Employment for indefinite period is terminable at will of either party.

- Employee under a contract of hiring indefinite in its duration may lawfully be discharged at the will of an employer with no cause of action for breach of contract. Lambert v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 624, 183 S.E. 814 (1936); Snyder v. Savannah Union Station Co., 85 Ga. App. 851, 70 S.E.2d 382 (1952).

Indefinite hiring may be terminated at will by either party, and a rule of the employer that an employee will be discharged if the employee's wages are garnished by a creditor does not alter the situation. Elliott v. Delta Air Lines, 116 Ga. App. 36, 156 S.E.2d 656 (1967).

In the absence of a controlling contract between the parties, employment for an indefinite period - a "permanent job" - is terminable at the will of either party, and a discharge in such circumstances affords no cause of action for breach of contract. Land v. Delta Air Lines, 130 Ga. App. 321, 203 S.E.2d 316 (1973).

Contract for permanent employment is a contract to continue indefinitely, and is terminable at any time by either of the parties. Ely v. Stratoflex, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 569, 208 S.E.2d 583 (1974).

Executory contract of service for no fixed period of time is obviously too indefinite to be capable of enforcement, and it is only by a fiction that the courts are enabled to hold that an engagement at a fixed salary per month, but with no stipulation as to its duration, is a legally binding contract for one month's employment at the agreed wage; but the employment, after the expiration of the first month, being indefinite as to its duration, may be terminated at the will of either party. Floyd v. Lamar Ferrell Chevrolet, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 756, 285 S.E.2d 218 (1981).

Indefinite hiring may be terminated at will by either party, with or without cause, and there is no cause of action against an employer for an alleged wrongful termination. Meeks v. Pfizer, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 815, 305 S.E.2d 497 (1983); Stanford v. Paul W. Heard & Co., 240 Ga. App. 869, 525 S.E.2d 419 (1999).

In Georgia, an "at will" employee may be removed with or without cause, and regardless of motive. Morast v. Lance, 631 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987).

No executory obligations are created.

- If the contract in a dispute over failure to promote on basis of seniority was for an indefinite term and was terminable at will, no claim for failure to promote can be maintained as it is the general rule that a hiring indefinite as to time is terminable at the will of either party and creates no executory obligations. Murphine v. Hospital Auth., 151 Ga. App. 722, 261 S.E.2d 457 (1979).

Ante litem notice not required for suit under Whistleblower Act.

- City employee who filed suit under the Georgia Whistleblower Act, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4, seeking money damages, among other remedies, was not required to provide written notice of the employee's claim within six months of the alleged retaliation under the municipal ante litem notice statute, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5, because the claim was not a negligence claim. West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743, 797 S.E.2d 809 (2017).

Effect of procedural default.

- By deeming claims of wrongful termination and slander as admitted due to a defendant's default in the action for failing to answer, a trial court erred by precluding the defendant from offering evidence to contradict those claims at a hearing on damages since the well-pled allegations of the complaint failed to establish that the plaintiff was anything other than an at-will employee, as no employment contract was alleged; therefore, the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for wrongful termination. Fink v. Dodd, 286 Ga. App. 363, 649 S.E.2d 359 (2007).

If no terms of contract of employment are set out, the petition must be construed as alleging that the employee was working under a contract terminable at the will of the employer. Elliott v. Delta Air Lines, 116 Ga. App. 36, 156 S.E.2d 656 (1967).

Oral contract for indefinite period.

- Oral contract of employment for an indefinite period of time is terminable at will and is not inhibited by the statute of frauds. Guinn v. Conwood Corp., 185 Ga. App. 41, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 910, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1988).

Oral executory promises relating to an employment contract for an indefinite period could not be enforced because the underlying employment contract, being terminable at will, was unenforceable. Marshall v. W.E. Marshall, 189 Ga. App. 510, 376 S.E.2d 393 (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 376 S.E.2d 393 (1989).

There was no exception to this section. Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978).

"Franchised contractual relationship," when it consists of an oral agreement for an indefinite period, is terminable at will. Arford v. Blalock, 199 Ga. App. 434, 405 S.E.2d 698 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 698 (1991), aff'd sub nom., Wilensky v. Blalock, 262 Ga. 95, 414 S.E.2d 1 (1992), overruled on other grounds Jordan v. Moses, 291 Ga. 39, 727 S.E.2d 460 (2012).

