O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-8-122 (2019)

Communications between employer and employee, or between employer or employee and department, privileged

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) All letters, reports, communications, or any other matters, either oral or written, from the employer or employee to each other or to the department or any of its agents, representatives, or employees, which letters, reports, or other communications shall have been written, sent, delivered, or made in connection with the requirements of the administration of this chapter, shall be absolutely privileged and shall not be made the subject matter or basis for any action for slander or libel in any court of the State of Georgia. (b) Any finding of fact or law, judgment, determination, conclusion, or final order made by an adjudicator, examiner, hearing officer, board of review, or any other person acting under the authority of the Commissioner with respect to this chapter shall not be admissible, binding, or conclusive in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding between a person and such person’s present or previous employer brought before any court of this state or the United States or before any local, state, or federal administrative agency, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same or similar facts; provided, however, any finding of fact or law, judgment, determination, conclusion, or final order made as described in this chapter shall be admissible in proceedings before the Commissioner.

History

(Code 1981, § 34-8-122, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 139, § 1.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Communication of reasons for discharge of employees privileged. - Hospital personnel director’s communication of reasons for discharge of employees to the Georgia Department of Labor was absolutely privileged and the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the director as to this aspect of the employees’ defamation claims. Davis v.

Copelan, 215 Ga. App. 754, 452 S.E.2d 194 (1994). Because statements by a city as an employer to the Department of Labor with respect to the discharged employee’s unemployment compensation benefits were absolutely privileged, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-8-122(a), and, as such, could not be used to support an at-will

employee’s defamation claim. Reid v. City of Albany, 276 Ga. App. 171, 622 S.E.2d 875 (2005). Collateral estoppel. - Superior court’s determination in an action for unemployment benefits that an employee was terminated for cause precludes that employee from relitigating the issue in a subsequent action such as one based on employment discrimination. Langton v. Department of Cor., 220 Ga. App. 445, 469 S.E.2d 509 (1996).

Cited in Hightower v. Kendall Co., 225 Ga. App. 71, 483 S.E.2d 294 (1997); Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 243 Ga. App. 71, 532 S.E.2d 463 (2000); ComSouth Teleservices, Inc. v. Liggett, 243 Ga. App. 446, 531 S.E.2d 190 (2000); Doss v. City of Savannah, 290 Ga. App. 670, 660 S.E.2d 457 (2008); Wright v. Brown, 336 Ga. App. 1, 783 S.E.2d 405 (2016).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases, 1994–2016 · leading case: Wright v. Brown Et Al., 783 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
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Wright v. Brown Et Al., 783 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “”); OCGA § 9-12-81 (b) (“As against the interest of third parties acting in good faith and without notice who have acquired a transfer or lien binding the property of the defendant in judgment, no money judgment obtained within the county of the defendant’s residence in any…”
Kaylor v. Atwell, 553 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “We have previously held that a personnel director’s communication to the labor department of the reasons for discharging an employee was absolutely privileged under OCGA § 34-8-122 (a). 11 Here, too, any communication Hamilton may have made to the department in connection with…”
Doss v. City of Savannah, 660 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “71, 75 (3) ( 532 SE2d 463 ) (2000); OCGA § 34-8-122 (a). And as the report to POST occurred on November 4, 2002, more than a year before Doss filed this suit, any claim as to that document is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitation.”
Langton v. Dep't of Corr., 469 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “Although Langton asserts multiple theories of recovery, the gravamen of her complaint in the instant action was that the DOC discharged her without cause.”
Desmond v. Troncalli Mitsubishi, 532 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “18 OCGA § 34-8-122 (a); Hightower v. Kendall Co.”
Reid v. City of Albany, 622 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “12 OCGA§ 34-8-122 (a). See also Hightower, supra at 72 (2); Cox v.”
Hightower v. Kendall Co., 483 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 34-8-122 (a). 3. Hightower’s notice of appeal and brief contain new allegations of slander not raised in Hightower’s complaint and an extended discussion of the law of libel.”
Davis v. Copelan, 452 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “These communications are absolutely privileged pursuant to OCGA § 34-8-122 (a) (formerly OCGA § 34-8-11 and Code Ann.”
ComSouth Teleservices, Inc. v. Liggett, 531 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 34-8-122 (a). Liggett admitted she had no knowledge of any publication, and ComSouth presented evidence that it never publicized Liggett’s termination to anyone outside the company.”
Skoglund v. Durham, 502 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “The investigation of such conduct benefits the public welfare (and the GREC) by generating and maintaining the degree of public trust required in a profession that brokers the contractual obligations between home seller and buyer and that acts in a fiduciary capacity therefor.”
Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1998). · cites it 2× “Plaintiffs claim that defendants can be held liable for such a communication if it was made with malice. (See Pis.’ Resp.”
Jimmy S. Lawal v. RTM, 260 F. App'x 149 (11th Cir. 2006). “O.C.G.A. § 34-8-122(a). Thus, Lawal cannot base his defamation claim on any statements made by an RTM employee at his unemployment compensation hearing, and he has failed to claim any other alleged statements made by an RTM employee about him were made known to a third party.”
— 34-8-122(a) — 2 cases
Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1998). “Plaintiffs claim that defendants can be held liable for such a communication if it was made with malice. (See Pis.’ Resp.”
Jimmy S. Lawal v. RTM, 260 F. App'x 149 (11th Cir. 2006). “O.C.G.A. § 34-8-122(a). Thus, Lawal cannot base his defamation claim on any statements made by an RTM employee at his unemployment compensation hearing, and he has failed to claim any other alleged statements made by an RTM employee about him were made known to a third party.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.