Purpose of section.

- This section was not designed to determine a change in the physical condition of the claimant to the end that the compensation then being received by the claimant shall be altered directly by the proceedings provided under that section. City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96, 22 S.E.2d 197 (1942).

This section was designed to bring about, hopefully for the better, a change in claimant's medical condition. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bradley, 152 Ga. App. 600, 263 S.E.2d 446 (1979).

No period of limitation for continued medical benefits.

- Court of Appeals properly affirmed the judgment of the superior court noting that an award of medical expenses was held to be an award of compensation within the meaning of the original Workmen's Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., and in applying that principle to find that the change-in-condition statute applied to cases in which income benefits had not been paid; further, this interpretation was consistent with the recognition that no period of limitation was provided for seeking continued medical benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200. Footstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Ga. 448, 637 S.E.2d 692 (2006).

Employer responsibility for artificial members, prosthetic devices, and aids.

- The 1985 amendment made the employer responsible for all artificial members, prosthetic devices and aids deemed necessary by the board to effect a cure, give relief, or restore the employee to suitable employment. Thompson v. Wilbert Vault Co., 178 Ga. App. 489, 343 S.E.2d 515 (1986) (applying amendment retroactively).

Nonmedical in-home attendant care.

- Worker injured before July 1, 1985, the effective date of the 1985 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200, could recover the cost of nonmedical in-home attendant care prescribed by a physician and provided to the worker even though such recovery was barred prior to the 1985 amendment, but compensation would be allowed only for costs incurred on and after July 1, 1985, and not from the date of the injury. Interchange Village v. Clark, 185 Ga. App. 97, 363 S.E.2d 350 (1987).

The 1985 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200 would allow an injured worker to recover the cost of nonmedical, at-home attendant care prescribed by a physician but provided by a worker's emancipated child who moved into the worker's home expecting to be compensated for the child's services. Interchange Village v. Clark, 185 Ga. App. 97, 363 S.E.2d 350 (1987).

Recovery of cost of at-home attendant care by licensed practical nurses was authorized by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200, even prior to its 1985 amendment, as constituting "other treatment" for a quadriplegic who was not receiving institutional care. Hopson v. Hickman, 182 Ga. App. 865, 357 S.E.2d 280, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 357 S.E.2d 280 (1987).

Liability for household services.

- Employer is liable under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) to compensate the injured employee for the full amount of domestic household services only when the factfinder determines that all those services are for the exclusive benefit of the injured employee and directly give relief to the work-related injury. Otherwise, the employer is liable only for a proportional share of the household maintenance services performed in the household to relieve the work-related injury of the employee exclusively, regardless of the individual allocation of household maintenance services in the employee's household prior to the employee's work-related injury. Berry College, Inc. v. Storey, 199 Ga. App. 298, 404 S.E.2d 640 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 404 S.E.2d 640 (1991).

Provision of handicap-accessible housing.

- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 permits the Workers' Compensation Board to require the employer to provide handicap-accessible housing to an injured employee. Pringle v. Mayor of Savannah, 223 Ga. App. 751, 478 S.E.2d 139 (1996).

Employee's prospective house was not a medical device within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) and did not foreclose any financial interest in the employer, which would allow the award of a life estate therein, because rather than prescribing wheelchair accessible housing in a medical sense, a licensed physician as a member of the employee's rehabilitation team, recommended that the employee be provided an "accessible house," among other things, as a rehabilitation service that would benefit the medical treatment being provided to the employee; even had a wheelchair accessible house been medically prescribed, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) could not reasonably be construed as such. S. Concrete/Watkins Associated Indus. v. Spires, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Mar. 22, 2011).

O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-200(b) and34-9-201(d) provide the sole method of changing physicians or treatment, including, apparently, any change effected by the employer-approved physician in referring the employee to another physician pursuant to § 34-9-201(c). Therefore, an employer-approved physician has no authority under § 34-9-201(c) to effect a change of physician or treatment by "revoking a referral", regardless of how the revocation is made. Brown v. Transamerica IMS, 200 Ga. App. 272, 407 S.E.2d 430 (1991).

Appealability of subsection (b) order.

- Decision of the board granting or denying a change in physicians under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(b) is appealable to the superior court. Columbus Foundries, Inc. v. Moore, 175 Ga. App. 387, 333 S.E.2d 212 (1985).

Claimant's burden of proof.