Section was inapplicable and did not bar a chief executive officer's (CEO) breach of fiduciary duty claim as the CEO had a contract for a definite term. Tidikis v. Network for Med. Communs. & Research, LLC, 274 Ga. App. 807, 619 S.E.2d 481 (2005).

If employment contract unenforceable, fraud claim inapplicable.

- Although fraud may not generally be predicated on statements which are promissory in nature as to future acts or events, it can be predicated on such representations when there is a present intention not to perform or a present knowledge that the future event will not occur, but such an exception has no application when the promises upon which the plaintiff relies for establishing fraud are unenforceable because the underlying employment contract, being terminable at will, is unenforceable. Taylor v. Amisub, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 834, 368 S.E.2d 791 (1988).

Executive promises pertaining to employment unenforceable.

- Employee whose employment was for an indefinite term, and for that reason was terminable at the will of the employer, had no cause of action for the employer's alleged failure to honor the terms of the employee's employment contract under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44(a) has no application to enforce executory promises pertaining to employment for an indefinite term. Also, any promises upon which the employee relied to show misrepresentation were unenforceable because the employee's underlying employment contract, being terminable at will, was unenforceable. Johnson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 207 Ga. App. 869, 429 S.E.2d 285 (1993).

Property interest.

- At-will employee typically does not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment sufficient to form a protectable property interest. However, a property interest does arise whenever a public employee can be terminated only for cause. Wofford v. Glynn Brunswick Mem. Hosp., 864 F.2d 117 (11th Cir. 1989); Nolin v. Douglas County, 903 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, 32 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds, McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, McKinney v. Osceola County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 513 U.S. 1110, 115 S. Ct. 898, 130 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1995).

Deputy sheriffs in a county that had not adopted a civil service program were employees at will and lacked a property interest in their employment. Zimmerman v. Cherokee County, 925 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

Employees of federal credit unions are not public employees within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1. Robins Fed. Credit Union v. Brand, 234 Ga. App. 519, 507 S.E.2d 185 (1998).

Age discrimination.

- At-will employee may not sue in tort under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 or § 51-1-8 for wrongful discharge based upon age discrimination. Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 528 S.E.2d 238 (2000).

Provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-6 and51-1-8 do not create a civil action for age discrimination for an employee-at-will based upon a violation of either O.C.G.A. § 34-1-2 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 221 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2000).

Summary judgment.

- Whether employment contract was created is genuine issue of material fact which would make the grant of summary judgment erroneous under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1. Floyd v. Lamar Ferrell Chevrolet, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 756, 285 S.E.2d 218 (1981).

Cited in Odom v. Bush, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S.E. 1013 (1906); Bentley v. Smith, 3 Ga. App. 242, 59 S.E. 720 (1907); Phillips Lumber Co. v. Smith, 7 Ga. App. 222, 66 S.E. 623 (1909); Webb v. McCranie, 12 Ga. App. 269, 77 S.E. 175 (1913); Foundation Co. v. Brannen, 25 Ga. App. 120, 102 S.E. 833 (1920); Davidson v. Citizens' Bank & Trust, 46 Ga. App. 78, 166 S.E. 775 (1932); Smith v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 56 Ga. App. 294, 192 S.E. 481 (1937); Bailey v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 60 Ga. App. 142, 3 S.E.2d 112 (1939); Crow v. Southern Ry., 66 Ga. App. 608, 18 S.E.2d 690 (1942); Fellton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 92 Ga. App. 186, 88 S.E.2d 463 (1955); Campbell v. Carroll, 121 Ga. App. 497, 174 S.E.2d 375 (1970); Alexander-Seewald Co. v. Questa, 121 Ga. App. 611, 175 S.E.2d 92 (1970); Stegall v. S.S. Kresge Co., 128 Ga. App. 679, 197 S.E.2d 737 (1973); Lowe v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 132 Ga. App. 37, 207 S.E.2d 620 (1974); Kingsbury v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 136 Ga. App. 146, 220 S.E.2d 481 (1975); Rhodes v. Levitz Furn. Co., 136 Ga. App. 514, 221 S.E.2d 687 (1975); Hill v. Delta Air Lines, 143 Ga. App. 103, 237 S.E.2d 597 (1977); West v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 808, 245 S.E.2d 46 (1978); Wright v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 156 Ga. App. 537, 275 S.E.2d 89 (1980); White v. I.T.T., 718 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1983); Taliaferro v. S & A Restaurant Corp., 172 Ga. App. 399, 323 S.E.2d 271 (1984); Anderberg v. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 175 Ga. App. 14, 332 S.E.2d 326 (1985); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987); Alston v. Brown Transp. Corp., 182 Ga. App. 632, 356 S.E.2d 517 (1987); Thomason v. Mitsubishi Elec. Sales Am., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Warren v. Crawford, 927 F.2d 559 (11th Cir. 1991); Burton v. John Thurmond Constr. Co., 201 Ga. App. 10, 410 S.E.2d 137 (1991); Johnson v. Hames Contracting, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 664, 431 S.E.2d 455 (1993); Golden v. National Serv. Indus., 210 Ga. App. 53, 435 S.E.2d 270 (1993); Jones v. Destiny Indus., Inc., 226 Ga. App. 6, 485 S.E.2d 225 (1997); Hiers v. ChoicePoint Servs., 270 Ga. App. 128, 606 S.E.2d 29 (2004).

