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(Ga. L. 1970, p. 700, § 3; Ga. L. 1973, p. 497, §§ 1, 3; Ga. L. 1985, p. 1485, §§ 2-4; Ga. L. 1988, p. 13, § 33; Ga. L. 1989, p. 74, §§ 3, 4; Ga. L. 1996, p. 912, § 6; Ga. L. 2005, p. 563, § 12/HB 407; Ga. L. 2013, p. 141, § 33/HB 79.)
The 2013 amendment, effective April 24, 2013, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in this Code section and substituted "any lessor" for "lessor" in paragraph (7).
- Ga. L. 1985, p. 1485, § 9, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act would be applicable to all insolvencies occurring on or after July 1, 1985.
Ga. L. 2005, p. 563, § 24/HB 407, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section shall apply to insolvencies which occur on or after July 1, 2005.
Ga. L. 2006, p. 887, § 1/HB 1444, not codified by the General Assembly, amended Ga. L. 2005, p. 563, § 24/HB 407, to read: "The provisions of Section 12 of this Act shall apply to insolvencies that occur on or after the effective date of this Act. All other provisions shall apply as of the effective date of this Act." Ga. L. 2005, p. 563/HB 407, became effective July 1, 2005.
- United States is a "person" within the meaning of subparagraph (2)(F) of O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3. United States v. Rutland, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 46 F.3d 71 (11th Cir. 1995).
- County is a "legal entity" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 33-1-2(5) and is, therefore, a "person" within the meaning of that Code section and of subparagraph (2)(F) of O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3. As a "person," if its stipulated net worth is more than $1 (now $3) million, its claim is not covered by O.C.G.A. Ch. 36, T. 33. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 258 Ga. 317, 368 S.E.2d 500 (1988).
Dollar limitation contained in paragraph (2)(F) does not apply to a company with a net worth in excess of one million (now three million) dollars, when that company asserts a claim for return of unearned premiums as the assignee and attorney-in-fact for individual policy holders who would be entitled to the premiums but for the assignments. United Budget Co. v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool, 253 Ga. 435, 321 S.E.2d 333 (1984).
- Third-party claim against an insured employer for indemnification arising out of a suit against the third party by the employer's employee was an obligation owed by the employer's insolvent insurer to the employer rather than to the third party, for purposes of the dollar limitation in paragraph (2)(F); the third-party claimant had assets over $3 million and the employer did not. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Southeast Atl. Cargo Operators, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 660, 440 S.E.2d 254 (1994).
Even if the Georgia Insurer's Insolvency Pool (GIIP) had a valid defense, i.e., the claimant was a person with a net worth in excess of $3 million, absolving it from liability, the insured could not assert the defense to substantively bar the claimant's tort action against it and, if the claimant recovered against the insured, the insured's obligation to pay the claimant's judgment was not dependent on the GIIP's obligation to reimburse the insured. United States v. Rutland, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 46 F.3d 71 (11th Cir. 1995).
Defense set forth in paragraph (2)(F) of O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3, which is available to the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool (GIIP), could not be asserted by the insured whose insurer has been declared insolvent and whose defense was being maintained by the GIIP, when the GIIP has not been made a party to the action. Norman Enters. Interior Design, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 245 Ga. App. 538, 538 S.E.2d 130 (2000).
- When an award of attorney fees was assessed against an employer and the employer's insurer, who had become insolvent, and the award was therefore not a "covered claim" under O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3, the employer's responsibility to pay the award was, nevertheless, not thereby extinguished. Claxton Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 201 Ga. App. 371, 411 S.E.2d 109 (1991).
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool Act, O.C.G.A. § 33-36-1 et seq., did not bar assignee's subrogation claim against an insolvent Florida corporation based on negligent construction of power lines that killed a worker in Georgia because it was not a "covered claim" under O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3(4); district court erred in barring the claim under the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Fla. Stat. § 631.54, because Florida law was not applicable under Georgia's ex loci delicti choice of law rule. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Exch. v. R. D. Moody & Assocs., 468 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
- Trial court did not err in excluding a county from Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool because it met the net worth exemption provided for in the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool Act (Act), O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3(4)(G), and, therefore, did not qualify for coverage under the Act. Lumpkin County v. Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool, 292 Ga. 76, 734 S.E.2d 880 (2012).
- That the insured's right to recover from the insolvent insurance company was assigned to another party did not relieve the pool from the statutory duty to pay the claim since an assignee of an insured who would be entitled to payment of a claim by the pool "stands in the shoes" of the insured and is entitled to the same benefits to which the insured would be entitled but for the assignment. J. Transport, Inc. v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool, 209 Ga. App. 748, 434 S.E.2d 552 (1993).
Cited in Crider v. Georgia Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 188 Ga. App. 407, 373 S.E.2d 30 (1988); Garel v. Georgia Insurers' Insolvency Pool, 191 Ga. App. 572, 382 S.E.2d 400 (1989).
- Paragraph (2)(I) of O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3 excludes from the definition of "covered claims" unearned premiums on an insurance policy resulting from a completed audit. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-3.
No results found for Georgia Code 33-36-3.