gas, the court was correct in enjoining enforcement of OCGA § 32-6-75(b)....
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Garden Club v. Shackelford, 274 Ga. 653 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 25, 2002 | 560 S.E.2d 522, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 586

...The issue in this appeal is whether the statute and regulations providing for the removal of public property to permit the viewing of outdoor advertising signs on private property violate the gratuities clause of the Georgia Constitution.1 We affirm the trial court’s holding that OCGA § 32-6-75.3 is constitutional because the statute provides a substantial benefit to the state through the information given to the traveling public on billboards and through the payment of the value of the trees removed....
...Because DOT failed to comply with the statute’s procedural requirements, however, we are unable to address the constitutionality of the regulations. Instead, we hold that the regulations are invalid based on DOT’s failure to consult with the Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Council as required by OCGA § 32-6-75.1. In Garden Club of Georgia v. Shackelford,2 this Court invalidated the Department of Transportation’s rules allowing the trimming of trees and vegetation on the highway rights-of-way. In response, the Georgia General Assembly enacted new statutory provisions, OCGA §§ 32-6-75.1 to 32-6-75.3....
...te billboard advertising. In direct response, the Georgia General Assembly declared in the 1998 act that “outdoor advertising provides a substantial service and benefit to Georgia and Georgia’s citizens as well as the traveling public.”5 OCGA § 32-6-75.3 (a) (2) states that it is in the public interest for outdoor advertising signs to be visible to provide information regarding places offering lodging, food, motor vehicle fuels, and any other service or product available to the general public....
...t, this Court’s responsibility is to decide whether the new statutory provisions provide a benefit to the public that is sufficiently substantial to avoid being an unconstitutional gratuity. After reviewing the legislative scheme outlined in OCGA § 32-6-75.3, we conclude that the statute does not violate the gratuities clause of the Georgia Constitution....
...The general rule is that a court will not consider a constitutional challenge if there is a non-constitutional basis for resolving the case.10 We do not address the constitutionality of the regulations in this appeal because the DOT violated mandatory procedures in promulgating the rules. OCGA § 32-6-75.1 provides for a 12-member Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Council to assist the DOT in formulating policies and resolving problems related to the vegetation removal program....
...romulgated its regulations without waiting for the appointment of the advisory council specified by the legislature. Because the DOT failed to involve the Roadside Enhancement and Beautification Council in the rulemak-ing process as required by OCGA § 32-6-75.1, we conclude that the regulations were not validly promulgated under the statute....
...Garden Club, 272 Ga. 146 (527 SE2d 856) (2000). See Swanberg v. City of Tybee Island, 271 Ga. 23 (518 SE2d 114) (1999); Haggard v. Board of Regents, 257 Ga. 524 (360 SE2d 566) (1987); Smith v. Board of Commissioners, 244 Ga. 133 (259 SE2d 74) (1979). OCGA § 32-6-75.3 (a) (2). See David C....
...393 (330 SE2d 348) (1985) (deferring to legislative judgment in enacting sentencing scheme). See Board of Tax Assessors v. Tom’s Foods, 264 Ga. 309 (444 SE2d 771) (1994); Georgia Board of Dentistry v. Brooks, 273 Ga. 852 (548 SE2d 284) (2001). See OCGA § 32-6-75.1 (b) (1), (2), (3), and (6). See OCGA §§ 32-6-90; 50-13-2 (6) (f).
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City of Columbus v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 292 Ga. 878 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 6, 2013 | 742 S.E.2d 728, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 1603

