Settlements encouraged.

- It is the general policy of the law to encourage settlements of disputes, and under this section, settlements of claims under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) were encouraged. Cardin v. Riegel Textile Corp., 217 Ga. 797, 125 S.E.2d 62 (1962).

First few sentences of this section express the intent of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) to encourage settlements and recognize the validity and binding effect of a settlement filed with and approved by the board, if the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with the law. National Engine Rebuilding, Inc. v. Noles, 116 Ga. App. 762, 159 S.E.2d 178 (1967).

Principal purpose of settlement agreement is to show compensable injury and amount of compensation agreed upon. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Carter, 116 Ga. App. 737, 158 S.E.2d 271 (1967).

This section referred to settlements entered upon before award of compensation was made by the department (now the board), but the same rule applied after such award was made. Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 182 S.E. 906 (1935).

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15 provides the sole method by which claims arising under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., may be settled. Caldwell v. Perry, 179 Ga. App. 682, 347 S.E.2d 286 (1986).

Exclusivity requirements not shown.

- Because, on the record, there was no evidence that compensation was paid to an injured person pursuant to a board-approved settlement agreement reached by the parties in a workers' compensation claim, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to a spa in the injured person's premises liability suit arising from the same incident on the basis that the suit was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions. Theesfeld v. Image Electrolysis & Skin Care, Inc., 274 Ga. App. 38, 619 S.E.2d 303 (2005).

Conditions for execution of compromise settlement.

- This section imposed two conditions which were essential to a valid settlement between employer and employee: (1) time and manner of payment must be in accordance with the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.); and (2) agreement must be approved by the department (now the board). Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 182 S.E. 906 (1935).

Compromise settlements of claims were permitted under this section when the following facts appeared: both sides must be represented by counsel; the dispute regarding the factum or amount of compensation or the applicability of the act must be bona fide; the parties must agree; the agreement must be reasonable under the evidence available at the time; and it must be approved by the board. Proctor v. Dixie Bell Mills, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 787, 149 S.E.2d 550 (1966).

Counsel requirement deleted.

- Prior to 1975, it was necessary that claimant before the board be represented by counsel if a settlement agreement was to have the binding effect of res judicata, and this requirement was mandatory and nonwaivable; in 1975, however, this section was amended to delete that requirement. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Rutledge, 146 Ga. App. 35, 245 S.E.2d 328 (1978).

When counsel required in execution of settlement.

- When there is a bona fide dispute as to compensation due claimant, and parties reach a settlement, for such settlement to be valid it is necessary that both parties be represented by counsel; however, it is not necessary that the parties be represented by counsel when they have executed a standard form agreement to pay compensation and it has been approved by the board. Gardner v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 145 Ga. App. 863, 245 S.E.2d 19 (1978).

Lump sum settlements governed by § 34-9-222. - The only authority vested in the department (now the board) to approve lump sum settlements is that conferred by former Code 1933, § 114-417 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-222). Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 182 S.E. 906 (1935).

Former Code 1933, § 114-106 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15) provided that the employer may voluntarily assume the obligation which the workers' compensation laws (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) imposed upon the employer, without being ordered to do so by the department (now the board); if the department (board) approves such a settlement, or if no such settlement is made and the department (board) enters an award against the employer, the employer may then contract with the employee, or the beneficiary of a deceased employee, to discharge the obligation imposed upon the employer in accordance with former Code 1933, § 114-417 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-222) by redeeming the amount to be paid in weekly sums by the payment of a lump sum. Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 182 S.E. 906 (1935).

Approved agreement equivalent to award.

- Approval by the board of an agreement between the parties for payment of compensation has the same effect as an award. National Union Ins. Co. v. Mills, 99 Ga. App. 697, 109 S.E.2d 830 (1959).

Res judicata effect of approved agreement.

- Agreement fixing compensation between employer and employee, approved by the board and not appealed from, is res judicata as to the matters therein determined, and the parties are precluded from thereafter contradicting or challenging the matters thus agreed upon. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gipson, 104 Ga. App. 108, 121 S.E.2d 256 (1961); Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 244 Ga. 165, 259 S.E.2d 429 (1979).

Settlement agreement filed with and approved by the board was res judicata under this section, and was as binding on the parties as if the claim had been tried and a final award entered. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. King, 104 Ga. App. 261, 121 S.E.2d 284 (1961).