Presumption of hiring for period stipulated for payment of wages.

- Unless there is something to the contrary in an express contract of employment, a provision merely for the payment of wages at a stipulated period raises the presumption that the hiring was for that period. National Manufacture & Stores Corp. v. Dekle, 48 Ga. App. 515, 173 S.E. 408 (1934).

Person who has been previously employed by the year or other fixed interval who is permitted to continue in the employment after the period limited by the original employment has expired will, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention, be presumed to be employed until the close of the current interval, and upon the same terms. Such a presumed renovation of the contract from the period at which the former expired is held to arise from implied consent of the parties, and in consequence of their not having signified their intention that the agreement should terminate at the period stipulated. Whether the first hiring has its duration fixed by express or implied contract, if it be fixed in either way, the term (if not longer than one year) admits of duplication by tacit as well as express agreement. National Manufacture & Stores Corp. v. Dekle, 48 Ga. App. 515, 173 S.E. 408 (1934).

Fact that wages are payable weekly raises presumption that contract of hiring was by week. Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951).

Offer of employment at so much per month will, in the absence of anything further indicating the period of employment intended, be treated as meaning employment for a term of one month. Floyd v. Lamar Ferrell Chevrolet, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 756, 285 S.E.2d 218 (1981).

Appellant's allegations that appellant was employed by appellee for an indefinite period at a fixed monthly wage sets forth a legally binding contract for one month's employment at the agreed wage, breach of which prior to the end of the first month is actionable. Floyd v. Lamar Ferrell Chevrolet, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 756, 285 S.E.2d 218 (1981).

If the presumption under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 is to arise, the employment contract must provide that the "wages are payable at a stipulated period." Therefore, an annual salary provision in an employment contract will not establish the presumption unless the employee is also paid on an annual basis. If the employee is paid on a weekly, bi-monthly or monthly basis, the statement of an annual salary will not create a binding one-year contract. Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1989).

Hiring period on basis of annual salary.

- Documents referring to an employee's annual salary do not give rise to a presumption that the employee is hired on a quarterly basis. American Std., Inc. v. Jessee, 150 Ga. App. 663, 258 S.E.2d 240 (1979).

Reference to an employee's annual salary in a written agreement merely establishes the total amount of the employee's salary during a 12-month period and does not establish a pay period requiring application of the presumption under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1. Fortenberry v. Haverty Furn. Cos., 176 Ga. App. 360, 335 S.E.2d 460 (1985); Ikemiya v. Shibamota Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 444 S.E.2d 351 (1994).

Period of employment deemed indefinite.

- Promise to employ a person until the employer becomes insolvent is an offer of employment for an indefinite term and is insufficient to support a cause of action for breach of an employment contract. Barker v. CTC Sales Corp., 199 Ga. App. 742, 406 S.E.2d 88 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 406 S.E.2d 88 (1991).

Minimum period of employment specified in contract.

- When an employment contract specified that the term of employment was to be "for a period of not less than three years," the contract was not terminable at will prior to the expiration of that three year period. Wojcik v. Lewis, 204 Ga. App. 301, 419 S.E.2d 135 (1992).

