O.C.G.A. § 34-8-280 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. - Compensation of employees of state institutions who contract tuberculosis or infectious hepatitis, T. 31, C. 29.

Liability of employers for injuries to employees generally, § 34-7-20 et seq.

Additional payments to members of Georgia State Patrol for injuries received in line of duty, § 35-2-9.

Additional payments to members of Georgia Bureau of Investigation for injuries received in line of duty, § 35-3-12.

Indemnification of law enforcement officers, firefighters, and prison guards for death or disablement in line of duty, § 45-9-80 et seq.

Public assistance, T. 49, C. 4.

Editor's notes. - Code Sections 34-9-18, 34-9-82, 34-9-100, 34-9-102, 34-9-104, 34-9-108, 34-9-201, 34-9-205, 34-9-221, 34-9-222, 34-9-241, 34-9-243, and 34-9-261 through 34-9-263 were amended by Ga. L. 1978, p. 2220. The provisions of Code Sections 34-9-261 through 34-9-263, and any other provision of the amendment which created a substantive right, shall apply to any accident or injury occurring on or after July 1, 1978. In all other respects, including all procedural matters, the provisions shall apply to any action taken on or after July 1, 1978, without regard to the date of accident or injury.

Administrative Rules and Regulations. - Workers' compensation insurance statistical agent - Forms and Rating Plans, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Office of Commissioner of Insurance, Safety Fire Commissioner and Industrial Loan Commissioner, Office of Commissioner of Insurance, Chapter 120-2-36.

Georgia workers' compensation insurance rate filings, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Office of Commissioner of Insurance, Safety Fire Commissioner and Industrial Loan Commissioner, Office of Commissioner of Insurance, Chapter 120-2-37.

Georgia workers compensation assigned risk insurance plan, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Office of Commissioner of Insurance, Safety Fire Commissioner and Industrial Loan Commissioner, Office of Commissioner of Insurance, Chapter 120-2-38.

Law reviews. - For article surveying history of workers' compensation laws and their application in this state, see 11 Ga. B. J. 413 (1949). For article, "Quasi-Municipal Tort Liability in Georgia," see 6 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (1955). For article, "1955 Amendments to the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Law," see 18 Ga. B. J. 307 (1956). For article, "Actions for Wrongful Death in Georgia: Part One," see 19 Ga. B. J. 277 (1957). For article, "Actions for Wrongful Death in Georgia: Part Two," see 19 Ga. B. J. 439 (1957). For article, "Actions for Wrongful Death in Georgia: Parts Three and Four," see 21 Ga. B. J. 339 (1959). For article arguing for inclusion of the State Board of Workers' Compensation under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (Ch. 13, T. 50), see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 269 (1965). For article, "Conflict of Laws in Damage Suits Related to Workmen's Compensation Cases," see 28 Mercer L. Rev. 497 (1977). For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with workers' compensation from June 1, 1976 through May 31, 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 269 (1978). For article, "Psychological Injury in Workers' Compensation," see 16 Ga. St. B. J. 18 (1979). For article surveying recent legislative and judicial developments regarding Georgia's insurance laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (1979). For article, "Workers' Compensation in Georgia Municipal Law," see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (1980). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of workers' compensation from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 261 (1980). For survey article on workers' compensation, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1982). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 359 (1983). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 393 (1984). For article surveying workers' compensation law in 1984-1985, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 461 (1985). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 39 Mercer L. Rev. 377 (1987). For article, "On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability," see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 843 (1987). For annual survey of law of workers' compensation, see 40 Mercer L. Rev. 487 (1988). For article, "Change in Condition v. New Accident: Old Problems Revisited," see 40 Mercer L. Rev. 961 (1989). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 429 (1989). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 505 (1990). For article, "The Status of the Workers' Compensation System in Georgia and Proposed Changes: Remedies for the Remedy," see 7 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 25 (1990). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 475 (1991). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (1992). For annual survey article on workers' compensation law, see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 493 (1993). For annual survey article on workers' compensation law, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 401 (1998). For annual survey article discussing workers' compensation law, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 505 (2000). For article, "Report of the Governor's Workers' Compensation Review Commission," see 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1241 (2004). For article, "Pandemic Preparation in the Workplace," see 12 Ga. St. B. J. 14 (2006). For article, "Medical Malpractice as Worker's Comp: Overcoming State Constitutional Barriers to Tort Reform," see 67 Emory L.J. 975 (2018).

For note, "The Worker's Compensation Insurer as a Third Party Tortfeasor in Georgia," see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 339 (1978). For note discussing compensation under this title for original injuries aggravated by subsequent injury, continued employment, or ordinary activity, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (1979).

For comment on Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275, 92 S.E.2d 103 (1956), see 19 Ga. B. J. 237 (1956).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS General Consideration Construction of Chapter Purposes of Chapter Recovery Pleading and Practice

General Consideration

Constitutionality of this chapter. - For constitutionality of the workers' compensation law, see Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S.E. 121, 59 A.L.R. 719 (1928); City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932); Garner v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container, 134 Ga. App. 917, 216 S.E.2d 709 (1975).

