O.C.G.A. § 34-9-86 (2019)
Applicability of time limits to mental incompetents, minors, and persons proceeding against defunct corporations
No limitation of time provided in this chapter for the giving of notice or making claim shall apply to any person who is mentally incompetent or a minor dependent, as long as he has no guardian or trustee, or to a person who proceeds in good faith against a corporation supposed to have a legal entity but which is proved to be defunct by reason of the expiration of its charter.
History
(Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 48; Ga. L. 1925, p. 282, § 3; Code 1933, § 114-306.)
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION MENTALLY INCOMPETENT PERSONS MINOR DEPENDENTS General Consideration Filing of claim within time prescribed is essential to enforce right to compensation fixed by the statute and is jurisdictional. Williams v. Campbell
Constr. Co., 63 Ga. App. 381, 11 S.E.2d 233 (1940). Cited in Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939); McDonald v. Travelers Ins. Co., 81 Ga. App. 614, 59 S.E.2d 537 (1950); Georgia
General Consideration (Cont’d) Forestry Comm’n v. Harrell, 98 Ga. App. 238, 105 S.E.2d 461 (1958). Mentally Incompetent Persons ‘‘Mentally incompetent’’ construed. - In the absence of anything in the workers’ compensation law to indicate that anything different was intended, the term ‘‘mentally incompetent’’ as used in former Code 1933, § 114-306 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-86), which exempted a person from the application of the limitation provision in former Code 1933, § 114-305 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82), must be given the same scope and meaning as that which is accorded to it, or words of similar import, in other statutes which deal with the status of persons generally. Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S.E.2d 57 (1941). Test for tolling statute of limitations. - The test as to whether a claimant was so ‘‘mentally incompetent’’ under this section as to toll the running of the statute of limitations was this: is the claimant’s mind so unsound or is the claimant so weak in the claimant’s mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that the claimant cannot manage the ordinary affairs of life? Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S.E.2d 57 (1941); Kell v. Bridges, 77 Ga. App. 424, 48 S.E.2d 780 (1948); Petteway v. Continental Cas. Co., 112 Ga. App. 496, 145 S.E.2d 635 (1965); Mayor of Athens v. Schaeffer, 122 Ga. App. 729, 178 S.E.2d 764 (1970). If there is such a degree of unsoundness of mind or imbecility as to incapacitate one from managing the ordinary business of life, it will authorize a
holding that a claimant is ‘‘mentally incompetent’’ and that the statute is tolled during the period of time the claimant is ‘‘mentally incompetent’’ and until the disability is removed. Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S.E.2d 57 (1941); Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga. App. 234, 257 S.E.2d 209 (1979). Duty of board. - When the claimant in a workers’ compensation case files a claim more than one year after the accident, and upon the hearing there is evidence adduced that would authorize the finding of fact that the claimant was mentally incompetent, it is not only within the power but it is the duty of the board to pass on this issue in order to determine whether the claim is barred. Kell v. Bridges, 77 Ga. App. 424, 48 S.E.2d 780 (1948). Minor Dependents Term ‘‘minor dependent’’, as used in Ga. L. 1925, p. 282, § 3, refers to a minor under the age of 18, who is conclusively presumed to be dependent upon a parent for support, and to claims arising in favor of the dependents of an injured or deceased employee, and not to a claim accruing in favor of one who is an employee personally. Porter v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ga. App. 86, 166 S.E. 675 (1932). When limitation period begins to run. - Since it is conclusive, under both the law and the evidence, that the claimant was a minor dependent at the time of the accident which resulted in the death of the claimant’s spouse, and having no guardian or trustee, the statute did not begin to run against the claimant until the claimant reached the age of majority. Durham v. Durham, 59 Ga. App. 430, 1 S.E.2d 207 (1939).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers’ Compensation, §§ 540 et seq., 593. C.J.S. - 100 C.J.S., Workers’ Compensation, § 948. ALR. - Applicability of general statute of limitations to action, or proceeding under workmen’s compensation acts, 16 ALR 462; 40 ALR 495. May notice of injury or claim contem-
plated by Workmen’s Compensation Act be waived, 78 ALR 1306. Mental incompetency as obviating effect of failure to comply with provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Acts as to giving notice or other procedural matters, 91 ALR 1400. Protection of interest or rights of minors in proceedings for, or award of, compensa-
tion under provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 120 ALR 395. Applicability and effect of Workmen’s Compensation Act in cases of injury to minors, 142 ALR 1018. Workmen’s compensation: provision limiting time for giving notice of injury or
presenting claim as applied to infants, 142 ALR 1035. Effect of injured employee’s proceeding for workmen’s compensation benefits on running of statute of limitations governing action for personal injury arising from same incident, 71 ALR3d 849.
PART 2 HEARING AND APPEALS
Law reviews. - For note on the 1994 amendments of Code Sections 34-9-100,
34-9-102, and 34-9-103 of this part, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 204 (1994).