O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Statute text
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act."
History
(Code 1981, § 33-34-1, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 1608, § 1.12.)
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Repeal of the No-Fault Act, effective October 1, 1991, did not affect the defendant's right to have the verdict reduced by the amount of the basic no-fault benefits received by the plaintiff. Walker v. Willis, 210 Ga. App. 139, 435 S.E.2d 621 (1993).
Repeal of O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3 which provided a right of subrogation to recover no-fault benefits paid in certain circumstances did not extinguish those subrogation rights with respect to cases in which the collision occurred prior to repeal of the statute even though the subrogation suit was not brought until after the repeal. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. GEIC, 213 Ga. App. 532, 445 S.E.2d 338 (1994).
Post-accident repeal of former § 33-34-9, providing that the plaintiff could not recover against a tortfeasor damages for which minimum, mandatory no-fault compensation was available, was not retroactively applicable so as to deprive an automobile accident defendant of limitation on liability. Glover v. Colbert, 210 Ga. App. 666, 437 S.E.2d 363 (1993).
ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE STATE BAR
Contingency fees. - Benefits paid under PIP coverage are assured; thus, the taking of a contingency fee for the filling out of routine, undisputed PIP claim forms is unreasonable and a violation of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia. An attorney may charge a reasonable fee for the attorney's time spent in processing a PIP claim. Adv. Op. No. 84-37 (January 20, 1984).
In those unusual circumstances when the payment of PIP benefits is not assured, the State Disciplinary Board does not prohibit contingency fees in general. However, the attorney should examine the factors set out in DR 2-106(B) to determine whether a contingent fee arrangement would be reasonable. Adv. Op. No. 84-37 (January 20, 1984).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR. - Automobile liability insurance policy as covering, in the absence of specific exclusion, personal injury to or death of, or loss sustained by, named or additional insured, 15 A.L.R.3d 711.
Validity, construction, and application of "named driver exclusion" in automobile insurance policy, 33 A.L.R.5th 121.
Conflict of laws in determination of coverage under automobile liability insurance policy, 110 A.L.R.5th 465.
Notes of Decisions
Cotton States Mut. Ins. v. Neese, 329 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. 1985).
· cites it 8× “As with liability insurance, uninsured motorist protection was for the benefit of the insured, not the driver of a vehicle struck by the insured.”
Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 300 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. 1983).
· cites it 4× “Chapter 34 of the insurance title is the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, OCGA § 33-34-1 (Code Ann. § 56-3401b), more commonly referred to as "no-fault" insurance.”
Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins., 480 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1997).
· cites it 8× “Given that many motorcycles are designed to be driven primarily on the public highways and present a daily risk to other motorists, and given that motorcycles are themselves required by OCGA § 40-6-11 to be covered by the same insurance required for "motor vehicles" under OCGA §…”
Collins v. Int'l Indem. Co., 349 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1986).
· cites it 8× “Hendry survived but *494 was unable to remember the accident. Collins' estate sued Lovett's insurer, International Indemnity Company, claiming no-fault benefits under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act.”
Cincinnati Ins. v. Reybitz, 421 S.E.2d 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 4× “There is no explicit language in the 1974 version of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (former OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq., hereinafter “the Act”) comparable to the joinder provision in OCGA §§ 46-7-12 (e) and 46-7-58 (e).”
Bryant v. Allstate Ins., 326 S.E.2d 753 (Ga. 1985).
· cites it 4× “” Certified Question “Does the statute of limitation on a cause of action based on Georgia’s Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq., claiming loss of wages, begin to run separately as to each wage loss period, or begin to run when the last payment is…”
Crider v. Zurich Ins., 474 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 4× “OCGA § 33-34-1. On the other hand, OCGA § 33-24-51(a) does not limit the governmental unit to the purchase of motor vehicle liability insurance under Chapter 34.”
Woody v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 551 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “In 1974, the General Assembly enacted the Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations (“No-Fault”) Act, which provided insurance coverage in virtually all circumstances to an injured victim.”
Berryhill v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 329 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 4× “" Young at 350 . Berryhill argues that all vehicle insurance policies in this state are now issued pursuant to a compulsory insurance plan, the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq.”
Olukoya v. Am. Ass'n of Cab Companies, 414 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 8× “All policies of motor vehicle liability insurance and all plans of self-insurance “must [have been issued] in accordance with the requirements of [former OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq.].” Former OCGA § 33-34-3 (a) (1).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.