Intent to broaden coverage of chapter. - Recent history of this state's workers' compensation laws, especially former Code 1933, §§ 114-101 and 114-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1), evidences an unmistakable legislative intent to broaden the coverage of the workers' compensation law by expanding the scope of the word "employer." Gaither v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 144 Ga. App. 16, 240 S.E.2d 560 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978).

Public interest in industrial accidents. - Fundamental basis of workers' compensation laws is that there is a large element of public interest in accidents occurring from modern industrial conditions, and that the economic loss caused by such accidents should not necessarily rest upon the public, but that the industry in which an accident occurred shall pay, in the first instance, for the accident. Globe Indem. Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599, 134 S.E. 357 (1926).

Nature of employer's liability. - Employer is liable under the workers' compensation law without regard to fault or negligence. Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 84 S.E.2d 847 (1954).

Burden of proof. - Obligation of an employer under the workers' compensation law is not that of an absolute insurer, and hence the burden is on the claimant to prove a case to which the law is applicable. Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275, 92 S.E.2d 103 (1956), for comment, see 19 Ga. B. J. 237 (1956).

Unemployment benefits. - Receipt of unemployment benefits does not estop a claimant from receiving compensation benefits under the workers' compensation law. James v. GMC, 107 Ga. App. 588, 131 S.E.2d 58 (1963).

Code of laws. - Ordinary rules of law do not apply to actions arising under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), as the law itself constitutes a complete code of laws upon the subject. Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 182 S.E. 906 (1935).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) embodies within itself a complete code of laws upon the subject, and is complete within itself as to its own subject matter. Zachery v. Royal Indem. Co., 80 Ga. App. 659, 56 S.E.2d 812 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Freeman Decorating Co. v. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund, 175 Ga. App. 369, 333 S.E.2d 204 (1985).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) constitutes a complete code of laws upon the subject of the rights and remedies of employers, employees, and their dependents, and the Court of Appeals can neither rewrite this title nor hedge it about with restrictions not included in it. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Miniweather, 119 Ga. App. 617, 168 S.E.2d 341 (1969).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) constitutes a complete code of laws upon its administration, and no contract or agreement, whether written, oral, or implied, can in any manner operate to change the law. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Crowder, 123 Ga. App. 469, 181 S.E.2d 530 (1971).

Applicability of abusive litigation statute. - Abusive litigation statute (O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80 et seq.) does not authorize a claim for abusive litigation in the context of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34. Patterson v. Cox Enters., Inc., 201 Ga. App. 222, 411 S.E.2d 85 (1991).

Misrepresentation of the employee's physical condition in an employment application will bar workers' compensation benefits if: (1) the employee has knowingly and wilfully made a false representation as to the employee's physical condition; (2) the employer has relied upon the false representation and such reliance was a substantial factor in the hiring; and (3) there was a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Georgia Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 259 Ga. 155, 378 S.E.2d 111 (1989).

A representation made during an employment intake process, but before the employee begins actual work, may constitute a "substantial factor in the hiring" within the meaning of Georgia Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 259 Ga. 155, 378 S.E.2d 111 (1989). Fort Howard Corp. v. Devoe, 212 Ga. App. 602, 442 S.E.2d 474 (1994).

False representation defense. - Decision in Georgia Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 259 Ga. 155, 378 S.E.2d 111 (1989), adopting the false representation defense, is not inconsistent with provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, title 42 of the United States Code. Caldwell v. Aarlin/Holcombe Armature Co., 267 Ga. 613, 481 S.E.2d 196 (1997).

Misrepresentations of an employee's resident status did not bar the employee from entitlement to workers' compensation benefits when there was no showing of a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the injury the employee suffered. Dynasty Sample Co. v. Beltran, 224 Ga. App. 90, 479 S.E.2d 773 (1996).

Enforceability of out-of-state policy. - In the case of a workers' compensation policy which was executed in Tennessee, a clear limitation in the policy to Tennessee benefits did not violate public policy and was enforceable in Georgia. Travelers Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 201 Ga. App. 297, 410 S.E.2d 788, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 410 S.E.2d 788 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Yoho v. Ringier of Am., Inc., 263 Ga. 338, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993).

Sexual harassment. - Employee's common-law tort claim of assault against the employee's supervisor and their employer is not barred by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), when the supervisor's alleged acts were not in furtherance of the employer's business but independent of the relationship of master and servant and the theory of recovery against the employer sounds in common-law tort, i.e., the employer's negligence in allowing the supervisor to remain in a supervisory position with notice of the supervisor's proclivity to engage in sexually offensive conduct directed against employees. Cox v. Brazo, 165 Ga. App. 888, 303 S.E.2d 71, aff'd, 251 Ga. 491, 307 S.E.2d 474 (1983).

Injuries in navigable waters. - Fatal injury which occurred while the deceased was strictly engaged in the deceased's duty as a fisherman in navigable waters fell under maritime law and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Grant, 169 Ga. 325, 150 S.E. 424 (1929), appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 690, 50 S. Ct. 240, 74 L. Ed. 1120 (1930).

When the claimant was employed to go out in a boat into navigable waters and catch fish, and while in a navigable stream, after getting the boat back into it after it had become stuck in mud, the claimant was injured by the claimant's coat being caught in the windlass and the claimant's arm pulled into the machine, the matter was one involving exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the injury was therefore not compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Saleens v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 47 Ga. App. 532, 171 S.E. 159 (1933).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), rather than general maritime law, applied in the case of a land-based electrician's suit against an employer for injuries sustained in a boating accident which occurred within state waters while the electrician was being transported to the work site. Brockington v. Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S. Ct. 676, 112 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1991).