Agreement to pay compensation for total temporary loss of use of a specific member is res judicata as to the degree of disability and the amount of compensation due the employee, until such time as it is changed in a manner provided by law. Vivian v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 159, 166 S.E.2d 399 (1969).

Original settlement agreement approved by the board is res judicata and is binding on the parties as if the claim had been tried and a final award entered. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 137 Ga. App. 79, 222 S.E.2d 885 (1975), overruled as to its holding that the average weekly wage could be relitigated in a change of condition hearing, Burkhart v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 239 Ga. 608, 238 S.E.2d 400 (1977).

Conclusiveness of agreement dates from execution thereof.

- Conclusiveness established by an agreement filed with and approved by the board that an employee has suffered an injury compensable under the terms of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) dates from the moment of execution of the agreement. Bump v. Continental Cas. Co., 109 Ga. App. 228, 136 S.E.2d 14 (1964).

Agreement not binding until approved.

- Settlement agreement is not binding, though filed with the board, until it has been approved. Taylor v. Sunnyland Packing Co., 112 Ga. App. 544, 145 S.E.2d 587 (1965).

Employee was bound by a settlement agreement for a discrimination case that the employee signed upon advice of counsel; however, the settlement could not permit the release of the employee's workers' compensation claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-10 and34-9-15 when the settlement had not been approved by the Workers' Compensation Board. Young v. JCB Mfg., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2008).

Court without authority to enter judgment pursuant to agreement not approved by board.

- When the department (now the board), on hearing a claim for compensation, made an award in favor of claimant for compensation payable in a certain amount weekly during disability, judge of the superior court, in considering the case on appeal, had no authority to render a judgment against the insurance carrier and in favor of claimant for a lump sum, in full and final settlement of the claim, pursuant to an agreement between the insurance carrier and claimant, not approved by the department (board). Department of Indus. Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883 (1933).

Release not submitted to board void.

- A worker's release of an employer from various claims, which release was never submitted to or approved by the board, was void and had no effect as to any claim for benefits, regardless of whether a claim was pending or contemplated when the settlement was attempted. Caldwell v. Perry, 179 Ga. App. 682, 347 S.E.2d 286 (1986).

Agreement binding absent fraud, accident, or mistake.

- Agreement between injured employee and an employer, providing for compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), is, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, binding on the parties. Cardin v. Riegel Textile Corp., 217 Ga. 797, 125 S.E.2d 62 (1962).

Movant guilty of negligence not entitled to have agreement set aside.

- When an agreement between claimant and employer has been approved by the board and no appeal is taken therefrom, it cannot be set aside because of fraud, accident, or mistake when it is shown that the movant was guilty of negligence in entering into the agreement. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Hix, 120 Ga. App. 415, 170 S.E.2d 762 (1969).

Procedure for alleging defect in proceedings.

- If there was any defect in the procedure followed by the parties and board, the claimant should contest the board's decision and not bring a civil action to attack the workers' compensation judgment alleging fraud. O'Neal v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 169 Ga. App. 483, 313 S.E.2d 501 (1984).

Delay in the performance of a ministerial function by clerk of the board is inconsequential as, under the language of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15, a settlement agreement becomes binding on the date of approval. Denton v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 158 Ga. App. 849, 282 S.E.2d 350 (1981).

Withdrawal of acceptance of offer of settlement.

- Any settlement that may be reached between an employer and an employee represents no more than their proposed mutual offer to settle, which offer must be accepted and approved by the board before a binding settlement agreement between them is created. When the claimants withdrew their consent to the mutual offer before the board could accept and approve it, the board correctly refused to enforce the settlement agreement. Justice v. Davidson Kennedy Co., 194 Ga. App. 585, 391 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 911, 391 S.E.2d 414 (1990).

Equity has jurisdiction to relieve against agreements entered upon in violation of the terms of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), by reason of which the beneficiary of an award of compensation is prevented from enforcing the award according to its terms. Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 182 S.E. 906 (1935).

Declining payment until claim determined to be compensable.

- A workers' compensation insurer was authorized to controvert and decline to pay a medical claim until such time as the board determined whether it was compensable under a settlement agreement, and seeking judicial enforcement of the agreement prior to that determination was premature. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Davis, 253 Ga. 376, 320 S.E.2d 368 (1984).

Denial of claim for medical expenses incurred after approval of settlement proper.

