Omitted form paragraphs serve to explain intent of parties.

- Omitted form paragraphs are parts of a written document and serve to explain the intent of the parties, just as typewritten or handwritten statements serve to clarify or to change the sense of printed paragraphs. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 454 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 916, 92 S. Ct. 2440, 32 L. Ed. 2d 691 (1972).

Contract law controls over parties' motives.

- Insurance is a matter of contract and it is contract law rather than the underlying motives of the contracting parties that is ultimately controlling. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. London, 180 Ga. App. 198, 348 S.E.2d 580 (1986).

Insurance contracts governed by same rules of construction as other contracts.

- Insurance contracts are governed by the same rules of construction or interpretation for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties as apply to other contracts. Genone v. Citizens Ins. Co., 207 Ga. 83, 60 S.E.2d 125 (1950); Kytle v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 109, 195 S.E.2d 787 (1973).

Insurance policy is a contract and has the same attributes and requirements as any other contract. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. King, 174 Ga. App. 716, 331 S.E.2d 41 (1985).

Construction of insurance contract is, like any contract, ordinarily a matter for the court. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Renew, 121 Ga. App. 883, 176 S.E.2d 103 (1970).

Contract of insurance as a whole must be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hutto, 115 Ga. App. 164, 154 S.E.2d 375 (1967).

Court must interpret an insurance policy in the policy's entirety, including any amplification, extension, or modification by a rider or endorsement. B.L. Ivey Constr. Co. v. Pilot Fire & Cas. Co., 295 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Ga. 1968).

Contract must be viewed as a whole and in light of usual rules of construction of contracts generally. National Hills Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 551 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1977).

Court cannot construe policy so as to create or avoid liability.

- It is the function of the court to construe a contract of insurance as the contract is written, and the court by construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer, nor make a new contract for the parties, nor one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to the contract either to create or avoid liability. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 94 Ga. App. 394, 94 S.E.2d 765 (1956).

When parties to a business transaction mutually agree that insurance will be provided as a part of the bargain, such agreement must be construed as providing mutual exculpation to the bargaining parties who must be deemed to have agreed to look solely to the insurance in the event of loss and not to liability on the part of the opposing party. Turner v. Clark & Clark, 158 Ga. App. 79, 279 S.E.2d 323 (1981).

When there is a conflict between endorsement and policy, terms of endorsement must apply, for it is a general principle of wide application in Georgia that when an endorsement or rider and a policy conflict, the former controls the latter, since it is a later expression of intent. B.L. Ivey Constr. Co. v. Pilot Fire & Cas. Co., 295 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Ga. 1968).

Court's role in interpreting pollution policy exclusion.

- In an action brought by a lessor against a former lessee, a dry cleaning corporation, for indemnification for remediation expenses incurred in cleaning up the contaminated shopping center property vacated by the lessee, the trial court properly refused to examine a Pollution Liability Exclusion Endorsement in a vacuum and, rather, considered that language in concert with other policy language addressing coverage of property damage arising out of the discharge of pollutants and thereby found that an umbrella policy provided coverage for quick, abrupt, and accidental discharges of pollutants. The trial court properly determined that the inconsistent language of the Pollution Liability Exclusion and an Amendatory Endorsement were ambiguous as the Amendatory Endorsement narrowed the scope of Pollution Liability Exclusion by exempting from it discharges that were quick, abrupt, and accidental; but the Pollution Liability Exclusion Endorsement broadened the scope of Exclusion by extending the exclusion to any discharge. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Walnut Ave. Partners, LLC, 296 Ga. App. 648, 675 S.E.2d 534 (2009).

Application for insurance becomes part of insurance contract itself when the application is attached to the policy of insurance. West v. Rudd, 242 Ga. 393, 249 S.E.2d 76 (1978).

When an application for insurance is attached to or made part of an insurance contract by reference, the contract must be construed according to the terms contained therein as amplified, extended, or modified by the application. West v. Rudd, 242 Ga. 393, 249 S.E.2d 76 (1978).

Beneficiary named in application controls over omission of any beneficiary in policy.

- When an application for a policy of life insurance designates a named person as the beneficiary of the policy, and a policy is issued which does not contain the name of any beneficiary, the person named in the application is to be treated as the beneficiary of the contract. West v. Rudd, 242 Ga. 393, 249 S.E.2d 76 (1978).

"Duplicate" insurance policy rendered the original contract of insurance void, and evidence showed that it was the intent of both parties to include the same table of guaranteed values found in the original policy within the terms of the "new" policy. Brannen v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 201 Ga. App. 241, 410 S.E.2d 763 (1991).