Concurrent jurisdiction exists under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., and the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., for injuries sustained by a stevedore on navigable waters. Allsouth Stevedoring Co. v. Wilson, 220 Ga. App. 205, 469 S.E.2d 348 (1996).

Effect of statutory amendments. - For effect of amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., on existing and terminated employment relationships, see Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 174 Ga. App. 800, 331 S.E.2d 638 (1985).

Cited in Fulton Bakery, Inc. v. Williams, 35 Ga. App. 681, 134 S.E. 621 (1926); McCoy v. Southern Lumber Co., 38 Ga. App. 251, 143 S.E. 611 (1928); United States Cas. Co. v. Burton-Pitt Lumber Co., 41 Ga. App. 405, 152 S.E. 919 (1930); Donaldson v. Central of Ga. Ry., 43 Ga. App. 480, 159 S.E. 738 (1931); Threatt v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 173 Ga. 350, 160 S.E. 379 (1931); Smith v. John T. Ragan & Co., 44 Ga. App. 111, 160 S.E. 538 (1931); Murphy v. Constitution Indem. Co., 174 Ga. 243, 162 S.E. 629 (1932); Smith v. Standard Oil Co., 178 Ga. 651, 173 S.E. 379 (1934); Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934); Swift & Co. v. Alston, 48 Ga. App. 649, 173 S.E. 741 (1934); DeKalb County v. Grice, 179 Ga. 458, 175 S.E. 804 (1934); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Co. v. Stein & Co., 50 Ga. App. 503, 179 S.E. 142 (1935); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Farr, 51 Ga. App. 147, 179 S.E. 841 (1935); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Reid, 54 Ga. App. 13, 186 S.E. 887 (1936); Hunter v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 54 Ga. App. 197, 187 S.E. 209 (1936); Martin v. State Hwy. Bd., 54 Ga. App. 856, 189 S.E. 614 (1936); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 185 Ga. 105, 194 S.E. 193 (1937); American Sur. Co. v. Castleberry, 57 Ga. App. 402, 195 S.E. 590 (1938); Ingram v. Parrish, 58 Ga. App. 463, 198 S.E. 842 (1938); Adams v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 58 Ga. App. 663, 199 S.E. 783 (1938); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Neal, 60 Ga. App. 179, 3 S.E.2d 211 (1939); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Sims, 62 Ga. App. 424, 8 S.E.2d 408 (1940); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 63 Ga. App. 763, 12 S.E.2d 110 (1940); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Lane, 64 Ga. App. 149, 12 S.E.2d 413 (1940); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Wilbanks, 64 Ga. App. 232, 12 S.E.2d 479 (1940); Richie & Co. v. Cohen, 65 Ga. App. 30, 14 S.E.2d 603 (1941); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lester, 73 Ga. App. 465, 36 S.E.2d 880 (1946); Beasley v. Burt, 201 Ga. 144, 39 S.E.2d 51 (1946); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Southwell, 78 Ga. App. 609, 51 S.E.2d 729 (1949); Holtzendorf v. Glynn, 79 Ga. App. 44, 52 S.E.2d 671 (1949); Free v. McEver, 79 Ga. App. 831, 54 S.E.2d 372 (1949); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mitchell, 82 Ga. App. 439, 61 S.E.2d 506 (1950); Mayo v. McClung, 83 Ga. App. 548, 64 S.E.2d 330 (1951); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Turk, 84 Ga. App. 547, 66 S.E.2d 364 (1951); Miller v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 86 Ga. App. 538, 71 S.E.2d 705 (1952); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Landers, 89 Ga. App. 100, 78 S.E.2d 878 (1953); Smith v. Globe Indem. Co., 89 Ga. App. 498, 80 S.E.2d 57 (1954); Combs v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 90 Ga. App. 90, 82 S.E.2d 32 (1954); Taylor v. Smith, 211 Ga. 5, 83 S.E.2d 602 (1954); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Overton, 92 Ga. App. 238, 88 S.E.2d 498 (1955); Creech v. Sirkin, 92 Ga. App. 509, 88 S.E.2d 697 (1955); Johnson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 93 Ga. App. 336, 91 S.E.2d 779 (1956); Board of Rd. & Revenue Comm'r v. Collins, 94 Ga. App. 562, 95 S.E.2d 758 (1956); DeKalb County v. Brown, 97 Ga. App. 572, 103 S.E.2d 600 (1958); Morgan County v. Craig, 97 Ga. App. 571, 103 S.E.2d 756 (1958); West End Cab Co. v. Stovall, 98 Ga. App. 724, 106 S.E.2d 810 (1958); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Giddens, 102 Ga. App. 576, 116 S.E.2d 883 (1960); Hopkins v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 103 Ga. App. 579, 120 S.E.2d 321 (1961); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Bates, 104 Ga. App. 621, 122 S.E.2d 305 (1961); Alexander v. Globe Indem. Co., 105 Ga. App. 212, 124 S.E.2d 428 (1962); Georgia Power Co. v. Carter, 110 Ga. App. 233, 138 S.E.2d 182 (1964); Carpenter v. Newcomb Devilbiss Co., 111 Ga. App. 472, 142 S.E.2d 381 (1965); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Bailey, 111 Ga. App. 609, 142 S.E.2d 388 (1965); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ga. App. 121, 166 S.E.2d 641 (1969); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., 226 Ga. 310, 174 S.E.2d 920 (1970); Mull v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 226 Ga. 462, 175 S.E.2d 552 (1970); Department of Transp. v. Livaditis, 129 Ga. App. 358, 199 S.E.2d 573 (1973); Fox v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 130 Ga. App. 104, 202 S.E.2d 568 (1973); Woods v. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 719, 213 S.E.2d 22 (1975); Employers Ins. v. Nolen, 137 Ga. App. 205, 223 S.E.2d 250 (1976); Moone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Ga. App. 629, 244 S.E.2d 148 (1978); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Ashbaugh, 147 Ga. App. 392, 249 S.E.2d 96 (1978); University Cab, Inc. v. Fagan, 150 Ga. App. 404, 258 S.E.2d 21 (1979); Samuel v. Baitcher, 154 Ga. App. 602, 269 S.E.2d 96 (1980); Mansfield Enters., Inc. v. Warren, 154 Ga. App. 863, 270 S.E.2d 72 (1980); Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980); Spencer v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Lowe v. Chemical Sealing Corp., 535 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 349, 304 S.E.2d 409 (1983); Mattison v. Travelers Indem. Co., 167 Ga. App. 521, 307 S.E.2d 39 (1983); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Barth, 167 Ga. App. 605, 307 S.E.2d 113 (1983); Southern Fried Chicken v. Thermo-King Corp., 172 Ga. App. 454, 323 S.E.2d 291 (1984); Jackson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 178 Ga. App. 673, 344 S.E.2d 495 (1986).

