"Mentally incompetent" construed.

- In the absence of anything in the workers' compensation law to indicate that anything different was intended, the term "mentally incompetent" as used in former Code 1933, § 114-306 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-86), which exempted a person from the application of the limitation provision in former Code 1933, § 114-305 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82), must be given the same scope and meaning as that which is accorded to it, or words of similar import, in other statutes which deal with the status of persons generally. Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S.E.2d 57 (1941).

Test for tolling statute of limitations.

- The test as to whether a claimant was so "mentally incompetent" under this section as to toll the running of the statute of limitations was this: is the claimant's mind so unsound or is the claimant so weak in the claimant's mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that the claimant cannot manage the ordinary affairs of life? Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S.E.2d 57 (1941); Kell v. Bridges, 77 Ga. App. 424, 48 S.E.2d 780 (1948); Petteway v. Continental Cas. Co., 112 Ga. App. 496, 145 S.E.2d 635 (1965); Mayor of Athens v. Schaeffer, 122 Ga. App. 729, 178 S.E.2d 764 (1970).

If there is such a degree of unsoundness of mind or imbecility as to incapacitate one from managing the ordinary business of life, it will authorize a holding that a claimant is "mentally incompetent" and that the statute is tolled during the period of time the claimant is "mentally incompetent" and until the disability is removed. Royal Indem. Co. v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S.E.2d 57 (1941); Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga. App. 234, 257 S.E.2d 209 (1979).

Duty of board.

- When the claimant in a workers' compensation case files a claim more than one year after the accident, and upon the hearing there is evidence adduced that would authorize the finding of fact that the claimant was mentally incompetent, it is not only within the power but it is the duty of the board to pass on this issue in order to determine whether the claim is barred. Kell v. Bridges, 77 Ga. App. 424, 48 S.E.2d 780 (1948).

When limitation period begins to run.

- Since it is conclusive, under both the law and the evidence, that the claimant was a minor dependent at the time of the accident which resulted in the death of the claimant's spouse, and having no guardian or trustee, the statute did not begin to run against the claimant until the claimant reached the age of majority. Durham v. Durham, 59 Ga. App. 430, 1 S.E.2d 207 (1939).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, §§ 540 et seq., 593.

C.J.S.

- 100 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 948.

ALR.

- Applicability of general statute of limitations to action, or proceeding under workmen's compensation acts, 16 A.L.R. 462; 40 A.L.R. 495.

May notice of injury or claim contemplated by Workmen's Compensation Act be waived, 78 A.L.R. 1306.

Mental incompetency as obviating effect of failure to comply with provisions of Workmen's Compensation Acts as to giving notice or other procedural matters, 91 A.L.R. 1400.

Protection of interest or rights of minors in proceedings for, or award of, compensation under provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 120 A.L.R. 395.

Applicability and effect of Workmen's Compensation Act in cases of injury to minors, 142 A.L.R. 1018.

Workmen's compensation: provision limiting time for giving notice of injury or presenting claim as applied to infants, 142 A.L.R. 1035.

Effect of injured employee's proceeding for workmen's compensation benefits on running of statute of limitations governing action for personal injury arising from same incident, 71 A.L.R.3d 849.

Law reviews.

- For note on the 1994 amendments of Code Sections 34-9-100, 34-9-102, and 34-9-103 of this part, see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 204 (1994).