Constitutionality.

- This section provided for judgment in superior court on memorandum from the board was not violative of the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. Taylor v. Woodall, 183 Ga. 122, 187 S.E. 697 (1936).

Summary procedure authorized by this section enabled a superior court to render judgment based on an award of the board without notice to or a hearing on behalf of the employer and insurer, and its provisions in this respect did not violate constitutional due process. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 119 Ga. App. 565, 168 S.E.2d 204 (1969); West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Springfield, 140 Ga. App. 530, 231 S.E.2d 811 (1976).

Entry of a judgment and the issuance of an execution under this section were administrative only and the equivalent of a determination of an amount due under a former final periodic payment judgment. The entry of the judgment and issuance of an execution under that statute did not amount to a "taking" or deprivation of property. West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Springfield, 238 Ga. 655, 235 S.E.2d 24 (1977).

Board's power and effect of its award.

- Administration of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is vested in an administrative board. It is expressly empowered to hear and determine claims arising under the provisions of that law, and, as between the parties, its award has the same effect as a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939).

Board determination of employer's credits.

- Determination as to what credits the employer may be entitled to is one to be made by the board. Taylor v. Sunnyland Packing Co., 112 Ga. App. 544, 145 S.E.2d 587 (1965).

Remedy of appeal and effect of award.

- When a hearing is had and an award made in favor of the claimant, if the claimant was dissatisfied with the amount of the award, claimant's remedy was by way of appeal as provided in former Code 1933, § 114-708 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103). When no appeal was taken, the award is conclusive and binding, and in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, the claimant may not thereafter have the award increased, except upon a change in condition. Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939).

Final judgment under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106 establishes noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debt owed by debtor. In re Perry, 56 Bankr. 663 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986).

Purpose of proceeding under this section was to obtain an adjudication in the superior court that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum awarded by the board and thus to have a judgment upon which an execution may issue. Durham Iron Co. v. Durham, 62 Ga. App. 361, 7 S.E.2d 804 (1940).

Enforcement of award.

- In case of an award against an employer, when the employer fails to comply with the terms of the award, the award may be enforced by suit and judgment in a superior court. Savannah Lumber Co. v. Burch, 165 Ga. 706, 142 S.E. 83 (1928); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Wade, 97 Ga. App. 125, 102 S.E.2d 640 (1958).

Constructive agreement to be bound by law.

- Every employer and every employee who fails to exempt oneself from the provisions of the compensation law thereby constructively agrees to be bound by all of the provisions of that law. One of the provisions of the law, to which the parties thus agree, is that, in an appropriate case, an award by the board may be reduced to a judgment without summons or any other prior notice from the court. Continental Cas. Co. v. Bump, 218 Ga. 187, 126 S.E.2d 783 (1962).

Lump sum as final settlement without board approval unauthorized.

- When the department (now board), on hearing a claim for compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) made an award in favor of the claimant for compensation payable in a certain amount weekly during disability, the judge of the superior court, in considering the case on appeal from the award of the department (now board), had no authority or jurisdiction to render a judgment against the insurance carrier and in favor of the claimant for a lump sum, in full and final settlement of the claim, in pursuance of an agreement of the insurance carrier and the claimant, not approved by the department (now board). Department of Indus. Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 553, 171 S.E. 169 (1933).

Penalty included in judgment.

- Penalty for late payment of benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(f) was not required to be authorized by an award of the board in order be included in a judgment of the superior court rendered under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106. Ayers v. Rembert, 241 Ga. App. 698, 527 S.E.2d 290 (1999).

Effect of judgment.

- Judgment rendered by the superior court in accordance with this section shall have the same effect as though rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by that court. Camp v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931).

Effect of adjudication on appeal by employer.

- Adjudication in the superior court in favor of the plaintiff on appeal of the award of the board by the employer was, for the purpose of an execution and for all purposes, as effective as if the plaintiff personally filed in that court a certified copy of the award and had a judgment entered thereon. Durham Iron Co. v. Durham, 62 Ga. App. 361, 7 S.E.2d 804 (1940).

Judgment entered on appeal distinguished.

- Distinction between effect of judgment entered by superior court in course of appeal from award of board and judgment by superior court under this section, see Armour & Co. v. Youngblood, 113 Ga. App. 73, 147 S.E.2d 351 (1966).

When judgment may not be entered.

- Under the provisions of this section, a judgment may not be entered so long as the award on which the judgment is sought to be based is subject to review by the courts. Gentry v. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co., 109 Ga. App. 294, 136 S.E.2d 26 (1964).

Determination that claim is compensable required before enforcement permitted.