- Claimant bore the burden of proving that the services for which claimant sought compensation were such as to give relief directly to claimant's work-related injury and were exclusively for claimant's benefit. Jarallah v. Pickett Suite Hotel, 204 Ga. App. 684, 420 S.E.2d 366 (1992).

Applicability of later version.

- Although an employee's injury occurred in 2000, the 2003 version of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(c) was applicable with respect to defining the employee's obligations for continuing treatment, as the change in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(c) merely affected the scope of treatment required; accordingly, as the employee did not present a cogent argument or supporting authority as to why the prior version of the statute should have been applied, the claim was deemed abandoned pursuant to Ga. Ct. App. R. 25(c)(2). Dallas v. Flying J, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006).

Suspension of benefits proper.

- Administrative law judge and the Georgia Workers' Compensation Board properly suspended a workers' compensation claimant's benefits as the claimant refused to submit to an examination of the claimant's treating physician at the request of an employer under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-202(a) and (c) as: (1) § 34-9-202 required the claimant to undergo an examination by "a duly qualified physician or surgeon" or face a suspension of benefits; (2) the treating physician was duly qualified; (3) § 34-9-202 did not require that the examination be done by an "independent" physician; (4) former § 34-9-200(c) dealt with the refusal to accept treatment ordered by the Board, which was a different situation; and (5) the version of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(c) set forth after a 2003 amendment and § 34-9-202 authorized the suspension of benefits if a claimant refused to submit to an employer-requested examination. Goswick v. Murray County Bd. of Educ., 281 Ga. App. 442, 636 S.E.2d 133 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 102 (Ga. 2007).

Cited in Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Money, 152 Ga. App. 72, 262 S.E.2d 240 (1979); City of Acworth v. Williams, 162 Ga. App. 694, 293 S.E.2d 352 (1982); Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Manigault, 167 Ga. App. 599, 307 S.E.2d 79 (1983); Georgia Power Co. v. Brown, 169 Ga. App. 45, 311 S.E.2d 236 (1983); Boaz v. K-Mart Corp., 254 Ga. 707, 334 S.E.2d 167 (1985); Murray County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilbanks, 190 Ga. App. 611, 379 S.E.2d 559 (1989); Wier v. Skyline Messenger Serv., 203 Ga. App. 673, 417 S.E.2d 693 (1992); Capital Atlanta, Inc. v. Carroll, 213 Ga. App. 214, 444 S.E.2d 592 (1994); Autry v. Mayor of Savannah, 222 Ga. App. 691, 475 S.E.2d 702 (1996); Housing Auth. v. Jackson, 226 Ga. App. 182, 486 S.E.2d 54 (1997).

Question of fact as to provision.

- Whether there is an emergency and whether the employer failed to provide medical care for the claimant is a question of fact to be resolved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation. Anderson v. GMC, 118 Ga. App. 4, 162 S.E.2d 464 (1968).

Refusal of medical treatment.

- When an operation, although recommended by physicians, and although it may reduce the injury, is attended with extraordinary pain and suffering, and is dangerous to life, and is of such an extremely delicate character that it can be successfully performed only by the most skilled and competent bone specialist, and when it does not appear that the services of a competent physician for the performance of the operation are tendered, the operation tendered cannot reasonably be expected to relieve the injury. The injured employee is therefore justified in refusing to accept the operation tendered. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Braden, 40 Ga. App. 178, 149 S.E. 98 (1929).

Failure to cooperate in continuing medical treatment.

- Although an employee attempted to make an appointment for continuing medical treatment, as ordered to do, the walk-in clinic at which the appointment was to be refused to make scheduled appointments and instead the employee was informed that appointments were made on a walk-in basis; accordingly, the employee's failure to have walked in and had the appointment was deemed a failure to cooperate with medical treatment, and termination of benefits and the refusal to reinstate them was proper pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(c). Dallas v. Flying J, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006).

Change of physicians or treatment.

- Subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200 and O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(d) prescribe the exclusive method for changing physicians or treatment, including any change effected by the referral of the employee by the employer-approved physician to another physician pursuant to § 34-9-201(c). Lee Fabricators v. Cook, 203 Ga. App. 450, 417 S.E.2d 35, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 35 (1992).