Construction of Chapter

Liberal construction. - Although the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is in derogation of the common law, due to its beneficent purposes it should, when construction is necessary, be given a liberal construction. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

Liberal construction must be given to the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) to effectuate the humane purposes for which it was enacted. Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515, 43 S.E.2d 780 (1947); Coulter v. Royal Indem. Co., 95 Ga. App. 124, 97 S.E.2d 358, rev'd on other grounds, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957); Schwartz v. Greenbaum, 236 Ga. 476, 224 S.E.2d 38 (1976).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) should be liberally construed. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 87 Ga. App. 198, 73 S.E.2d 517 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Souther, 110 Ga. App. 84, 137 S.E.2d 705 (1964); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Cooley, 118 Ga. App. 46, 162 S.E.2d 821 (1968).

Ordinary acceptance of chapter's terms. - When its language is such as to render judicial construction necessary, nevertheless a reasonable and logical application of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) should be had according to the ordinary acceptance and significance of its terms. Harden v. United States Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 340, 175 S.E. 404 (1934).

Reasonable and logical application of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) should be had according to the ordinary and usual acceptance and significance of its terms. Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 71 Ga. App. 184, 30 S.E.2d 420 (1944).

Prevention of miscarriage of compensation purposes. - Compensation act will be reasonably construed so as to prevent, if possible, miscarriage of the objects and benefits for which it is designed. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maddox, 52 Ga. App. 416, 183 S.E. 570 (1935).

Interpretation in favor of claimants. - In order to accomplish its beneficent purposes, the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is to be interpreted liberally in favor of those claiming compensation. GMC, Fisher Body Div. v. Bowman, 107 Ga. App. 335, 130 S.E.2d 163 (1963); GMC v. Hargis, 114 Ga. App. 143, 150 S.E.2d 303 (1966).

Necessary meaning of terms. - While the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is to be given a liberal construction when necessary to effectuate its beneficent purposes, this rule does not authorize a construction beyond what appears to be the necessary meaning of its terms. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Neal, 188 Ga. 105, 3 S.E.2d 80 (1939).

Intent of legislature. - Liberal construction of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) can only be had when judicial interpretation is necessary, and the law should not be so liberally construed as to defeat the purposes and intents of the legislation. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. McLain, 49 Ga. App. 177, 174 S.E. 726 (1934).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) should be liberally construed so as to effect the purposes intended by the legislature in its enactment. Ware v. Swift & Co., 59 Ga. App. 836, 2 S.E.2d 128 (1939); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Dempsey, 94 Ga. App. 408, 94 S.E.2d 749 (1956).

Remedial purposes. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), although in derogation of the common law, is highly remedial in character and should be liberally and broadly construed to effect its beneficent purposes. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Cox, 41 Ga. App. 329, 153 S.E. 227 (1930); Harden v. United States Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 340, 175 S.E. 404 (1934); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 585, 178 S.E. 472 (1935); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maddox, 52 Ga. App. 416, 183 S.E. 570 (1935); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Sockwell, 58 Ga. App. 111, 197 S.E. 647 (1938); Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 71 Ga. App. 184, 30 S.E.2d 420 (1944); Zachery v. Royal Indem. Co., 80 Ga. App. 659, 56 S.E.2d 812 (1949); Coulter v. Royal Indem. Co., 95 Ga. App. 124, 97 S.E.2d 358, rev'd on other grounds, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957); McElreath v. McElreath, 155 Ga. App. 826, 273 S.E.2d 205 (1980).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is a remedial statute and must be given a liberal construction. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. McLain, 49 Ga. App. 177, 174 S.E. 726 (1934).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is remedial and has a beneficent purpose, and it should be accorded a liberal and broad construction or interpretation in order to promote or effectuate its purposes. Continental Cas. Co. v. Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 181 S.E. 126 (1935), aff'd, 182 Ga. 608, 186 S.E. 683 (1936).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is to be interpreted liberally to effectuate its remedial purposes. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gaither, 148 Ga. App. 251, 251 S.E.2d 66 (1978).

