Subsection (b) inapplicable when binder ratified by issuance of policy at later date.

- Subsection (b) of this section does not apply when binder is ratified by issuance of a policy at a later date. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 138 Ga. App. 582, 227 S.E.2d 77 (1976).

Binder has much the same effect as policy and may be canceled in accordance with this section. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 126 Ga. App. 215, 190 S.E.2d 447 (1972).

Binder may be either oral or written.

- In general, contracts for insurance must be in writing and may not be partially parol. A binder or other contract for temporary insurance is an exception to this general rule and may be either oral or written. Thomas v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 267, 308 S.E.2d 609 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 259, 312 S.E.2d 333 (1984).

Oral orders by insured for change of coverage are in the nature of a binder and enforceable. Canal Ins. Co. v. Aldrich, 489 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ga. 1980).

Binder must be a contract in praesenti and actual payment of premium is not a condition precedent to its validity. Greene v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 136 Ga. App. 346, 221 S.E.2d 479 (1975).

Premium payment as condition precedent to coverage under binder.

- When the insurance application stated that the payment of the premium installment was a condition precedent to the existence of coverage and stated the intent of the insurance company that if premium remittance was dishonored no coverage of any type would exist, when check sent as remittance for the premium payment was dishonored, there was a total failure of consideration for the binder and the contract was null and void. McDuffie v. Criterion Cas. Co., 214 Ga. App. 818, 449 S.E.2d 133 (1994).

Language or conduct necessary to create the contract is simply that which is enough to show that there has been a meeting of the minds. Ray v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Ga. App. 776, 337 S.E.2d 779 (1985).

Purpose and effect of binder.

- Binder issued on an application for insurance is a mere memorandum of the most important terms of a preliminary contract of insurance, intended to give temporary protection pending the investigation of the risk by the insurer, or until the issuance of a formal policy. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 139 Ga. App. 80, 227 S.E.2d 771 (1976).

Insurance binder analysis.

- Under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-33, the analysis of an insurance binder proceeds as follows: If clear and express terms have been agreed upon, they must be considered as controlling over the usual policy provisions. If there are no clear and express terms agreed upon, the usual policy provisions must be considered as controlling, together with any applicable endorsement that is specified in the binder. If there are no applicable endorsements specified in the binder, the usual policy provisions must be considered to be controlling. International Indem. Co. v. McKeever, 174 Ga. App. 871, 331 S.E.2d 909 (1985).

Expiration of binder results in no coverage.

- When construction company did not intend to have insurance with defendant insurer after the expiration of the binder coverage and when the accident occurred afterwards, there was no error in granting summary judgment to defendant insurer on the claim by plaintiff insurer for contribution. Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Ragan Ins. Agency, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 690, 442 S.E.2d 871 (1994).

Fixing of effective date of policy by parties.

- Time when an insurance policy shall become effective is an essential element of the contract, and parties may fix a future date upon which the contract shall become effective. Rowell v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 109 Ga. App. 631, 136 S.E.2d 917 (1964).

No apparent authority existed.

- Grant of summary judgment to an insurance company and an underwriter was affirmed in a case asserting the bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim because the tree service company owner failed to bring forth evidence that the agent had the apparent authority to bind the insurance company or the underwriter to an insurance policy and the payment was not received by the deadline, therefore, there was no coverage under the binder issued. Popham v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 340 Ga. App. 603, 798 S.E.2d 257 (2017).

Effective date of a contract for temporary insurance is the time fixed in the contract for the commencement of the risk as opposed to the date upon which the contract is executed or issued. Rowell v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 109 Ga. App. 631, 136 S.E.2d 917 (1964).

Terms of policy supersede temporary binder coverage.

- Fact that the policy application specified a slightly different expiration time than did the policy was irrelevant in determining whether the policy had expired at the time of an accident since the policy superseded any temporary binder of coverage which may have existed by virtue of the application. Green v. Progressive Ins. Co., 196 Ga. App. 733, 397 S.E.2d 20 (1990).

Temporary policy expired by date of collision.

- When no formal written policy was ever issued to the decedent and the collision occurred more than 90 days after the date that the decedent's temporary policy of insurance became effective, the temporary policy had expired by the policy's own terms by the time the collision occurred. Jourdan v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am., 203 Ga. App. 155, 416 S.E.2d 162 (1992).