Employer's prior refusal to provide benefits did not excuse the claimant from filing a petition for change in physicians once the dispute was resolved in the claimant's favor and the employer was then providing medical care. Wright v. Overnite Transp. Co., 214 Ga. App. 822, 449 S.E.2d 167 (1994).

Superior court did not err in failing to vacate an order allowing an employee to change an authorized treating physician, as the employer failed to show that due to the employee's misleading service and the Board's loss of its pleadings, it was the victim of constructive fraud which amounted to the deprivation of due process; while the employer should have been served with the evidence presented to the administrative law judge, and the Board should have properly handled the employee's filings, the employer could not show that it suffered any harm or injury. MARTA v. Reid, 282 Ga. App. 877, 640 S.E.2d 300 (2006).

In a workers' compensation case, an employee who worked on an automotive production line was treated by several physicians for a shoulder injury. Because the State Board of Workers' Compensation's denial of the employee's request to change the authorized treating physician was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the trial court erred by designating a new, authorized treating physician and finding that the employer should pay the medical expenses under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200; the bills of a doctor who was not the employee's authorized treating physician could not be reimbursed. Decostar Indus. v. Juarez, 316 Ga. App. 642, 730 S.E.2d 120 (2012).

Board was required to determine if unauthorized treatment was related to work injury.

- Because an employee's authorized physicians discharged the employee and released the employee to work without restrictions in April 2010, and the question of whether the employee's subsequent unauthorized medical treatment was related to the employee's work injury was not addressed below, the employee's claim was remanded for a determination of that issue. Lane v. Williams Plant Servs., 330 Ga. App. 416, 766 S.E.2d 482 (2014).

Common law decision's retroactive application.

- Superior court's holding that the Lee Fabricators case, holding that O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-200 and34-9-201 prescribe the exclusive method for changing physicians or treatment, should not be applied retroactively required reversal, as there was no evidence that such an application would work significant hardship or injustice. Dart Container Corp. v. Jones, 209 Ga. App. 331, 433 S.E.2d 417 (1993); Craig v. Red Lobster Restaurant, 214 Ga. App. 829, 449 S.E.2d 307 (1994).

Denial of request for change of physicians.

- Proper standard of review for reviewing the board's affirmance of an administrative law judge's denial of an employee's request for a change of physicians is whether the board acted arbitrarily or in excess of its powers. Franchise Enters., Inc. v. Sullivan, 190 Ga. App. 767, 380 S.E.2d 68 (1989).

Board may authorize compensation of claimant refusing treatment.

- Claimant under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is entitled to compensation during the period of claimant's refusal to accept medical treatment when it appears that the State Board of Workers' Compensation did not order the treatment, or having ordered treatment, further determines that the circumstances justify the refusal of the claimant to accept the treatment. Magnus Metal Div. of Nat'l Lead Co. v. Stephens, 115 Ga. App. 432, 154 S.E.2d 869 (1967).

Criteria for determining compensability.

- Employer is liable for compensating the injured employee for the full amount of services prescribed by a licensed physician only when the factfinder determines that all those services are for the exclusive benefit of the injured employee and directly give relief to the work-related injury. Jarallah v. Pickett Suite Hotel, 204 Ga. App. 684, 420 S.E.2d 366 (1992).

Treatment held to be unauthorized.

- Claimed expenses of an employee who suffered injuries to the employee's neck and back in the course of employment, who was treated by a physician selected and authorized by the employer, which physician forwarded to the employee a "physical therapy slip" and prescription which instructed "please treat as needed", but who nevertheless proceeded to incur expenses for medical treatment which certainly could not be classified as physical therapy, were for unauthorized services. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Holcombe, 171 Ga. App. 532, 320 S.E.2d 552 (1984), aff'd, 253 Ga. 719, 324 S.E.2d 446 (1985).

While using a heating pad on a sore hip that had been injured in a work-related accident, a worker fell asleep and sustained third-degree burns to the hip. The Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation properly ruled that the burn was not a compensable superadded injury as there was some evidence to support the Board's findings that the heating pad, which had not been prescribed by a physician, was not reasonable and necessary treatment under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a), and that the burn was not a natural consequence of the hip injury. City of Atlanta v. Roach, 297 Ga. App. 408, 677 S.E.2d 426 (2009).

Claim for evaluation in addition to authorized evaluation denied.