Melton, Justice. This is the third appearance of this statutory matter before this Court. This appeal, as did the prior two, revolves around the constitutionality of OCGA § 32-6-75.3, which allows vegetation, including trees, to be removed in order to facilitate billboard advertising under specific circumstances and with remuneration to the State for removed trees....
...24 (463 SE2d 470) (1995) (Garden Club I), we later found the statute to be constitutional after it was amended by the Legislature to indicate that “outdoor advertising provides a substantial service and benefit to Georgia and Georgia’s citizens as well as the traveling public.” OCGA § 32-6-75.3 (a) (2)....
...s, Gateways Foundation, Inc., and Trees Columbus, Inc., to applications for vegetation maintenance permits submitted by CBS Outdoor, Inc., to the Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT”). In2011,the Legislature passedHB 179,whichamends OCGA § 32-6-75.3 by enlarging the “viewing zone” that an advertiser may clear around a billboard and altered the number and type of trees which may be removed. Billboard owners are now precluded under OCGA § 32-6-75.3 (e) (3) (D) from cutting trees in front of signs only when the targeted *879vegetation is a landmark, historic or specimen tree, or “part of a permitted local, state, or federal beautification proj ect” planted before July 1,2011....
...T approval but which plans or documents may no longer be available. In July 2012, the Superior Court granted in part, and denied in part, the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment, finding: (1) the vegetation maintenance program of OCGA § 32-6-75.3 and the accompanying valuations set forth in the MOG were constitutional and, therefore, summary judgment should be granted to CBS Outdoor with regard to Columbus’s claims that these laws violated the gratuities clause, the trustee cla...
...qual protection and requiring the continuance of a statewide injunction on granting any new vegetation removal permits. These rulings generated three appeals. In Case No. S13A0079, Columbus argues that the trial court erred by determining that OCGA § 32-6-75.3 and the valuation methods employed in the MOG are constitutional....
...For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s rulings in Case Nos. S13A0079 and Si3X0080, but, in Case No. S13X0081, we reverse the trial court’s determination that the take-down credits violate the gratuities clause. Case No. S13A0079 Columbus contends that OCGA § 32-6-75.3 violates three constitutional provisions: the gratuities clause, the trustee clause, and the due process clause of the state constitution....
...e public that is sufficiently substantial to avoid being an unconstitutional gratuity. (Footnote omitted.) Garden Club II, supra, 274 Ga. at 655 (1). Based on this standard of review, we held: After reviewing the legislative scheme outlined in OCGA § 32-6-75.3, we conclude that the statute does not violate the gratuities clause of the Georgia Constitution....
...value trees cut down by billboard advertisers. As a result, Columbus contends that GDOT has failed, as trustee of Georgia citizens, to receive full compensation for trees that it allows billboard owners to remove. The trial court found *882that OCGA § 32-6-75.3 does not violate the trustee clause of the Georgia constitution, which provides: “Public officers are the trustees and servants of the people and are at all times amenable to them.” Ga....
...the public; therefore, as the trial court found, the trustee clause is not applicable to the facts of this case. Finally, with regard to due process, the appellants other than the City of Columbus contend that the statutory scheme set forth in OCGA § 32-6-75.3 is unconstitutionally vague because “permitted beautification project” is inadequately defined.1 “ ‘To withstand an attack of vagueness or indefiniteness, a civil statute must provide fair notice to those to whom the statute is...
...uld obtain enough evidence to determine whether the pre-existing beautification project located in the City of Columbus qualified as a “permittedbeautification project” and whether Columbus’s right to equal protection had been violated by OCGA § 32-6-75.3 and the MOG....
...iscretion. [Cit.]” Hampton Island Founders v. Liberty Capital, 283 Ga. 289, 292 (1) (658 SE2d 619) (2008). Because the trial court’s decision on Columbus’s equal protection claim has the potential of affecting the statewide application of OCGA § 32-6-75.3, we cannot say that, under the specific facts and posture of this case, the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. Case No. S13X0081 OCGA § 32-6-75.3 (j) allows billboard owners to obtain a credit against the appraised value of cut trees by taking down old billboards....
...et al. Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, C. Edward Dobbs, Rebeccah L. Bower, Troutman Sanders, Arthur H. Domby, amici curiae. The trial court determined that these take-down credits violated the gratuities clause of the state constitution. We find that OCGA § 32-6-75.3 (j) does not violate the gratuities clause....
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Victory Media Grp., LLC v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 319 Ga. 16 (Ga. 2024).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 16, 2024

...The Department approved Victory Media’s application but later revoked the permit because another sign, which was already established pursuant to a permit, was located less than 5,000 feet from the requested location for Victory Media’s multiple message sign. See OCGA § 32-6-75 (c) (1) (C) (“No ....
...See, e.g., OCGA § 32-6-71 (defining among other things categories of signs referenced in the Act); OCGA § 32-6-72 (limiting outdoor advertising visible from the main traveled way of the state’s interstate or primary highways to specific categories of signs); OCGA § 32-6-75 (a) (establishing additional conditions associated with certain categories of permissible signs); Ga....
...672-6-.03 (requiring a permit before the construction of certain categories of signs). But none of those provisions were actually enforced against Victory Media. Instead, Victory Media’s permit was revoked because 8 OCGA § 32-6-75 (c) (1) (C) directs that “[n]o ....