Cited in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534 (1963); Wells v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 826, 131 S.E.2d 634 (1963); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240, 138 S.E.2d 310 (1964); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, 111 Ga. App. 98, 140 S.E.2d 505 (1965); Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 572, 148 S.E.2d 925 (1966); Morris v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 114 Ga. App. 517, 151 S.E.2d 813 (1966); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 127 Ga. App. 352, 193 S.E.2d 173 (1972); Hawkins Iron & Metal Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 462, 196 S.E.2d 903 (1973); Blue Cross of Georgia/Atlanta, Inc. v. Grenwald, 148 Ga. App. 486, 251 S.E.2d 585 (1978); Dunham v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 176 Ga. App. 263, 335 S.E.2d 666 (1985); S & T Timber, Inc. v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 198 Ga. App. 18, 400 S.E.2d 379 (1990); McMillon v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App. 378, 433 S.E.2d 429 (1993); Canal Indem. Co. v. E.M.C. Motors, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 84, 488 S.E.2d 126 (1997); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 242 Ga. App. 531, 530 S.E.2d 229 (2000); Gentry Mach. Works, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Ga. 2008).

"The insured" defined.

- Meaning of "the insured" as such term is used in the employee exclusion provision of an insurance policy, see Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ga. 1982).

"Relative" defined.

- When the insured and the insured's spouse had a child living when the spouse died, the relationship created by affinity in marriage between the insured and the insured's spouse's sibling survived the spouse's death; thus, the sibling, who resided in the insured's home, remained a "relative" of the insured for purposes of the insured's auto insurance contract. Rutledge v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 249 Ga. App. 361, 548 S.E.2d 86 (2001).

"Business auto policy" may be, in effect, "personal" policy.

- By including an endorsement in a "business auto" policy issued to an "individual" business which provides that, if the named insured is an individual, the words "named insured" include the named insured's spouse if a resident of the same household, the intent is to make what would otherwise be a "business auto policy" issued to an "individual" business in effect a "personal" policy for at least some coverages afforded thereunder. Purcell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 863, 310 S.E.2d 530 (1983).

Words in business liability policy to be given ordinary meaning.

- Under a business liability policy, the parties are presumed to have in contemplation the nature and character of the business, and to have foreseen the usual course and manner of conducting the business; thus, in construing a policy of insurance so as to arrive at the true intention of the parties, the ordinary legal and literal meaning of the words must be given effect when it is possible to do so without destroying the substantial purpose and effect of the contract. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Nix, 644 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1981).

Bad faith not found.

- Trial court erred by denying a title company's motion for summary judgment on a lender's claim for coverage under the title insurance policy and for bad faith damages because the policy stated that the title company was liable for the lesser amount of the difference between the value of the insured estate and the value of the insured estate subject to the defect insured against, thus, since the lender received more in the foreclosure sale than the value, the title company was liable for zero. Doss & Assocs. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 325 Ga. App. 448, 754 S.E.2d 85 (2013).

Policies generally to be construed in favor of insured.

- While a contract of insurance should be construed so as to carry out the true intention of the parties, policies of insurance will be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished, and provisions therein will be strictly construed against the insurer; and if a policy or contract of insurance is fairly susceptible of more than one construction, the interpretation most favorable to the insured will be given effect. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 54 Ga. App. 830, 189 S.E. 369 (1936); McLendon v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 557, 31 S.E.2d 429 (1944); Hulsey v. Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co., 207 Ga. 167, 60 S.E.2d 353 (1950); Gill v. Federal Life & Cas. Co., 86 Ga. App. 455, 71 S.E.2d 683 (1952); North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Mercer, 211 Ga. 161, 84 S.E.2d 570 (1954); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 94 Ga. App. 394, 94 S.E.2d 765 (1956); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hulsey, 109 Ga. App. 169, 135 S.E.2d 494, rev'd on other grounds, 220 Ga. 240, 138 S.E.2d 692 (1964); Float-Away Door Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 372 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 823, 88 S. Ct. 58, 19 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1967); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Columbus-Muscogee Aviation, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 742, 204 S.E.2d 474 (1974); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 133 Ga. App. 567, 211 S.E.2d 783 (1974); Lester v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 138 Ga. App. 353, 226 S.E.2d 149 (1976); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Gwinnett Furn. Mart, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 444, 226 S.E.2d 283 (1976).

It is a cardinal principle of insurance law that a policy or contract of insurance is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly as against the insurer since the policies are prepared by the company's experts and legal advisers acting in the interest of the company, and the insured has no voice in the selection and arrangement of the words employed. Kytle v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 109, 195 S.E.2d 787 (1973).

When the language of the insurance policy is ambiguous, the policy must be construed most strongly against the insurer and in favor of the insured, the policy having been issued for the purpose intended. Hutsell v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 157 Ga. App. 845, 278 S.E.2d 730 (1981).

