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2018 Georgia Code 36-1-14 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 36-1-14 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 36-1-14

TITLE 36 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 1. General Provisions, 36-1-1 through 36-1-27.

36-1-14. Interested transactions prohibited; removal from office for violation.

  1. No county governing authority, any member thereof, or any other county officer authorized by law to use public or county funds for the purchase of goods or property of any kind for public or county purposes shall purchase such goods or property from any store in which such county governing authority, any member thereof, or other county officer is an employee, or in which he is directly or indirectly interested, or from any person or partnership of which he is a member or by whom he is employed, unless by sanction of the majority of the members of the county governing authority or unless it is made clearly to appear that such individual, partnership, or owner of the store offers and will sell the goods or property as cheaply as or cheaper than the same can be bought elsewhere.
  2. Any county governing authority, any member thereof, or any county officer violating subsection (a) of this Code section shall be removed from office upon proper proceedings instituted by any taxpayer in the county. Any contract made in violation of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be illegal.

(Ga. L. 1898, p. 105, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1899, p. 68, § 1; Ga. L. 1901, p. 81, § 1; Civil Code 1910, §§ 393, 394; Code 1933, §§ 23-1713, 23-1714.)

Law reviews.

- For article surveying important general legal principles of municipal and county government purchasing and contracting in Georgia, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 371 (1965).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

By its terms this section is of general application. Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14).

Section subject to qualification by special Act.

- This section, so far as it refers to county commissioners, is subject to qualification by special Acts under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Paras. VI and VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I), and the special Acts need not be uniform. Robitzsch v. State, 189 Ga. 637, 7 S.E.2d 387 (1940); Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14).

Section not preempted by Georgia Constitution.

- Georgia Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III), providing for removal of county officers for malpractice in office, does not preempt this section which prohibits use of county funds by county commissioners for purchases of goods or property in which the commissioners have an interest. Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga. App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14).

General Assembly had authority to effect a pro tanto repeal of the general law contained in this section, by making the provisions of this section inapplicable to the commissioners of a named county. Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14).

Not applicable to mere acceptance of order for payment.

- This section does not apply to an acceptance of an order for payment submitted by a materialman on a contract for the building of a road. Eatonton Oil & Auto Co. v. Greene County, 53 Ga. App. 145, 185 S.E. 296 (1936) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14).

Quo warranto is not the proper remedy for violation of this section. McDonough v. Bacon, 143 Ga. 283, 84 S.E. 588 (1915) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14).

Due process requirement for proceedings.

- Phrase "upon proper proceedings" used in subsection (b) implies that proceedings will be conducted in accordance with due process requirements, and it is not necessary to specify the exact procedure to be followed. Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga. App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982) (see O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14).

Commissioner's transfer of building, which benefitted county, did not require commissioner's removal.

- Trial court properly harmonized Ga. L. 1983, pp. 4594, 4603, § 14, the Local Act creating the Miller County Board of Commissioners, and O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14 to find that a commissioner's actions in transferring a building the commissioner owned to the county, which benefitted the county at no cost to taxpayers, did not require the commissioner's removal. Richardson v. Phillips, 309 Ga. App. 773, 711 S.E.2d 358 (2011).

Sufficiency of evidence for summary judgment.

- Evidence that the hauling fee paid to a county commissioner was the same as that which would have been paid to anyone else does not, on motion for summary judgment where all inferences are construed against the movant, satisfy the requirement that it shall clearly appear that the goods purchased were as cheap or cheaper than the goods could be bought elsewhere. Dalton Rock Prods. Co. v. Fannin County, 136 Ga. App. 649, 222 S.E.2d 93 (1975).

Claim for removal from office not rendered moot by the completion of the questioned transaction.

- Taxpayer's claims seeking the removal of a county commissioner from office for violation of conflict of interest laws, Ga. Laws 1983, pp. 4594, 4603, § 14, and O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14, had never been determined; nor were the issues moot, although the transaction leading to the claims had been completed. Therefore, a trial court erred in dismissing the claims as moot. Richardson v. Phillips, 302 Ga. App. 305, 690 S.E.2d 918 (2010).

Ordinance not preempted by statute.

- Miller County, Ga., Ordinance No. 10-01, § 3 could not be preempted by O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14 because § 3 did not impair the statute's operation but rather strengthened and augmented the statute; the exception in § 3 was more narrow than in O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14, requiring that a majority of the Board of Commissioners of Miller County approve the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods and the County had authority, as an incident of the county's home rule power, to amend Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594, § 14. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Callan, 290 Ga. 327, 720 S.E.2d 608 (2012).

Cited in Eatonton Oil & Auto Co. v. Greene County, 53 Ga. App. 145, 185 S.E. 296 (1936); Colonial Oil Co. v. United States Guarantee Co., 56 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ga. 1944).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Purchase of insurance from wife.

- County board of education may purchase insurance from the wife of a member of the board when there is no direct or indirect benefit gained by the member. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 158.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §§ 169 et seq., 184 et seq., 197, 375.