Humanitarian purpose. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is a humanitarian measure providing relief to injured employees and protecting employers from excessive damage awards, and should be liberally interpreted to carry out this purpose. Samuel v. Baitcher, 247 Ga. 71, 274 S.E.2d 327 (1981).

Beneficent purposes. - While the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is in derogation of the common law, yet, in view of its beneficent purpose and remedial character, it should be so liberally and broadly construed as to effect its general purpose in every instance in which its language is such as to render judicial interpretation necessary. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); Van Treeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 204, 121 S.E. 215 (1924); Austin Bros. Bridge Co. v. Whitmire, 31 Ga. App. 560, 121 S.E. 345 (1924).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is to be construed reasonably and liberally, with a view of applying its beneficent provisions so as to effectuate its purposes, and to extend them to every class of workman and employee that can fairly be brought within its provisions. Gaither v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 144 Ga. App. 16, 240 S.E.2d 560 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978); Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ga. App. 179, 257 S.E.2d 44 (1979).

Purposes of Chapter

Public demand. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) arose from public demand and attempts to solve certain pressing problems which have arisen out of the changed industrial conditions of our time. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

Protection from economic hazards. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) was enacted to protect the worker in some measure from economic hazards consequent upon the worker's exposure to today's manifold industrial hazards to life and health. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pioda, 90 Ga. App. 593, 83 S.E.2d 627 (1954).

Insurance against personal injuries. - Purpose of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is to insure the workman against personal injuries not expected or designed by the workman personally, provided such injury arises out of and in the course of employment. Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934).

Injuries resulting from employer's negligence. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) was intended to include injuries resulting from the negligence of the employer in every particular, whether arising under common law or statutory duties, and the pain and suffering incident to such injuries. Reid v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 58 Ga. App. 184, 197 S.E. 904 (1938).

Protection from want. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) was adopted to protect working individuals and their dependents from want in case of injury, on the theory that contributory negligence, the doctrine of fellow servant negligence, and assumption of risk are inapplicable. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

Alleviation of human suffering. - Purpose of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is to alleviate human suffering and to contribute to human need when accidental injury is suffered in the manner prescribed thereby. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

Immediate financial assistance. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) attempts to provide immediate financial assistance for injured employees, without regard to whether or not the injury resulted from the fault of the employer, the single and only requirement being that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944).

Scheduled and limited rate of compensation. - One of the main objects of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) was to enable an injured employee to recover from an employer according to a scheduled and limited rate of compensation, regardless of assumption of risk or of whose negligence caused the injury, thus assuring the employee of some compensation for the injury and assuring the employer that the employer's liability will be limited. Critchfield v. Aikin, 33 Ga. App. 668, 127 S.E. 816 (1925); Horn v. Planters' Prods. Co., 40 Ga. App. 787, 151 S.E. 552 (1930).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is intended to establish rates of compensation for personal injuries or death sustained by employees in the course of employment. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 178 S.E. 728 (1935).

Replacement of common law rules. - Purpose of workers' compensation legislation was to do away with common law rules governing actions by employees under the law of master and servant, and to replace such an antique system with one that provided absolute liability of the employer and fixed compensation for accidental injury or death. Sands v. Union Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977).

Method of settling disputes. - Design of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is to furnish speedy, inexpensive, and final settlement of the claims of injured employees. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) abhors and shuns protracted and complicated litigation over the facts of any case. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936).

Intent of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) was to substitute its procedure for the former methods of settling disputes arising between those occupying the strict relationship of master and servant or employer and employee. Denis Aerial Ag-Plicators, Inc. v. Swift, 154 Ga. App. 742, 269 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

Health and accident insurance. - Purpose of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) was to substitute a method of accident insurance in place of common law rights and liabilities for substantially all employees. Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944).

Workers' compensation is in the nature of health and accident insurance against injuries which arise out of and in the course of the worker's employment. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pioda, 90 Ga. App. 593, 83 S.E.2d 627 (1954).

Workers' statutory compensation is not in the nature of damages awarded for injury, and is not intended to give full satisfaction for an injury; it is more like benefits provided ex contractu under a policy of insurance. Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 84 S.E.2d 847 (1954).

Life insurance. - Workers' compensation has never been like life insurance. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Russell, 246 Ga. 269, 271 S.E.2d 178 (1980).