If a definite minimum contract period has been established by the contract of employment, only such minimum employment period falls outside the employment at will and any future contract period comes under the employment at will. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 534 S.E.2d 533 (2000).

Although an employment contract set up a two-week pay period, that provision did not define the employment term because the contract specifically stated that it "will run from October 10th, 1994 through January 10th, 1995," a three month period. Mail Adver. Sys. v. Shroka, 249 Ga. App. 484, 548 S.E.2d 461 (2001).

Breach of promise not to fire.

- Trial court did not err in finding that the terminated employees did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted for their claim that they were wrongfully discharged based on the businesses' alleged breach of a promise-not-to-fire, as the terminated employees did not show that Georgia law recognized a "freedom of contract" public policy exception to the general rule of at-will employment in Georgia that dictated that an employee was not hired for a specific period of employment and could be terminated for any or no reason. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 261 Ga. App. 543, 583 S.E.2d 131 (2003), aff'd, 278 Ga. 227, 599 S.E.2d 158 (2004).

Ambiguity.

- When an ambiguity in a contract as to the contemplated duration of a subcontractor's services remained even after application of applicable statutory rules of construction, construction of the contract was for the jury rather than the trial court. Lineberger v. Williams, 195 Ga. App. 186, 393 S.E.2d 23 (1990).

Employer may discharge employee without liability.

- When a plaintiff's employment is terminable at will, the employer, with or without cause and regardless of its motives, may discharge the employee without liability. Clark v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 419, 233 S.E.2d 496 (1977); Grace v. Roan, 145 Ga. App. 776, 245 S.E.2d 17 (1978); Taylor v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981); Hall v. Answering Serv., Inc., 161 Ga. App. 874, 289 S.E.2d 533 (1982).

Trial court's dismissal of a city employee's wrongful discharge action was proper because the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; the employee was an at-will employee and, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 and as a matter of law, the employee could not assert a wrongful discharge claim. Reid v. City of Albany, 276 Ga. App. 171, 622 S.E.2d 875 (2005).

No actionable conspiracy out of exercising right to discharge employee.

- Granting that the allegations of the plaintiff are sufficient to sustain the conclusion of conspiracy, there could be no actionable conspiracy growing out of the exercise, in a lawful manner, of the legal right to discharge the plaintiff. Clark v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 419, 233 S.E.2d 496 (1977).

No actionable conspiracy arises from the authorized exercise of a legal right to discharge. Meeks v. Pfizer, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 815, 305 S.E.2d 497 (1983).

Absent a racial or other motive in violation of public policy, an employer may discharge an at will employee for any reason or no reason. Phinazee v. Interstate Nationalease, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 39, 514 S.E.2d 843 (1999).

Oral promise not to fire not enforceable.

- Noting that Georgia courts have refused to acknowledge any exceptions not encompassed by the employment at-will statute, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1, a court applied the well-settled doctrines of Georgia law and held that an employer's oral promise not to fire employees for cooperating with government inspection did not modify the terms of their at-will employment relationship and did not create an enforceable contract. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 599 S.E.2d 158 (2004).

Impermissible discharge on grounds of public policy.

- At-will employee cannot maintain a successful wrongful discharge suit against an employer on grounds of public policy. Jellico v. Effingham County, 221 Ga. App. 252, 471 S.E.2d 36 (1996).

Employment terminable at will.

- Appellant's employment was terminable at will and the evidence clearly shows that appellant was discharged by one who had the authority to do so, appellant's lengthy allegations as to improper motive for firing are legally irrelevant and present no genuine issues of material fact. Hall v. Answering Serv., Inc., 161 Ga. App. 874, 289 S.E.2d 533 (1982).

As an at-will employee terminable with or without cause pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1, a plaintiff employee had no enforceable employment contract rights with which to interfere and, thus, had no basis for a claim that the defendant president tortuously interfered with the employee's employment for an insurance company. Culpepper v. Thompson, 254 Ga. App. 569, 562 S.E.2d 837 (2002).

Because under Georgia law, absent contractual or statutory exception, employment is terminable at will by either party, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1, an employee of a state university was an at-will employee with no reasonable expectation in continued employment that would give rise to a property interest; therefore, because the employee did not have an identifiable property interest in the employment, the employee could not prevail on a claim for denial of procedural due process. Braswell v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2005).

