O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14 (2019)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article surveying

important general legal principles of municipal and county government purchasing and contracting in Georgia, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 371 (1965).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS By its terms this section is of general application. Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940). Section subject to qualification by special Act. - This section, so far as it refers to county commissioners, is subject to qualification by special Acts under Ga. Const. 1877, Art. XI, Sec. III, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I), and the special Acts need not be uniform. Robitzsch v. State, 189 Ga. 637, 7 S.E.2d 387 (1940); Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940). Section not preempted by Georgia Constitution. - Georgia Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III), providing for removal of county officers for malpractice in office, does not preempt this section which prohibits use of county funds by county commissioners for purchases of goods or property in which the commissioners have an interest. Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga. App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982). General Assembly had authority to effect a pro tanto repeal of the general law contained in this section, by making the provisions of this section inapplicable to the commissioners of a named county. Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940). Not applicable to mere acceptance of order for payment. - This section

does not apply to an acceptance of an order for payment submitted by a materialman on a contract for the building of a road. Eatonton Oil & Auto Co. v. Greene County, 53 Ga. App. 145, 185 S.E. 296 (1936). Quo warranto is not the proper remedy for violation of this section. McDonough v. Bacon, 143 Ga. 283, 84 S.E. 588 (1915). Due process requirement for proceedings. - Phrase ‘‘upon proper proceedings’’ used in subsection (b) implies that proceedings will be conducted in accordance with due process requirements, and it is not necessary to specify the exact procedure to be followed. Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga. App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982). Commissioner’s transfer of building, which benefitted county, did not require commissioner’s removal. - Trial court properly harmonized Ga. L. 1983, pp. 4594, 4603, § 14, the Local Act creating the Miller County Board of Commissioners, and O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14 to find that a commissioner’s actions in transferring a building the commissioner owned to the county, which benefitted the county at no cost to taxpayers, did not require the commissioner’s removal. Richardson v. Phillips, 309 Ga. App. 773, 711 S.E.2d 358 (2011). Sufficiency of evidence for summary judgment. - Evidence that the

hauling fee paid to a county commissioner was the same as that which would have been paid to anyone else does not, on motion for summary judgment where all inferences are construed against the movant, satisfy the requirement that it shall clearly appear that the goods purchased were as cheap or cheaper than the goods could be bought elsewhere. Dalton Rock Prods. Co. v. Fannin County, 136 Ga. App. 649, 222 S.E.2d 93 (1975). Claim for removal from office not rendered moot by the completion of the questioned transaction. - Taxpayer’s claims seeking the removal of a county commissioner from office for violation of conflict of interest laws, Ga. Laws 1983, pp. 4594, 4603, § 14, and O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14, had never been determined; nor were the issues moot, although the transaction leading to the claims had been completed. Therefore, a trial court erred in dismissing the claims as moot. Richard-

son v. Phillips, 302 Ga. App. 305, 690 S.E.2d 918 (2010). Ordinance not preempted by statute. - Miller County, Ga., Ordinance No. 10-01, § 3 could not be preempted by O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14 because § 3 did not impair the statute’s operation but rather strengthened and augmented the statute; the exception in § 3 was more narrow than in O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14, requiring that a majority of the Board of Commissioners of Miller County approve the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods and the County had authority, as an incident of the county’s home rule power, to amend Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594, § 14. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Callan, 290 Ga. 327, 720 S.E.2d 608 (2012). Cited in Eatonton Oil & Auto Co. v. Greene County, 53 Ga. App. 145, 185 S.E. 296 (1936); Colonial Oil Co. v. United States Guarantee Co., 56 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ga. 1944).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Purchase of insurance from wife. - County board of education may purchase insurance from the wife of a member of

the board when there is no direct or indirect benefit gained by the member. 1960-61 Op. Att’y Gen. p. 158.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §§ 169 et seq., 181 et seq., 194, 371. C.J.S. - 67 C.J.S., Officers and Public Employees, §§ 347, 348, 349. ALR. - Relation as creditor of contracting party as constituting interest within statute or rule of common law against public officer being interested in contract with the public, 73 A.L.R. 1352.

Relationship as disqualifying interest within statute making it unlawful for an officer to be interested in a public contract, 74 A.L.R. 792. Public officer’s relation to corporation as officer or stockholder as constituting interest within statute or rule of common law against public officer being interested in contract with public, 140 A.L.R. 344.