- Workers' compensation insurer was authorized to controvert and decline to pay a medical claim until such time as the board determined whether it was compensable under a settlement agreement, and seeking judicial enforcement of the agreement prior to that determination was premature. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Davis, 253 Ga. 376, 320 S.E.2d 368 (1984).

When judge can refuse to enter judgment for unpaid compensation.

- When a claimant was given an award for partial incapacity under former Code 1933, § 114-405 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262), but no finding or determination was made as to the percentage of loss of capacity to work or the average weekly wages which the claimant was able to earn thereafter upon which to base the amount of compensation to which the claimant was entitled under the award, it was not error for the judge of the superior court to refuse to enter a judgment for unpaid compensation thereunder against the employer and insurance carrier upon application for judgment under former Code 1933, § 114-711 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106). Colbert v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 187, 144 S.E.2d 470 (1965).

If compensation is insured, no judgment shall be rendered nor execution issued thereon, except upon application to the court and for good cause shown. Camp v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931).

Authorization for court to render judgment against employer.

- If the insurance carrier becomes insolvent or for any reason the security fails to comply with the carrier's obligation, the liability for compensation which has been established by the commission (now board) may be enforced by judgment against the employer. Savannah Lumber Co. v. Burch, 165 Ga. 706, 142 S.E. 83 (1928).

So long as good cause was shown, such as insolvency of the insurance carrier and failure to pay the award, the court was authorized to render judgment against the employer, the employer being under the terms of this section primarily liable. Taylor v. Woodall, 183 Ga. 122, 187 S.E. 697 (1936).

Cited in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hairston, 37 Ga. App. 234, 139 S.E. 685 (1927); Wilkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 142, 182 S.E. 628 (1935); Harrison v. Harrison, 208 Ga. 70, 65 S.E.2d 173 (1951); Heath v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 94 Ga. App. 548, 95 S.E.2d 726 (1956); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Wade, 97 Ga. App. 125, 102 S.E.2d 640 (1958); National Sur. Corp. v. Nelson, 99 Ga. App. 95, 107 S.E.2d 718 (1959); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Carroll, 106 Ga. App. 624, 127 S.E.2d 687 (1962); Continental Cas. Co. v. Bump, 106 Ga. App. 826, 128 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Armour & Co. v. Youngblood, 107 Ga. App. 505, 130 S.E.2d 786 (1963); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Davis, 108 Ga. App. 76, 132 S.E.2d 109 (1963); Carpenter v. Newcomb Devilbiss Co., 111 Ga. App. 472, 142 S.E.2d 381 (1965); Crowe v. Quilted Textile Corp., 221 Ga. 551, 145 S.E.2d 553 (1965); Martin v. GMC, 118 Ga. App. 43, 162 S.E.2d 742 (1968); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lueckert, 118 Ga. App. 98, 162 S.E.2d 820 (1968); Martin v. GMC, Fisher Body Div., 224 Ga. 677, 164 S.E.2d 107 (1968); Martin v. GMC, Fisher Body Div., 226 Ga. 860, 178 S.E.2d 183 (1970); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Funderburk, 128 Ga. App. 395, 196 S.E.2d 695 (1973); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Williams, 131 Ga. App. 376, 206 S.E.2d 91 (1974); Neal v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 134 Ga. App. 854, 216 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Jax Car Wash Mfg., Inc. v. Davis, 156 Ga. App. 729, 275 S.E.2d 685 (1980); Crawford v. Holt, 172 Ga. App. 326, 323 S.E.2d 245 (1984); City of Atlanta v. Holder, 309 Ga. App. 811, 711 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Doctor as party in interest.

- Doctor who has rendered medical or surgical services to an injured employee entitled to compensation is a party in interest; and this pecuniary interest held by the doctor in the result of the proceedings before the commission (now board) is sufficient to bring the doctor within the class designated by the act as parties in interest. J.M. Tull Metals Co. v. United States, 123 Ga. App. 76, 179 S.E.2d 543 (1970).

Veterans Administration Hospital was "party in interest" within the meaning of this section and was entitled to an award for medical services rendered to a claimant. J.M. Tull Metals Co. v. United States, 123 Ga. App. 76, 179 S.E.2d 543 (1970).

Function of superior court to enforce, not change, awards.

- Function of the superior court as provided in this section was to enforce, not to change, the awards. City of Hapeville v. Preston, 67 Ga. App. 350, 20 S.E.2d 202 (1942); Jenkins v. Reliance Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 70, 147 S.E.2d 343 (1966).

In a hearing under this section, the superior court had no authority to hear and decide any issue of fact respecting the right of the employee to receive compensation for a period prior to termination of the award or approved agreement. Jenkins v. Reliance Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 70, 147 S.E.2d 343 (1966).