Despite the fact that a teacher's contract provided for a yearly salary, such only referred to the pay system and any presumption that such contract was for one year was rebutted by the next sentence of the contract that, "should employment be terminated prior to the end of the school year, the termination pay will be prorated on the number of days worked." Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple, 279 Ga. App. 71, 630 S.E.2d 604 (2006).

City employee was an at-will employee because the record did not show that the employee was hired for a definite term of employment, and the city's personnel policies and practices were legally insufficient to create an implied contract for a definite term of employment. Goddard v. City of Albany, 285 Ga. 882, 684 S.E.2d 635 (2009).

In a former employer's suit to enforce noncompetition and nonsolicitation clauses, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the employer on a former employee's wrongful termination claim; as an at-will employee, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1, the employee had no claim for wrongful termination. H&R Block Eastern Enters. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2010).

Probationary period.

- When contract between parties provided that first year of employment was a probationary period, and terms of contract did not specify duration of employment, employer had right to discharge employee without cause. Gunn v. Hawaiian Airlines, 162 Ga. App. 474, 291 S.E.2d 779 (1982).

Promise of lifetime employment unenforceable.

- Employment in Georgia is generally considered to be at will, and a trial court properly dismissed an employee's breach of contract suit based on a termination of employment; since an alleged promise of lifetime employment was unenforceable, the employee's claim of fraud could not have been predicated on that alleged promise. Jenkins v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 279 Ga. App. 160, 630 S.E.2d 654 (2006).

Employee's investigations into company activities.

- O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 will not allow action for wrongful discharge by a terminable-at-will employee, despite allegations by the employee that the employee's discharge was caused by the employee's investigations into possibly criminal company activities. Taylor v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981).

Oral contract between attorney and client.

- Trial court's denial of a client's summary judgment motion was reversed as the oral contract between an attorney and the client was unenforceable in that: (1) there was no definition of what was to be considered the ultimate or logical conclusion of any given case assigned to the attorney, nor were there standards for determining if the attorney "didn't do the job"; (2) there was no stated duration of the agreement, and the public policy of Georgia was clear that, absent a definite term of employment, the contract was terminable at will under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1; and (3) the attorney's claimed damages, the attorney's hourly rate times the number of hours it would have taken the attorney to bring each case to its ultimate or logical conclusion, were speculative and not objectively ascertainable from the oral contract. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Croley, 263 Ga. App. 659, 588 S.E.2d 840 (2003).

Exercising workers' compensation rights.

- There is no public policy exception to an employer's right to discharge an employee at will when the right is exercised in retaliation for the employee's assertion of the employee's rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Evans v. Bibb Co., 178 Ga. App. 139, 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986).

Termination due to application for disability benefits.

- Even if an employer's decision to separate an employee from the employee's employment was prompted by the employee's application for full-time disability benefits, this would not give rise to a cause of action for wrongful termination. Bendix Corp. v. Flowers, 174 Ga. App. 620, 330 S.E.2d 769 (1985).

Termination due to pregnancy.

- Summary judgment for employer was affirmed in former at-will employee's action for "wrongful discharge" allegedly based on employee's pregnancy, as there was no existing "public policy" exception for termination of at-will employees because of gender in general or pregnancy in specific. Borden v. Johnson, 196 Ga. App. 288, 395 S.E.2d 628 (1990).

Discharge for violations of employment directive.

- When an employee manual provided that dismissal "shall result from a serious infraction of a company rule involving misconduct such as . . .", it was neither the intent nor the effect of the manual to limit terminations to infractions listed but rather the list of infractions was for illustrative purposes only so that the employee had notice of the types of offenses which the company believed were of such a serious nature that termination would be warranted. Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 181 Ga. App. 876, 354 S.E.2d 204 (1987).

Company handbook.

- Even if company handbook was considered to be a contract, as it was for no specific term, employees remained as at will and their employment was terminable at will. Jackson v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 810, 426 S.E.2d 630 (1992).

Negligent hiring and retention claim.

- Employee's claim of negligent hiring and retention could not be used to circumvent the employment-at-will doctrine since the employment was for an indefinite period and was terminable at the will of either party to the employment relationship. Dong v. Shepeard Community Blood Ctr., 240 Ga. App. 137, 522 S.E.2d 720 (1999).