- Appellee's claim of reimbursement for a rehabilitation evaluation was denied when the evaluation was initiated by the appellee after undergoing a similar examination authorized by the Board of Workers' Compensation, no emergency existed necessitating a second evaluation, and appellee's disability could have been caused by alcohol or malnutrition rather than injury. City of Atlanta v. Walker, 169 Ga. App. 34, 311 S.E.2d 479 (1983).

Non-FDA approved treatments.

- Employer was liable to furnish a surgical procedure that had not been approved by the FDA when the employee's authorized treating physician prescribed the procedure and referred the employee to a physician to perform it. Williams v. West Central Ga. Bank, 225 Ga. App. 237, 483 S.E.2d 607 (1997).

When claimant entitled to see "any" doctor.

- When the employer cut the employee off from receiving medical benefits, the claimant was entitled to see any doctor, not just a company doctor, and to receive medical benefits if claimant could prove claimant was still injured at the time as a result of the accident in question. Georgia Power Co. v. Brasill, 171 Ga. App. 569, 320 S.E.2d 573 (1984), aff'd, 253 Ga. 766, 327 S.E.2d 226 (1985).

Because the evidence relied upon by the Appellate Division was incomplete, misstated that physical therapy was completed a year later than the therapy was, and included evidence that the employee sought treatment from a third physician after the employee's authorized physicians released the employee to work, a decision denying the employee's request for payment of unauthorized medical expenses was vacated; remand was required to determine whether the treatment was related to the employee's work injury. Lane v. Williams Plant Servs., 330 Ga. App. 416, 766 S.E.2d 482 (2014).

Employer not liable for unauthorized expenses.

- When employer contended that certain treatment for which compensation was being sought was unauthorized, the employer was liable only for medical expenses ordered by the physician to whom the claimant had been referred by the initially authorized physician for physical therapy, as such other expenses were unauthorized due to a failure to relate to physical therapy, and on the ground that no order was obtained from the Workers' Compensation Board changing the physicians and/or treatment originally extant. Holcombe v. Brown Transp. Corp., 253 Ga. 719, 324 S.E.2d 446 (1985).

Determination as to whether change in condition has taken place.

- It was one thing to require the claimant to submit to reasonable medical and surgical treatment under this section in an effort to bring about a change in condition, and an entirely different thing to determine whether or not a change in condition had already taken place. City of Atlanta v. Padgett, 68 Ga. App. 96, 22 S.E.2d 197 (1942).

Attorney fees properly awarded.

- Administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Georgia Workers' Compensation Board properly awarded an employer its attorney fees as: (1) the claimant did not appeal the ALJ's decision to require the claimant to submit to an examination, but simply defied it; (2) the blatant defiance of an ALJ order was evidence that the claimant defended the proceedings in part without reasonable grounds; (3) the claimant was not required to defy the order so as to present the claimant's justification for doing so; (4) the claimant had a chance to present the claimant's justification to the ALJ, and failed to reiterate the claimant's position on an appeal to the Board; and (5) the ALJ and the Board had some evidence upon which to base a finding that when the claimant contested the sanctions motion, the claimant did so without reasonable grounds. Goswick v. Murray County Bd. of Educ., 281 Ga. App. 442, 636 S.E.2d 133 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 102 (Ga. 2007).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, § 418 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 101 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 1578 et seq.

ALR.

- Workmen's compensation: duty of injured employee to submit to operation or to take other measures to restore earning capacity, 18 A.L.R. 431; 73 A.L.R. 1303; 105 A.L.R. 1470.

Workers' compensation: value of home services provided by victim's relative, 65 A.L.R.4th 142.

Workers' compensation: recovery for home service provided by spouse, 67 A.L.R.4th 765.

Workers' compensation: reasonableness of employee's refusal of medical services tendered by employer, 72 A.L.R.4th 905.

Workers' compensation: compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 A.L.R.4th 110.

Workers' compensation as covering cost of penile or similar implants related to sexual or reproductive activity, 89 A.L.R.4th 1057.

What amounts to failure or refusal to submit to medical treatment sufficient to bar recovery of workers' compensation, 3 A.L.R.5th 907.

Social security: right to disability benefits as affected by refusal to submit to, or cooperate in, medical or surgical treatment, 114 A.L.R. Fed. 141.

Workers' compensation: value of expenses reimbursed by employer as factor in determining basis for or calculation of amount of compensation under State Workers' Compensation Statute, 63 A.L.R. 6th 187.