Means of escape from personal injury litigation. - Legislature has endeavored by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) to provide a means by which an employer and employee may, if they so choose, escape entirely from that very troublesome factor known as "personal injury litigation," through a system by which every employee not guilty of willful misconduct may obtain at once a reasonable recompense for injuries accidentally received in employment, without lawsuit and without friction. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

Bearing of financial losses caused by injury. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is founded on the basic principle that industry should be made to bear the financial losses sustained through personal injuries by the workmen engaged therein, and its purpose is to furnish a remedy that will reach every injury sustained by a workman engaged in that industry; thus, compensation is awarded without reference to the fault of the employer or the care of the employee. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is based on the broad economic theory that workers' compensation is properly chargeable as a part of the costs of industrial activity and production. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

Benefit of both employers and employees. - While the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) severely limits the maximum amount of recovery in a strong case of serious injury, and is in this respect beneficial to the employer, it was the manifest purpose of the legislature to distribute a portion of such savings to the unfortunate employee whose case is weak but who is injured nevertheless. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

Recovery

Pro rata reduction of social security benefits. - Reduction in existing social security benefits so as to reflect workers' compensation payments to a beneficiary has a rational legislative basis and does not violate the due process clause. Massey v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 368 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Ga. 1973).

Limitations on right of recovery. - Court is not at liberty to impose any limitations or exceptions upon an employee's statutory right to recover compensation in the absence of a clear legislative intent. GMC v. Hargis, 114 Ga. App. 143, 150 S.E.2d 303 (1966).

Maximum recovery established. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) fixes the maximum that can be recovered by any employee, and thus protects employers against excessive recoveries of damages. Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944).

Accidents outside employment. - Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) does not provide for general insurance or for general accident insurance, and covers neither accidents sustained nor diseases contracted by an employee outside of employment. Carroll v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 73 Ga. App. 799, 38 S.E.2d 185 (1946).

Pleading and Practice

Cause of action. - In order to have a cause of action under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), a claimant need not have a cause of action under the laws applicable when workers' compensation is not involved; to hold otherwise would defeat the very object of the chapter. Critchfield v. Aikin, 33 Ga. App. 668, 127 S.E. 816 (1925).

Pleading and procedure. - Technical niceties of pleading and procedure are not required in the administration of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. McLain, 49 Ga. App. 177, 174 S.E. 726 (1934).

Common-law claims. - Constructions of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., proffered to the courts, which would, if accepted, operate in derogation of a party's common-law right of action, must be rejected. George v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 254 Ga. 95, 326 S.E.2d 744 (1985).

Renewal statute inapplicable. - Former Code 1933, § 3-808 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61), prescribing that when an action was dismissed a renewal may be had within six months, had no application under the workers' compensation law. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. McLain, 49 Ga. App. 177, 174 S.E. 726 (1934).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Medical services for work release inmates. - The Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Department of Corrections) is ultimately responsible for the payment of medical services for work release inmates. O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34, when applicable, provides the primary statutory remedy for payment of medical services when such services are provided to a work release inmate who sustains work-related injuries, but, upon default by the employer under that chapter, the Department of Offender Rehabilitation is ultimately responsible for paying the provider of those medical services. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-27.

Enforcement of aggravated identity fraud statute. - Investigators of the Enforcement Division who are certified as peace officers may enforce the aggravated identity fraud statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-121.1, by arrest and the execution of search warrants provided that the arrest and search is the result of a criminal investigation of an alleged violation of the workers' compensation laws of O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34. 2012 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12-3.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Failure to Provide Safe Work Place, 2 POF2d 517.

Accident Occurring in Course of Employment - "Dual Purpose" Doctrine, 10 POF2d 505.

Dependency of Child Who Has Attained Majority - Workers' Compensation, 11 POF2d 423.

"Casual Worker" Under Workers' Compensation Act, 24 POF2d 439.

Disability Resulting from Mental Stress, 25 POF2d 1.

Special Mission Exception to Going-and-Coming Rule, 32 POF2d 199.

Employer's Tort Liability Under Dual Capacity Doctrine, 40 POF2d 603.

Injury Occurring During Social, Recreational, or Athletic Activity, 42 POF2d 481.

Employer's Liability for Failure to Recognize Employee's Medical Problem, 45 POF2d 339.

Forensic Audiology - Worker's Compensation for Noise-Induced Hearing Loss, 46 POF2d 221.

Employer's Intentional Misconduct, 48 POF2d 1.

Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for Filing Worker's Compensation Claim, 50 POF2d 187.

Workers' Compensation for Attendant Care Services by Family Members, 7 POF3d 143.

Amputation Damages - Phantom Pain and Stump Pain, 9 POF3d 207.

Compensable Coronary Episode (Heart Attack), 10 POF3d 669.

Proof of Employer Liability for Employee Injury From Third Person Attack, 53 POF3d 373.

Tornado, Hurricane, or Other Violent Windstorm Causing Injury to Employee, 80 POF3d 95.

Lightning or Electrical Storm Causing Injury or Death to Employee, 81 POF3d 1.

Seamen's Injuries, 9 Am. Jur. Trials 665.

Workmen's Compensation - Back Injuries, 10 Am. Jur. Trials 589.

Litigation under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 11 Am. Jur. Trials 397.

Handling Claims for Injuries to Longshoremen, 14 Am. Jur. Trials 563.

Security Hearings and Appeals in Disability Cases, 24 Am. Jur. Trials 699.