Superior court exceeded its authority under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106 when it granted a petition seeking enforcement of a judgment based on the court's earlier affirmance of the board's award, when the petition sought additional penalties for failure of prompt payment of award and also sought an additional award for temporary partial disability. Kingery Block & Concrete Co. v. Luttrell, 174 Ga. App. 481, 330 S.E.2d 181 (1985).

Superior court exceeded its authority in reaching behind an award sought to be enforced to make findings contrary to those made by the workers compensation board regarding the identity of the employer and the adequacy and validity of notice to it of the workers' compensation proceeding. Wade v. Harris, 210 Ga. App. 882, 437 S.E.2d 863 (1993).

Enforceability of award.

- Under former Code 1933, § 114-711 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106) when an award was rendered, either on a hearing or on an agreement between the parties, the award is enforceable in the superior courts until a new award based on a change in condition was applied for on behalf of the claimant or the employer, or until on a hearing applied for by the claimant under former Code 1933, § 114-706 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-100). Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Davis, 101 Ga. App. 849, 115 S.E.2d 482 (1960).

Because the board's award was for an amount certain and clearly incorporated the superior court's directions on remand, the court erred in denying the employee's amended petition for entry of judgment filed under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106. Hansche v. City of Atlanta Police Dep't, 242 Ga. App. 606, 530 S.E.2d 512 (2000).

In a workers' compensation action, because an employer's motion to set aside an award in favor of its injured employee focused exclusively on issues that it could have corrected in a direct appeal to the Workers' Compensation Board, or in the hearing before the administrative law judge, the motion was properly denied. Winnersville Roofing Co. v. Coddington, 283 Ga. App. 95, 640 S.E.2d 680 (2006).

Enforcement proceeding is continuation, not separate suit.

- Proceeding to enforce an award of the board or approved agreement pursuant to this section was not a separate suit but was merely a continuation of the proceeding instituted before the board. Camp v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931); Simpson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 43, 159 S.E.2d 294 (1967).

Method of enforcing an award of compensation by the board is by filing in the superior court of the proper county a certified copy of the award; the proceeding is not a separate suit, but merely a continuance of the original proceeding. Durham Iron Co. v. Durham, 62 Ga. App. 361, 7 S.E.2d 804 (1940).

Filing in superior court of a petition to enforce an award or a settlement agreement pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-106 is not a separate suit but rather a continuation of the board of workers' compensation proceeding and the concept of default is not applicable. Wade v. Harris, 210 Ga. App. 882, 437 S.E.2d 863 (1993).

Board not precluded from making nonconforming award.

- Judgment of a superior court based upon the original award of the board does not preclude the board thenceforth from making any award not conforming to the superior court judgment. The proceeding in the superior court is merely a continuation of the proceeding before the board for enforcing an award of compensation. Anglin v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 106 Ga. App. 395, 126 S.E.2d 913 (1962).

Showing of good cause.

- "Good cause" required by this section was shown by appearance and pleading by the employer and insurer to the effect that they were not liable for a portion of an award pursuant to an approved agreement to pay compensation which would have accrued to claimant therefor, since that amounted to an admission of failure to pay part of the award. Jenkins v. Reliance Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 70, 147 S.E.2d 343 (1966).

Defenses of employer or insurance carrier.

- In the hearing upon a claimant's application for judgment upon an approved agreement or an award of the board, the employer or its insurance carrier can have no defense except by virtue of: (1) a final settlement receipt or other like agreement between the parties changing the terms of the original agreement, approved by the board; or (2) evidence that the statutory amount, or the amount called for by the agreement or award has been paid in full; or (3) an order of the board changing or allowing a discontinuance of the compensation; or (4) evidence that the employer has filed an application for a hearing upon a change of condition. Jenkins v. Reliance Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 70, 147 S.E.2d 343 (1966).

Effect of employer's application for hearing on change of condition.

- When after an award or agreement for the payment of compensation approved by the board the employer files an application for hearing on a change of condition and ceases making payments, the employer's liability for payments after the date of the application will be determined upon the hearing; and the employee is not entitled before the hearing to a judgment under this section for payments due under the original award or agreement after the date of the application for hearing. Crowe v. Quilted Textile Corp., 113 Ga. App. 68, 147 S.E.2d 340 (1966).

Purpose of reducing award of compensation to judgment enables the person in whose favor compensation has been awarded to have execution in default of payment and creates a lien on the property of the employer. Continental Cas. Co. v. Bump, 218 Ga. 187, 126 S.E.2d 783 (1962).

No authority to retroactively revoke or change award.

- Board is without authority to revoke or change award or agreement, duly approved, for compensation and medical expenses retroactively. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Crowder, 123 Ga. App. 469, 181 S.E.2d 530 (1971).