Insurer is presumed to have intended that the clause most favorable to the insured be effective or else the insurer would not have inserted the clause in the policy the insurer issued, and the insured is presumed to have chosen and intended to accept that which is most favorable to the insured; there being a conflict in the policy as written and amended or endorsed, an issue of material fact remains for determination as to the coverage and as to the intentions of the parties with reference to the contract of insurance. Hutsell v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 157 Ga. App. 845, 278 S.E.2d 730 (1981).

Construction in favor of insured must not be unreasonable or strained.

- Since insurance policies are contracts of adhesion penned by the insurer, when ambiguity is present, construction of the policy is in favor of the insured, although the construction must not be unreasonable or strained. Imperial Enters., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1976).

While an ambiguous insurance contract will be liberally construed in favor of the insured, one which, when construed reasonably and in the contract's entirety, unambiguously and lawfully limits the insurer's liability cannot be expanded beyond what is fairly within the contract's plain terms. City of Albany v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 594, 234 S.E.2d 109 (1977); National Hills Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 551 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1977).

Insurance policies are construed so as to avoid forfeitures. Imperial Enters., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1976).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 275.

C.J.S.

- 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 583.

ALR.

- Pro rata provisions of insurance policy as affected by insolvency or receivership of other insurer or invalidity of other policy, 56 A.L.R. 472.

Constitutionality of compulsory arbitration or appraisal provision of standard policy, 77 A.L.R. 619.

When one deemed to have attained or passed age specified in insurance policy, 84 A.L.R. 389.

Custom or practice as regards duration of insurance risk as supplying omission in written policy in that regard, 85 A.L.R. 1334.

Election or request contemplated by policy as condition of right, option, or benefit extended thereby as predicable upon language or content of the application, 108 A.L.R. 882.

Election of option under insurance policy where person otherwise entitled to make it is dead, incompetent, or an infant, 112 A.L.R. 1063; 127 A.L.R. 454; 136 A.L.R. 1045.

Right of insured or beneficiary to enforce a policy provision more favorable to him than the standard policy; or to have policy reformed so as to include such a provision, 113 A.L.R. 773.

Kind of insurance or insurer contemplated by provision in policy of life, health, or accident insurance, or by a question in application therefor, in regard to other or additional insured or prior application therefor, 119 A.L.R. 765.

Right of insurer to reformation of policy or other relief because of its own error, not due to misrepresentation by insured, in computing premiums, indemnity, or other benefits or options under policy, 125 A.L.R. 1058.

Conflict of laws as regards effect of divorce, or other change in the relation of insured and beneficiary, upon rights beneficiary under insurance policy, 125 A.L.R. 1287.

Unsigned riders or slips physically attached to policy, or unsigned endorsements on policy, as part of insurance contract, 128 A.L.R. 1034.

Validity and enforceability of agreement, between insurer and beneficiary of insurance electing to leave proceeds in insurer's hands, as to ultimate disposition of proceeds, 138 A.L.R. 1483.

Mutual rescission, waiver, ratification, or estoppel, as regards insurer's attempt to rescind policy of insurance or particular provisions thereof, 152 A.L.R. 95.

Extension or other subsequent agreement as affected by provision of policy or statute (or qualification thereof) that policy, together with the application if endorsed thereon or attached thereto, shall constitute or shall contain the entire contract, 152 A.L.R. 384.

Full faith and credit provision as affecting insurance contract, 173 A.L.R. 1138.

Fraud or misrepresentation by insured's agent after loss as within provision avoiding policy for fraud or attempted fraud of insured, 24 A.L.R.2d 1220.

Insurer's admission of liability, offers of settlement, negotiations, and the like, as waiver of, or estoppel to assert, contractual limitation provision, 29 A.L.R.2d 636.

Doctrine of estoppel or waiver as available to bring within coverage of insurance policy risks not covered by its terms or expressly excluded therefrom, 1 A.L.R.3d 1139.

Choice of law in construction of insurance policy originally governed by law of one state as affected by modification, renewal, exchange, replacement, or reinstatement in different state, 3 A.L.R.3d 646.

Construction of express insurance policy provision restricting insurer's right to cancel or otherwise terminate coverage, 19 A.L.R.3d 1429.

Notice or proof of loss under one policy as notice or proof of loss under another provision of same policy or another policy issued by same insurer, 29 A.L.R.3d 856.

Who is "employed or engaged in the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of liability policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261.

Liability insurance: what is "claim" under deductibility-per-claim clause, 60 A.L.R.4th 983.

Construction and effect of "rain insurance" policies insuring against rainfall on the date of concert, exhibition, game, or the like, 70 A.L.R.4th 1010.

Who is an "executive officer" of insured within meaning of liability insurance policy, 1 A.L.R.5th 132.