C.J.S.

- 67 C.J.S., Officers and Public Employees, §§ 244, 245.

ALR.

- Relation as creditor of contracting party as constituting interest within statute or rule of common law against public officer being interested in contract with the public, 73 A.L.R. 1352.

Relationship as disqualifying interest within statute making it unlawful for an officer to be interested in a public contract, 74 A.L.R. 792.

Public officer's relation to corporation as officer or stockholder as constituting interest within statute or rule of common law against public officer being interested in contract with public, 140 A.L.R. 344.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Richardson v. Phillips, 677 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 4, 2009 | 285 Ga. 385, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 1566

...Phillips transacted business with the County in violation of a local act which prohibits county officers from having a financial interest in any contract to which the County is a party, and which provides for their removal from office in accordance with the provisions of OCGA § 36-1-14....
...However, quo warranto is not a proper remedy for misconduct committed while in office. Belcher v. Harris, 228 Ga. 387, 389, 185 S.E.2d 771 (1971); Turner v. Wilburn, 206 Ga. 149, 152-153, 56 S.E.2d 285 (1949). Indeed, it has been specifically held that quo warranto is not a proper remedy for a violation of what is now OCGA § 36-1-14....
...tition. Moreover, even if he did properly get permission to file the petition, he has not challenged Ms. Phillips' qualifications to hold office, but has alleged that she committed misconduct while in office and should be removed in accord with OCGA § 36-1-14....
...'s jurisdiction, and thus transferred to Court of Appeals). See also Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga.App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982) (case directly appealed to Court of Appeals where taxpayers sued to remove county commissioner under prior version of OCGA § 36-1-14)....
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Bd. of Commissioners v. Callan, 290 Ga. 327 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 9, 2012 | 720 S.E.2d 608, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 70

...o consider proposed transactions, approve or disapprove them, and make findings of fact to be recorded in the Board’s minutes. The argument that section 3 affects an elective office in violation of subparagraph (c) (1) is particularly weak if OCGA § 36-1-14 still applies to Miller County, because that statute is quite similar to section 3. The trial court determined, and Appellees contend, that section 14 of the Local Act *331repealed OCGA § 36-1-14 pro tanto with respect to Miller County commissioners....
...I (c) (1). “[A]n action of a county governing authority could ‘affect’ an elective county office ... if that action negatively impacted on the ability of the elective county officer ... to perform the[ 3 job[ ]. [Cit.3” Stephenson v. Bd. of Commissioners of Cobb County, supra at 401-402 (4). Even if OCGA § 36-1-14 was repealed pro tanto and section 3 therefore had the effect of granting the commissioners a limited new authority to permit a commissioner to transact business with the County subject to certain standards and procedures, section 3 “doe...
...Gwinnett County, 279 Ga. 19 (1) (608 SE2d 639) (2005). See also *332Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 270 Ga. 272, 275 (2) (507 SE2d 460) (1998). The trial court decided, and Appellees argue, that section 3 of the Ordinance is preempted by OCGA §§ 36-1-14 and 16-10-6. (a) “ ‘Generally preemption is based on legislative intent.’ [Cit.]” City of Atlanta v. S.W.A.N. Consulting & Security Services, 274 Ga. 277, 279 (2) (553 SE2d 594) (2001). If, as the trial court ruled, the General Assembly repealed OCGA § 36-1-14 pro tanto with respect to Miller County commissioners, then the legislative intent that that statute not preempt Board action regarding a commissioner’s transaction of business with the County is clear. Indeed, in that case, it could not be said that provision for that subject matter “has been made by an existing general law .. . .” Ga.. Const, of 1983, Art. Ill, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a). On the other hand, if Richardson is correct and OCGA § 36-1-14 has not been repealed, then provision for the same subject matter of section 3 has been made by general law, and we must proceed to the second part of the uniformity clause providing “for an exception to the general rule of preemption wh...
...I (b). As for the matter of conflict with general law, “[w]e have concluded that there was no conflict when the local law did not impair the general law’s operation but rather augmented and strengthened it. [Cits.]” Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., supra. OCGA § 36-1-14 (a) prohibits counties from purchasing goods or property from any store in which a county officer has an interest unless sanctioned by a majority of the county governing authority or unless it is made clearly to appear that the goods or property is offered as cheaply as or cheaper than elsewhere....
...er that any agent of a firm which employs the officer or in which he has an interest is prohibited from selling to or purchasing from the County any property, goods or services. The exception in section 3 of the Ordinance is more narrow than in OCGA § 36-1-14, requiring that a majority of the Board approve the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods, services or property cannot be obtained *333for less and that the taxpayers’ interests would be served. Therefore, even assuming that OCGA § 36-1-14 remains applicable, section 3 of the Ordinance does not impair its operation but rather strengthens and augments it. Accordingly, section 3 could not be preempted by OCGA § 36-1-14. (b) OCGA § 16-10-6 has made provision for the same subject matter as section 3 of the Ordinance....