- When an approved settlement stipulated that it was in full, final, and complete settlement of any claims arising out of compensable injury, superior court did not err in affirming award of the board denying claim for medical expenses incurred after approval of the settlement. Stone v. Citizens Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 805, 152 S.E.2d 894 (1966).

Discontinuance of payments after award or agreement.

- When claimant is entitled to compensation payments under an award of the board or an agreement between the parties, employer or its insurance carrier cannot discontinue payments thereunder until the claim has been paid in full or has been settled between the parties, or until a new award or order of the board authorizes such discontinuance. American Cas. Co. v. Herron, 102 Ga. App. 658, 117 S.E.2d 172 (1960).

New agreement following award.

- If parties to original award enter into a new agreement effecting a change in the compensation payable, approval of such agreement by the board is not authorized unless the agreement stipulates facts showing that claimant's condition has changed since original award or agreement. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 112 Ga. App. 452, 145 S.E.2d 645 (1965).

Adjudication of change in condition does not result from approved agreement unless facts are stipulated in it showing a change in employee's condition. Taylor v. Sunnyland Packing Co., 112 Ga. App. 544, 145 S.E.2d 587 (1965).

Penalty for late payment of benefits improperly reversed.

- It was error to reverse a penalty assessed against an employer under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(f) on the basis of a finding that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b) gave the board discretion not to assess the penalty because the employee and the employer reached an approved liability stipulated settlement after a compensable injury was established, and the employer did not pay benefits within 20 days of the adoption of that agreement by the Workers' Compensation Board and the issuance of an award based thereon; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-15(b) only applied to no-liability stipulated settlements, and the parties entered into an approved liability stipulated settlement. Brewer v. Wellstar Health System, 314 Ga. App. 234, 723 S.E.2d 526 (2012).

Cited in Thomas v. Macken, 37 Ga. App. 624, 141 S.E. 316 (1928); New York Indem. Co. v. Allen, 47 Ga. App. 657, 171 S.E. 191 (1933); Attaway v. First Nat'l Bank, 49 Ga. App. 270, 175 S.E. 258 (1934); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Stephens, 76 Ga. App. 723, 47 S.E.2d 108 (1948); Wiley v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 76 Ga. App. 862, 47 S.E.2d 652 (1948); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Brown, 81 Ga. App. 790, 60 S.E.2d 245 (1950); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Shoemake, 105 Ga. App. 432, 124 S.E.2d 653 (1962); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Parham, 218 Ga. 640, 129 S.E.2d 868 (1963); Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Gaudio, 116 Ga. App. 672, 158 S.E.2d 680 (1967); Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Gates, 225 Ga. 824, 171 S.E.2d 723 (1969); Williams v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 121 Ga. App. 175, 173 S.E.2d 250 (1970); Bowen v. Sentry Ins. Co., 134 Ga. App. 88, 213 S.E.2d 185 (1975); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Puckett, 139 Ga. App. 772, 229 S.E.2d 550 (1976); GMC v. Dover, 239 Ga. 611, 238 S.E.2d 403 (1977); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Barden, 179 Ga. App. 442, 346 S.E.2d 588 (1986); Don Mac Golf Shaping Co. v. Register, 185 Ga. App. 159, 363 S.E.2d 583 (1987); King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 568, 415 S.E.2d 176 (1992); Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 731 S.E.2d 731 (2012).

C.J.S.

- 100 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, §§ 871, 878 et seq.

ALR.

- Judgment against or settlement by person responsible for a personal injury as affecting his liability on account of improper medical or surgical treatment of injured person, 29 A.L.R. 1313.

Construction and effect of provision of Workmen's Compensation Act as to "waiver" or "compromise" of claims, 65 A.L.R. 160.

Validity of agreement by injured employee that employer shall have benefit of workmen's compensation, 96 A.L.R. 1019.

Settlement of claim or recovery against physician or surgeon or one responsible for his malpractice on account of aggravation of injury as affecting right to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, 98 A.L.R. 1392.

Relief from settlement or compromise of claim under Workmen's Compensation Act upon ground of fraud or mistake respecting amount of compensation to which employee was entitled, 121 A.L.R. 1270.

Workmen's compensation: right of employer or insurance carrier to discontinue, without an order or ruling in that regard, payments provided for by agreement, 129 A.L.R. 418.

Workmen's compensation: character or status of right or claim within provision of act requiring or authorizing approval by the court or commission of settlement or compromise, 153 A.L.R. 285.