Superior court, rather than the board of workers' compensation, is the proper forum for bringing a motion to set aside a workers' compensation award. Griggs v. All-Steel Bldgs., Inc., 201 Ga. App. 111, 410 S.E.2d 309 (1991).

Effect of award or agreement as res judicata.

- Agreements approved by the board, unmodified in the manner provided by law, were res judicata, and upon proper application to a superior court under the provisions of this section, it was mandatory that the court enter judgment and issue execution for the amount shown to be due and unpaid. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Willingham, 119 Ga. App. 761, 168 S.E.2d 910 (1969).

Award is res judicata of right of employee to receive payments thereunder until terminated in the manner provided by law, and when it appears that the employer and insurance carrier have failed or refused to pay all of the compensation due under the award the court has no discretion and it is mandatory on it to enter judgment and issue execution for the amount shown to be due. Sanders v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 472, 124 S.E.2d 923 (1962); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 119 Ga. App. 565, 168 S.E.2d 204 (1969); West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Springfield, 140 Ga. App. 530, 231 S.E.2d 811 (1976).

Statutory right of action within prescribed time limitation.

- Right of action upon an award of the board, or an agreement between the parties approved by the board, is given by statute; and the statute does not prescribe a time limitation for bringing the action. Nation v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 380, 145 S.E.2d 265 (1965).

Vacation or modification of judgment after expiration of term.

- The last sentence of this section created an exception to the rule that a judgment may not be vacated or modified after expiration of the term of the court during which it was entered. Brown v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 490, 148 S.E.2d 436 (1966).

A judgment entered on behalf of an employee in the superior court upon application therefor under this section can be amended or vacated at a subsequent term of court based upon a certified copy of an order from the board diminishing or terminating compensation for the period upon which the judgment was based. Brown v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 490, 148 S.E.2d 436 (1966).

Board's approval of change in compensation.

- Assuming arguendo that parties to an original compensation award or agreement can enter into a new agreement effecting a change in the compensation payable, the approval of such an agreement by the board is not authorized unless the agreement stipulates facts showing that the claimant's condition has changed since the original award or agreement. Stone Mt. Grit Co. v. Christian, 115 Ga. App. 102, 153 S.E.2d 569 (1967).

Superior court, on proper showing, must conform its order to modifying action by board affecting the compensation adjudged to be due and unpaid, and credits against such payments. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Willingham, 119 Ga. App. 761, 168 S.E.2d 910 (1969).

Revival of dormant judgment.

- In an action wherein a workers' compensation claimant revived a lump-sum judgment of $37,747.08 plus accrued interest, which had become dormant against an employer, the trial court properly refused to amend the 2006 judgment that revived it to provide for weekly disability payments as the term of court ended and, therefore, the trial court had no authority to amend or alter that 2006 judgment. However, the trial court should have issued a writ of execution for the payments that became due after July 27, 2000, as those payments had not become dormant. Taylor v. Peachbelt Props., 293 Ga. App. 335, 667 S.E.2d 117 (2008).

Effect of prior approved settlement.

- Board cannot refuse to make finding as to change in condition merely because of prior approved settlement. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Gibby, 118 Ga. App. 758, 165 S.E.2d 455 (1968).

Satisfaction of attorneys' fees.

- Lien of an attorney at law representing a claimant attaches to a proceeding in the commission (now board) brought for the purpose of obtaining an award of compensation; and, when an award of compensation is entered in favor of the claimant, the employer and the employer's insurance carrier, having notice of the attorney's relationship to the proceeding, are not at liberty to satisfy the award until the lien or claim of the attorney for attorney's fee is fully satisfied, and, if they do so, they are liable in the action to a recovery for the benefit of the attorney to the extent of the attorney's fees; and the attorney may prosecute the proceeding in the manner pointed out by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) by seeking, in superior court, a judgment upon the award entered in favor of the attorney's client, for the attorney's benefit to the extent of the attorney's fees. Camp v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 653, 157 S.E. 209 (1931).

Board is without authority to enforce an attorney's lien, and an award directing the employer, as the result of the employer having settled with the claimant without consulting the employer's attorney, to pay attorney's fees directly to the claimant's attorney is contrary to law and unenforceable. Dunagan v. Marell Farms, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 857, 99 S.E.2d 236 (1957).

C.J.S.

- 100A C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 1299 et seq. 101 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 1627 et seq.

ALR.

- Res judicata as regards decisions or awards under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 122 A.L.R. 550.

Workmen's compensation: character or status of right or claim within provision of act requiring or authorizing approval by the court or commission of settlement or compromise, 153 A.L.R. 285.