Violation of termination procedures.

- The fact that an at-will employee had notice of certain policies and procedures regarding discipline and termination of employees which the employee alleges were not followed in the employee's discharge would not give rise to an action for wrongful termination. Garmon v. Health Group of Atlanta, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 587, 359 S.E.2d 450 (1987).

Evidence of wrongful discharge.

- Evidence that a former fellow employee, who did not have the absolute right to discharge without consulting superiors, attempted to suborn perjury from an employee, asking the employee to lie at a deposition hearing with reference to a lawsuit then in progress involving the employer, and thereafter threatened the employee that "he would never expect to get anything out of this company again," and that subsequently the employee was terminated, supported the liability of that fellow employee for wrongful discharge. Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 763, 320 S.E.2d 872 (1984).

President of limited liability company with contract.

- Trial court erred in entering a judgment on the pleadings for a limited liability company, its founder, and a corporation, as O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 did not bar the president's breach of fiduciary duty claim since the president had a contract for a definite term; further, the founders were bound by the contract, which contained a clause purporting to establish a fiduciary relationship. Tidikis v. Network for Med. Communs. & Research, LLC, 274 Ga. App. 807, 619 S.E.2d 481 (2005).

Employee's suit on contract for compensation due.

- Parol agreement in a contract to begin in praesenti for an indefinite period, terminable at will, was not inhibited by the statute of frauds; and when an employee sued on the contract for the amount of compensation due the employee, based upon services actually performed by the employee up to the time of the employee's discharge, and not for damages or for compensation for services not performed or for any breach of contract, it was not necessary that the employee sue on a quantum meruit for services actually performed. Brazzeal v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 51 Ga. App. 471, 180 S.E. 853 (1935).

When there is a contract of employment and the employee thereunder sues on the contract for the amount of compensation due the employee, based upon services actually performed by the employee up to the time of the employee's discharge, and not for damages or for compensation for services not performed or for any breach of contract, the contract is conclusive on the matter and it is not necessary that the plaintiff sue on a quantum meruit for services actually performed. Van Houten v. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 93 Ga. App. 774, 92 S.E.2d 731 (1956).

Oral contract of employment at will for an indefinite time, even though it may not be performed within one year, is not within the statute of frauds; and when the employee has actually performed services thereunder the employee may recover of the employer the compensation due the employee for the services rendered. Trade City G.M.C., Inc. v. May, 154 Ga. App. 371, 268 S.E.2d 421 (1980).

Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to the defendant, a former employer, on the plaintiff's claims that the plaintiff was wrongfully terminated, that the plaintiff was entitled to one year's salary, that the plaintiff was entitled to participate in the profit sharing plan, or that the plaintiff was entitled to purchase stock in the company, when the record was clear that the plaintiff had no contract for a stated period. The mere reference to the position's annual salary is not sufficient to invoke the presumption set forth in O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1. Foreman v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 332, 393 S.E.2d 695 (1990).

Damages for wrongful discharge.

- When an employee is wrongfully discharged before the end of the employee's term and elects to sue for a breach of the contract of employment, the employee may do so immediately and claim any special injury which the employee may have sustained in consequence of the breach; in such an action the measure of damages is the actual loss from the breach of the contract, and, in estimating the amount, all facts down to the time of the trial may be considered. Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951).

No right of action for federal credit union employees.

- Federal credit union employees had no right of action for wrongful termination since they had no vested property right under federal law, and there was no state law public exception to the at-will doctrine. Robins Fed. Credit Union v. Brand, 234 Ga. App. 519, 507 S.E.2d 185 (1998).

Length of notice or compensation.

- Georgia law does not provide for a specific length of time or compensation when an employee is discharged; the length of notice or compensation when discharged would depend entirely upon the agreement or contract between the employer and employee. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 242.

The length of employment, wages therefor and termination of employment depends entirely upon the contract between parties. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 242.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Employment Relationship, §§ 8 et seq., 26 et seq.

Defending Wrongful Discharge Cases, 36 Am. Jur. Trials 419.

ALR.

- Constitutionality of law regulating right to tips as between master and servant, 3 A.L.R. 310.

