O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Upon the death of or termination of the marital relationship of a named insured under a personal lines policy of insurance covering a private passenger motor vehicle, a spouse of said named insured who was covered under said policy of insurance immediately prior to the death or termination of the marital relationship shall upon notice to the insurer or agent of the insurer continue to be covered under said policy for a period of 90 days following such death or termination of marital relationship or until the expiration of the policy term, whichever is shorter. Every personal lines policy of insurance covering a private passenger motor vehicle shall contain a provision providing the coverage required by this Code section; and in the absence of such a provision in such a policy the policy shall be deemed to contain such a provision.
History
Code 1981, § 33-34-7, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 1.12.
Annotations
Law reviews. - For annual survey on
insurance, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 179 (2009).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Cited in Green v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 206 Ga. App. 478, 426 S.E.2d 3 (1992). RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - What constitutes bad faith on part of insurer rendering it liable for statutory penalty imposed for bad faith in failure to pay, or delay in paying, insured’s
claim - Particular grounds for denial of claim: risks, causes, and extent of loss, injury, disability, or death, 123 A.L.R.5th 259.
Notes of Decisions
Johnson v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins., 338 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 20× “OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) provides for the payment of basic nofault benefits without regard to fault for economic loss resulting from "(3) Accidental bodily injury sustained by any other person as a result of being struck by the owner's motor vehicle while a pedestrian in this state.”
Cole v. New Hampshire Ins., 373 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 15× “Cole contends she is entitled to coverage pursuant to OCGA §§ 33-34-7 and 33-34-2 (1) (5) (8) and (9) concerning payment of no-fault benefits, and under coverage of her insurance policy, which closely tracks the language of the statutes.”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Holmes, 333 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 12× “State Farm asserts that the trial court erred in overruling its *656 motion for directed verdict because plaintiffs' claim does not fall within the coverage of OCGA § 33-34-7 of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act since Mr.”
Collins v. Int'l Indem. Co., 349 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1986).
· cites it 12× “The statute does, however, afford protection to pedestrians, OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (3); and pedestrians are defined as any person not occupying a motor vehicle or motorcycle or any other motor driven vehicle designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads and…”
Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 320 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. 1984).
· cites it 8× “2 An insurer is liable for payment of no-fault benefits when the injury complained of falls into one of the following three categories (OCGA § 33-34-7 (a)): “(1) Accidental bodily injury sustained within the United States of America .”
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. v. Burnetti, 385 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 19× “The appellant insurer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the appellee’s testimony established without dispute that he had not been “struck by [a] motor vehicle” within the contemplation of OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (3). In response, the appellee submitted an affidavit in…”
Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Jah, 387 S.E.2d 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 14× “, was not “similarly insured”) as required by OCGA § 33-34-4, under OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (1) appellant was nevertheless required to pay appellee basic no-fault benefits for the “[accidental bodily injury sustained” by appellee, the relative of the insured and a resident of the…”
Olukoya v. Am. Ass'n of Cab Companies, 414 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 10× “See former OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (2). The parties themselves had recognized this by specifically providing that appellee, in its capacity as the self-insurer, would provide no-fault benefits to the “driver” of the self-insured cab and that “nothing” was to be construed to the…”
Reynolds v. Transp. Ins., 343 S.E.2d 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 8× “OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (2). [1] " `Accidental bodily injury' means bodily injury .”
USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Wilbur, 427 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 6× “1202, § 6 (formerly found at OCGA § 33-34-7 (1990); Ga. L. 1974, p. 113, § 7 (formerly found at OCGA § 33-34-7 (1990)).”
Prot. Ins. v. Johnson, 352 S.E.2d 760 (Ga. 1987).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (1) provides for the payment of no-fault benefits for accidental bodily injury sustained while occupying any motor vehicle.”
First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 394 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 4× “" OCGA § 33-34-7 (a). The term "`[a]ccidental bodily injury' means bodily injury.”
— 33-34-7(a) — 1 case
— 33-34-7(a)(1) — 1 case
— 33-34-7(a)(2) — 1 case
— 33-34-7(a)(3) — 2 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.