Workmen's Compensation - Employment Party Injury Litigation, 26 Am. Jur. Trials 645.

Workers' Compensation: Compensability of Multiple Sclerosis, 36 Am. Jur. Trials 573.

Use of Videotape Surveillance to Prove Workers' Compensation Fraud, 66 Am. Jur. Trials 1.

Railroad Health and Safety; a Litigator's Guide, 72 Am. Jur. Trials 1.

Sexual Harassment Damages and Remedies, 73 Am. Jur. Trials 1.

Obtaining Workers' Compensation for Back Injuries, 79 Am. Jur. Trials 231.

Litigation Welding Fume-Induced Parkinsonism Cases, 95 Am. Jur. Trials 91.

Cosmetics and Related Products: Facing the Litigation, 96 Am. Jur. Trials 115.

Defending the Workers' Compensation Claim in the Trucking Industry, 99 Am. Jur. Trials 1.

ALR. - Extraterritorial operation of Workmen's Compensation Statutes; conflict of laws, 3 A.L.R. 1351; 18 A.L.R. 292; 28 A.L.R. 1345; 35 A.L.R. 1414; 45 A.L.R. 1234; 59 A.L.R. 735; 82 A.L.R. 709; 90 A.L.R. 119.

Constitutionality of Workmen's Compensation Act giving choice of remedies exclusively to either employer or employee, 6 A.L.R. 1562.

Workmen's compensation, insolvency of insurer or employer, as affecting liability for compensation, 8 A.L.R. 1346.

Constitutionality of provisions of workmen's compensation acts which are limited to residents of the state, 12 A.L.R. 1207; 147 A.L.R. 925.

Applicability of compensation acts to watchman, 13 A.L.R. 512.

Workmen's compensation: injury as result of labor trouble, 13 A.L.R. 549; 31 A.L.R. 1085.

Workmen's compensation: power of commission to make award against self-insurer, 13 A.L.R. 1385.

Workmen's compensation: constitutionality and construction of provisions directed against noninsuring or self-insuring employers, 18 A.L.R. 267.

Workmen's compensation: rights and remedies where employee was injured by third person's negligence, 19 A.L.R. 766; 27 A.L.R. 493; 37 A.L.R. 838; 67 A.L.R. 249; 88 A.L.R. 665; 106 A.L.R. 1040.

Workmen's compensation: injury received while doing prohibited act, 26 A.L.R. 166; 58 A.L.R. 197; 83 A.L.R. 1211; 119 A.L.R. 1409.

Judgment in an action for death as a bar to another action for the same death in another jurisdiction or under another statute, 26 A.L.R. 984; 53 A.L.R. 1275.

Workmen's compensation: extent of power of legislature to define hazardous employment, 28 A.L.R. 1222.

Workmen's Compensation Act: one working out road tax as within act, 31 A.L.R. 1286.

Applicability of state statutes and rules of law to actions under Federal Employers' Liability Act, 36 A.L.R. 917; 89 A.L.R. 693.

Submission of rejected claim under Workmen's Compensation Act as affecting independent action for death or injury, 36 A.L.R. 1293.

Accident and disability insurance: when insured deemed to be totally and continuously unable to transact all business duties, 37 A.L.R. 151; 41 A.L.R. 1376; 51 A.L.R. 1048; 79 A.L.R. 857; 98 A.L.R. 789; 39 A.L.R.3d 1026.

Workmen's compensation: injury from assault, 40 A.L.R. 1122; 72 A.L.R. 110; 112 A.L.R. 1258.

Retroactive effort of provision for reduction or increase of award under Workmen's Compensation Act, 40 A.L.R. 1473.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee on his way to or from work on premises of employer's customer, 40 A.L.R. 1477.

Recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act for service rendered by one spouse to another, 44 A.L.R. 697.

Injury after closing of lumber camp or other isolated place of work as within Workmen's Compensation or Employers' Liability Act, 45 A.L.R. 823.

Insurance under Workmen's Compensation Act as coextensive with the insured's liability under act, 45 A.L.R. 1329; 108 A.L.R. 812.

Workmen's compensation: street risks incurred in course of employment, 51 A.L.R. 509; 80 A.L.R. 126.

Survival of right to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act upon the death of the person entitled to the award, 51 A.L.R. 1446.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee who is resting during working hours as arising out of and in the course of his employment, 55 A.L.R. 981.

Workmen's compensation: death or injury while traveling as arising out of and in the course of employment, 63 A.L.R. 469; 100 A.L.R. 1053.

Who are within provisions of workmen's compensation acts relating to hazardous employments or occupations, 83 A.L.R. 1018.

Workmen's compensation: when prescriptive period begins to run in case of occupational or industrial disease, 86 A.L.R. 572.

Workmen's compensation: injuries incident to performance of employer's work in whole or part at employee's home, 92 A.L.R. 1036.

What is "seasonal" employment within provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 93 A.L.R. 308.

Duty of receiver of self-insurer employer to continue payments under award made under workmen's compensation act prior to receivership, 94 A.L.R. 863.

Workmen's compensation: claim or action against one as third party as precluding action or claim against him as employer, or vice versa, 98 A.L.R. 416.

Action by employee for injury as claim, or notice of claim, under Workmen's Compensation Act, 98 A.L.R. 529.

