O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-351 (2019)

Definitions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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As used in this article, the term: (1) ‘‘Merger of an injury with a preexisting permanent impairment’’ describes or means that: (A) Had the preexisting permanent impairment not been present, the subsequent injury would not have occurred; (B) The disability resulting from the subsequent injury in conjunction with the preexisting permanent impairment is materially, substantially, and cumulatively greater than that which would have resulted had the preexisting permanent impairment not been present, and the employer has been required to pay and has paid compensation for that greater disability; or (C) Death would not have been accelerated had the preexisting permanent impairment not been present. (2) ‘‘Permanent impairment’’ means any permanent condition due to previous injury, disease, or disorder which is, or is likely to be, a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed.

History

(Code 1933, § 114-911, enacted by Ga. L. 1977, p. 608, § 1.)

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Board erred in requiring that merger be established first under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-351(1)(A) as a condition precedent to determining the existence of a merger under subparagraph (1)(B) and in failing to consider subparagraph (1)(B) of that section. Brockway Std. v. Harper, 200 Ga. App. 250, 407 S.E.2d 475 (1991). Focus of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-351 is not merely the cumulative effect of the injuries but requires that the disability resulting from the subsequent and preexisting injuries be ‘‘materially, substantially, and cumulatively greater than that which would have resulted had the preexisting permanent impairment not been present.’’ JPS Carpets v. Troupe, 203 Ga. App. 602, 417 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 333 (1992). Employee’s first injury must aggravate the degree of permanent partial disability resulting from a second injury in order for there to be a merger between the two injuries rather than considering whether the disability to an employee’s body as a whole and/or the employee’s

state of employability has been rendered materially, substantially, and cumulatively greater due to the prior injury. JPS Carpets v. Troupe, 203 Ga. App. 602, 417 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 333 (1992). Review of lower court’s finding of fact. - Full board is a finder of fact which is entitled to make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law even though the facts are the same but the conclusions different. A finding of fact, that the claimant did not establish merger made by the full board when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding upon the superior court as well as the Court of Appeals. Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Brockway Std., 204 Ga. App. 519, 419 S.E.2d 755 (1992). Cited in Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Knight Ridder Newspapers-Macon Tel. & News, 203 Ga. App. 458, 416 S.E.2d 887 (1992); Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Hanson Indus., 211 Ga. App. 700, 440 S.E.2d 89 (1994).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 6 cases, 1991–1995 · leading case: Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Brockway Stand., 419 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).

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Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Brockway Stand., 419 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 16× “Appellant contends that the superior court erred in reversing the decision of the full board which found that the employer/insurer, appellees herein, had not established a merger of claimant’s injuries under OCGA § 34-9-351 (1). The facts are fully set out in the first case,…”

JPS Carpets v. Troupe, 417 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 14× “t the second injury would not have occurred but for the preexisting injury; that the disability resulting from the subsequent injury to Troupe’s right arm and shoulder, in combination with the preexisting permanent impairment, was materially, substantially and cumulatively…”

Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Knight Ridder Newspapers-Macon Tel. & News, 416 S.E.2d 887 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “SITF defended on the basis that there had been no merger (OCGA § 34-9-351 (1) (b)) and denied liability for medical expenses not caused by or related to the pre-existing disability.”

Brockway Stand. v. Harper, 407 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 16× “We granted appellant’s application for discretionary appeal in this workers’ compensation case to consider whether the full board erred in its application of OCGA § 34-9-351 (1) and its denial of appellants’ claim for reimbursement from the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund.”

Muscogee Iron Works v. Ward, 455 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “It took the position that the amputated arm had not caused a hindrance to Ward’s employment; that Muscogee did not know of Ward’s impairment before hiring him, as required by OCGA § 34-9-361; and that no merger occurred between the back injury and the previous disability, as…”

Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Hanson Indus., 440 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 34-9-351 (2) defines permanent impairment as “any permanent condition due to previous injury, disease, or disorder which is, or is likely to be, a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.