O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-6-22 (2019)

Payment to labor organization of fee or assessment as condition of employment

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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No individual shall be required as a condition of employment or continuance of employment to pay any fee, assessment, or other sum of money whatsoever to a labor organization.

History

(Ga. L. 1947, p. 616, § 3.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Right to work law violation under state law. - In a state which has a ‘‘right to work’’ law, such as the one provided for in Ga. L. 1947, p. 616, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-6-22), the right to work is a state-conferred right, and a violation of this right creates a cause of action which arises under state law rather than under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. McDowell v. Clement Bros. Co., 260 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ga. 1966). No violation of statute. - When a union operated a hiring hall where both members and nonmembers could obtain referrals for temporary work, the union’s

charging of a referral fee did not violate O.C.G.A. § 34-6-22. The payment of the fee was not a condition of employment, and in the wake of a settlement before the National Labor Relations Board, the union charged members and nonmembers the same fee. Perry v. Int’l Longshoremen Ass’n Local No. 1414, 295 Ga. App. 799, 673 S.E.2d 302 (2009). Cited in Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951); Carpenters Local Union No. 3024 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 220 Ga. 596, 140 S.E.2d 876 (1965); Nixon v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 249 Ga. 862, 295 S.E.2d 78 (1982).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Union shop agreement. - A union shop agreement between a railroad and a union is enforceable in Georgia in light of the amendment to the federal Railway

Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., authorizing union shop agreements notwithstanding any state right to work law. 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-12.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 48A Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor Relations, §§ 1655 et seq., 1671. C.J.S. - 51 C.J.S., Labor Relations, § 110 et seq. ALR. - Closed shops and closed unions, 160 ALR 918. Refusal of member of labor union to pay assessment imposed by it for purposes of promoting or defeating contemplated legislation as ground for suspension or expulsion, 175 ALR 397.

Rights in union label, shop card, or other insignia denoting union shop or workmanship, 42 ALR2d 709. Procedural rights of union members in union disciplinary proceedings - modern state cases, 79 ALR4th 941. Validity, construction, and application of state right-to-work provisions, 105 ALR5th 243.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 2009–2016 · leading case: James M. Sweeney v. Michael R. Pence, 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
James M. Sweeney v. Michael R. Pence, 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014). · cites it 2× “§ 11-3-303 (1947); GaCode Ann. § 34-6-22 (1947); Iowa Code § 731.”
Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 370 v. Wasden, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1209 (D. Idaho 2016). “§ 11-3-303 (1947); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-6-22 (1947); Idaho Code Ann.”
Perry v. Int'l Longshoremen Ass'n Local No. 1414, 673 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “The trial court denied appellants’ motion to dismiss on grounds including that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction, that the settlement agreement was reasonable, and that the fees did not violate OCGA § 34-6-22. The trial court later granted summary judgment to Local 1414 on the…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.