Settlement of claim or recovery against physician or surgeon or one responsible for his malpractice on account of aggravation of injury as affecting right to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, 98 A.L.R. 1392.

Workmen's Compensation Act as precluding common-law action by husband or wife of the injured employee, 104 A.L.R. 346.

State Workmen's Compensation Act as precluding action based on noncompliance with Federal Safety Appliance Act to recover for death or injury to railroad employee while engaged in intrastate commerce, 104 A.L.R. 839.

Workmen's compensation: termination of employment before occurrence of disability or disease attributable to employment as affecting right to compensation, 104 A.L.R. 1210.

Construction and application of provisions of workmen's compensation acts regarding allowance for aggravation of injury from same accident after time limited for filing claim, 105 A.L.R. 971.

Construction and application of term "business" as used in provisions of workmen's compensation acts, 106 A.L.R. 1502.

National bank or receiver thereof as within state Workmen's Compensation Act, 113 A.L.R. 1454.

Construction, application, and effect of provision of workmen's compensation and employers' liability policy as regards employees not within operation of compensation acts, 117 A.L.R. 1299.

Workmen's compensation: presumption or inference that accidental death of employee arose out of and in course of employment, 120 A.L.R. 683.

Attachment or garnishment with respect to award (or judgment thereon) under Workmen's Compensation Act, 126 A.L.R. 150.

Injury to employee in course of employment but away from employer's place of business, due to a cause or risk to which others are also subject, as arising out of the employment, within Workmen's Compensation Act, 139 A.L.R. 1472.

What amounts to withdrawal or termination of election by employer to come within Workmen's Compensation Act, 145 A.L.R. 921.

Liability of insurance carrier under Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of personal injury to or death of employee where because of relationship between employee and employer recovery would inure in whole or in part to employer, 147 A.L.R. 115.

Workmen's compensation: leaving state or locality of employment after the injury as affecting right to compensation, 162 A.L.R. 1462.

Workmen's Compensation Act: voluntary payment of compensation under statute of one state as bar to claim on ground for reduction of claim of compensation under statute of another state, 8 A.L.R.2d 628.

Declaratory relief with respect to unemployment compensation, 14 A.L.R.2d 826.

Matters concluded, in action at law to recover for the same injury, by decision or finding made in workmen's compensation proceeding, 84 A.L.R.2d 1036.

Necessity and sufficiency of showing that "substantial and gainful activity" is available to disability claimant under Federal Social Security Act, 22 A.L.R.3d 440.

Validity and construction of accident insurance policy provision making benefits conditional on disability occurring immediately, or at once, or within specified time of accident, 39 A.L.R.3d 1026.

Master and servant: employer's liability for injury caused by food or drink purchased by employee in plant facilities, 50 A.L.R.3d 505.

Liability for injury or death of participant in theatrical performance or spectacle, 67 A.L.R.3d 451.

Modern status of effect of state Workmen's Compensation Act on right of third-person tortfeasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 350.

Cancer as compensable under workers' compensation acts, 19 A.L.R.4th 639.

Workmen's compensation: recovery for discharge in retaliation for filing claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Right of health or accident insurer to intervene in workers' compensation proceeding to recover benefits previously paid to claimant or beneficiary, 38 A.L.R.4th 355.

Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as compensable, 52 A.L.R.4th 731.

Workers' Compensation Act as precluding tort action for injury to or death of employee's unborn child, 55 A.L.R.4th 792.

Workers' Compensation: injuries incurred during labor activity, 61 A.L.R.4th 196.

Workers' compensation: injuries incurred while traveling to or from work with employer's receipts, 63 A.L.R.4th 253.

Workers' Compensation: recovery for home service provided by spouse, 67 A.L.R.4th 765.

Divorce and separation: workers' compensation benefits as marital property subject to distribution, 30 A.L.R.5th 139.

Validity, construction, and application of state workers' compensation laws specifically providing for facial disfigurement, 11 A.L.R.7th 7.

- - - - - - - - - -

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Law reviews. - For note on 1995 amendments and enactments of Code sections in this article, see 12 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 271, 276, and 280 (1995).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Enforcement of judgment of State Board of Workers' Compensation. - Given that the remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., was available to the claimant, the claimant was not left unprotected because the claimant did not assert or show, either below or on appeal, that any of the difficult or impossible circumstances in enforcing any judgment obtained by the State Board of Workers' Compensation existed in the claimant's case, and the claimant's guesses or speculation about them were insufficient on summary judgment. Saxon v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, 339 Ga. App. 495, 793 S.E.2d 659 (2016).

Consistent enforcement. - In the claimant's tort claims against a co-worker and the employer, the enforcement of the employer's automobile insurance policies' exclusion provisions did not violate federal and Georgia public policy of requiring statutory compulsory minimum automobile limits coverage because the claimant did not point to any evidence showing that the remedy available to the claimant under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., was inadequate; the claimant did not cite any federal public policy that was violated; and the policies' exclusion provisions were consistent with Georgia's liability and Workers Compensation statutes, and were enforceable. Saxon v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Company, 339 Ga. App. 495, 793 S.E.2d 659 (2016).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. - Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli - compensability of particular injuries and illnesses, 20 A.L.R.6th 641.