Duration of contract of hiring which specifies no term, but fixes compensation at a certain amount per day, week, month, or year, 11 A.L.R. 469; 100 A.L.R. 834; 161 A.L.R. 706.

Payment as condonation preventing discharge of servant for breach of duty, 44 A.L.R. 532.

Injunction against discharge of employee, 44 A.L.R. 1443.

Negligence or incompetency as a ground for discharge of an employee, 49 A.L.R. 472.

Changes in personnel or conditions of business as justification for termination of contract of employment, 59 A.L.R. 294.

Expenses incurred in seeking or in obtaining other employment as element of damages in an action for wrongful discharge of employee, 84 A.L.R. 171.

Specification in employment contract of grounds or causes of discharge as exclusive of other grounds or causes, 100 A.L.R. 507.

Servant's right to compensation for extra work or overtime, 107 A.L.R. 705.

Operation of negative or restrictive covenant in contract of employment for a specific period, as extended by continuance in the employment after the expiration of that period, 163 A.L.R. 405.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutory or contractual provision in, government construction contract referring to Secretary of Labor questions respecting wage rates or classification of employees of contractor, 163 A.L.R. 1300.

Right of employer to terminate contract because of employee's illness or physical incapacity, 21 A.L.R.2d 1247.

Oral contract for personal services so long as employee is able to continue in work, to do satisfactory work, or the like, as within statute of frauds relating to contracts not to be performed within year, 28 A.L.R.2d 878.

Power of corporate officer or agent to hire employees for life, 28 A.L.R.2d 929.

Discharge from private employment on ground of political views or conduct, 51 A.L.R.2d 742; 29 A.L.R.4th 287, 38 A.L.R.5th 39.

What law governs employee's right to damages for wrongful discharge, 61 A.L.R.2d 917.

Employer's damages for breach of employment contract by employee's terminating employment, 61 A.L.R.2d 1008.

Recovery of damages by employee wrongfully discharged before expiration of time period fixed in employment contract as embracing entire term of contract or as limited to those damages sustained up to time of trial, 91 A.L.R.2d 682.

Termination by principal of distributorship contract containing no express provision for termination, 19 A.L.R.3d 196.

Employer's termination of professional athlete's services as constituting breach of employment contract, 57 A.L.R.3d 257.

Validity and duration of contract purporting to be for permanent employment, 60 A.L.R.3d 226.

Right of corporation to discharge employee who asserts rights as stockholder, 84 A.L.R.3d 1107.

Modern status as to duration of employment where contract specifies no term but fixes daily or longer compensation, 93 A.L.R.3d 659.

Liability for discharging at-will employee for refusing to participate in, or for disclosing, unlawful or unethical acts of employer or coemployees, 9 A.L.R.4th 329.

Discharge from employment on ground of political views or conduct as affecting right to unemployment compensation, 29 A.L.R.4th 287, 38 A.L.R.5th 39.

Judicial review of termination of pastor's employment by local church or temple, 31 A.L.R.4th 851.

Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Right to discharge allegedly "at-will" employee as affected by employer's promulgation of employment policies as to discharge, 33 A.L.R.4th 120.

Damages recoverable for wrongful discharge of at-will employee, 44 A.L.R.4th 1131.

Liability for retaliation against at-will employee for public complaints or efforts relating to health or safety, 75 A.L.R.4th 13.

Liability for discharge of at-will employee for refusal to submit to drug testing, 79 A.L.R.4th 105.

Effectiveness of employer's disclaimer of representations in personnel manual or employee handbook altering at-will employment relationship, 17 A.L.R.5th 1.

Pre-emption by workers' compensation statute of employee's remedy under state "whistleblower" statute, 20 A.L.R.5th 677.

Pre-emption of wrongful discharge cause of action by civil rights laws, 21 A.L.R.5th 1.

Liability for breach of employment severance agreement, 27 A.L.R.5th 1.

After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699.

Liability for discharge of employee from private employment on ground of political views or conduct, 38 A.L.R.5th 39.

Wrongful discharge based on public policy derived from professional ethics codes, 52 A.L.R. 5th 405.

Negligent discharge of employee, 53 A.L.R.5th 219.

Wrongful discharge based on employer's fraternization policy, 71 A.L.R.5th 257.

Federal pre-emption of whistleblower's state-law action for wrongful retaliation, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 775.