Section nullifies rule prohibiting parol renewal of policy.

- This section, in effect and as a practical matter, overrides or nullifies the principle of law which prohibits the parol renewal of a policy of insurance. Rowell v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 109 Ga. App. 631, 136 S.E.2d 917 (1964).

Conduct of agent.

- Insurance agent's conduct, including the agent's acceptance of a premium check, coupled with the parties' past dealings, was sufficient evidence to foreclose summary judgment as to whether a binder for temporary protection had been created. Parks v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 26, 497 S.E.2d 575 (1998).

Agent not automatically clothed with power to issue valid oral binder.

- Even if the acts of a party are such as to bring the party within the statutory definition of an agent, this would not automatically clothe the party with the power to issue a valid oral binder as recognized under subsection (a) of this section. Southeastern Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 861, 165 S.E.2d 887 (1968).

Allegation of issuance of oral binder by insurer's agent sufficient.

- Allegation in petition that an agent of the defendant insurer by oral agreement issued an oral binder obligating the principal on a contract of insurance is sufficient against demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 114 Ga. App. 623, 152 S.E.2d 609 (1966).

Presumption of kind and amount of insurance requested inferred from prior dealings.

- It is clear that even such terms as amount of premium and kind and limits of insurance may be inferred from the course of dealing between the parties, and when a broker is accustomed to "insuring" the owner's automobiles, it may be presumed that a request for insurance means insurance of the kind and amount habitually purchased. Greene v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 136 Ga. App. 346, 221 S.E.2d 479 (1975).

Negligent failure to secure written policy may give rise to liability.

- Even if a binder expires before the injury of the type which would have been covered occurs, the insurer may still be liable in negligence for the damages if the insurer's agent fails to secure the written policy after having promised to do so, and the insured, reasonably relying on such promise and refraining from obtaining insurance elsewhere, sustains injury of the type against which the insured would have been insured if the policy had been properly issued. Ray v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Ga. App. 776, 337 S.E.2d 779 (1985).

Binder contained no ambiguity.

- Carrier properly applied a coinsurance penalty clause and refused to pay plaintiff insured's claim for damaged tanks and buildings in full because neither the insurance binder, pursuant to O.C.G.A § 33-24-33(a), nor the signed insurance application contained any qualifying language specifying how many tanks, or which tanks, were insured; the meaning of the term "tanks" was plain and obvious. Asphalt Ref. & Tech. Co., LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011)(Unpublished).

Question regarding terms of binder.

- Trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the insured on the insured's breach of contract claim because a question of fact remained regarding whether the insurance coverage on the insured's other properties provided coverage for property losses due to theft and, thus, whether such coverage was available for the subject property, for which only a binder had been issued at the time of the theft. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. T & G Enters., 324 Ga. App. 445, 751 S.E.2d 99 (2013).

Cited in Bryant v. Motors Ins. Corp., 109 Ga. App. 47, 134 S.E.2d 905 (1964); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Westbrook, 112 Ga. App. 137, 144 S.E.2d 199 (1965); Sasser v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 17, 147 S.E.2d 5 (1966); Posey v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 531, 154 S.E.2d 745 (1967); Parris & Son v. Campbell, 128 Ga. App. 165, 196 S.E.2d 334 (1973); Speir Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Lee, 158 Ga. App. 512, 281 S.E.2d 279 (1981); Guthrie v. GMAC, 172 Ga. App. 260, 322 S.E.2d 752 (1984); Bedgood v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 191 Ga. App. 644, 382 S.E.2d 421 (1989); Moore v. Nebb, 200 Ga. App. 242, 407 S.E.2d 411 (1991); Parks v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 238 Ga. App. 814, 520 S.E.2d 494 (1999).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 219.

ALR.

- Binding effect of application not signed by insured, 91 A.L.R. 1127.

Periodical payment for which insurer is bound during life of insured or other specified period as apportionable in respect to time, 135 A.L.R. 876.

Temporary automobile insurance pending issuance of policy, 12 A.L.R.3d 1304.

Temporary fire, wind, or hail insurance pending issuance of policy, 14 A.L.R.3d 568.